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JOHN LOSCERBO

Being and Technology

A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	IX
<i>Abbreviations</i>	XI
PART ONE: PREPARATION FOR THE QUESTION CONCERNING MODERN TECHNOLOGY	
I. Beginnings: <i>Τέχνη</i> and the Origin of Modern Technology	1
A. The Primordial Notion of <i>Φύσις</i>	3
B. <i>Φύσις</i> and <i>Λόγος</i> (Heraclitus and Parmenides)	4
1. Heraclitus and the <i>Λόγος</i>	10
2. Parmenides	13
C. The Notion of <i>Τέχνη</i> (Sophocles' Chorus)	16
1. Stage One	17
2. Stage Two	19
3. Stage Three	20
D. The Notion of <i>Τέχνη</i> as Responsive "Wissen"	21
II. The Platonic <i>Ἰδέα</i> and <i>Ἰδέιν</i>	43
A. The Platonic <i>Ἰδέα</i> : "Affinity" and "Distance"	44
B. A More Appropriate Interpretation of the Relationship <i>Ἰδέα-Ἰδέιν</i>	49
C. The "Primacy of Beings" ("Vorrang des Seienden")	50
III. Descartes: The "Beginning" of Modern Technology	59
A. The Notion of "Reality"	59
B. The Second Determination of the Notion of Reality	62
C. The Cartesian Task	62
1. Preliminary	62
2. The Execution of the Task	66

IV.	Nietzsche and the “Consummation” of Metaphysics	77
A.	First Approximation to the Notion of the Will to Power	79
B.	The Will to Power as the Most Radical Subjectivity	81
C.	The Will to Power and the Eternal Return of the Same	86
D.	The “Consummation” and the “End” of Metaphysics	89

PART TWO: FIRST APPROACH TOWARD THE QUESTION OF THE ESSENCE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY 97

I.	Remarks concerning Some Earlier Texts	101
A.	A Text from <i>Nietzsche II</i> (pp. 20–29)	101
B.	“Seinsverlassenheit und Irrnis”	106
II.	Texts from “Wozu Dichter”	115
A.	The Will (der Wille) and Human Willing (Wollen)	116
B.	Human Willing	118
C.	The “Danger” and the “Turn”	120
III.	The Essay “Die Frage nach der Technik”	129
A.	“Technology Is Not Identical with the Essence of Technology”	129
B.	The “Correct” Notion of Technology and the Analysis of Causality (<i>Tέχνη</i>)	131
C.	Modern Technology as a Manner of “Revealing”	136
D.	The Notion of “Unconcealment”, Especially the Thesis that the Unconcealment of Beings Implies the Concealment of Being	141
E.	The Notion of Ge-stell	145

PART THREE: SECOND APPROACH TOWARD THE QUESTION OF THE ESSENCE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY 155

I.	The Notion of <i>Geschick</i>	157
A.	The Truth-Untruth Structure	159
1.	Sein und Zeit: Dasein’s Openness	159
a.	Attunement	160

b.	Primary Understanding	163
c.	Rede	165
d.	Fallenness	166
e.	Being-toward-Death and Resolute Openness (Entschlossenheit)	168
2.	VWW and the Notion of Truth	183
a.	The Inner Possibility of Accordance	183
b.	The Ground of the Possibility of “Richtigkeit” (section 3)	186
c.	The Essence of Dasein’s Opening (Freiheit)	187
d.	The Essence of Truth (section 5)	192
e.	Untruth as Concealment	194
f.	Untruth as Errancy	197
3.	Truth-Untruth according to “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”	198
B.	The Self-Revealing Self-Concealing of Being Itself	202
1.	“Die Seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus”	204
a.	The Determination of Nihilism or Meta- physics	204
b.	The “Remaining Aloof” of Being Itself	206
c.	“Inauthentic Nihilism”	208
2.	The Principle of the Ground and Being’s Self-Sending	209
a.	The First Formulation	209
b.	The Second Formulation	211
C.	Conclusion: A Note on the Time of Being	213
II.	Being’s Self-Sending, the Danger, and the Saving	239
A.	Being’s Self-Sending and the Danger (“Die Frage nach der Technik,” pp. 24ff)	240
B.	Being’s Self-Sending and the Saving	242
C.	The Notion of Essence (Wesen)	244
III.	Technology and Ereignis	249
A.	Preliminary	249
B.	Technology and Ereignis according to “Die Kehre”	253
C.	Technology and Ereignis according to “Der Satz der Identität”	258
	<i>Bibliography</i>	271
	<i>Index</i>	279

PREFACE

The present writing attempts a clarification of the question bearing on technology and of its “Essence” in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger. In view of this, our initial task will consist in examining the origins of modern technology, which Heidegger describes in the primordial “experience” of Being as *φύσις*, together with the human manners of comportment to this the primordial manifestness of Being. We will begin in Part One by attending primarily, but not exclusively, to the subjective dimension, allowing thereby the manner of the historical “progression” of Being, that is, its transforming self-showing, to stand in the background. This procedure seems to us not merely appropriate with respect to our purpose as a whole, but moreover corresponds to the matter at issue, for Being in its own progression is essentially self-concealing, which in turn brings to prominence the “subjective” in union with the varied modes of the “Being of beings”, termed “beingness”. In conformity with Heidegger’s interpretation of “Metaphysics”, there can be but little doubt that Being itself persists throughout in presence only as absence. Thus, we will trace out this manner of Being’s presence in absence and the respective dominating human manners of relatedness to Being’s beingness, that is, we must observe the transformation of original *νοεῖν* (or *λέγειν, τέχνη*), into Platonic *ιδεῖν* (*Ἰδέεα*). But Platonic *ιδεῖν*, in its ambiguity, only sets the stage for the oncoming of metaphysical “Vorstellen”, in which we will detect the fundamental features of the prevailing technological *Tun*, called “Her-stellen” (in “Wozu Dichter”) or more characteristically “Bestellen”. Modern technology, as distinguished from the “Essence” of technology, must first be exposed “metaphysically”, that is, in terms of human, technological “ordering” of Nature (Part Two).

However, this will give rise to the question of whether this way of interrogation which accents the “metaphysical” – that is, the subjective aspect and its “product” – is at all adequate. Is modern Technology simply an affair of man, perhaps the unbridled exercise of human “free” choice; or is this anthropological dimension already and unwittingly a “response” to Being’s way to be? Does the “measure” (“Maß”) reside in that which is “without measure” (viz. technology viewed subjectively) or is it, as Heidegger’s essay “Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung” suggests, the “measure” which must be placed before that which heeds no measure? To be sure, Heidegger opts for the latter alternative in his attempt to “recover” (“verwinden”) tradition – a tradition which purports to have mastered its life-source. Hence, we must explore more closely this “measure”, namely, Being itself in its own historical “Entwerfen”, that is, in its own Self-Sending (Being as “Geschick”) (Part Three). This will lead us to the point of passing-over, to the possible initiation of what Heidegger calls “Ereignis”.

The work has no pretense to “criticize” in the sense of “refuting” – which task we leave to those more able. We owe gratitude to J. Taminiaux, Professor at the University of Louvain and Director of the “Centre d’Etudes Phénoménologiques”, for his encouragement and advice.

ABBREVIATIONS

SZ	Sein und Zeit
VWG	Vom Wesen des Grundes
KM	Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik
WM	Was ist Metaphysik?
VWW	Vom Wesen der Wahrheit
EM	Einführung in die Metaphysik
FD	Die Frage nach dem Ding
SA	Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit
EHD	Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung
N I	Nietzsche, Erster Band
N II	Nietzsche, Zweiter Band
HW	Holzwege
PL	Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit
BH	Brief über den Humanismus
G	Gelassenheit
WHD	Was Heißt Denken
VA I	Vorträge und Aufsätze, Teil 1
VA II	Vorträge und Aufsätze, Teil 2
VA III	Vorträge und Aufsätze, Teil 3
SVG	Der Satz vom Grund

xii

US	Unterwegs zur Sprache
SF	Zur Seinsfrage
ID	Identität und Differenz
SD	Zur Sache des Denkens
GA	Gesamtausgabe

PART ONE

**PREPARATION FOR THE QUESTION CONCERNING
MODERN TECHNOLOGY**

CHAPTER I

BEGINNINGS: ΤΕΧΝΗ AND THE ORIGIN OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY

In opposition to the more current view regarding the historical reciprocity between the rise of modern science and that of modern technology,¹ Martin Heidegger holds that the latter has its essential origin in Greek τέχνη.

For it (i.e. technology) goes back to the τέχνη of the Greeks not merely in name, but originates essential-historically out of τέχνη as a mode of ἀληθεύειν ...²

Hence, at the very outset some acquaintance with Heidegger's τέχνη-interpretation is necessary. But even this requires considerable groundwork, for a sufficient grasp of Heidegger's interpretation of τέχνη presupposes a thorough familiarity with the primordial notion of Being as φύσις to which τέχνη is responsive. Moreover, a reading of pertinent texts³ reveals two versions of τέχνη, one of which is more primordial and a second which is somewhat derivatory. Regarding the texts in which the earlier version of τέχνη is discussed, we will examine a few pages from EM; more precisely, we will consider Heidegger's reading of the first chorus of Sophocles' *Antigone*. This key text, however, forms part of a whole which we should first clarify. It may be recalled that the interpretation of the Chorus serves the purpose of elucidating the original bond of Being (φύσις) and λόγος, and it is in this connection that Heidegger interprets the saying of Parmenides in regard to the sameness of "Being" and "apprehending" (νοεῖν).⁴ In the Chorus, the original unity of φύσις-λόγος is mirrored in the guise of the δίκη-τέχνη relation. Thus, we must make the attempt to bring to light Heidegger's fundamental interpretation of φύσις and λόγος, i.e. the original unity of φύσις-λόγος. The intent of such a consideration will be twofold: it will serve as introductory to Heidegger's interpretation of the first

Chorus itself and thus in view of understanding the *τέχνη*-interpretation; but secondly and more essentially as an appropriate preliminary stage to the Heideggerian interpretation of the History of Western thought, which interpretation is no less than decisive for the question bearing on modern technology in its “essence”.

A. THE PRIMORDIAL NOTION OF ΦΥΣΙΣ

On Heidegger’s view “Nature” reveals itself today as the “bestellter Bestand” for and through the workings of modern technology, which, as we will show, is radically at variance with the original experience of *φύσις*. Heidegger’s most detailed (to date) consideration of the primordial, that is, pre-Platonic, notion of *φύσις* may be found in EM.⁵

To be underlined in the first place is the all-encompassing scope of primordial *φύσις*. Accordingly, the meaning of original *φύσις* is not to be confined to any being (Seiendes) in particular, nor to any single region of beings. Rather, primordial *φύσις* refers to the “totality of beings” (“All des Seienden”),⁶ to “beings as a whole”⁷ – which expressions are clearly distinguished in WM – or even to “Being itself”.⁸ In EM, for example, this comprehensive character of *φύσις* is brought to expression in the following manner:

φύσις signifies ... primordially the heaven as well as the earth, rocks as well as plants, animals as well as man, the history of man as well as the works of men and gods, lastly and in the first place the gods themselves subjected to fate.⁹

However, this should not suggest that *φύσις* is simply the amalgamation of everything under the sun; hence, the sum total of “reality”. Rather, the all-inclusive character of primordial *φύσις* is emphasized in order to prevent confusion with a subsequent and more contracted notion of *φύσις* in line with which the latter would enclose one particular arena, viz., the “physical”, as set over against another, viz., the “psychical” (or “spiritual”). Primordially, contends Heidegger, the physical as well as the psychical belong to *φύσις*.

But what more characterizes Greek *φύσις* – this most primordial manifestation of Being? Heidegger's further elaboration takes account of the somewhat precarious etymology¹⁰ of the term. The substantive *φύσις* belongs to the infinitive *φύειν* which, as Heidegger insists, means "to grow".¹¹ And yet, "to grow" ("growth") is not to be construed in a modern biological sense; to grow signifies neither a quantitative increase in matter, nor a sort of development, nor even a "becoming" ("Werden"), but rather refers to a self-emerging or self-emergence.¹² The *φύσις* of a particular being (e.g. the blossoming of a flower) or of beings in general signifies primarily a process of emerging which originates from and out of itself. Why does Heidegger insist on this character of *φύσις*?

By this means Heidegger intends to undercut the cause-effect schema whose influence has been overwhelming in traditional Metaphysics. From a more original perspective, *φύσις* may neither be thought of as an "effect" (a "Bewirktes" in Heidegger's language) nor as something which effects after the fashion of a "cause". With regard to primordial *φύσις* it is never a question of an emerging or coming to appearance as the result of having been caused. Rather, if we may so express the matter, self-emerging in the manner of *φύσις*, is self-caused,¹³ i.e. a self-rising.

But there is a second reason for which Heidegger lays emphasis on and persistently returns to the notion of *φύσις* as self-emerging – a reason which is closely associated with one of the fundamental intentions of the Heideggerian Philosophy in general. The intention to which we allude is that of "recovering" a tradition held spellbound by a subjectivistic point of view. It is reported repeatedly that by the expression "Philosophy of Subjectivity" is meant a Philosophy revolving around the "person" as the knowing "subject", around the pivotal point called consciousness or self-consciousness. And this manner of defining the sense of "subjectivity" is not foreign to numerous Heideggerian passages, but nonetheless overlooks the more essential meaning of Subjectivity.¹⁴ From a Heideggerian standpoint, a philosophy of subjectivity is one which pretends that "Being" is the result ensuing from the subjective activity called "thinking" in the sense of "Vorstellen" or acting, that is, manipulating, in the way of "Bestellen".¹⁵ Thus, on this view "Being" would end up to be the mere product of the subjective dimension.

How is this possible, however, if *φύσις* (that is, primordial Being or presencing) is self-activity, self-emerging? How could a Philosophy of Subjectivity prevail if Being is, as Heidegger unflaggingly states, a “self-revealing” (“Sich Entbergen”) which, at once, tends of itself toward its own “self-concealing” (“Sich Verbergen”)? With the determination of *φύσις* as self-emerging, we are given a presentiment of the first and indispensable ingredient of Heidegger’s confrontation with traditional Metaphysics from which primordial Being never completely vanishes – a confrontation whose highlights will be brought to the fore.

Concerning the feature of self-emerging, which serves to accent the creativeness of primordial *φύσις*,¹⁶ we notice synonymous expressions such as “Walten” and “Sich Entfalten”. Doubtless, and in line with what was said above regarding Subjectivity, these notions want to suggest the pre-sway of Being (as *φύσις*) vis-à-vis the human element, however this latter may be designated (*νοεῖν, λέγειν, τέχνη*). As a creative happening, *φύσις* is the most sublime instance of *ποίησις*, a term which Heidegger usually¹⁷ renders with the word “Hervorbringen”. *Φύσις* brings itself forth from there to here (“her”);¹⁸ in point of fact, *φύσις* is itself *ποίησις* in the most elevated sense, precisely in virtue of having its source in itself.¹⁹ The expression “im höchsten Sinne” is not only not an exaggeration as far as Heidegger is concerned: it is rather an understatement, that is, the character of *φύσις* is solely and uniquely the self-emerging.

But at this point a question urges itself: whence does the self-emerging rise forth, a question whose answer has apparently already been furnished. *Φύσις* emerges *from itself*, *φύσις* brings itself forth. However, both these expressions tell us about the how of this process, not about the “origin” of the self-unfolding of *φύσις*.

Heidegger’s response is significant not merely with respect to his *φύσις*-interpretation, but just as well regarding his persistent efforts to think Being itself. *Φύσις* issues forth out of “concealedness” (“Verborgenheit”).²⁰ We also read that *φύσις* “lets” (presumably something) “issue forth out of concealedness” (“aus der Verborgenheit heraustreten”, EM p. 77). Taken in unison, these two assertions may appear inconsistent with each other. On the one hand, *φύσις* emerges of itself out of

“concealedness”, and on the other, “lets” (beings) step out of concealedness. But in this regard, we should remain mindful of the fact that *φύσις* does not happen as if it held itself in isolation from beings. *Φύσις*, that is, the character of self-emerging of previously concealed beings, issues forth indeed out of concealedness and in so doing “lets” beings, of which it is the fundamental feature, come out into the open.²¹ In other words, what speaks here is a unity despite the difference between the essential characteristic or process (*φύσις*) and individual beings. The concomitant “unconcealment” of beings, which is in EM called the “truth” of *φύσις*, belongs then in the strictest relationship to *φύσις* itself. *Φύσις* is itself the self-unconcealing.

A further feature of primal *φύσις*, which may be called no less than fateful and which, with more patent reference to “history”, reformulates the above-stated, makes itself manifest in the crucial term “Erscheinen”. The rising up of *φύσις*, as it were, implies at the same time its coming to appearance, its appearing. Heidegger describes *φύσις* as a “self-emerging appearing” (“aufgehendes Erscheinen”).²²

In this respect, we notice two points, the one relevant to traditional “Metaphysics”, while the second concerns, more specifically, Heidegger’s own determination of Being. Firstly, in the way *φύσις* is, that is, as self-emerging appearing, lies latent the possibility – indeed the necessity – that Being (as *φύσις*) is subsequently interpreted as *ιδέα*. On Heidegger’s view, it is undeniable that the interpretation of Being (“beingness” is already more appropriate) as *ιδέα* follows from the original experience of Being as *φύσις*. The text from EM is well known in which Heidegger affirms that the interpretation of Being as *ιδέα* “is a necessary consequence following from the essence of Being as self-emerging shining”.²³ That may be stated even more strikingly and in a manner that accords profoundly, we believe, with Heidegger’s interpretation of traditional Metaphysics: the latter, from the Platonic interpretation of *ιδέα* to the Gestell of modern technology, is rooted in the manner of Being’s appearing, an appearing which has the tendency (as Heraclitus well knew) of “keeping to itself” (“An sich Halten”). As will become clear in the course of the present writing, this expresses the fundamental “Vor-habe” of the Heideggerian interpretation of Metaphysics.

The second point pertains to the relation between “Erscheinen” and “Scheinen” which Heidegger briefly works out in section 2 of chapter 4 of EM.²⁴ With regard to its uses in German, the following three are noted: shining in the sense of “glanzig” or “glowing”; shining in the sense of appearing (“Erscheinen”); and lastly shining in the sense of “mere shine” (“bloßer Schein”) or as “semblance” (“Anschein”).²⁵ What is essential with regard to Heidegger’s question about the meaning of Being is the connectedness among these three significations and what is implied by this connectedness.

Heidegger insists that “appearing”, which is a “Sichzeigen” (EM, p. 76), provides the ground of the possibility for shine in the sense of “glowing” *and* in the sense of “semblance”. As Heidegger puts it: “the essence of shining resides in appearing.”²⁶ And he is certainly adverting to shining in the first and third sense enumerated above, for in the second sense “shine” is identical with the self-showing, with “appearing”. But why dwell on the matter after having remarked the terminology – what does it mean that the essence of shining resides in “Erscheinen”?²⁷ The critical point is obvious: Being as appearing is the source of “semblance” (Scheinen in sense #3). How could something “seem” such as to be mistaken for what it is not, if Being had not, already in advance as it were, shown itself? Is not Being as appearing, as the ground of shine,²⁸ the source of human deception, illusion or disguise in all its modes? This is precisely the consequence Heidegger himself draws:

It must now be clear, to Being itself as appearing belongs shine . . . shine not only disguises beings of which it is the shine, but it thereby covers itself up as shine, insofar as it shows itself as Being. And since shine in this manner disguises itself so essentially in covering up and in dissimulation, we assert with justification: shine deceives.²⁹

This fundamental thesis is expressed, though differently, throughout the Heideggerian Philosophy and is crucial to his determination of Being: self-concealing belongs, as an essential feature, to Being itself, and is not primarily imputable to thought. Otherwise, the following would ensue: thought, human thinking, as the “reason” for Being’s self-concealment (Being’s

“Oblivion”, *λήθη*), would determine Being – that is, if concealment is a fundamental feature of Being as Being. And if this is true, then we are entangled irremediably in a Philosophy of Subjectivity.³⁰

The final feature of *φύσις* which deserves mention is its manner of “Verweilen”.³¹ So much is already evident on the basis of what we have already said. For what emerges of itself so as to come to appearance, must also persist as lingering. But how does *φύσις* linger and does this lingering, constitutive for its “constancy” (“Beständigkeit”), conflict with another essential characteristic of *φύσις*, namely the latter’s “return” (self-return), this is, its tendency toward concealment? How long would *φύσις* have to persist in a way of appearing before it could be said to linger?

Underlying such questions is the misunderstanding that *φύσις*, as self-concealing, as a self-returning to itself, could no longer be said to linger. However, precisely the opposite must be brought to light: self-concealment is its ownmost manner of lingering. It is as “keeping to itself” that *φύσις* appears, and indeed, all the more poignantly.³² As Heidegger confirms in “Von Wesen und Begriff der *φύσις*”: “*φύσις* is *ἀλήθεια*, revealment and for that reason *κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ*.”³³

Regarding Heidegger’s own working-out of the meaning of Being, this term “lingering” is of utmost importance. What in EM is called the lingering of *φύσις*, and which in one passage translates *οὐσία* (p. 48),³⁴ is subsequently (and more frequently) referred to as “Seiendheit”, a term whose sense is by no means easy to grasp. Provisionally, we allow ourselves the following interpretation which will find its vindication in the sequel of this work. Within the context of traditional Metaphysics, “beingness” is Being’s manner of lingering, Being’s manner of “enduring” (“Währen”) – which always for Heidegger implies a “Gewähren”, an according or granting – in various modes, – as *ἰδέα*, as *ἐνέργεια*, as actualitas, extending to Being’s appearing (as beingness) as “Ge-stell”. What Heidegger terms the lingering of *φύσις* is the historical “permanence” (“Ständigkeit”) of Being – of Being, however, which tends to conceal itself; that is, which *appears not as itself but in the modus of beingness*. Again we note that such concealment is not the refusal to linger, but on the contrary Being’s manner of “giving” itself while keeping to

itself.³⁵ If this initial interpretation is tenable, then a study of Heidegger's interpretation of *φύσις* seems to be a most appropriate introduction to his questioning about the meaning of Being (at least very appropriate with regard to his "later" manner of questioning), for already in *φύσις* the fundamental traits of Being as "Geschick"³⁶ as well as of "Ereignis" are clearly perspicuous.

B. ΦΥΣΙΣ AND ΛΟΓΟΣ (HERACLITUS AND PARMENIDES)

Having acquired some familiarity with Heidegger's interpretation of *φύσις*, which is most basic, it seems appropriate to present his interpretation of the *λόγος*,³⁷ for the discussion of the mutual relationship of *δίκη-τέχνη* of the Chorus of Sophocles' *Antigone* is designed to uncover the initial bond between *φύσις-λόγος*. In general, it may be said that Heidegger's later *λόγος*-interpretation (from the year 1936 onward) comprises two stages: a first, which consists in an etymological *Hinweis*, especially concerning the original meaning of the term *λέγειν*, and a second in which the pertinent pre-Platonic fragments are interpreted, namely, those of Heraclitus and Parmenides.

1. Heraclitus and the Λόγος

Heidegger's view respecting the most original signification of *λέγειν* is well known. Admitting readily that at the time of Heraclitus *λέγειν* signified "to speak" or "to say", Heidegger nonetheless points out that *λέγειν*, more essentially, is to be understood as a sort of bringing together, collecting or gathering.³⁸ In writings subsequent to EM, notably in the "Logos" article (1944) and in WHD, the German word "legen" is frequently employed to designate the original meaning of *λέγειν*, a laying or "letting-lie-before" of that which already of itself lies before (Das Vorliegende or *λόγος*, or the "primordial Gathering").³⁹ This, stresses Heidegger, is the most basic meaning of *λέγειν* – not "to speak" or "to say",⁴⁰ and accordingly should be suggestive of the original meaning of *λόγος*.

However, it would be utterly mistaken to believe that Heidegger, in these matters or in any respect, bases himself solely

on etymology.⁴¹ At the most, the latter merely serves to corroborate what is *already had* – to use an expression from SZ (das “Vorhabe” in general). At the time of his later *λόγος*-interpretation, which is initially explicated in EM, Heidegger had already thought the marked contrast between Greek thought and that exhibited by Modernity (the former’s transformation), that is, he is convinced that a subjectivistic standpoint is unequivocally foreign to the Greeks. As concisely reported in *Vier Seminare*, there are no “objects” as far as Greek thought is concerned, but rather that which of itself presences.⁴² Add to this the thesis, central to EM, that primordial *λόγος* must be in close kinship with original *φύσις* (for both express original manifestations of Being), and Heidegger’s reading of the Heraclitean fragments, as attested in EM and in later writings, is set in its proper light. It is to this reading that we must now turn our attention.⁴³

Concerning the meaning of the *λόγος*, Heidegger begins his interpretation with two texts, namely, fragments 1 and 2 of Heraclitus.⁴⁴ Despite all the caviling over Heidegger’s interpretation of Greek Philosophy in general, his Heraclitus-interpretation seems in harmony with the most notable of scholarship. For who, with the exception of John Burnet, would construe the *λόγος* as expressed in fragments 1 and 2 as the “word” of man, or the discourse of Heraclitus himself.⁴⁵ However, Heidegger’s cardinal point is not merely that the *λόγος* here signifies the very “same” (“*dasselbe*”) as *φύσις* – in its own manner.⁴⁶ Accordingly, Heidegger emphasizes the notion of “permanence” which is a fundamental feature of *φύσις* and which is intimated in the first line of fragment 1 in the word *ἀεί*. In the best of philological circles, it remains a moot question whether the word *ἀεί* qualifies *ἔοντος* (i.e. the *λόγος* being *ἀεί*) or *ἀξύνετοι*,⁴⁷ but nonetheless general agreement prevails concerning the “eternity” of the *λόγος*, or as Heidegger speaks, concerning its “permanence”. Secondly, with regard to fragments 1 and 2, Heidegger stresses the notion of “Zusammen”, *ξυνός* – more currently rendered with “das Gemeinsame”, the “common”, understood in the sense of a sort of primitive “universal”. “(*λόγος*) presences as the together in beings, the together of beings – the gathering.”⁴⁸

On Heidegger’s view, the *λόγος* is precisely not what is

“common” if by “common” is meant: “for everyone”.⁴⁹ Quite to the contrary, as fragment 1 (and others) makes plain, the *λόγος* is “commonly” bypassed. And then too, if one thinks of the traditional interpretation of the “common” as the “indifferent” “universal”, one discerns all the more pointedly why Heidegger avoids using this term – which is however not to gainsay (even on Heidegger’s interpretation) that the *λόγος* is, in a sense, common to what is. For Heraclitus, what is is essentially in opposition, which opposition is fundamentally a “harmony” in virtue of (or as) the *λόγος*, the latter’s bringing-together of apparently conflicting elements.

A third remark pertains to the expression *κατὰ φύσιν* (fragment 1) which, says Heidegger, says the same as the opening words of the second sentence. Everything that happens, that is, all *πόλεμος*, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, happens according to the *λόγος*,⁵⁰ in accord with *φύσις*. From an Heideggerian viewpoint this wants to accent two fundamental points: (1) that everything happens in relation to the prior pre-sway of *φύσις* or *λόγος* and that (2) the *λόγος* as primordial and permanent self-gatheredness which gathers rules throughout beings in their seeming opposition. Indeed, it is palpable that “conflict” or “opposition” in Heraclitus is apparent (secondary), that is, deceptive, especially for those (*οἱ πολλοί*) who remain oblivious⁵¹ to the *λόγος*, that is, for those who fail to “see” that “what is in opposition” is, from another perspective which is able to transcend the immediacy of the given “particulars”, a harmony” (cf. fragment 8). From the stance of the “many”, about which Heidegger senses as much as Heraclitus,⁵² opposition is opposition, conflict conflict. But seen from the point of view of the whole (which is distinctive of Heraclitus’ manner of seeing), opposition *as* opposition is at most “apparent”, that is, less essential – but precisely for this reason, that in which the *οἱ πολλοί* are most “at home”. Stated as concisely as possible, the gathering of the in-itself already self-gathered (the *λέγειν* of the *λόγος*) “maintains in a harmonious Belonging-together that which strives apart and yet toward each other”,⁵³ a manner of expression which reminds us of Heidegger’s notion of “Austrag”, that which in holding apart, keeps separate, but at the same time unifies.

But how does Heidegger endeavor to show that *λόγος* (*λέγειν*) in fragments 1 and 2 does not mean “word” or “discourse”? After all, it seems undeniable that fragment 1 speaks of “having heard” the *λόγος*. And what about the frequently quoted fragment 50: “If you have heard not me, but the *λόγος*, then it is wise to say accordingly: all is one” – which clearly suggests a connection between *λόγος* and being heard.⁵⁴ Heidegger is hardly set on denying that the *λόγος* is that which may be heard; in fact, he tends himself to underscore the word “Hören” (*ἀκουεῖν*). But as far as fragment 1 is concerned, “to hear” is not to be construed in its ordinary sense, just as little as *λόγος* is meant in its more everyday meaning, in the sense of language, word, or discourse. We notice that the second sentence (of the Greek fragment 1) mentions “words” (*ἐπέιον*): even though men have heard (*πειράω*)⁵⁵ words,⁵⁶ they are nonetheless unable to hear, that is, to “follow” (*ἔπεσθαι*)⁵⁷ the *λόγος* as fragment 2 asserts. Thus, Heidegger rightly distinguishes between the mere hearing of words and the hearing of the *λόγος* and, accordingly, fragment 50 signifies something quite counter to what may impose itself upon us at first sight. Indeed, the *λόγος* is to be “heard”, but not in the sense of mere acoustical receptivity.⁵⁸ We observe, moreover, in Heidegger’s sense, the first sentence of fragment 34: *ἄξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφῶσιν εἰκόασι*, “those hearing axynetoī seem like deaf ones”. As Cleve points out⁵⁹ (and Heidegger, EM, p. 98),⁶⁰ *ἄξύνετοι* – a word employed in fragment 1 – alludes to the *λόγος*, to the *ξυνός* (fragments 2, 80, 103, 114). Thus, *ἄξύνετοι* refers to a hearing without the *λόγος*, that is, a hearing which has not in fact attended to the *λόγος*. Surely this offers some justification for the distinction “mere hearing” (here the hearing without *ξυνός*, the *λόγος*) and the hearing which we are enjoined to take up.

2. Parmenides

Still in search of testimony of the primal unity of *φύσις* and *λόγος* as the ground for their subsequent separation, Heidegger encounters Parmenides. In the Parmenidean fragments, Heidegger detects not only the unity of *φύσις-λόγος*, but the clearest evidence⁶¹ of the duplicity of the *λόγος*, that is, the *λόγος* as self-gatheredness *and* as human *λόγος* (*λέγειν*).⁶² It is this duplicity

which is the most proximate source of the later, traditional interpretation of *λόγος* as “statement” or as “assertion” (*λέγειν τὶ κατὰ τινος*). But a question – given the traditional interpretation of Parmenides⁶³ – may be put: where does Parmenides speak of *λόγος* and what is the meaning of this speech?

In taking up this issue, Heidegger points first to the Parmenidean fragment 3:⁶⁴ *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι*. How is it that *νοεῖν* as well as *εἶναι* are *τὸ αὐτὸ*? As far as the term *εἶναι* is concerned, Heidegger merely states that the prior *φύσις*-interpretation suffices, that is, *εἶναι* is to be understood out of *φύσις* as self-emerging coming to appearance. More bothersome, however, is the word *νοεῖν* usually rendered as “to think” (“thought”), the latter being construed fundamentally as “conceptualization”, as “mental” “representation” carried out by the knowing subject. But this is all too contracted, that is, much too derivatory, a sense in order to characterize primordial *νοεῖν*, for the latter is to be appropriately grasped as a primal mode of relatedness. Heidegger, almost invariably, from the time of EM onward, translates Greek *νοεῖν* with “Vernehmen” (“to apprehend”)⁶⁵ which, however, should not suggest that everyday perception of “objects”. Rather, *νοεῖν* as apprehending connotes a certain receptive welcoming⁶⁶ which “brings to stand” – not in the sense of “objectifying”, but in the sense of acknowledging⁶⁷ the already unconcealed as unconcealed.⁶⁸ In the context of Heidegger’s interpretation of tradition, this initial interpretation of “thought” as Vernehmen is unusually significant, for it (together with human *λέγειν*) is the progenitor, via Platonic *ιδεῖν*, of the “metaphysical” “Vorstellen”. As Heidegger states succinctly in “Was Heißt Denken”: “Apprehending unfolds itself in representational thought”⁶⁹ – an evolution which we will witness throughout Part One of the present writing.

But what does *τὸ αὐτὸ* mean? Is this to say that *εἶναι* and apprehending are the same in the sense of being blankly identical with each other; which would certainly be a curious state of affairs. Indeed, it may be said that Heidegger understands *τὸ αὐτὸ* as “sameness” but this in the sense of a “belonging-together” of “distinct” (“Verschieden”) items. Moreover, such items which are the “same” (“dasselbe” in contrast to “das Gleiche”),⁷⁰ that

is, which belong-together, concern one another. This is not an “indifferent” unity, but as Heidegger writes: “Einheit ist Zusammengehörigkeit des Gegenstrebigen.”⁷¹ Admittedly, this strikes the ear harshly, especially after the description of *νοεῖν* in terms of taking-up in the sense of welcoming. But this is only because the term “gegenstrebig” is ineptly, that is, one-sidedly, understood in the sense of “antagonistic”, “conflicting”, and the like. Surely, Heidegger would not characterize *νοεῖν* as “for the sake of Being”, as a “taking-up” (“Aufnehmen”) and then in the very same context mean to say that *νοεῖν* is somehow opposed to *εἶναι*. As we will point out in the sequel the term “gegen” in “gegenstrebig”⁷² indicates, most essentially, a movement toward rather than “in opposition to” or “against” – which, however, does not intend to exclude the latter sense. Thus, we interpret the above passage: “the unity of the Belonging-together of that which, persisting in apparent opposition, tends toward one another.”⁷³

In what may be called a still later Parmenides-interpretation, the sense of “das Selbe” (*τὸ αὐτὸ*) is understood in a more radical sense, that is, as that wherein the items in question belong-together; that is, as primordial recovering Being as the unifying and separating “principle” (call it “Austrag”, “Differenz” or “Ereignis”)⁷⁴ of tradition in general. This interpretation is already clearly suggested in “Moira” (1954) where Heidegger points out that *τὸ αὐτὸ* is to be regarded as the grammatical “subject” of fragment 3. In consequence, writes Heidegger, “. . . ἐστίν, is, signifies; to presence, to endure and indeed in the sense of according out of that which accords, as which *τὸ αὐτὸ*, the same, holds sway . . .”⁷⁵ Indisputably, *τὸ αὐτὸ* is used synonymously with “das Gewährende”, that is, with Being, as that which “accords itself” and as such “endures”.⁷⁶

At this stage, however, of especial importance to us is Heidegger’s interpretation of fragment 6: *χρῆ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι*. Clearly *λέγειν* and *νοεῖν* are mentioned together, and clearly *λέγειν* precedes *νοεῖν*.⁷⁷ But *λέγειν* here in this Parmenidean fragment cannot refer to *λόγος* in its primary sense – in the sense of self-gatheredness (Gesammeltheit) as the “Fug” of beings. Rather, *λέγειν* here refers to human *λέγειν*, to human gathering, which together with *νοεῖν* is necessary for the pre-

servation of Being.⁷⁸ However, human gathering itself is of a twofold character – that is, human gathering is first a self-gathering (Sich Sammeln)⁷⁹ toward Being (φύσις, λόγος), which then, as it were, transfers in transforming (“versetzen”) man into his proper “essence”⁸⁰ – as the “Sammler”. Only man as self-gathered is able to gather (to let lie before) that which is *of itself* gathered but which tends to conceal itself. Hence, λέγειν as human gathering (“Sammlung”) has the character of holding open, of revealing, of δηλοῦν⁸¹ – and for this “Gewalt” is possibly called for; not an unbridled “violence”, but rather a “gathering” of “Das Waltende”.

Concerning the genesis of the traditional interpretation of λόγος, Heidegger sees this as most crucial, for in the first place it is λέγειν as human δηλοῦν which bears witness to λόγος as at one with φύσις, that is, as self-unconcealing. Hence, the clearly rhetorical question: “Whence could the λέγειν, gathering, have received the signification of to make manifest (to reveal) as distinguished from covering up, if not on the basis of its essential relatedness to λόγος in the sense of φύσις?”⁸² Secondly, it is λέγειν as gathering δηλοῦν which is recumbent on the threshold of the interpretation of λόγος as “assertion”.⁸³

C. THE NOTION OF ΤΕΧΝΗ (SOPHOCLES’ CHORUS)

Concerning the meaning of τέχνη in Heidegger’s writings, we have suggested that a distinction is in order,⁸⁴ a distinction between an earlier and more primordial notion of τέχνη which is closely bound up with original φύσις and a second version of τέχνη which is thought in conjunction with the first mutation of φύσις, that is, with the Platonic ιδέα.⁸⁵ Among the numerous texts already cited (cf. Note 3 of this chapter), only two interpret the earlier version of τέχνη, namely, a text in which Heidegger analyzes a passage from Sophocles’ *Antigone*⁸⁶ and a second found in N I, pp. 96–97.⁸⁷

Heidegger’s attempt at interpreting the Sophoclean Chorus (EM, pp. 112ff)⁸⁸ consists of three stages: (1) a first in which the language itself is clarified; (2) a second in which the reciprocal relation δίκη-τέχνη is worked out in its essential features; (3) and

a final stage, which, as a concrete illustration of *τέχνη*, i.e. of “Gewalt-brauchen” in view of *ἀληθεύειν*, endeavors to make more explicit the union, *νοεῖν*, *λέγειν*, *τέχνη* with *φύσις*, *λόγος* and *δίκη*, respectively.

1. Stage One

The first term of significance is *δεινόν* which, Heidegger contends, means essentially the “awesome in the sense of the overwhelming Prevailing”,⁸⁹ a striking formula which calls to mind the fundamental meaning of *φύσις*. We have seen that the latter is a sort of “Walten”, which moreover and in an undetermined manner, signifies “beings as a whole” or rather their basic feature. Likewise, in keeping with the Antigone-interpretation, *δεινόν* in its primary sense, refers to “beings as a whole”: “Beings as a whole are as the Prevailing that which overwhelms, *δεινόν*, in its first sense.”⁹⁰

But *δεινόν* bears a second meaning, that is, *δεινόν* signifies a human activity relative to *δεινόν* in its primary sense. Heidegger summarizes as follows: “*δεινόν* (signifies) that which is forceful in the sense of the one who uses force, not only disposing over force but is indeed forceful . . .”⁹¹ Thus, in the second sense, it is man who is *δεινόν*; even *τὸ δεινότατον*, which Heidegger, in an elucidating manner, translates as “das Unheimlichste des Unheimlichen”.⁹² But let us return to the notion of using-force.

Man as *δεινόν* uses force “against” (“gegen”, to translate in the current manner) *δεινόν* in the primary sense which, as noted, is expressly called “that which prevails or holds sway” (“das Walten”). We have translated “Gewalt” with “force” instead of the more usual “violence” in view of alleviating the character of man’s movement relative to Being. As we will observe shortly, *δεινόν* in the second sense is none other than *τέχνη* and as we have already ascertained, Heidegger is here attempting to show up the original bond between *φύσις*, *λόγος* and *δίκη* to which *νοεῖν*, *λέγειν*, and *τέχνη* belong – the latter being responsive modes of revealing and as such already in a relationship to Being. Yet “using violence” (supposedly *δεινόν* as *τέχνη*) hardly bespeaks a responsiveness, nor does it rhyme well with the notion of “Erscheinen lassen” employed in this very same context.

Furthermore, we notice that Heidegger frequently makes use of the prefix Ge- to indicate a gathering-together⁹³ which leaves us to wonder whether the so-called use of force or forcefulness of man does not rather intend to say that man “gathers” “das Waltende” – or that the forcefulness of man signifies his persistence in gathering, that is, in keeping-open that which tends to close itself. Indeed, our suggestion at undertoning such expressions is substantiated by the text itself in which Heidegger clarifies human *δεινόν* in the following manner: “Man is at the same time *δεινόν*, because he is the forceful one . . . (He gathers the prevailing and admits it into an openedness.)”⁹⁴

And yet counter to our interpretation the following question must be posed: why does Heidegger use, with such frequency and precisely in this context, the word “gegen”?⁹⁵ The word “gegen” must unequivocally speak in favor of the current translation, namely, that of “using violence”. Certainly, if we understand the word “gegen” in its current sense – which is perchance not the most adequate sense. Is it plausible that the word “gegen” not only (and not most fundamentally) means “against”, but just as well something like “toward”, as already suggested above. Or to put it more accurately: the movement of *τέχνη* gegen . . . is at once a movement toward, a movement *for*. In this sense, we notice that Heidegger, when speaking of *λέγειν* and *νοεῖν* in whose kin *τέχνη* belongs, writes: “*λέγειν* and *νοεῖν*, human gathering and apprehension, are a need and a forceful act gegen that which overwhelms, but thereby always also *for* the latter”.⁹⁶

Moreover, we are invited by the text to understand the unusual word “gegenwendig”⁹⁷ in much the same way: a “gegenwendige” relation is not a mere turning-against but a turning-toward, which then also harmonizes with Heidegger’s use of the synonymous expression “wechselweise”.⁹⁸ The *δίκη-τέχνη* relation is one of reciprocity, a mutual turning-toward – and it is *only at this point* that the term force as characteristic of *τέχνη* takes on signification. Forceful gathering is “needed”⁹⁹ owing to Being’s ownmost tendency toward concealment and hence as the ground of the possibility of “Schein” in the sense of “semblance”.

2. Stage Two

In the course of stage two, the dual character of *δεινόν* (*δεινόν* as *δίκη* and *τέχνη*) is further discussed. We notice in the first place that the word *τέχνη* does indeed occur¹⁰⁰ and is translated with the German *können* – understood primarily in the sense of “Wissen”.¹⁰¹ It is this latter expression which Heidegger most frequently employs to define *τέχνη*, a *Wissen* which is to be sharply distinguished from an “Erfassen”, from a theoretical seizing upon that which is to be “understood”. *Τέχνη* is a sort of “Wissen” constitutive for the “Know-how” or “competency” relating to what is to be done. But what has just been stated in an anticipatory manner, more adequately describes *τέχνη* as it is discussed in other passages; this is the more contracted sense of *τέχνη*.

In the present context, *τέχνη* signifies rather what we have explicated above: a forceful gathering in view of disclosing Being.¹⁰² And even if the term “Wissen” is used,¹⁰³ its sense in the context of the Antigone-interpretation and *τέχνη* as “Wissen” in accord with other texts would have to be differentiated.¹⁰⁴ *Δεινόν*, in its primary sense, on the other hand, is now understood as *δίκη* which Heidegger translates as “Fug”, in the sense of “das fugende Gefüge” – that which “forces” “Einfügung und Sichfügen”.¹⁰⁶ These are undoubtedly unfamiliar expressions; all the more so if they purport to translate Greek *δίκη*, usually rendered with “justice”. Nonetheless, with regard to *τέχνη*, to man as *τέχνη*, the basic sense of “Fug” as “Das Fügende” is clear: it adverts to the prevailing *λόγος*, that which prevails in the mutual relationship between *δεινόν* as *δίκη* and *δεινόν* as *τέχνη*.¹⁰⁷ The latter, states Heidegger, “rises up to the encounter with *δίκη*, which for its part as Fug disposes over all *τέχνη*.”¹⁰⁸ Thus *τέχνη* is disposed over – is “das Verfügte”. We notice that the prefix *ver* (*verfügen*) suggests a transition – a transition from this way to be to another way to be on the part of man. But Heidegger hardly speaks here of a transition: he speaks of man who is *τέχνη*, who is *τὸ δεινότατον*, the most “unhomely of the unhomely”. That is to say, Heidegger presupposes that the transition has been made from man’s most familiar abode to that of a dwelling in “Unheimlichkeit”. As Heidegger writes: “The pressing-forward of *τέχνη* to the encounter of *δίκη* is ... that

happening through which man becomes unhomely.”¹⁰⁹ And he adds, most interestingly: “It is in virtue of being-placed-outside of the homely that the homely as such reveals itself.”¹¹⁰

No doubt but that these passages (in fact the entire Sophocles-interpretation) are reminiscent of the movement of SZ; more exactly of the self-retrieval of Dasein out of “publicness” back to the authentic self.¹¹¹ However, there is one essential difference: as far as EM’s analysis is concerned, anything resembling a “self-retrieval” (SZ, p. 268) is out of the question. Man as *τέχνη* is *verfügt*: already summoned as that which is “needed” to participate in Being’s disclosure amidst beings. This is emphasized in the third stage of the interpretation.

3. Stage Three

The third stage of the interpretation should be the most revealing – most revealing, for it is not a mere speaking about the Sophoclean Chorus, not merely an abstract account of the relation between Being and man (*δεινόν* as *δίκη* and as *τέχνη*). The third stage is a concrete illustration of *τέχνη* in the sense of “Gewalt-brauchen”¹¹² – that is, the third stage is already beyond its immediate context toward the Gathering itself.¹¹³

Clearly, according to the preceding, *τέχνη* is essentially *as* the “gegenwändiger Bezug” (EM, p. 124) toward Being as *δίκη* as that which predominates.¹¹⁴ But we may ask the Heideggerian question: how is it, in the first place, that *τέχνη* comes to relate to that which holds sway? Is this simply a matter of “free choice” by means of which man is enabled to take the initiative in its relatedness to Being? Notwithstanding any indications to the contrary, this is *not* the most fundamental Heideggerian point of view. It is not man as *τέχνη* (or otherwise) who initiates this “Bezug”, but instead this is granted to him. In our present context, this is clearly suggested: man is “necessitated”¹¹⁵ by the self-unconcealing; or again, “Being itself throws man”,¹¹⁶ which being “thrown” (certainly not Dasein’s “thrownness” of SZ) thus enables man to turn back to Being. Accordingly, the essence of being-human consists in being “needed”¹¹⁷ as the site of the disclosure of Being.

Seemingly therewith, however, a certain inconsistency is in-

troduced: according to the text, Being (as *φύσις*, *λόγος* or *δίκη*) predominates and as predominating needs man. Does this suggest that Being depends on man and if so is this not a species of the Philosophy of Subjectivity? It is rather a question of the interdependence of Being and man in which Being always holds sway.¹¹⁸ This is the sense of the Heideggerian term “brauchen”, his characterization of man as “der Gebrauchte”. In the Philosophy of Heidegger, it is never a question of Being as some isolated power – but equally it is never a question of Being’s Being in exclusive dependence on man.

D. THE NOTION OF ΤΕΧΝΗ AS RESPONSIVE “WISSEN”

How does this same unity, the unity of *φύσις* – *τέχνη*, come to expression in other passages? By way of introduction, the following points may be helpful.

Heidegger often repeats a general distinction between *φύσις* and *τέχνη*. In contrast to *τέχνη*, *φύσις* is regarded as a manner of bringing-forth (*Hervorbringen*) which, however, is self-initiated as stressed previously.¹¹⁹ *Τέχνη*, too, will show itself as a manner of “bringing-forth”, a manner of revealing, but one whose source of possibility is external to the *τεχνίτης* (see Note 1 below). To characterize *τέχνη* in this sense, Heidegger makes use of a series of expressions: *τέχνη* as a “having-seen” (“Gesehen haben”),¹²⁰ which expression already suggests the manner of *φύσις* to which *τέχνη* responds,¹²¹ as “the way of proceeding of reflection in the service of doing and making”,¹²² as a “*preview* regarding that with relation to which one exercises a certain competence”,¹²³ as a “seeing beyond” or “being beyond” that which is merely there,¹²⁴ and lastly as “an understanding one’s stuff”¹²⁵ – all expressions which designate the mode of “Wissen” peculiar to *τέχνη*. As will become lucid in the following, *τέχνη* constitutes a sort of grounded Wissen, one whose *ἀρχή* is *not ἐν αὐτῷ* (in Heidegger’s sense).

A second introductory point concerns the relation between *τέχνη* and “Art”. Heidegger systematically disavows the identification of *τέχνη* and art, but respecting this disavowal “Art” is meant basically in the sense of “aesthetics”.¹²⁶ Determinants of

this latter are the concepts *ὑλη-μορφή*,¹²⁷ a duality whose origin is Platonic, that is, which is determined by the transformation of *φύσις* to *ιδέα*. In general, “aesthetics”, as Heidegger uses the term, implies two things: (1) that the work of art is considered in terms of the artist – and this all too shortsightedly; (2) and secondly, that the finished “product” represents, that is, is an “imitation”¹²⁸ or objectification of the external “object”. In other words, “aesthetics” moves within the subject-object schema – which is to say, it overlooks the origin of the work itself.¹²⁹ In distinction to what Heidegger calls “schöne Kunst” (which is a mode of *τέχνη*), aesthetics is then restrictive in correspondence to the contraction of *φύσις* to *ιδέα*, which contraction becomes increasingly patent in relation to Being’s “Fortgang”.

Finally, and perhaps most significant with regard to the version of *τέχνη* to be examined, is the *ιδέα* itself and the correlative role of “seeing” (*ιδείν*). The sundry expressions which were enumerated at the outset of this section not only denote a non-thematic manner of Wissen but signify, more precisely, a pre-knowing – or better a pre-viewing – of the respective *ιδέα*.¹³⁰ Now this pre-viewing which “guides” a certain activity, a human “Verhalten” (analogous to the “Sicht” of “Besorgen” or that of “Verstehen” in SZ), whether it be the making of cabinets or a more creative sort of activity, constitutes the essence of *τέχνη* and not the doing itself – which means, moreover, that the *ἀρχή* of *τέχνη* rest in what is pre-viewed in its manner of being unconcealed.¹³¹

We may begin where we already began, namely, with EM. In view of clarifying the word *τὸ μαχανόεν*,¹³² which occurs in the *Antigone* Chorus, Heidegger comes to epitomize the sense of *τέχνη*, not, however, in terms of its reciprocity with *δίκη* but in contrast to “art”, intended in the manner sketched above. *Τέχνη*, says Heidegger, is neither art – that is the objectifying imitation of the “object” – nor is it a sort of fabricating, nor may it be classified as a primitive sort of modern technology. Rather, *τέχνη* is a “knowing” which Heidegger then describes as follows:

... the primordial and permanent seeing out beyond that which is merely there. In diverse fashion, along diverse pathways and in diverse realms, this being out beyond puts

beforehand in work that which bestows on the already merely given first its relative justification, its possible determinateness and therewith its boundaries. Knowing is the ability of putting into work of Being as, in each case, a definite being.¹³³

At issue in the passage is clearly the distinction between “aesthetics” and the more genuine art, namely, *τέχνη*, for is it not true that the so-called “Vorhandenes” (in this case the given object to be “imitated”) *does* determine the possibility and limits of aesthetics? In contrast, *τέχνη* as “Wissen” is already an “Hinaussehen über das je gerade Vorhandene” and it is in virtue of this “Hinaussehen” or “Hinaussein” (not in virtue of the “object”) that *τέχνη* is able to let Being shine through or in beings. But what is über¹³⁴ the “je gerade Vorhandene”, what is other than the latter as such in union with which *τέχνη* is, as its source and origin? A general answer is provided by the immediate context (EM, p. 122), namely, Being, sc. *φύσις* in its aspect of “Erscheinen”.¹³⁵ Or again, as WM had already observed: das Nichts.¹³⁶ Whether it be in the context of EM or of WM, or even of SZ, the crucial point remains essentially the same: human transcending, which enables man to relate to himself and to beings in the first place (that is, determines the manner of this Verhalten), is preordained by a pre-theoretical Blick toward Being. Thus, in relating to beings in whichever manner,¹³⁷ man is always already, but for the most part unwittingly, related to Being, which is surely not to hold that man has a thematic grasp of that out of which he relates to beings. The relevance of this Heideggerian thesis will become evident in the course of this work. Stated in short at this stage: it is by way of the unconcealment of *beings*¹³⁸ in the midst of which man is always already “exposed” (“ausgesetzt”) and which, depending on the manner of “Entbergen” in question, may and does, on Heidegger’s account, entail¹³⁹ the concealment of Being, that man relates to Being. But it is this latter, in its way to be, that preconditions man’s way to be. *Τέχνη* as a *wissendes* bringing-forth, as a mode of “Erscheinen lassen” or as a manner of human revealing of beings in their Being, depends for its very sustenance on that which is self-revealing. Hence, if Heidegger repeats Aristotle in saying that what is brought forth after the manner of *τέχνη*, in

contrast to the self-coming-forth of *φύσις*, has its source in the *τεχνίτης*, it is not to be understood that he is adopting (or endorsing) an Aristotelian idea. Indeed, he is rather suggesting that Aristotle's point of view stops short. For even if it is true that what is brought forth in the manner of *τέχνη* has its source in the *τεχνίτης*, may it be said that the latter's activity is self-contained? Hardly! For the *τεχνίτης* has his proper source outside himself.¹⁴⁰

It is in this sense, we believe, that Heidegger's insistence on the notion of *τέχνη* as "Entbergen", as "Offenbarmachen", or as "Erscheinen lassen" has to be understood.¹⁴¹ Heidegger does not insist on human "Entbergen", be it of the most elevated (creative) sort, in order to sing the praises of man,¹⁴² but rather continually in view of pointing to the ground of the possibility of human Entbergen, namely: *das Sich-Entbergende*.

But at this point we must focus on some additional texts in the attempt to more thoroughly elucidate what Heidegger understands by *τέχνη* as "Wissen", and secondly in the hope of bringing to light the Platonic character of this interpretation. We begin with pertinent passages from Heidegger's work on the "Origin of the Work of Art".

Afresh, in this crucial work Heidegger accents the general breadth of Greek *τέχνη*. *Τέχνη* can neither be tapered in the sense of "art", nor does it mean only a type of handicraft or practical "performance". And again, in a positive manner, Heidegger clarifies *τέχνη* as "Wissen"; now, however, describing it in terms of a "having-seen"¹⁴³ which guides human relatedness to beings. Does the notion of "Gesehen-haben" say something at variance with the notion of "Hinaussehen" (or "Hinaussein") or does it allude to the same in a different fashion? Obviously, the latter alternative is more exact. Man "is" or "sees" out beyond the "je gerade Vorhandene", that is: *with relation* to the "je gerade Vorhandene", man *has already seen*. To be sure, Heidegger is not speaking about some sort of sensuous seeing,¹⁴⁴ nor about any species of "grasping" but rather about a way to be and about what is decisive for this way to be. Having-seen, as determinative for *τέχνη*, signifies that something has already, in advance, come into view, and indeed, has come into view presumably in a Platonic sense.¹⁴⁵ However, in the passage from "Der Ursprung

des Kunstwerkes”, Heidegger does not speak of Plato, but rather relates the notion of “having-seen” to *νοεῖν*: having-seen, says Heidegger, signifies “apprehending that which is present as such”.¹⁴⁶ But even if Heidegger does not speak expressly of Plato in the passage being considered, a Platonic element bobs to the surface when he refers to *τέχνη* as a “bringing-forth”:

As a mode of knowing, experienced after a Greek fashion, *τέχνη* is a bringing forth of beings to the extent that it brings forth that which is present out of Concealedness in the unconcealment of its *Aussehen*. *Τέχνη* never means the activity of merely making.¹⁴⁷

We underscore the word “Aussehen”¹⁴⁸ which Heidegger uses invariably to interpret the Platonic *εἶδος* – that through which the respective *ιδέα* shows itself, which will be discussed in the following chapter. Of interest here is the question: how does *τέχνη* bring forth a particular being, that which is present (Anwesendes), into the unconcealment of its “Aussehen”? Presumably, *τέχνη* is so enabled precisely owing to its specific mode of “Gesehen-haben” – a having-already-seen the *ιδέα* which is made to shine in what is brought forth. Again Heidegger’s single point bears reiteration: *τέχνη*, that is, the *τεχνίτης*, cannot and does not draw from his own resources, but rather in activity is sustained by what “has been seen”. We observe how Heidegger, in the above passage, remains tacit about this more essential feature of *τέχνη*, remarking simply that *τέχνη* is a mode of *Hervorbringen*, a bringing-forth from there to here (“Her”-), thus letting that which is seen come to appearance in the particular being, however dimly.

If in the previous passage from “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, the Platonic reference seems disputable, all ambiguity is dissipated as soon as we turn to “Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις”. Commenting on an Aristotelian text¹⁴⁹ (Physics, 192b, 16–20), Heidegger states curiously enough that *τέχνη* is the “ἀρχή der Gemächte” (p. 321). And as is wont, he points out that *τέχνη* is not a sort of mere producing nor is it “Art”. Rather, in reference to what is to be produced, the artist’s activity or *τέχνη* is a “sich auskennen” in that in which the producing is rooted.¹⁵⁰

We notice how Heidegger’s assertions seem to conflict with one

another – *τέχνη* as the “*ἀρχή* der Gemächte” and *τέχνη* as a “sich auskennen” which is *not* self-grounded. How then is *τέχνη* the “*ἀρχή* der Gemächte”? Is it not palpable again that, strictly speaking, *τέχνη* is *not* the “source” – or put differently: *τέχνη* is *ἀρχή* but only in virtue of being itself grounded. Heidegger himself urges the point as follows: In any mode of doing, of producing in the way of *τέχνη*, “the *εἶδος* must be already in advance in view, and this previously sighted Aussehen, this *εἶδος προαιρετόν*, is the end, *τέλος*, in relationship to which *τέχνη* is competent.”¹⁵¹

The accent is not placed on *τέχνη* as self-sufficient human activity, which should constitute the salt of the earth, but rather and incontestably the accent is placed on the ground of human activity, namely here the previously sighted *εἶδος*, the unifying Aussehen, to which *τέχνη* is subordinated.¹⁵² Therefore, Heidegger’s affirmation that the essence of *τέχνη* is a “sich auskennen im Verfahren” has to be revised. On the basis of the texts themselves,¹⁵³ the “essence” of *τέχνη* is not exactly a “sich auskennen” but much more: that *in which*¹⁵⁴ *τέχνη* “sich auskennt”.

The writing “Die Frage nach der Technik” adds nothing essential to what we have already brought forth. Heidegger, after having distinguished *φύσις* and *τέχνη* as two modes of “Hervorbringen”, differing from each other in the manner already mentioned, re-emphasizes the broad scope of *τέχνη*. Secondly, the link between *τέχνη* and “Wissen” is mentioned (Heidegger uses the term “Erkennen”) – a “Wissen” signifying a “sich Auskennen in”, or a “sich Verstehen auf etwas”. And lastly, it is made explicit that *τέχνη* is a manner of *ἀληθεύειν*,¹⁵⁵ a manner of revealing. Heidegger writes:

What is decisive about *τέχνη* in no way lies in making and manipulation, nor in the employment of tools, but in the already mentioned revealing.¹⁵⁶

However, we have pointed out what is more decisive (on the basis of Heidegger’s own writings): that is, what sustains “das Entbergen” in the first place – which sustaining ground is expressed in the following passage:

Whoever builds a house or ship or forges a sacrificial chalice

reveals that which is to be brought forth according to the four modes of occasioning. This revealing gathers in advance the *Aussehen* and the material of ship and house with a view to the finished thing envisioned as completed – and from this perspective determines the kind of fabrication.¹⁵⁷

This text is found at the core of Heidegger's concise discussion of *τέχνη* in "Die Frage nach der Technik" and appertains as well to his formulation of "causality", to the four manners of occasioning mentioned in the first sentence of the cited passage. From Heidegger's point of view, "casuality" is another of the modes of human *ἀληθεύειν*, human *Entbergen*, belonging to the same family as *τέχνη*.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, what we have called "more decisive" is clearly alluded to in the passage. Human revealing "gathers" in advance – has already gathered (i.e. "has seen"); that is, with reference to human bringing forth, something has already been sighted, sc. the *Aussehen* (*εἶδος*) of the respective "thing" in question. We notice that this "gathering" or "having already gathered" is antecedent to the gathering of "Stoff" (that "out of which"), for how could the appropriate material be selected unless the "Aussehen" had already come into view? Hence, we are led to the same fundamental idea which remains reticent in the background: gathering, any mode of human *Entbergen*, is dependent on the pre-given or, in more Heideggerian terms, on that which "von sich her" reveals itself and as self-revealing holds itself concealed.

If the above analysis of *τέχνη* is at all adequate, it would seem that we have defeated our own purpose, that is, we have shown – or at least suggested – that technology *does not* go back to Greek *τέχνη*. Have we not rather shown what WHD expresses; namely, that the essence of technology originates from the "Anwesen des Anwesenden"?¹⁵⁹ However, there is a considerable difference between what is said in the text from BH with which we launched the discussion and what is stated in WHD. For the former text speaks of technology while the second speaks of the *essence* of technology. In other words, what our interpretation of Greek *τέχνη* has served to bring out is the crucial distinction and union between technology (the technological) and its essence; more precisely the fons et origo of the technological in the essence of technology. For just as little as *τέχνη* is self-grounded, is modern technology an autonomous anthropological power.

NOTES

1. With regard to the "Wechselwirkung" between technology and the natural sciences, cf. Werner Heisenberg, *Das Naturbild der heutigen Physik* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1955), p. 12.

2. BH, *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1979), p. 171: "Sie (die Technik) geht nämlich nicht nur im Namen auf die τέχνη der Griechen zurück, sondern sie stammt wesensgeschichtlich aus der τέχνη als eine Weise der ἀληθεύειν..." Cf. also "Die Frage nach der Technik", VA I (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1954), p. 30: "Das herausfordernde Entbergen hat im hervorbringenden seine geschickliche Herkunft." In connection with this latter passage, it may be pointed out that the notion of "bringing forth" ("Hervorbringen"), which we will examine later and which clearly stands in sharp contrast to the technological manner of "Entbergen", i.e. of technological "Herausfordern" (or "Bestellen"), is not restricted to Greek τέχνη. Rather, it is used in a more comprehensive sense – which, however, does not diminish the force of the previous statement from Heidegger's *Brief*. Moreover, and this bears emphasis, Heidegger is not saying that the "essence" of modern technology derives from Greek τέχνη, nor would one such assertion be borne out by Heidegger's writings. The origin of the "essence" of technology would have to be spied in φύσις itself, especially in its character of concealment, a point which will be elucidated in the course of this writing.

3. The following texts are central: EM (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953), pp. 13, 122–23, 124, 127, 129–30; N I (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1966), pp. 96–98, 192, 453, 494; "Die Frage nach der Technik", pp. 11–14, 20, 34; "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", HW (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1963), pp. 47–48; "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken", VA II (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1954), p. 34; "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", VA I, p. 72; "Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις", *Wegmarken*, pp. 321–22; "Der Spruch des Anaximander", HW, pp. 298–99; 341–42. Cf. also GA II, 26, p. 140.

4. In EM, the interpretation of the Chorus is a sort of detour in view of facilitating access to the Parmenidean fragment 3.

5. Cf. pp. 11–14, 47–48, 77–78, 86–87, 96, 139. In addition, cf. the following texts: "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", p. 31; N I, pp. 210–211; N II (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1966), pp. 12, 216–17, 227, 403–8; "Wozu Dichter", HW, p. 257; WHD (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1961), p. 135; "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 11; VWW, *Wegmarken*, p. 85; EHD (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1963), p. 55; "Der Spruch des Anaximander", pp. 298–99; "Aletheia", VA III (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1954), pp. 66–69; SVG (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1965), pp. 110–14. Concerning the notion of φύσις autour the period of SZ, cf. GA II, 21, p. 1; and GA II, 24, p. 151.

6. Cf. "Der Spruch des Anaximander", p. 298.

7. In texts prior to 1936, Heidegger occasionally speaks of φύσις as "beings as a whole" ("Das Seiende im Ganzen"). Cf., for instance, EM, pp. 12–13; VWW, p. 85; N I, p. 96. At the same time, he refers to φύσις as

“Being itself” (cf. following note). This could invite confusion owing to the fact that in later writings there is an indisputable and essential distinction between the meaning of the two expressions. However, in the context of primordial $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ we are in a context where this dichotomy does not yet hold true.

8. Cf. EM, p. 11; N I, p. 211.

9. EM, p. 11: “ $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ meint . . . ursprünglich sowohl den Himmel als auch die Erde, sowohl den Stein als auch die Pflanze, sowohl das Tier als auch den Menschen und die Menschengeschichte als Menschen- und Götterwerk, schließlich und zuerst die Götter selbst unter dem Geschick.” Cf. also “Der Spruch des Anaximander”, p. 298; and GA II, 21, p. 1. In the latter, whose composition is prior to SZ, Heidegger writes: “ $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ umgreift den universalen Bereich dessen, was überhaupt vorhanden ist, die Welt: das Ganze, – Gestirne, Erde, Pflanze, Tiere, Menschen, Götter.”

10. However, it would be erroneous to believe that Heidegger simply bases his analysis of $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ on its etymology.

11. Cf. EM, p. 11; EHD, p. 55; GA II, 24, p. 155. Heidegger as well as W.A. Heidel (cf. “*περί φύσεως*, A Study of the Conception of Nature among the Presocratics”, *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* No. 4 [1910]: 77ff) maintain that the original meaning of $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is “growth”. On the other hand, John Burnet believes that its original meaning is something akin to “stuff”, that out of which anything happens to be. Cf. *Early Greek Philosophy* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1930), pp. 10ff. Werner Jaeger, whose book *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* served at the time as a most needed and able response to Burnet’s influential study, is more in agreement with Heidegger and Heidel concerning this matter. In the above-mentioned study, p. 20, Jaeger writes: “ $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is one of those abstract formulations with the suffix $-\sigma\iota\varsigma$ which becomes fairly frequent after the period of the later epics. It denotes quite plainly the act of $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\iota$ – the process of growth and emergence . . .” Cf. also p. 198, Note 5. Also W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 82: “Most commonly it ($\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$) meant the real constitution or character of things, including the way they behave, though it could also mean ‘birth’ or ‘growth’ . . .”

12. The term “Aufgehen”, which is always in this context a “von sich her” Aufgehen – hence a self-emerging or rising up – is used most frequently. From EM to the later work SVG, $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is described invariably as an activity of self-emerging. Cf. EM, pp. 11, 12, 47, 54, 77, 87, 96, 127, 135, 139, 141; N I, pp. 96, 210, 453, 505; N II, pp. 216, 403, 408; WHD, p. 135; “Die Frage nach der Technik”, p. 11; VWW, p. 85; EHD, p. 55; “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, p. 31; “Wozu Dichter”, HW, p. 257; “Der Spruch des Anaximander”, p. 299; “Aletheia”, pp. 66, 67; SVG, pp. 111, 113. Heidegger even emphasizes this feature of $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ in a Vorlesung from the year 1927. Cf. GA II, 24, p. 151. Here Heidegger notes: “ $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$ besagt wachsen lassen, erzeugen, zunächst sich selbst erzeugen.”

13. Needless to say, Heidegger refrains from using the expression “self-caused” – and this for two reasons. First, owing to its traditional affiliations with the notion of “God”, the “God” of Metaphysics as “causa sui” (cf. “Die

Onto-Theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik", ID [Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1957], p. 64), and secondly, since Heidegger, from his earlier period onward, has his mind on reformulating the meaning of "causality".

14. Moreover, the term "subjectivity" may not even be confined to man – at least not in Heidegger's philosophical interpretation of Tradition. Hence, the introduction of the terminus "Subjektivität".

15. In the following we will have ample opportunity to discuss both of these.

16. Cf. Werner Marx, *Heidegger und die Tradition* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1972), p. 144.

17. But not always. Cf. NI, p. 206; "Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις", p. 359. Also "Dichterisch wohnt der Mensch", VA II, p. 62: "Mache heißt griechisch ποιήσις". For Heidegger, both "Mache" and "Her-stellen" in the Greek sense mean so much as "Erscheinen lassen".

18. The sense of the German "her".

19. Cf. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 11: "Die φύσις ist sogar ποιήσις im höchsten Sinne."

20. The terms "Verbergung" and "Verborgenheit" are surely essential to Heidegger's thinking of Being and will play an important role in this study. Cf. especially Part Three.

21. Heidegger often uses the word "lassen" in connection with human modes of "Entbergen", thus underplaying the role of the "causa efficiens" – in opposition to the tradition. "Lassen" suggests the sense of aiding in the bringing to light, not an "effecting". Secondly, the word "lassen" designates a fundamental feature of Being as Heidegger understands it – which feature comes especially to the fore in texts on "Ereignis". The latter fulfills the function of "letting" "Being" (in traditional sense) and "thought", or in another context, "time" and "being", belong together. Expressed in the most general way possible: *Ereignis läßt ins Eigene eingehen*. Cf. our final chapter.

22. Cf. EM, p. 87.

23. EM p. 139: "... eine notwendige Folge aus dem Wesen des Seins als aufgehenden Scheinens". Or again in NI, p. 505: "... wie anders soll die 'Idee' das Seiendste am Seienden sein, wenn nicht im voraus schon entschieden ist, das Seiendsein heißt: aufgehend-anwesendes Sichzeigen." The latter expression, no doubt, refers to φύσις. Cf. NI, p. 212: "Die Auslegung des Seins als εἶδος, Anwesen im Aussehen, setzt die Interpretation der ἀλήθεια, Unverstelltheit voraus." The term ἀλήθεια in this passage, refers to φύσις (is φύσις' way to be), not to the ἀλήθεια of *idéa*. Hence, Heidegger can say that the interpretation of Being as ἀλήθεια is presupposed by the interpretation of εἶδος.

24. The immediate purpose of this section is to return to the original unity of Being and shine (Sein und Schein) in order then to work out the way of their subsequent cleavage.

25. Cf. EM, p. 76.

26. Cf. EM, p. 76: "Das Wesen des Scheinens liegt im Erscheinen."

27. It bears mentioning that the term "Erscheinen" in the context of EM is not to be confounded with the same term as it is discussed in §7 of SZ. In SZ,

what Heidegger here calls "Erscheinen" more closely resembles "Phänomen" of SZ.

28. In EM, Heidegger uses the word "Scheinen" (or "Schein") in the sense of "Erscheinen", and less often in sense three.

29. Cf. EM, p. 83: "Jetzt muß deutlich werden: Zum Sein selbst als Erscheinen gehört Schein ... der Schein verstellt nicht nur das Seiende, dessen Schein er ist, sondern er verdeckt sich dabei selbst als Schein, insofern er sich als Sein zeigt. Weil so der Schein sich selbst wesenhaft im Verdecken und Verstellen verstellt, deshalb sagen wir mit Recht: der Schein trügt." The wording and meaning of this passage reminds us of two passages, one found in SZ (p. 222) and a second in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" (p. 42). In SZ, Heidegger mentions Dasein's engulfment in "Das Man", in public "Ausgelegtheit": "Das Seiende ist nicht völlig verborgen, sondern gerade entdeckt, aber zugleich verstellt; es zeigt sich – aber im Modus des Scheinens." We notice that in SZ this state of affairs is put in relation to Dasein's "Verschlossenheit", Dasein's being in the "Untruth". The second text from "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" is much more in line with EM: "Hier ist das Verbergen nicht jenes einfache Versagen, sondern das Seiende erscheint wohl, aber es gibt sich anders, als es ist. Dieses Verbergen ist das Verstellen. Würde Seiendes nicht Seiendes verstellen, dann könnten wir uns am Seienden nicht versehen und vertun ... Daß das Seiende als Schein trügen kann, ist die Bedingung dafür, daß wir uns täuschen können, nicht umgekehrt."

30. A considerable portion of the secondary literature still persists in this manner of interpretation.

31. Cf. EM, p. 87, where Heidegger discusses fragment 123 of Heraclitus. Cf. also EHD, p. 55, and "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", p. 31. In EHD, Heidegger writes: "φύσις ist das aufgehende In-sich-zurück-Gehen und nennt die Anwesenheit dessen, was im so wesenden Aufgang als dem Offenen verweilt."

32. This is precisely why "die Gefahr", that is, the most extreme withdrawal of Being, is at the same time called "that which saves" ("das Rettende").

33. Cf. p. 371: "φύσις ist ἀλήθεια, Entbergung und deshalb κρῖνται φιλῆι."

34. Most often Heidegger translates οὐσία with "Anwesenheit" or "Seiendheit" – which, however, is not to say that these two central concepts signify the identical state of affairs.

35. From the point of view of meaning, the word "Being" *within tradition* signifies "beingness" – the most "universal" or "general" of concepts. Cf. N II, p. 211.

36. Cf. Chapter I, Part Three below.

37. Essentially, our presentation will confine itself to relevant passages from EM.

38. Cf. EM, p. 95. "Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις", p. 348; "Logos", pp. 4ff; SA (Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1971), p. 152. Again from a purely philological point of view, Heidegger's understanding has its solid support. For example, writing in 1939, Edwin Minar states: "The word λόγος is simply the verbal noun from λέγω, which means primarily 'gather', 'collect', as appears

clearly from the cognates collected by Walde-Pokorny." Cf. "The Logos of Heraclitus", *Classical Philology* 34 (1939): 323. It should also be pointed out in passing that the Liddell-Scott *Greek Lexicon* lists "pick up, gather, and choose" as the first sense of *λόγος* (*λέγειν*). In the same vein, G.S. Kirk states that the root "λεγ – basically implies picking out or choosing", a point likewise stressed in EM. Cf. *Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 38. Cf. also H. Boeder, "Der Frühgriechische Wortgebrauch von Logos und Aletheia", *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 4 (1959): 82ff. Boeder seeks to clarify the sense of *λόγος* and *ἀλήθεια* in early Greek literature, excluding, however, the philosophical fragments.

39. Cf. "Logos", VA III, p. 6: "Im gesammelten Sammeln waltet ursprüngliche Versammlung."

40. Heidegger's insistence on this point in EM has to be understood in context, that is, against the background of the later transformation of *λόγος* in Plato and Aristotle. In later writings, in "Das Wort", p. 237, and in "Das Wesen der Sprache", p. 155 (Both in US), Heidegger is fond of calling the *λόγος* "Die Sage", which expression names the "essence" of language, as distinct from "Sagen," human "letting appear" in its genuine mode (in contrast to "information").

41. And hence equally non-sensical to believe that Heidegger's views are to be "refuted" in the same manner, Heidegger's etymological considerations have nothing to do with an attempt to be "scientific", but are rather rooted in his own metaphysics of language. Primordial, that is, responsive expression is already disclosure of Being – the "Sage" to which "Sagen" attends.

42. Cf. p. 124 of German version, tr. C. Ochwad (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1977).

43. Moreover, we would suggest that Heidegger's earlier *λόγος-λέγειν* interpretation present in SZ and even earlier (GA II, 21) harmonizes well with the later *λόγος*-interpretation in EM. It is true that Heidegger in SZ did not characterize *λόγος* (*δηλοῦν*) as "gathering", and yet Heidegger in SZ, in regard to the *λόγος*, had already regressed behind "language", as it were, to the *λόγος* as Rede and to *λέγειν* as *δηλοῦν*.

44. Heidegger's version of the fragments may be found in EM, p. 97. For the Greek texts, cf. Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Erster Band (Dublin/Zürich: Weidmann, 1966), 12. Unveränderte Auflage, p. 150.

45. This is indeed John Burnet's view. In reference to fragment 1 (in Bywater's edition fragment 2), Burnet states: "the logos is primarily the discourse of Herakleitos himself; though, as he is a prophet, we may call it his 'word'." Cf. *Early Greek Philosophy* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1930, 4th edition), p. 133, Note 1. Concerning Burnet's view, cf. G.S. Kirk, *Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 37; and G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 188. Also Werner Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 109ff. Karl Reinhardt, among others including Heidegger, has pointed out that such a rendering of *λόγος* in fragment 1 would conflict with

fragments 50, 72, 2, and 45. Cf. *Parmenides und Die Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie* (Bonn: Verlag Von Friedrich Cohen, 1916), p. 217, Note 1.

46. Cf., as a later testimony, WHD, p. 135: "Das von sich her Vorliegende ... ist für die Griechen das von sich her Aufgehende (*φύσις*) ..."

47. It seems that it was Aristotle himself (Rhet III, 5, 1407b) who first noticed the ambiguity of *ἀεί*. Cf. W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 424, Note 2. Guthrie, for his part, contends that *ἀεί* qualifies *ἔοντος*, while G.S. Kirk in his Heraclitus-book, pp. 34ff, holds the alternate view. In this regard the discussion has merely philological interest, for none would deny that the *λόγος* is *ἀεί*, notwithstanding the supposed ambiguity in fragment 1. Cf. also F. Cleve, *The Giants of Presophistic Greek Thought*, Vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969) p. 41 and esp. p. 95, Note 2. According to Cleve "in fragment 1 it is not obscure and dubious whether *ἀεί* belongs to *ἔοντος* or to *ἀζύονετοι* although this was not clear to Aristotle..." Cf. also the work *Vier Seminare*, pp. 10ff, which in this case, seems to conflict with EM.

48. Cf. EM, p. 98: "er (*λόγος*) west als das Zusammen im Seienden, das Zusammen des Seienden, das Sammelnde."

49. Cf. F. Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, #43: "... was gemein sein kann, hat immer wenig wert."

50. In addition to the whole, this point dictates against anything resembling Burnet's interpretation. Surely, not even Heraclitus would be bold enough to assert that everything happens according to his own discourse.

51. But even here it is essential to remark that it is *φύσις*, that is, the "less apparent" (*ἀφανής*, fragment 54) *λόγος* of the conflicting, which "loves to hide" (fragment 123).

52. As attests Heidegger's "Das Man" analysis of SZ.

53. Cf. EM, p. 102: "... behält das Auseinander- und Gegenstrebig in eine Zusammengehörigkeit ein."

54. Heidegger, who in this regard hardly circumvents the issue, even brings forth fragment 73 in which *λέγειν* is used in the sense of human speaking. Nor should it be thought that he believes that any and all occurrences of the word "*λόγος*" in Heraclitus signify primordial gatheredness.

55. Heidegger interprets *πειράω* – to try, to attempt – as "to hear" in a sense which must be distinguished from *ἀκουεῖν* (fragments 1, 50). Heidegger translates the former with "Versuchen".

56. The words of Heraclitus.

57. Middle infinitive of *ἐπομι*.

58. With regard to Heidegger's interpretation of *ἀκουεῖν*, fragment 19 seems interesting: *ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ' εἰπεῖν*. "Not knowing how to hear, they neither know how to talk." This is in line with Heidegger's interpretation in EM, for hearing the *λόγος* is the ground of genuine "talk" – and also with SZ. According to SZ, "hearing" is one of the essential possibilities of Rede (often translated with *λόγος*) and since primordial Rede is pre-linguistic, so must "hearing" ("hören") be distinguished from receiving sensations-stimuli (or as division 2 has it, "Hinhören auf das Man"). Also, an

“authentic” articulation of Dasein’s “Da” would be the foundation of authentic speech as distinct from the ever-prevailing “Idle talk”.

59. Cf. F. Cleve, *The Giants of Presophistic Greek Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), Vol. 1, p. 106. Cf. also Cleve’s reading of fragment 112 (p. 107) where he interprets *κατὰ φύσιν* as: “with the will of the Logos”.

60. However, Heidegger points out that *ἀξύνετοι* is the negation of *συνίημι* which signifies “zueinander bringen”. Hence, men are those who hearing are nevertheless unable to bring it together, that is, to compass that which is already of itself gathered.

61. We call this “the clearest evidence”, since Heidegger, in EM, in order to point out that *λέγειν* also refers to human *λέγειν* (as distinguished from the *λέγειν* of *λόγος* as Being) does not refer to Heraclitus but instead to the Parmenidean fragment 6.

62. *λέγειν* as “Sammlung in die Not”. Cf. EM, p. 129.

63. That is, that Parmenides, in marked opposition to Heraclitus (the Philosopher of “Flux”), is the Philosopher of “Being”, the “ever-abiding” which excludes all “Werden”. Cf. EM, pp. 104–5.

64. This was already broached in SZ – but somewhat ambiguously. Cf. esp. p. 171 where Heidegger comments as follows: “Sein ist, was im reinen anschauenden Vernehmen sich zeigt, und nur dieses Sehen entdeckt das Sein. Ursprüngliche und echte Wahrheit liegt in der reinen Anschauung.” Thus, Parmenides is viewed as the founder of traditional “Erkenntnistheorie”, for which as Heidegger clearly outlines in his *Logik Vorlesung* (1925/26) “Erkennen” in its purest form signifies “Anschauung”. Cf. GA II, 21, pp. 100ff. *However*, even here, Heidegger confirms that Greek *voεῖν* is to be understood “in dem ganz weiten Sinne” (p. 110).

65. Cf., for instance, BH, p. 163; N II, pp. 227, 319–20; “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”, HW, p. 83; “Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung”, HW, pp. 162, 180; “Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens”, SD (Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), p. 79. Another more provocative translation reads: “in-die-Acht-nehmen” – which connotation is already implicit in the Heideggerian “Vernehmen”. Cf. “Moirai”, VA III, pp. 39, 40; and WHD, pp. 117ff. Moreover, it is not astonishing that Heidegger in later texts, notably in “Der Satz der Identität”, ID, p. 14, and in “Kants Theses über das Sein”, *Wegmarken*, p. 304, translates *voεῖν* with “Denken” – which had been so cautiously avoided earlier. We understand this in relation to the attempted determination of primordial Being (“Ereignis”, etc.) as that third “element” out of which traditional “Being” and “thinking” in general are to be grounded. Cf. in this regard, Chapter III, Part Three.

66. Cf. Heidegger’s interpretation of “thought” essentially as an “Entsprechen” (as “Gelassenheit”, “Besinnung”, “Sagen”, etc.). Gabriel Marcel has attempted an analogous interpretation of “thought” (human relatedness) with his notion of “recueillement”.

67. As fragment 8 states, apprehension is for the sake of Being – not inversely.

68. Cf. EM, p. 105.

69. Cf. VA II, p. 16: "Im Vorstellen entfaltet sich das Vernehmen."
70. Cf. our Chapter III, Part Two, Section A.
71. Cf. EM, p. 106.
72. Or used prepositionally.
73. Our word "apparent" here is not to be set in opposition to "real", but is meant in the sense of "secondary" as distinguished from primary "harmony", primary *λόγος*.
74. Cf. our final chapter.
75. Cf. VA III, p. 45: "... ἐστίν, ist, bedeutet jetzt: west, währt, und zwar während aus dem Gewährenden, als welches τὸ αὐτὸ, das Selbe, waltet."
76. We interpret this more fully in our final chapter.
77. Heidegger discusses the precedence of *λέγειν* over *νοεῖν* in EM, pp. 129ff; WHD, pp. 125ff. In this regard, cf. also Ernst Tugendhat, "Das Sein und das Nichts", *Durchblicke* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970), pp. 141ff.
78. Cf. EM, p. 108, where Heidegger, in interpreting fragment 6, refers to man as the "Verwahrer" of Being.
79. EM, p. 129. This feature coincides well with SZ, that is, with the process (or rather the real possibility) of "authenticity" of Dasein. Dasein, as chapter 2 (division 2) emphasizes, must first "retrieve itself" ("Sich zurückholen", SZ, p. 268) from the enticement of "publicness" into which it "has already" "fallen" – that is, Dasein has it first of all to dwell in its "Unhomeliness" ("Unheimlichkeit") as preparatory for the modification of the Self from the "they-self" to the authentic self. We notice how Heidegger in the present context (EM and the interpretation of human *λέγειν, νοεῖν, τέχνη*) often employs, and surely not coincidentally, the word "Unheimlichkeit" so central to SZ.
80. Significantly, Heidegger uses the word "Versetzen", whose prefix ("Ver") indicates a transition, modification, a change over. Cf. EM, p. 129: "Der *λόγος* als Sammlung, als das Sich-Sammeln des Menschen auf den Fug, versetzt das Menschsein allererst in sein Wesen und stellt es so in das Unheimliche..." Cf. also "verfügen" in EM, p. 123, and in the context of the interpretation of Ereignis the term "ver-eignen".
81. Cf. p. 130. As far as we are able to discern, this is the closest SZ came to the later interpretation of *λόγος*.
82. EM, p. 130: "Woher kann das Wort *λέγειν*, sammeln, die Bedeutung von offenbarmachen (Entbergen) im Gegensatz zu Verbergen bekommen haben, wenn nicht auf Grund seines Wesensbezuges zum *λόγος* im Sinne der φύσις."
83. We recall that in SZ, Heidegger characterizes *λέγειν* as *δηλοῦν* and moreover contends that "Aussage" as "Prädikation" and "Heraussage" – hence as expressed "Rede" – is grounded in "Aufzeigen" in the sense of *λόγος* as *ἀπόφανσις*, as letting something be seen from itself.
84. This distinction may be gleaned from a reading of the relevant passages. Moreover, Heidegger explicitly draws the distinction. Cf. N I, p. 95ff.
85. This remains true even when *τέχνη* is thought in an Aristotelian context

as it is, for example, in "Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις", p. 321.

86. In this regard, cf. Louis Bolle, "Le Roi Oedipe a peut-être un oeil de trop", *Revue de L'Université d'Ottawa* (1968): 599–627; and Jean-François Jobin, "Heidegger et la Technique", *Studia Philosophica* 35 (1975): 91ff.

87. With regard to the interpretation of the *Antigone* Chorus, Heidegger, in N I, p. 97, clarifies the sense intended of the word "gegen", so frequent in EM and which, if exaggerated and understood exclusively in the sense of the English "against", can be very misleading. The so-called "Vorgehen gegen" characteristic of the mode of Verhalten called τέχνη is no "Angriff", but rather an "Ankommen lassen". In contrast to this sense of "Vorgehen gegen" we note another passage in which Heidegger uses the same expression but interprets it in the context of Modernity (Descartes): "'Methode' ist jetzt der Name, für das sichernde, erobernde Vor-gehen gegen Seiendes, um es als Objekt für das Subjekt sicherzustellen." Cf. N II, p. 170.

88. For the Greek version, cf. *Sophocles*, tr. F. Storr (Cambridge: The Harvard University Press, 1912), p. 314ff. In most editions, the Chorus which Heidegger calls the first is actually the second.

89. EM, p. 114: "Furchtbare im Sinne des überwältigenden Waltens."

90. EM, p. 115: "Das Seiende im Ganzen ist als Waltens das Überwältigende, δεινόν, in dem ersten Sinne."

91. EM, p. 115: "δεινόν (bedeutet) das Gewaltige im Sinne dessen, der die Gewalt braucht, nicht nur über Gewalt verfügt, sondern gewalt-tätig ist..."

92. An expression which we may best understand with reference to SZ; more precisely, with regard to the function of Angst in its character of making manifest to Dasein the possibility of "Eigentlichkeit". Angst as a fundamental mode of Attunement "individualizes" Dasein, that is, sets Dasein before the "Unheimlichkeit" of existing, having brought Dasein face to face with the "Nothing" of the "World" of concern. But, as such, Dasein no longer finds itself "at home" in "publicness".

93. For instance, Ge-stell, Ge-schick, Ge-viert, and Ge-wesen in later writings.

94. Cf. EM, p. 115: "Der Mensch ist aber zugleich δεινόν, weil er der Gewalt-tätige ... ist. (Er versammelt das Waltende und läßt es in eine Offenbarkeit ein.)"

95. Cf. EM, pp. 122, 123, 124, 127, 218, 129, 135, 146.

96. Cf. EM, p. 135: "λέγειν und νοεῖν, Sammlung und Vernehmung, sind eine Not und eine Gewalt-tat gegen das Überwältigende, dabei aber immer auch für diesen."

97. Cf. EM, pp. 114, 124, 127. Also used in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", pp. 49, 51, 57.

98. Cf. EM, pp. 123, 127. Also "Wechselbezug", pp. 117, 123, 126, 127.

99. EM, p. 124.

100. R. Boehm and H. Taux assure us that the word τέχνη does not occur. Boehm writes: "Il faut remarquer tout de suite que, lorsque Heidegger se réfère ici à ce mot grec (τέχνη) et insiste sur sa signification authentique, cela relève d'un choix et d'une décision de sa part absolument libres; ce mot n'intervient

nulle part dans les textes à l'explication desquels son évocation doit servir." Cf. "Pensée et Technique", *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 52 (1960): 197. Also Henri Taux, *La Finitude dans la Philosophie de M. Heidegger* (Lausanne: Editions L'Age de L'Homme, 1971), p. 150, who repeats Boehm in this regard. In his thorough study of *τέχνη*, Jörg Kube comments briefly on the Sophoclean text. Cf. *Techne und Arete* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969), p. 38.

101. And not in its auxiliary sense.

102. Cf. EM, p. 122. Heidegger confuses the issue somewhat by speaking of *τέχνη* as a *wissendes* "Hinaussehen" or "Hinaussein über", conceptions which more aptly characterize the second version of *τέχνη*. The "Hinaussein" on the part of *τέχνη*, i.e. of man as *δεινόν*, would signify, in line with the Antigone-reading, having undone everydayness, as it were, and having thus "Unheimlichkeit" as a mode of Being. With relation to the second version, "Hinaussein" (or "Hinaussehen") refers essentially to a "Vorblick", hence to a "Gesehen haben" in virtue of which the ground is sighted.

103. For instance, EM, p. 122: "... das wissende Erkämpfen des vordem verschlossenen Seins in das Erscheinende als das Seiende". Cf. also pp. 123, 125.

104. Cf. Section D below.

105. Or "das fügende Fug".

106. EM, p. 123.

107. Again, the basic meaning of "Überwältigende".

108. Cf. EM, p. 123: "... (*τέχνη*) aufbricht gegen *δίκη*, die ihrerseits als Fug über alle *τέχνη* verfügt."

109. EM, p. 127: "Der Andrang der *τέχνη* gegen die *δίκη* ist ... jenes Geschehen, durch das der Mensch unheimisch wird."

110. EM, p. 127: "In solcher Heraussetzung aus dem Heimischen erschließt sich das Heimische erst als ein solches." Analogously, the "they-self" or "publicness" in SZ only becomes manifest to Dasein as "retrieved" or as "unheimisch" – not to "absorbed" Dasein.

111. This is especially worked out in chapter 2, division 2 of SZ. Cf. Chapter I, Part Three.

112. Cf. EM, p. 124: "Die eigentliche Auslegung muß jenes zeigen, was nicht mehr in Worten dasteht und gesagt ist. Hierbei muß die Auslegung notwendig Gewalt brauchen."

113. With regard to the third stage, we will discuss only what is essential to the determination of Being.

114. Suggested by the expressions: Walten, Überwältigend, Fug.

115. EM, p. 124: "Der Mensch ist genötigt..."

116. EM, p. 125. "Das Sein selbst wirft den Menschen..." In this sense, Heidegger notices that the Greeks were necessitated to their unique "Dasein" by "Being itself." Cf. EM, p. 125.

117. Heidegger uses the term "Brauchen" on p. 124.

118. The fundamental purpose of Heidegger's interpretation of the Greeks consists in showing that being-human is to be understood out of Being itself.

119. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 12A, 107. Heidegger himself usually mentions *Nico. Ethics VI, C3* and 4. In this regard, cf. Walter Biemel, *Martin*

Heidegger (Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1973), p. 114. In “Die Frage nach der Technik”, p. 11, Heidegger almost repeats Aristotle verbatim: “Denn das Anwesende hat den Aufbruch des Her-vor-bringens, z.B. des Aufbrechens der Blüte ins Erblühen in ihr selbst (*ἐν ζαντῶ*). Dagegen hat das handwerklich und künstlerisch Hervor-gebrachte, z.B. die Silberschale, den Aufbruch des Her-vorbringens nicht in ihm selbst, sondern in einem anderen (*ἐν ἄλλῳ*), in Handwerker und Künstler.” But this manner of distinguishing *τέχνη-φύσις*, on Heidegger’s part, is somewhat misleading. As we will see in the following, the above distinction represents a curtailment, for that which is brought forth after the manner of *τέχνη* does not have – or only has – its immediate source (*ἀρχή*) in the craftsman or Artist. The sustaining source of *τέχνη* lies elsewhere.

120. Cf. “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, pp. 47–48, 56; “Wissenschaft und Besinnung” VA I, p. 44; “Der Spruch des Anaximander”, pp. 318–19, 321; “Wozu Dichter”, p. 276; “Logos”, p. 13.

121. Namely, as *ιδέα*, that is, on the basis of most of the texts.

122. BH, p. 147: “Das Verfahren des Überlegens im Dienst des Tuns und Machens.”

123. “Vom Wesen und Begriff der *φύσις*”, p. 326: “. . . der sich auskennende *Vorblick*”.

124. EM, p. 122: “. . . Hinaussein über das bloße Vorhandene”.

125. Cf. “Die Frage nach der Technik”, pp. 12–13.

126. Concerning the notion of “Aesthetics”, cf. N I, pp. 95–96, 93, 195; “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”, p. 69; “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, pp. 16–17, 28; “Nachwort” to “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, p. 66.

127. Cf. especially N I, pp. 95–96.

128. In N I, Heidegger attempts to put the Platonic notion of *μίμησις* in its proper perspective. Cf. “Platons Staat: Der Abstand der Kunst (Mimesis) von der Wahrheit (Idee)”, pp. 198ff.

129. For a brief but essential resume of the History of Idealistic (subjective) Aesthetics, cf. H.G. Gadamer, “Heidegger’s Later Philosophy”, tr. David E. Linge in *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 218ff. The German original may be found in Gadamer’s edition of Heidegger’s “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” (Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1960), pp. 102ff.

130. Cf. Eugen Fink, “Vom Sinne der Arbeit in unserer Zeit”, *Technik und Gesellschaft* (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1968), pp. 91–93. In this article, Fink summarily discusses Greek *τέχνη* and the notion of “Voraussicht”.

131. In contrast to Aristotle, this is what is specific to the Heideggerian analysis.

132. Heidegger translates “Machenschaft”.

133. EM, p. 122: “. . . das anfängliche und ständige Hinaussehen über das je gerade Vorhandene. Dieses Hinaussein setzt in verschiedener Weise und auf verschiedenen Bahnen und in verschiedenen Bereichen das zuvor ins Werk, was dem schon Vorhandenen erst sein verhältnismäßiges Recht, seine mögliche Bestimmtheit und damit seine Grenze gibt. Wissen ist das Ins-Werk-setzen-können des Seins als eines je so und so Seienden.” This text reminds us, though

faintly, of Heidegger's Nietzsche-interpretation. The Will to Power, as a movement, a "Steigerung" to more-power, is also a "Hinaussehen" beyond the "je gerade Vorhandene". In the case of the Will to Power the "je gerade Vorhandene" may be likened to "das Erhaltene", that which is being maintained, having already been acquired. In this regard, we call attention to the word "verhältnismäßig". At any moment, the Will to Power, in accord with its very essence, is *relative* – relative to possibilities of Steigerung. Hence, as the Will to Power, as its own Übermächtigung of "die je erreichte Machtstufe", the Will to Power is always inconstant. Cf. Chapter IV below.

134. There are here two *übers*: the über of *τέχνη*, the latter's transcending of the "je gerade Vorhandene", and what lies über, that is, that out of which *τέχνη* is.

135. Hence as *ιδέα*.

136. Cf. WM (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965), p. 35: "Dieses Hinaussein über das Seiende nennen wir Transzendenz. Würde das Dasein im Grunde seines Wesens nicht transzendieren, das heißt jetzt, würde es nicht im vorhinein in das Nichts hineinhalten, dann könnte es sich nie zu Seiendem verhalten, also auch nicht zu sich selbst." W.J. Richardson refers to the affinity between "Hinaussein" and "Verstehen" in SZ, p. 271, Note 33. Actually in Heidegger's writings a variety of notions have this character of "Hinaussein". To *τέχνη*, Verstehen, and Transzendenz, we may add: *μάθησις*. Cf. FD (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1966), pp. 55ff, 71, 80; and "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", pp. 71–72. Also the notion of "Gerechtigkeit" is termed a "Hinaussehen" and "Hinausgehen". Cf. N II, pp. 27, 326. But in all this Heidegger is not merely emphasizing the metaphysical in man, as one is so wont to think, but much more the ground of this dimension.

137. Be it in the way of *νοεῖν* or *τέχνη*, be it in the manner of Vorstellen or of technological Bestellen.

138. As we will show, this expression may not be simply identified with the expression "Unverborgenheit *des Seins*".

139. This Heideggerian contention to the effect that the concealment of Being follows from the Unconcealment of beings was first expressed in WM, in the notion of the "Verweisen des Nichts". Secondly, and quite generally, the same thesis prevails in the context of Heidegger's interpretation of tradition. Beings are unconcealed, as das Vorgestellte, etc., but such a mode of unconcealment of beings only calls forth Being's concealment. Or in the context of modern technology, beings are revealed (entborgen) as das Bestellte, as Bestand more generally. But again this Unverborgenheit des Seienden (Gen. ob.) is equivalent to the Verborgenheit des Seins (Gen. sub.), a thesis we will return to in Chapter III, Part Two. And yet despite this, and "prior" (*τῆ φύσει*) to this, it must be affirmed that Verborgenheit (das Sich Verbergen) of Being belongs to Being itself – and is precisely not entailed by the Unconcealment of beings. In fact, as we will see, all modes of the unconcealment of beings (as Vorgestelltes, Bestelltes, etc.) within tradition are elicited by Being's keeping to itself (Being's refusal or withdrawal).

140. Cf. Note 133. But at this point the analogy between *τέχνη* as

“Hinaussehen” and the “Will to Power” shows up its inadequacy. In passing, we mention that Heidegger, in the context of his Nietzsche-interpretation, defines “Gerechtigkeit” as “Hinaussehen”. Cf. N I, p. 646; N II, p. 326.

141. Is it not so, on Heidegger’s own view, that any mode of human relatedness is sustained by ἀλήθεια, Being’s “Sich Entbergen”?

142. This is merely a deeply riveted prejudice of a good part of the Heidegger secondary literature. It even claims to have some support in Heidegger’s writings themselves.

143. εἰδέναι.

144. Cf. “Logos”, p. 13.

145. The unity of τέχνη, as a Wissen in the sense of “having-seen”, and the Platonic *ιδεῖν* is unmistakable. Cf., for example, “Wissenschaft und Besinnung”, p. 44: “Platon nennt dieses Aussehen, worin Anwesendes das zeigt, was es ist, εἶδος. Dieses Aussehen gesehen haben, εἰδέναι, ist Wissen.” Cf. also N I, pp. 198ff.

146. “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, p. 47: “... vernehmen des Anwesenden als eines solchen”.

147. “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, p. 48: “Die τέχνη ist als griechisch erfahrenes Wissen insofern ein Hervorbringen des Seienden, als es das Anwesende als ein solches aus der Verborgenheit her eigens in die Unverborgenheit seines Aussehens vorbringt. Τέχνη bedeutet nie die Tätigkeit eines Machens.”

148. Within the context of Heidegger’s Plato-interpretation, the word “Aussehen” (εἶδος) is not exactly univocal. On the one hand “Aussehen” is used synonymously with *ιδέα*, but on the other it is used as particularized, as the “Aussehen” of a being, in which the *ιδέα* shines through.

149. With regard to the notion of τέχνη in Aristotle, cf. Karl Ulmer, *Wahrheit, Kunst und Natur bei Aristoteles* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953); and K. Bartels, “Der Begriff τέχνη bei Aristoteles”, *Synusia* (1965): 275–87.

150. Cf. p. 321: “... τέχνη ist ein Erkenntnisbegriff und besagt das Sichauskennen in dem, worauf jede Anfertigung und Herstellung gründet.”

151. “Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις”, p. 321: “... das εἶδος muß im voraus im Blick stehen, und dieses vorweg erblickte Aussehen – εἶδος προαιρετόν ist das Ende, τέλος, worin die τέχνη sich auskennt.”

152. Speaking of the Platonic notion of *μίμησις* in N I, p. 203, Heidegger remarks that the worker, with regard to the respective *ιδέα*, is “nach-geordnet” – that is, clearly subordinated.

153. We might say with justification: on the basis of Heideggerian Philosophy in general. As far as Heidegger is concerned, no human “Tun” is self-grounded. With the interpretation of τέχνη (or *νοεῖν*) we are already in the context of Heidegger’s re-thinking of thinking as “Entsprechen”.

154. The “work” itself is only secondarily the “in which”.

155. This should not be confounded with ἀλήθεια, Being’s manner of “according itself” (“gewähren”) – or sich Entbergen.

156. “Die Frage nach der Technik”, p. 13: “Das Entscheidende der τέχνη liegt ... keineswegs im Machen und Hantieren, nicht im Verwenden von Mitteln, sondern in dem genannten Entbergen.”

157. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 13. Cf. also "Das Ding", p. 40, whose first part is likewise concerned with reformulating the traditional notion of "causality": "Beim Vorgang des Herstellens muß der Krug allerdings zuvor sein Aussehen für den Hersteller zeigen." Thus, again the preordination of the self-showing of Aussehen.

158. Along with *voeiv* and *legeiv*. Furthermore, we notice that Heidegger, already in SZ, made reference to the primordial experiences of Being and the ways of access to Being. Cf. p. 22. Speaking of the "Destruction" of the history of Ontology, Heidegger remarks: "Diese Aufgabe verstehen wir als die *am Leitfaden der Seinsfrage* sich vollziehende *Destruktion* des überlieferten Bestandes der antiken Ontologie auf die ursprünglichen Erfahrungen, in denen die ersten und fortan leitenden Bestimmungen des Seins gewonnen wurden." Cf. also John Sallis, "Where Does 'Sein und Zeit' Begin", *Heidegger's Existential Analytic* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), p. 42. Closing a remarkable article Sallis states: "Heidegger's thought does not move away from *Being and Time* but rather back to its beginning – in order to attempt a more originary beginning."

159. p. 142.

CHAPTER II

THE PLATONIC ἸΔΕΑ AND ἸΔΕΪΝ

The domain of *φύσις-λόγος* is a primordial one which on Heidegger's view is not yet "metaphysical", provided we conceive of "Metaphysics" as the "Vorstellen" of "beings as such" whereby Being as Being remains unthought. But this preoccupation with "beings as such" or "beings as a whole" lets us encounter two perspectives out of which the "essence" of modern technology may be approached. Is not technology, as Heidegger views it, the unfolding of the fundamental tendency of traditional Metaphysics which seems to have taken over the task of determining the "Being of beings" (the "beingness" of beings) by means of a certain style of "thinking"; that is, of determining the Being of beings subjectively? But more essential: what else issues from the "essence" of technology, if not the preoccupation with beings in the manner of "Bestellen"? Is not technology and the technological Bestellen the consequence of Being's "refusal" ("Verweigerung") or "concealment" ("Verbergung")?¹ The event which inaugurates Being's ownmost "withdrawal", with respect to which modern technological activity is to be considered, begins as soon as Being (in the essential sense of *φύσις*) is interpreted as *ιδέα*. Thus it is sufficiently manifest that Heidegger's Plato-interpretation must concern us.

In keeping with the secondary literature, the thought of Plato for Heidegger may be summed up in the notion of "truth" in its ambiguous character ("Zweideutigkeit") or expressed differently, in the transformation of the meaning of truth from the self-unconcealing of primal Being (the manner in which *φύσις* brings itself to appearance) to the notion of truth as the "correctness of seeing" ("Richtigkeit des Sehens"),² a remarkable shift – and doubtless such an event within the context of Heidegger's interpretation of Metaphysics is fundamental. It

may be noticed here that this representative view of the secondary literature is primarily based on the essay PL; in fact, some presume that this is the only Heideggerian account of Plato. This is as if Heidegger had never published N I and II with whose aid the Heideggerian understanding of Platonic Philosophy may be more adequately elucidated.³ It is our conviction that the notion of truth construed in terms of “correctness”, although indeed significant, is nonetheless not foundational, for this event according to which truth is transformed from the self-unconcealing of *φύσις* to the “correctness” of *ιδέιν* is an unavoidable sequel to the Platonic interpretation of *φύσις* as *ιδέα*. Hence, the need of bringing this foundation into view, together with the two senses of *ιδέιν*.

A. THE PLATONIC *ΙΔΕΑ*: “AFFINITY” AND “DISTANCE”

The terms “affinity” (“Verwandtschaft”) and “distance” (“Abstand”, also “Abfall”) mark a certain “ambiguity” peculiar to the *ιδέα* itself. However, in using the term “ambiguity” we are not alluding to this characteristic whose general sense was given above. Instead, we wish to direct attention to the “ambiguity” of the *ιδέα* itself, conceived of, on the one hand, as pure “presence” (“Anwesenheit”) and, on the other, as “that which renders possible” (“Ermöglichung”).⁴ That is to say, we want to discuss a more essential meaning of “ambiguity” in accord with which *ιδέα* presents itself, in the first place, as the offspring of primal *φύσις*: *ιδέα* as Heidegger interprets it shares in the originality of *φύσις*. But, on the other hand, the Platonic *ιδέα* suggests another direction which itself is two-dimensional: the *ιδέα* and its correlate *ιδέιν* lay the ground for the Cartesian “representedness” (“Vorgestelltheit”) – “representing” and secondly, the *ιδέα*, insofar as it is considered as the “What-being” (“Wassein”) of beings, clears the way for the “Essentia” of “School” Philosophy. Thus, consonant with Heidegger’s interpretation of the Platonic *ιδέα* and its crucial place within the History of Being’s Self-concealment, we will have to discuss three points: (1) the decisive kinship *φύσις-ιδέα*; (2) the *ιδέα* as a kind of precondition for the transmutation of “seeing” into the properly

metaphysical “Vorstellen”; and (3) the *ιδέα* as the origin of the traditional notion of “Essentia”. The second and the third points constitute the cells of what Heidegger calls the “distance” of Being as *ιδέα* from Being as *φύσις*. In view of more clearly and closely characterizing the ambiguity of the *ιδέα* itself, we will begin with the relationship *φύσις-ιδέα*.

From this vantage point, the kinship in question is manifest. To show this we need only recall the principal characteristics of *φύσις* itself as the primordial experience of “Anwesen”. *Φύσις* is the character of self-emerging, of an “appearing” which “lingers”. Greek *φύσις* denotes furthermore an “arising” out of concealment (its own), together with a “return to itself”. All these active determining features signify a certain “permanence” (“Ständigkeit”) or “constancy” (“Beständigkeit”) – which is not yet to describe the mode of this “permanence”.⁵ It is this notion of permanence in general, coupled with the character of “appearing” which Heidegger pushes into prominence when attempting to show up the kinship *φύσις-ιδέα*. For example:

Φύσις is self-emerging Prevaling, that which stands here in itself, is permanence. *Ἰδέα*, Aussehen, as that which is viewed is a determination of that which is permanent.⁶

The same conviction is stated elsewhere but in this case *ιδέα* takes up a relation to “presence” – the presence of *φύσις*.

Because Being is the presence of that which is constant in what is unconcealed, Plato is able to interpret Being as *οὐσία* (beingness) as *ιδέα*.⁷

Ἰδέα, however it may be elaborated upon, is in the first place to be circumscribed with reference to the “permanence” of *φύσις*, which is hardly suggestive of the so-called “falling-away” from the primordial Inception. How does the latter, the falling-away or the distance (more appropriately) begin to assert itself?

The event of falling-away is intimated in that the *ιδέα* is grasped as that which “is viewed in union with that which is visible”⁸ or as “Anblick”.⁹ In other passages, the *ιδέα* is called “das Gesicht”¹⁰ – that is, that which gathers to itself human viewing (not “face”) – the “viewed Aussehen”,¹¹ that “which is viewed by seeing”,¹² “die Sichtigkeit”,¹³ “die Sichtsamkeit”,¹⁴

and lastly as “die Sichtbarkeit”.¹⁵ But what is at work in this continual reference to the visible and correspondingly to “seeing”? How are the visible (what is viewed) and “seeing” related to each other such that Heidegger, in this regard and from an historical perspective, senses a falling-away from the primordial?

It is scarcely a novelty to state that Platonic “seeing”¹⁶ does not advert to the sensuous, the physiological occurrence, which fact is explicitly recognized in EM (p. 138).¹⁷ However, what has to be shown in this regard is that Platonic seeing, in the Heideggerian context, is not to be equated with primordial “apprehending”, nor with “Vorstellen”, which is so central to the Cartesian Philosophy and which, Heidegger insists, characterizes the way of “thinking” of traditional Metaphysics in general.¹⁸ Rather, Platonic seeing lies midway between original apprehending, which epitomizes the human experience of initial *φύσις*, and its radical contraction which the term “Vorstellen” exemplifies. An examination of relevant texts will bear this out. For instance, in EM Heidegger writes the following:

Ἰδέα, Aussehen as that which is viewed, is a determination of that which is permanent, to the extent that it and *only to the extent* that it stands over against a seeing.¹⁹

We underscore the crucial words (Heidegger, in a fashion, underscores the words by repeating them, prefaced by “nur” – “nur sofern es”) which irrefragably suggest a certain reversal, demanding clarification. We note that the passage does not state that a “seeing” is confronted by what is seen, is responsively related to the latter, and is determined with reference to and in terms of it. Quite to the contrary, what is asserted is that “Aussehen” as that which is viewed is a determination of the permanent, *but only on the condition* that it (das Aussehen als das Gesichtete) is related to – and that means relative to – a “seeing”. Thus seeing is not, as original *νοεῖν*, “for the sake of Being” but rather “Being” is clearly subordinated to a seeing, that is, to the human dimension.²⁰ Obviously then, in contrast to Heidegger’s manner of understanding the saying of Parmenides, in which the union of Being and apprehending is expressed, the above quotation says something fundamentally different.

There are two manners of taking account of the relation

seeing-seen (that is, the human element and Being or beingness as *ιδέα*). Either Being is determined by the human act of seeing,²¹ signaling a misinterpretation and a falling-away from the primordial Inception – meaning further that a “consequence of Essence” (“Wesensfolge”) (namely *ιδέα* itself as viewed in the *εἶδος*) is elevated to the rank of “essence”. Or the seen, the self-showing holds sway over the act of “seeing”, constitutes the latter’s very character, in which case such a “seeing” would be closely akin to *νοεῖν*, that is, heedful to its own origin. It need not be said that it is the first alternative which, in accord with Heidegger’s interpretation of tradition, prevails, asserting itself one-sidedly in the Cartesian Metaphysics, only to amplify itself in the domain of modern technology by means of the all-encompassing and all-excluding “Bestellen”.

It may be well to accent the so-called “Abfall” by examining another text which is found in a section of NI entitled “Die Auslegung des Seins als *ιδέα* und der Wertgedanke”. Since in this section it is a question of the relation between the Platonic *ιδέα* and the Nietzschean interpretation of “Being” as “Value”, the ambiguity characteristic of the *ιδέα* is set in a somewhat different light. The point brought out in the preceding paragraph is now expressed as follows:

The ambiguity of Being as Idea (pure presence and that which makes possible) announces itself in the fact that through the Interpretation of Being (*φύσις*) as *ιδέα* the relation to seeing, to human knowing resounds. Being is on the one hand as visible presence, but at the same time that which man brings before himself.²²

Again, we readily discern the affinity between *ιδέα* and *φύσις*. “Being”, that is, the “Being of beings” or “beingness” – *ιδέα* – is as “visible presence”; and “presence” is that in which original presencing²³ presents itself or its “Weise” of shining forth. But the notion of “seeing”²⁴ and visibility suggests an essential limitation as compared with the more original mode of relation called *νοεῖν*. The previously mentioned “reversal” is here indicated in that the notion of seeing is joined with human knowing (“Erkennen” which in SZ is usually called “Erfassen” as distinct from and grounded in primary understanding). The last segment

of the sentence of the passage unmistakably points in the direction of the Cartesian Philosophy: Being (*ιδέα*) is “presence”²⁵ but at the same time that which man poses before himself. In other words, the primordially of Being as *φύσις* is relativized and restricted in its scope as soon as it becomes dependent on “seeing” (“Erkennen”). If we follow up the text being discussed, the mediating character of “seeing” (intermediate between *νοεῖν* and *Vorstellen*) becomes even plainer.

How is it then, when the moment comes when man liberates himself to himself as to that being who represents, in that he brings everything before himself as before the tribunal of constantness? At that time *ιδέα* becomes the perceptum of perceptio; becomes that which the representing of man brings before himself and indeed as the one who makes possible what is to be represented in its representedness. Now the essence of *ιδέα* is turned upside down from visibleness and presence to representedness for and through the one who represents.²⁶

It is noteworthy how Heidegger in this passage circumvents the Middle Ages which is often so when attempting to bring to light, more perspicuously, the relationship between *ιδέα* – *ιδεῖν* and the Cartesian *Vorgestelltheit*–*Vorstellen*.²⁷ The statement concerning the “self-liberation to oneself”, the liberating of oneself from the “certitude of Salvation” (“*Heilsgewißheit*”) to a certitude grounded in the “subject”, will be discussed in the following chapter. But now the following deserves reiteration.

Previously, with reference to the original Greek ways to be (*νοεῖν*, *λέγειν*, *τέχνη*), in contrast to those activities which prevail in Modernity, we pointed out that the former do not will Being as their product but rather acknowledge their essence out of Being. Now the passage in question lucidly expresses this characteristic of the modern: *Vorstellen* wills Being as its product over which it would then presume unrestricted dominion.²⁸ Is it not affirmed that it is the representing activity of man which makes possible the “Being of beings”, that is, in this context, that which is represented in its representedness? Being, according to Heidegger’s manner of questioning, is never exclusively for and never through a subject’s representing, but rather the pre-

condition in order that anything like “representing” takes place.²⁹ In “Das Ding”, we read the following text: “Man can represent, in whichever mode conceivable, only that which first in advance and of itself has lighted itself and thereby shown itself to man in its own light which it has brought with it”³⁰ – a passage which expresses Heidegger’s critique of modernity in the most concise fashion possible.

Thus far, the passages have suggested how “seeing”, instead of bearing witness to the primordial “apprehending” from which it sprang, contributed to the possibility of the supposed domination of man over Being. But Heidegger, in this regard, is speaking of what came to pass within tradition,³¹ not of a more adequate interpretation of Platonic “seeing” itself. With the interpretation of Being as *ιδέα*, the possibility asserts itself that the essence of man is not (so it seems) determined out of the pre-sway of Being but inversely: it is henceforth “Being” (as the “Being of beings” or as “beingness”) which is determined by man, therefore becoming dependent on him.³² In contrast to initial apprehending Platonic “seeing”, traditionally “interpreted”, is no longer “Um des Seins willens”, but rather the stage is set for the full mastery of the subject.

B. A MORE APPROPRIATE INTERPRETATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP *ἸΔΕΑ-ἸΔΕΙΝ*

The traditional manner of “understanding” Platonic seeing as that to which Being becomes “relative” fails to do justice to Plato himself – a fact of which Heidegger takes full cognizance. In N I, we find three sections on Plato,³³ which affords us a more accurate account of Platonic “seeing” – and of the *ιδέα* itself.³⁴ In the following, we will focus attention on the section entitled “Platons Staat: Der Abstand der Kunst (Mimesis) von der Wahrheit (Idee)” in which Heidegger interprets a well-known section of the *Republic* (X, 595aff) – and most specifically on the notion of *ιδείν*. How is the latter to be interpreted with regard to the Platonic *ιδέα* in general? Does *ιδείν* engender *ιδέα* as such, such that *ιδέα* would be “relative” to human *ιδείν* or is it much rather the case that *ιδέα* is, with regard to any possible *ιδείν*, pre-given? Indeed, the latter alternative responds most accurately to

the matter at issue. Heidegger illustrates this in his compressed discussion of the table-maker.

In making the table, the table-maker “brings” the *ιδέα* (of table) “from there to here” (“Her-stellen”), that is, the table-maker “lets” (“läßt”) the *ιδέα* in question come to appearance in “sensuous visibility” (“sinnliche Sichtbarkeit”).³⁵ However, this special “Lassen”³⁶ with which the table-maker is endowed, is always subordinate in a sense; that is, subordinated to the prior givenness of the *ιδέα* itself. The table-maker (any mode of artisanship whatsoever, including “thinking” as far as Heidegger is concerned) is not only incapacitated when it comes to fabricating the *ιδέα*, but what is more: the table-maker must look to the respective *ιδέα* “in order to be precisely what he is: namely, the producer of the table. . . . With regard to the table-maker, the *ιδέα* is *pre-ordained*, which means that he himself is *subordinated* to the Idea”.³⁷ Or as Heidegger makes plain on a following page: any artisan must hold himself “in the realm of the Idea which guides” (“im Bereich der ihn leitenden Idee”) his very activity of making.³⁸

Obviously, what is said here applies not only to *ιδείν* (which is here paradigmatic) but equally to *τέχνη*. In fact, as we emphasized in Chapter I, the latter is precisely a “sighting” in advance of that which gives itself of itself. Accordingly, *ιδείν*, adequately interpreted, joins the primordial modes of *νοεῖν*, *λέγειν*, and *τέχνη*.

C. THE “PRIMACY OF BEINGS” (“VORRANG DES SEIENDEN”)

The above title, if it purports to have anything to do with Platonic Philosophy, must appear strange, for which philosophical doctrine enjoys more agreement than the Platonic teaching that “beings” are *μη ὄντα*. Heidegger is fully aware of this³⁹ but nonetheless insists that “beings” in the Philosophy of Plato somehow assume “primacy”.⁴⁰ Thus we are faced with two states of affairs: beings in their putative primacy, on the one hand, and beings as *μη ὄντα*, on the other. Does this not suggest that beings, the *μη ὄντα*, become the really real? A rather curious doctrine –

all the more so, if it is to be foisted upon one of the greatest thinkers. But it would be advisable to ask how the two statements are to be construed; that is, how do *beings* attain primacy, as Heidegger clearly holds? To work out the question, we must turn again to the *ιδέα* itself.

In addition to what has already been brought forth, the following, which is connected with the “falling-away”, is of equal relevance: the Platonic *ιδέα* signifies the “what-being”⁴¹ of beings. That is, Heidegger detects in the Platonic *ιδέα* two fundamental features which will subsequently characterize the traditional conception of “essentia”, namely, the feature of “universal genus” and that called “possibility” (certainly to be held apart from the same notion in SZ). For our present purpose, we need only discuss summarily the character of “universality.”

We may begin with a “Nachherige”,⁴² with an individual being, for example with a “house”. How is the *ιδέα* of a house, or more appropriately, the *Aussehen* (*εἶδος*) of a house to be elucidated (in traditional fashion)? From the start we notice that the German word “Aussehen” already seems calculated to invite confusion, for “Aussehen”, in the Platonic sense, signifies neither the partial “perspective” beheld by the perceiver, nor does it directly suggest how the house looks or appears.⁴³ The *Aussehen* of a house is first determined in terms of what Heidegger calls “houseness” (“das Haushafte”), which is certainly not a matter of perceptual experience. Furthermore, this so-called “houseness” is not to be confined to an individual house, but rather applies, analogous to the traditional “concept” of Being, to several individual houses as the universal (the so-called “common”) is related to the particular. For this reason, “the *ιδέα* received quite soon the characteristic of *κοινόν*, of what is common to many individuals”.⁴⁴ Hence, it would seem evident that the “what-being” of beings for Plato, according to the current interpretation, as well as for the School Philosophy is bound up with the notion of “universality”.⁴⁵ But even so, we do not notice anything which contributes to the falling-away from the primordial Inception.⁴⁶ Why does the notion of *κοινός* point forward to the *Essentia* of School Philosophy (and to the notion of Being as that which is already included in the concept of anything, to Being as the most universal of concepts) rather than to testify to the primordially of the Greek experience?

Bearing resemblance to the case of Platonic “seeing”, the doctrine of the *ιδέα* as “Was-sein” – which misapprehends the “Unity” of *ιδέα* – runs the risk of the adherence to beings, while Being itself remains unthought, for the *ιδέα*, as “what-being”, as well as the “Essentia” of School Philosophy, determines beings (naturally in their “Being”, but less primordially). And, as we will later stress, to determine “beings” signifies, for Heidegger, so much as: not to attend to another dimension, namely, that of Being as Being – which expression cannot simply mean the most formally universal. Or with reference to the expression “primacy of beings”, the will to determine beings along traditional lines brings with it the “remaining aloof” of Being itself; in one word “Seinsverlassenheit”.

However, in this regard Heidegger’s own notion of “Essence” (“Wesen”) would have to be brought into the account, which to do at this point would be out of place. We mention only that for Heidegger “essence”, the manner in which Being “accords” itself, is the essence of Being itself, not that omnipresent concept contained in the concept of any and all beings. The following passage in which Heidegger puts Plato (or rather Platonism) and Medieval Philosophy in the same confines, as it were, bears this out.

Plato determines the whatness of beings as *ιδέα*. . . . The whatness of beings, the essentia of ens, is also called “Essence”. But this is no accidental and harmless designation. Herein is rather concealed that the Being of beings, that is, the way in which they come to presence, is thought in terms of whatness. “Essence” in the sense of Essentia (Whatness) is already the metaphysical interpretation of “essence” which questions the what of beings as such. And indeed “essence” is here always thought of as the essence of beings. The Being of beings is interrogated in terms of beings. . . .⁴⁷

In a sense which becomes progressively clearer in the following, the essence of beings has to be understood in terms of or out of the essence of Being (“vom Sein her”) – Being’s manner of giving itself which then lets beings appear in its own self-shrouded light.

Heidegger's Plato-interpretation is thoroughly ambiguous owing foremost to the ambiguity of the matter at issue. *ἰδέα* and *ιδέιν* are not only offsprings of the more primordial experience of Being, and thus reflect this more primordial Being, but at the same time progenitors of a tradition which steadily moves away from the primordial. To a large extent, this interpretation occupies itself with the historical "interpretedness" of Platonism and not with Plato himself. The difficulty is compounded in that, for the most part with the exception of those sections found in N I (pp. 189–231), the two are continually intertwined.

NOTES

1. It seems to us quite true to state that the "essence" of technology and that of the antecedent Metaphysics is the "same". In a sense which we will attempt to clarify in Parts One and Two the essence of Metaphysics and technology predetermines Metaphysics and technology. It is well known that Heidegger distinguishes the essence of technology from the technological and from technology; and the same applies to "Metaphysics". The latter, seen "vom Sein her", that is, in its "essence" (or out of its essence), is not determined by individual thinkers, but rather by the manner in which Being (as Seiendheit) währt – hence gewährt. Within and out of the "Same", the differences are accountable for in terms of Being's manner to be, not in terms of man's way to determine Being.

2. Cf. Walter Hirsch, "Platon und das Problem der Wahrheit", *Durchblicke* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970), p. 209. In this noteworthy article and with reference to Heidegger's essay PL, Hirsch summarizes the above-mentioned "Zweideutigkeit" as follows. The ambiguous character of Plato's "theory" of truth consists in the fact "daß Platon für das seinsgeschichtliche Denken Übergang ist, in dem das Alte (kaum verlassen) und das Neue (kaum erreichte) Wesen der Wahrheit in einem selbst übergehenden Zugleich einander berühren: Wahrheit ist bei Platon nicht mehr Unverborgenheit und noch nicht nur Richtigkeit; sie ist gewissermaßen beides und doch keines ganz."

3. N I and II contain the following illuminating texts: "Umkreis und Zusammenhang von Platons Besinnung auf das Verhältnis Kunst und Wahrheit", N I, pp. 189–98; "Platons Staat: Der Abstand der Kunst (mimesis) von der Wahrheit (Idee)", N I, pp. 198–217; "Platons Phaidros: Schönheit und Wahrheit in einem beglückenden Zwiespalt", N I, pp. 218–31; "Das Sein als *ιδέα*, als *ἀγαθόν*, als Bedingung", N II, pp. 223–28. Some additional texts of importance are: "Die Auslegung des Seins als *ιδέα* und der Wertgedanke", N II, pp. 217–20; SA, p. 110; "Moira", p. 48; "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", p. 84. EM, pp. 137–44, remains quite basic. Even though N I and II were published more

than fifteen years ago, these critical texts are systematically overlooked. In an article published in 1974 we read, for example: "Although a quotation from the *Sophist* heads Sein und Zeit and Heidegger alludes to Plato in a variety of contexts, Plato's work as such is the explicit subject of just a single essay", namely, PL. Cf. David White, "Truth and Being: A Critique of Heidegger on Plato", *Man and World* 7 (1974): 118–34. But beforehand Heidegger on Plato is to be considered.

4. Cf. N II, p. 229. The term "Anwesenheit" characteristic of "Anwesen" (Presencing) points back to *φύσις* – as the manner in which *φύσις* is, while *ιδέα* as "Ermöglichung" points historically forward to the notion of "essentia". In lieu of Anwesenheit, Heidegger often describes the *ιδέα* in terms of the permanent or constant – related terms through which the essence of primordial *φύσις* shines.

5. Does not the so-called "permanence" of Being, even as *φύσις*, for the most part, amount to Being's concealment? Is not Being, for Heidegger, that which reveals itself in remaining concealed?

6. EM, p. 139: "*φύσις* ist das aufgehende Walten, das In-sich-dastehen, ist Ständigkeit. *Ἰδέα*, Aussehen als das Gesichtete, ist eine Bestimmung des Ständigen." Another instructive text is found in EM, p. 138: "Das Wort *ιδέα* meint das Gesichtete am Sichtbaren, den Anblick, den etwas darbietet. Was dargeboten wird, ist das jeweilige Aussehen, *εἶδος* dessen, was begegnet. Das Aussehen eines Dinges ist das worin es sich uns, wie wir sagen, präsentiert, sich vor-stellt und als solches vor uns steht, worin und als was es an-west, das heißt im griechischen Sinne *ist*. Dieses Stehen ist die Ständigkeit des von sich her Aufgegangenen, der *φύσις*."

7. N II, p. 217: "Weil das Sein Anwesenheit des Beständigen ins Unverborgene ist, deshalb kann Platon das Sein als *οὐσία* (Seiendheit) als *ιδέα* auslegen." Heidegger's use of Anwesenheit and Seiendheit offers difficulties. In numerous passages, he translates Greek *οὐσία* with Seiendheit; in others (also quite numerous), he renders it with Anwesenheit – which suggests that the two terms are interchangeable. In general, that is, with respect to a large number of passages, Seiendheit names a mode of presence accentuating at once the feature of "Allgemeinheit" of the traditional interpretation of the "Being of beings". To be kept in mind in this regard is the following: in the Philosophy of Heidegger there is no such thing as *pure* presence, but only presence which conceals itself.

8. EM, p. 138: "... das Gesichtete am Sichtbaren".

9. EM, p. 138.

10. EM, p. 139; "Moira", p. 48.

11. N I, p. 195.

12. SA, p. 110: "... in Sehen Gesichtete".

13. N II, p. 217.

14. N II, pp. 226, 239, 230, 237, 470.

15. N II, pp. 217, 224, 225; N I, pp. 204, 215; "Moira", p. 48; PL, p. 131.

16. Cf. John Sallis, *Being and Logos* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1975), p. 383; also p. 152.

17. And in "Die Frage nach der Technik", pp. 19–20; also in N I, p. 177.

18. If *ιδέiv* is not to be identified with “Vorstellen” and if *Vorstellen* designates the traditional, metaphysical manner of thinking at home with itself, then it seems to follow that Platonic Philosophy may not be labeled the “Beginning” of Metaphysics. On the other hand, however, Platonic Philosophy as the “Beginn” of Metaphysics has to be understood in terms of the *ιδέα* and *ιδέiv* ambiguity. Moreover, and in line with Heidegger’s thought, it might be said that Metaphysics begins as soon as *φύσις* emerges – and returns to itself. But Heidegger prefers to distinguish between the “Beginn” and the “Anfang”. In later writings, “tradition” assumes a more comprehensive sense.

19. EM, p. 139: “*Ἰδέα*, Aussehen als das Gesichtete, ist eine Bestimmung des Ständigen, sofern es und nur sofern es einem Sehen entgegensteht.” It is often stated that for Heidegger the platonic *εἶδος* and the *ιδέα* are identifiable. This is hardly the case despite texts which would seem to suggest as much – even which state so explicitly. For example, the text just quoted could be read in that light, that is, misread: “*Ἰδέα*, Aussehen als das Gesichtete. . .” The *ιδέα* is not the Aussehen pure and simple but the latter is that in which the *ιδέα* shines through via the individual being – even if this shining of the *ιδέα* in Aussehen is “obfuscated” and “dulled” (cf. N I, p. 209). To put it in Heideggerian terms, the *ιδέα* presences in the Aussehen of beings. Hence, the *ιδέα* is never viewed in itself but always through the medium of *εἶδος*. Regarding this interpretation of the *ιδέα*, cf. especially N I, pp. 198ff.

20. Cf. EM, p. 140: “Wohl gehört ein Gesichtetes zum Sehen, aber daraus folgt nicht, daß die Gesichtetheit als solche allein das Anwesen des Gesichteten bestimmen solle und könne. Der Spruch Parmenides sagt gerade nicht, das Sein solle von der Vernehmung her, d.h. als nur Vernommenes begriffen werden, sondern Vernehmung sei um des Seins willen.” This passage succinctly expresses the “reversal” mentioned above.

21. Which possibility, as Heidegger emphasizes, *Plato himself excludes*.

22. N II, p. 229: “Die Zweideutigkeit des Seins als Idee (reine Anwesenheit und Ermöglichung) kündigt sich auch darin an, daß durch die Auslegung des Seins (*φύσις*) als *ιδέα* der Bezug auf das Sehen, das Erkennen des Menschen anklingt. Das Sein ist als sichtsame Anwesenheit, aber zugleich das, was der Mensch zu Gesicht bringt.”

23. Cf. N I, p. 211; “*φύσις* ist das anfängliche griechische Grundwort für das Sein selbst im Sinne der von sich her aufgehenden und so waltenden Anwesenheit.”

24. In another passage, Heidegger speaks as though this relation called “seeing” were bound to come to prominence owing to the Greek experience of Being as presence and constancy. Cf. N II, pp. 223–24: “Die Griechen haben das Verhältnis zum Seienden nicht durch das Sein erläutert, weil sie ‘Augenmenschen’ waren sondern sie waren, wenn man schon so will, ‘Augenmenschen’, weil sie das Sein des Seienden als Anwesenheit und Beständigkeit erfahren.” The last word “erfahren” contrasts with the modern vorstellendes Denken, which for Heidegger blocks the path to any more primordial “experience”. Cf. also Heidegger’s Vorlesung (1925/26), Logik, GA II, 21, p. 56.

25. That is, "Durchscheinen" in *εἶδος*.

26. N II, pp. 229–30: "Wie nun, wenn der Augenblick kommt, da der Mensch sich zu sich selbst befreit als zu demjenigen Seienden, was vorstellt, indem es alles vor sich als den Gerichtshof der Beständigkeit bringt? Dann wird *ιδέα* zum perceptum der perceptio; zu jenem, was das Vorstellen des Menschen vor sich bringt und zwar als dasjenige, was das Vorzustellende in seiner Vorgestelltheit ermöglicht. Jetzt schlägt das Wesen der *ιδέα* von der Sichtsamkeit und Anwesenheit um in die Vorgestelltheit für und durch den Vorstellenden..."

27. Cf. also "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", pp. 211, 218; and "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung", p. 180. But there is an evident reason for this circumvention of the Middle Ages, for the medieval mode of relatedness to Being, that is, to "actualitas" in its purest form (*actus purus*), hardly fits in well with the Heideggerian "project" ("Entwurf") of the History of Metaphysics in general, at least not on this score. In fact, the medieval mode of relatedness is more akin to the primordial relation *φύσις-νοεῖν*, with one slight (but for Heidegger decisive) alteration: human responsiveness is not toward a self-emerging *φύσις* but rather it is a relation to a "uncaused cause", a relation whose possibility is granted by "grace". Another decisive difference as far as Heidegger's philosophy is concerned, lies in the notion of causality – the very scaffold of Medieval thinking – but hardly preponderant in the context of the primordial. In this, too, it is somewhat surprising that Heidegger (at least in his published writings) does not discuss Aristotle's *περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς* in which thought is likened to a "seeing" – is thought in analogy with "seeing" (*ὁρῶν*). Cf. 431bff. It seems to us that this would have made the transition to the Middle ages smoother and, then too, we discern more clearly the movement from the Medieval theory of "Abstraction" to the Cartesian *Vorstellen*.

28. Cf. H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (London: Sphere Books, 1972), pp. 84ff, and *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 144ff. Comparable with, but likewise to be set in contrast with Heidegger's Analysis, Marcuse understands the historical unfolding of the human *λόγος* as that of the unfolding of the "Logic of domination" – the *λόγος* as "ordering, classifying, mastering reason". Regarding Heidegger and Marcuse, cf. Hans Sachsse, "Was ist Metaphysik: Überlegungen zur Freiburger Antrittsvorlesung von M. Heidegger und ein Exkurs über seine Frage nach der Technik", *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 28 (1974): 90; Rolf Ahlers, "Technologie und Wissenschaft bei Heidegger und Marcuse", *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 25 (1971): 575ff; and M. Zimmerman, "Beyond Humanism: Heidegger's Understanding of Technology", *Listening* 3 (1977): 78.

29. We mention here that in PL the interpretation of *ιδεῖν* shows up the same line of thought as just presented. As a sequel to the transformation of *φύσις* and the latter's unconcealment into *ιδέα*, unconcealment itself gets "harnessed in a relation to seeing" and thus becomes "relative" to the latter. The outcome is forthcoming, namely the possibility of the transformation of "truth" from the self-revealing of Being to a sort of "seeing" in its "correctness" – that is, the danger lies ready that "seeing" becomes the standard of the true.

Concerning PL, M. Gelven relates the following: "It is in this work that Heidegger sees Plato establishing a theory of truth which is 'under the yoke of the Idea' – that is, a theory of truth which forever locks truth to an entity rather than in the Understanding of Being as such. Such an interpretation of Plato is demonstrably false." Cf. "Eros and Projection: Plato and Heidegger", *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 3 (1973): 125. It is quite correct that Heidegger affirms that unconcealment "stands already under the yoke of the idea" – which suggests for Heidegger that unconcealment is to become (certainly not at the hands of Plato) "relative" to a "seeing", to man. But if it were true that truth gets "locked" to an entity – and Gelven means thereby a "Seiendes" – then Heidegger in PL would hardly be endeavoring to show up the distance between *φύσις* and *ιδέα*. Indeed, the distance consists precisely in the fact that *ιδέα* is "locked", that is, is subjected to a "seeing" – but we repeat, this is not Plato's doing.

30. p. 43: "Vorstellen kann der Mensch, gleichviel in welcher Weise nur solches, was erst zuvor von sich her gelichtet und in seinem dabei mitgebrachten Licht sich ihm gezeigt hat."

31. To believe that Heidegger "philosophizes with a hammer" with regard to Plato is an unfortunate misunderstanding. Cf. Stanley Rosen's comments in "Panel Discussion", *On Heidegger and Language* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 268. That this is so, becomes lucid in Section B.

32. We notice here that man's determination of Being is never the case. The interpretation of Being's beingness as *ιδέα* or as "representedness", as "Will to Power", or as "Ge-stell", are not man's determination of Being – at most his determination of "beings as such" – but rather are themselves grounded in Being's manner of according itself, i.e. of concealing itself. Hence, on Heidegger's view, any Philosophy of Subjectivity remains forgetful of its ownmost source.

33. pp. 189–231.

34. Concerning the Platonic *ιδέα*, upon which we will not expatiate here, the following point may be underscored. Heidegger especially and with justification emphasizes the character of the "unity" or "oneness" of the *ιδέα*. Cf. also in this regard the important contribution of John Sallis, *Being and Logos* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1975), pp. 145ff, 382ff.

35. Cf. N I, p. 204.

36. Cf. N I, p. 204: "Anfertigen heißt daher: das Aussehen selbst in einem anderen, dem Anfertigen, zum sich-zeigen-Bringen, das Aussehen 'Herstellen', nicht es selbst anfertigen, sondern es erscheinen lassen." However, even this "erscheinen lassen" given to one who "produces" is, in its turn, dependent on the "Lassen" of the *ιδέα* itself. "Das Hergestellte 'ist', weil die Idee es als ein solches sehen, im Aussehen anwesen, d.h. 'sein' läßt."

37. N I, p. 203: "... um der zu sein, der er ist: Hersteller des Tisches... Die Idee ist ihm *vor*-geordnet, und er ist ihr *nach*-geordnet."

38. Cf. N I, p. 204.

39. Cf. EM, p. 140; N I, pp. 189, 441–42; N II, pp. 277, 218, 408.

40. Cf. N II, p. 486: "Die Seiendheit, beginnend als *ιδέα*, eröffnet den

Vorrang des Seienden hinsichtlich der Wesensprägung der Wahrheit, deren Wesen zum Sein gehört.”

41. Cf. KM (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1951), p. 202; EM, pp. 138, 140; PL, pp. 127, 131; “Die Frage nach der Technik”, pp. 19–20; N I, pp. 177, 208–9; 541–43; N II, pp. 345, 218, 488, 413.

42. Heidegger distinguishes between a “Nachherige”, i.e. the individual being, and the Vorherige”, i.e. the a Priori, the pre-given Being (the *ιδέα*).

43. The Aussehen is that of the *ιδέα*, is the mirroring of the *ιδέα* in the particular; hence, in a sense the *εἶδος* lets the “looks” of the *ιδέα* shine forth.

44. N II, p. 218: “... erhält die *ιδέα* alsbald die Kennzeichnung des *κοινόν*, dessen was vielen Einzeln gemeinsam ist.”

45. Cf. N I, p. 198ff.

46. As we remarked earlier, the conception of *ιδέα* as “Was-sein” is one of the perspectives from which the “Abfall” may be interpreted.

47. Cf. N II, p. 345: “Die Washeit des Seienden bestimmt Platon als die *ιδέα*. . . . Die Washeit des Seienden, die *essentia* des ens, nennt man auch ‘das Wesen’. Aber das ist keine zufällige und harmlose Benennung. Darin verbirgt sich vielmehr, daß das Sein des Seienden, d.h. die Weise, wie es west, aus der Washeit gedacht wird. ‘Wesen’ in der Bedeutung von *essentia* (Washeit) ist bereits die metaphysische, nach dem Was des Seienden als solchen fragende Auslegung des ‘Wesens’. Und zwar wird ‘das Wesen’ hier stets gedacht als das Wesen des Seienden. Das Sein des Seienden ist erfragt vom Seienden *her*. . . .”

CHAPTER III

DESCARTES: THE “BEGINNING” OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY

The possibility and the grounds of the possibility of falling-away from the primordial Inception – which possibility is prefigured in the Platonic Interpretation of Being as *ιδέα* in accordance with which unconcealment, i.e. the truth Being, becomes “relative” to the subjective – asserts itself as the prevailing reality at the outset of modernity. It is “demanded” (“*gefordert*”)¹ of Descartes that man become the “subject” in an unprecedented sense in order to provide a new foundation for an equally novel determination of “freedom”. Such an event, which is no less than decisive for traditional “Metaphysics”, did not, however, come to pass overnight, but has its most immediate source in a tradition predominately influenced by the “Platonic-Aristotelian” way of thought. This proximate source, whose understanding is indispensable for Heidegger’s Descartes-Interpretation, will be called the tradition of “reality” (“*Wirklichkeit*”).²

A. THE NOTION OF “REALITY”

As a point of departure³ we will take the Heideggerian sketch of the “Being of beings” (of “beingness”) as “Reality”,⁴ for it is this which is predeterminative with respect to the transformation of “truth” to “certitude” (“*Gewißheit*”) carried through in the Cartesian Philosophy.⁵ In the German Philosophical literature, the term “*Wirklichkeit*” is the usual – and accounted as the appropriate⁶ – translation of the Aristotelian *ἐνέργεια*. It is somewhat supererogatory to remark that Heidegger does not altogether accede. Rather than to regard “*Wirklichkeit*” as an adequate rendering of *ἐνέργεια*, Heidegger considers this translation as suggestive of its “irrevocable transformation”⁷ – but

nonetheless as a transformation and as such still bound up, after a fashion, with *ἐνέργεια*.⁸ In view of briefly contrasting *ἐνέργεια* and the notion of reality, we will survey Heidegger's texts concerning the "particular" in Aristotle.

Aristotle calls the particular *τόδε τι*, which Heidegger characterizes in the following manner:

... as that which, having come to stand, stands in constancy or lies before. That which is constant and lying before, having come forward in unconcealment, is in each instance this and that – a *τόδε τι*.⁹

Or to further delimit the *τόδε τι* we may recall the term *ὑποκείμενον* and this conceived, in the first place, in a general sense embracing all that "lingers"¹⁰ in a manner other than the *συμβεβηκότα*. Heidegger clarifies this by using the example of a house. A house which "has been produced according to its *Aussehen*"¹¹ and is thus "set out in the unconcealed" lies before as *ἔργον*. This latter, whether it be the *ἔργον* of a house or of a tree, is characteristic of a certain manner of "presencing". But in this, how is the pointed contrast between *ἐνέργεια* and "reality" brought out? The following words are most helpful:

Presence, *ουσία*, means ... *ἐνέργεια*: that which presences in the work as work ... or in workness. This latter does not signify reality as the result of an effecting.¹²

If we are to grasp *ἐνέργεια* in its Greek sense, we must remain on our guard against assuming that it is some sort of *effected* product, that it exhausts itself as a caused effect. To think *ἐνέργεια* of an *ἔργον* as that which gets effected through the agency of something like an "efficient cause", is to think the Greek in Latin, insists Heidegger. And in consequence, *ἔργον* would be construed in the disfigured sense of an "opus" of an "operare" (as "actus" of "agere").¹³ Hence *ἔργον*, that is, a being as *ἔργον*, would be:

... no longer that which is opened in the openness of presencing but rather that which has been effected in effecting, that which has been accomplished in doing. The essence of the work is no longer "workness" in the sense of a distinguished presencing in the open, but the reality of

something real – that which is mastered in effecting and which gets harnessed in the process of effecting. Being is now, having progressed out of the beginning essence of *ἐνέργεια*, actualitas.¹⁴

As cursory as our exposition may be in this regard, it has nevertheless become evident in what sense *ἐνέργεια* is set in contrast with “reality”. But it hardly suffices to declare that a current translation is un-Greek and hence the question urges itself: why is the term “Wirklichkeit” a misleading account of *ἐνέργεια*? A first reply has already been proffered: on Heidegger’s view such a rendering fails to observe that the Greek determination of Being is in no wise primarily determined by “causality”, the latter being understood “traditionally” as an “effecting”. That which lies before us (*das Vorliegende*) is not in the first place to be conceived as that which is effected, but rather as a coming to presence – whether the manner of the latter be that of *φύσις* or of *τέχνη*. But in all this why does Heidegger feel compelled to discredit the traditional scheme of cause-effect understood as a “Wirken”?¹⁵

It is essentially the same state of affairs as implied in the Platonic “seeing” as the prominent mode of access to Being. As we pointed out, when this prerogative accrues to “seeing”, the human, subjective element tends to gain jurisdiction over “Being”. The cause-effect scheme presents the very same possibility, which Heidegger at all costs wants to undermine. In the essay “Die Frage nach der Technik” (p. 8), in which the notion of causality is reformulated, it is remarked that the “*causa efficiens*” has become a sort of standard. And is this not a rather obvious consequence? Once the effecting of something is carried out, it is unavoidable, according to a traditional manner of thinking, to posit the cause, and indeed as that in which the effect has its ground. It is precisely this possibility of the priority of the efficient cause (the “subject” in a more restricted sense), that Heidegger constantly attempts to undertone by endeavoring to show how the human element, from the very outset, is taken up in the “appealing claim” (“*Anspruch*”) of the pre-given. First the acknowledgement of that which is pre-given and thereupon the appropriate “responsiveness” to it constitutes the most essential task of being human.

B. THE SECOND DETERMINATION OF THE NOTION OF REALITY

Thus far, it has been clarified that “reality”, that is, the “actualitas” of the Medievals, is opposed to Greek *ἐνέργεια*, for the former is thought in terms of the cause-effect scheme. What is “real” is what is effected (with the one exception of the “uncaused cause”) and effecting. But the notion of reality must be scrutinized more closely, whereby two pertinent concepts will be brought into focus: the concepts of the “certitude of Salvation” and that of “Freedom”.

The notion of the “certitude of salvation” refers us directly to the most exalted efficient cause, to the highest instance of “reality”; indeed to the God of Metaphysics. For the God of Metaphysics embodies “in all its purity” the notion of causality not merely owing to his creative activity, but also by reason of his distinction as the “highest good” (hence as “final cause”).¹⁶ In the present context, the only fitting term is “pure act”, God as “pure and always fulfilled self-realization”.¹⁷

God is, as pure act, pure reality and thereby the causality of everything that is real; that is, the source and stead of salvation which as blissfulness guarantees eternal existence.

Man can never of himself and in an absolute manner become certain and be certain of this salvation.¹⁸

This is Heidegger’s fashion of bringing out the notion of contingency, a contingency which calls forth the necessity of “actus purus”, the first and highest cause. From “him”, that is, “never” from himself alone, does man receive his certitude; a certitude, then, which is grounded in its origin: *Heilsgewißheit*.¹⁹ We are here still quite removed from the notion of a “subject” as the self-certifying ground.

C. THE CARTESIAN TASK

1. Preliminary

In the context of Heidegger’s interpretation of the History of Metaphysics, the Philosophy of Descartes occupies a special place, for it is first with Descartes that the subjective attains to its

unquestioned dominion which then culminates in Nietzsche's representation of the Being of beings, i.e. "beings as a whole", as the Will to Power. For Heidegger, Descartes' manner of thinking heralds the "beginning" of the "consummation" of Metaphysics,²⁰ and we notice that technology itself is called in a text which dates from this same period "Metaphysics in the process of consummating itself".²¹ Accordingly, it may be affirmed that the Cartesian Metaphysics marks the "beginning" of modern technology. To specify how this is to be understood will be the task of the following.

We have already employed the decisive expression, namely, the dominion of the subjective. But how does this dominion of the subject announce itself? How is it possible that at the dawn of modernity the subjective assumes (or pretends to assume) dominion over what is.²² Such a question becomes all the more pressing if we remind ourselves that hitherto the term "subject" was not exclusively, nor even primarily, applicable to man, but was understood more generally, including stones, plants, animals, God – in short, diverse "subjects" in the sense of substrata, the latinized version of Greek *ὑποκείμενον*.

In its more primordial sense, *ὑποκείμενον* signifies "each thing which lingers of itself and hence lies before".²³ Again, we observe the phrase "von sich her" ("of itself") intended to stave off any association with "causality" in its traditional sense. Indeed, with the above concise formulation we are reminded of initial *φύσις*, for the description given here coincides perfectly with Heidegger's characterization of this most primordial manifestation of Being which is fundamentally a self-emerging lingering.²⁴ But it is this primordial indeterminateness which begins to mutate itself as soon as the beingness of beings becomes actualitas. Therewith, *ὑποκείμενον* undergoes its first decisive contraction.

The "subiectum", even if it is a "faithful" translation of the Greek, says something quite different from the original sense of *ὑποκείμενον*. "The subiectum is that which im actus is underlaid and thrown under, which then may take on others."²⁵ For Heidegger, there is no little difference between the term "Vorliegen" proper to primordial *ὑποκείμενον* (as well as to primordial *λόγος*) and the terms "das Untergelegt" and "das

Unterworfenen”, descriptive of “subiectum”.²⁶ What has been underlaid has been so by another; hence, is already a caused effect and qua effect may then serve as “ground” for “others”, that is, for “accidents”.²⁷ Traditionally, this underlaid ground or fundament is commonly known as “substans”:

Subiectum and substans mean the same – that which is really permanent and real which then measures up to the notions of reality and permanence and is thus called substantia. It is from the point of view of substantia that the essence of *ὑποκείμενον*, of that which of itself lies before, is soon to be interpreted. *Ὀὐσία*, presence is thought as substantia.²⁸

We notice how, even here in Heidegger’s assertions about subiectum and substantia, the primordial is still echoed, which may be clearly perceived in the expression “Ständige”, originally determinative of *φύσις*, no less that in the term “presence” – that is, primordial Being’s manner of absence. On the other hand, the term “das Wirkliche” (and its “Wirklichkeit”) suggests the distance between the primordial and that in which the primordial conceals itself. The “constancy” of the presence of presencing takes the stage as the “real”, that is, as caused substance.²⁹

Yet in keeping with the Heideggerian interpretation, the signification of *ὑποκείμενον* undergoes its still more crucial restriction when man, unique among all other substantia, appears on the scene as “subject” in quite a privileged sense. What should “privileged” mean in this context? Which role does man assume so that the title “subject” becomes characteristic of him? And before that, why must man become “subject” in this special sense?

According to Heidegger, the oncoming of this latter event lies in the fact that it is exclusively man who is capable of satisfying the demand for a “fundamentum absolutum inconcussum veritatis”, that is, for “an unshakeable ground of truth in the sense of certitude – a ground which reposes in itself”.³⁰ Noteworthy in this regard is the addition intended to clarify the thought expressed in Latin: “in the sense of certitude”. The primordial notion of “truth”, the unconcealment of *φύσις* itself, has become “certitude”, a “certitude” which is “secured” and “guaranteed” by the subject. And with respect to the more proximate medieval

conception of truth, epitomized by the expression “Heilsgewißheit”, i.e. a certitude whose ground is provided by the highest reality, we notice the omission of the prefix “Heils”, an omission which suggests a short-cut on the way to truth. Man no longer requires the detour via the truth of faith in order to hold fast his being-certain. Rather, at the break of Modernity he himself is equal to the task of securing his own ground – and this moreover “from and out of himself” (“vom ihm selber her”).³¹ Furthermore, it is not merely that man as subject guarantees what should count as “true” in the sense of “certain”, but man grounds his own truth, his own being, in that he “thinks” in the sense of *Vorstellen*. Thus, man becomes the “most permanent” of beings.

In this same connection and by way of emphasis Heidegger speaks of the new notion of “freedom” which prevails at the opening of Modernity, to wit, “freedom” as self-certitude.³² The realisation of such a freedom involves, initially, a “liberation from” the certitude grounded in God. But this detachment from the source of truth and human security represents merely the “darkside” (“Nachtseite”) of the new freedom. Its reverse side, the so-called “Tageseite”, consists in a “liberation to . . .”,³³ that is, in a freeing of man *to himself* as the ground and guarantor of “certitude”. Heidegger summarizes as follows:

Now Being-free means that man posits, in the place of the certitude of salvation – which had set the pace for all truth – such a certitude in virtue of which he becomes certain of himself as the being who in this manner poses himself on and as his own ground.³⁴

Moreover, it should be noticed that notwithstanding its newness and decisiveness, the beginning of modernity should not be conceived of as some sort of total break with the Middle Ages. Analogous to the transition from *φύσις* to *ιδέα*, the new notion of truth as self-certitude is to be grasped as a “necessary sequel”³⁵ to the appearance of beingness as actualitas in conjunction with the latter’s “truth”. In the section of N II entitled “Der Wandel der Wahrheit zur Gewißheit”, Heidegger expresses this in the following manner:

This demand for the self-securing of his own natural

permanency which is to be carried out by man does not however originate in a sort of rebellion against the doctrine of faith, but quite to the contrary is the necessary consequence issuing from the notion of the highest truth in the sense of the certitude of salvation.³⁶

Thus, the specific “certitude” characteristic of modernity has been well prepared, even though, as it seems, Heidegger is hard put to exhibit the “necessity” attaching itself to the transition from “Heilsgewißheit”.³⁷

2. *The Execution of the Task*

At present we must explore this being-the-subject which with Descartes³⁸ displays the essential “nature” of man. What is it about man which enables him, unique among subjects, to serve as the self-grounding ground³⁹ of “Being” and “truth”? A reply is forthcoming: man is able to become “subject” by virtue of his specific manner of thinking which Heidegger likes to designate with the German word “Vorstellen”. With regard to Heidegger’s interpretation of Western Thought it would be no easy undertaking to exaggerate the importance of this activity on the part of man. Indeed, for Heidegger the metaphysical mode of relatedness to “Being”, that is, to Being’s concealment (beingness) may be described as “Vorstellen” whose peculiar character was adumbrated in the twofold nature of Platonic “seeing”. Moreover, as already mentioned, it is the notion of “Vorstellen” which is the precursor of modern “Herstellen” (cf. “Wozu Dichter”, and Chapter II, Part Two) and of technological “Bestellen”, which express the dominant human activity in the context of the modern world.

In the essay “Das Cogito Descartes’ als me Cogitare”,⁴⁰ Heidegger interprets the celebrated phrase “Cogito ergo sum”, his prime concern consisting in the clarification of the diversified sense of the term “cogito”, “to represent”. Representing involves first of all a “bringing to oneself” (“Auf sich zu bringen”) or a “delivering over to the self” (“Zustellen”). By this means, that which is to be “represented”, “set before”, gets conducted to the “one representing” (“der Vorstellende”), that is, to the subject but in such a manner that the latter “disposes over” (“verfügt

über”)⁴¹ what is represented, an occurrence in which the contrast between *νοεῖν*⁴² (or *λέγειν* or *τέχνη*) and *Vorstellen* is clearly evidenced. In the very same tone, Heidegger, in “Der Wandel des *ὑποκείμενον* zum subiectum”, clarifies this “auf sich zu” as fundamentally a sort of “effecting” (“Wirken”).⁴³ Hence, that which is represented is likened to an “effect”,⁴⁴ which point again serves to distinguish between the primordial and the modern, that is, beings as *Anwesenden* to which apprehension (*νοεῖν*) belongs and beings as that which gets effected in the representing activity of man.⁴⁵ That which presences is now grasped as that which is set before the subject, i.e. as “object”.⁴⁶

But given this first activity of *Vorstellen*, namely, the “delivering over” through which the subject comes to dispose over what he has brought before himself, one is still far from the required “certitude”, even if the so-called “Zustellen”⁴⁷ is the first and indispensable step. It is not merely a question of a “delivering over”, but more than this: what is delivered over must be “secured” (“sichergestellt”) by the subject. The subject has it to control the admission of that which may be recognized, once and for all, as “certain”, that is, as secured. No mention is made of the well-known Cartesian criterion of “clearness” and “distinctness” which is decisive in this regard; Heidegger seems less than intent on emphasizing the attributes of clearness and distinctness, for these are manners in which something presents itself. Rather his principal aim is to call attention to the domineering role of the subject.⁴⁸ What is “secured”, after having been delivered over, is not so secured in that it presents itself with necessity – which seems consonant with Descartes’ theory of truth – but rather, as Heidegger construes the matter in historical, traditional setting, owing to subjective decision. In a word and in analogy with *one* of the meanings of Platonic “seeing”, the “subject” is not responsive to the given, but the given, being for and through the subject, is relative to the latter – which is not to say that this intends to state the most appropriate view of Descartes himself. Again, Heidegger is accenting that which prevailed traditionally, not a more adequate interpretation.

This “securing”, which is achieved by the subjective act of representing and which Heidegger elsewhere underscores as a fundamental feature of modern technology,⁴⁹ indicates the

significance of this human act, for it is only in virtue of this capacity that man may venture the first step out of the bindingness of Faith. By means of the act of “Vorstellen”,⁵⁰ man begins to procure for himself (and through himself) a certain security, that is, a mastery over what is.

But the subject’s securing of what is represented or posed before, that is, the process of establishing certitude vis-à-vis the “object”, is not foundational. Rather, the foundation consists of a self-securing – the securing on the part of the subject of himself as the ground for the securing of “objects”.⁵¹ As the title of the essay under discussion unequivocally states “cogitare” signifies first and foremost “me cogitare” (“sich vorstellen”), which constitutes what Heidegger calls the “Grundgewißheit”. The act of representing, that is, of objectifying (or rather of subjectifying) beings as such, presupposes the prior bedrock of the subject itself. How could something be represented if the subject as the one representing were not already given?⁵²

At this point, however, Heidegger seemingly confounds matters by making use of the word “Mitvorstellen” – that is, together with the representing of something, the self is concomitantly posited, that is, posits itself. Does the “sich” precede, in a sense, the representing of something, as Heidegger seems to affirm, or is it rather a question of the co-representing of the “sich”? Surely, the “Mit” in “Mitvorstellen” denotes “at the same time” or “simultaneously”, not “in advance” implied by the expressions “Zum voraus” and “zuvor”. Heidegger writes:

However in such positing before itself the act of representing in each case and necessarily *co*-posits itself; and indeed not subsequently and as an object of sorts, but in advance and as the one to whom everything must be delivered over and in whose circumference alone suchlike may be held secure.⁵³

The priority of the self as that which already grounds the representation of something is not to be understood in terms of mere chronology, nor “epistemologically” – or in any logical sense, but instead “ontologically”. This is the sense of the self’s co-being-represented in representing to which Heidegger refers as the “Grundgewißheit” – the *a priori* ground for the certitude of what is represented.

Thereby we are in a better position to grasp the fuller significance of the expression “auf-sich-zu”, that “back to itself” connected with the meaning of “delivering over” of the act of *Vorstellen*. This does not merely consist in the consignment of the object to a subject; it is, at once, the delivering-over of the subject to itself, that is, the subject’s own constant self-grounding. Or, as Heidegger states in “Der Wandel des *ὑποκείμενον* zum subiectum”, the “delivering-over”, which as mentioned is an “effecting”, is more essentially a “self-effecting” (“Sich Erwirken”) in the very act of “effecting”.⁵⁵

In concluding we may recall the primordial experience of Being as *φύσις*. *Φύσις*, which Heidegger frequently calls “das Anwesen”, together with “das Anwesende”, is never to be conceived of as some “effect”. Meanwhile, in the circuit of Cartesian thought and subsequent tradition, the crucial dimension of the “von sich Her”, determinative for *φύσις*, seems to have vanished. Or rather to state the matter more exactly: the fundamental feature of primordial Being, that character of coming to appearance, of self-emerging to which man needs respond, has been purportedly usurped by man as “subject”, for it the subject who “from and out of itself” is to serve as self-grounding ground.⁵⁶ It is the subject who becomes the most “permanent” or “constant” of beings; and secondly and inseparably therefrom, that which gets certified *by* the subject as “certain”. “Being”, that is, “beingness”, which Heidegger calls in this context “representedness”,⁵⁷ signifies then primarily the subject itself, this self-effecting ground, inclusive of what the subject, in representing, “secures” as *its* “effect”. Indeed, “representedness” comprises these two so intimately that the distinction subject-object forfeits its usual signification; for there is no “object” which is not subjective. With the ascendancy of the act of *Vorstellen*, the primordial Greek manner of apprehending the pre-given has irreversibly paled.⁵⁸ The so-called “Sammlung in die Not” (human *λέγειν*) has become the “co-agitatio” of representational thinking.

NOTES

1. With regard to this "demand" or "requirement" ("Forderung"), cf. FD, p. 81; "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", pp. 99–100; N II, pp. 148, 428ff.

2. The term "Reality" should not be thrown together indiscriminately with the "Realitätsproblem" within the context of SZ, nor that of "Geltungslogik", which Heidegger discusses in GA II, 21.

3. Regarding Heidegger's Descartes-interpretation, we will concentrate attention on texts subsequent to SZ. The following are most illuminating: "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", pp. 91–92, 99–103; "Die Herrschaft des Subjekts in der Neuzeit", N II, pp. 141–47; "Das Cogito Descartes' als me cogitare", N II, pp. 145–58; "Descartes' Cogito Sum", N II, pp. 158–69. As preparatory, the following texts are useful: "Der Wandel der Wahrheit zur Gewißheit", N II, pp. 421–29; "Der Wandel des *ὑποκειμενον* zum subiectum", N II, pp. 429–36; FD, pp. 76–82; "Die innere Zusammenhang der Grundstellungen von Descartes und Nietzsche", N II, pp. 189–92; "Moira", pp. 30–31, 33; "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", pp. 224–27. With regard to Heidegger's Descartes-interpretation in SZ and its relationship to the later interpretation, cf. F. Von Herrmann, "Sein und Cogitationes. Zur Heideggers Descartes-Kritik", *Durchblicke* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970), pp. 235ff.

4. In this context – Medieval Period and Cartesian Philosophy – the term "Reality" is Heidegger's rendering of "actualitas" and intends to lay accent on the dominance of the notion of "causality" as a "Bewirken" of beings. Heidegger discusses the "Kausalitätscharakter der Wirklichkeit", especially in N II, pp. 415ff. Cf. also N II, p. 472: "In der 'Wirklichkeit', die zum beherrschenden Grundzug der Seiendheit des Seienden wird, liegt Wirken und damit causalitas. . ."

5. Cf. N II, p. 425: "... dieser Wandel des Wesens der Wahrheit von der Richtigkeit der denkenden Aussage zur Gewißheit des Vorstellens ist durch das Wesen des Seins als Wirklichkeit vorbestimmt." We note that in this stage of the Heideggerian reflection of Being's shining-through, what counts is to make explicit the radicalization of the "correctness of seeing" in the notion of "truth" as grounded in the human manner of Vorstellen.

6. Cf., for example, H.G. Gadamer's translation of *Aristoteles. Metaphysik XII* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970). F. Schwarz translates *ἐνέργεια* with "Verwirklichung". Cf. *Aristoteles. Metaphysik* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1970).

7. Cf. N II, p. 421: "unwiderrufflicher Wandel".

8. Cf. N II, pp. 413–14. The continuity between *ἐνέργεια* and "Wirklichkeit" (actualitas) is clearly discernible in the following text: "Die actualitas bewahrt über den unbestimmten Bezug zum Werk hinaus nichts mehr vom Wesen der *ἐνέργεια*. Und dennoch waltet in der actualitas noch das beginnliche Wesen des Seins, sofern das Wassein als *ἰδέα* bestimmt ist."

9. N II, p. 403: "... als jenes, was zum Stand gekommen, in einer Beständigkeit steht oder vorliegt. Das in die Unverborgenheit hervorgekommene Beständige und Vorliegende ist jeweilen dieses und jeweilen jenes, ein *τόδε*

τι.” It is patent that such a determination of *τόδε τι* might just as well describe *φύσις* in its most original sense.

10. Cf. N II, p. 406. We recall that “Verweilen” characterizes primordial *φύσις*.

11. “in sein Aussehen her-gestellt”.

12. N II, p. 404: “Die Anwesenheit, *ουσία*, heißt ... *ἐνέργεια*: das im Werk als Werk-Wesen (Wesen verbal begriffen) oder die Werkheit. Diese meint nicht die Wirklichkeit als Ergebnis eines Wirkens ...”

13. N II, p. 412.

14. N II, p. 412: “... nicht mehr ins Offene des Anwesens Freigelassene sondern das im Wirken Gewirktes, im Tun Geleistete. Das Wesen des ‘Werkes’ ist nicht mehr die ‘Werkheit’ im Sinne des ausgezeichneten Anwesens in das Freie sondern die Wirklichkeit eines Wirklichen, das im Wirken beherrscht und in das Vorgehen des Wirkens eingespannt wird. Das Sein ist, aus dem beginnlichen Wesen der *ἐνέργεια* fortgegangen, zur actualitas geworden.”

15. Aside from the fact that “Wirken” is derivatory of the primordial.

16. Heidegger refers to a text by Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theo*, I, Q 1–23. Cf. N II, p. 416. With regard to Heidegger’s discussion of Aquinas the GA II, esp. Vol. 24, is also helpful.

17. Cf. N II, p. 415: “... reine, stets erfüllte Verwirklichung”.

18. N II, p. 423: “Gott ist als actus purus die reine Wirklichkeit und damit die Ursächlichkeit alles Wirklichen, d.h. der Quell und die Stätte des Heils, das als Seligkeit ewigen Bestand verbürgt. Dieses Heils kann der Mensch nie von sich aus unbedingt gewiß werden und sein.”

19. Cf. N II, pp. 425–26.

20. Cf. “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”, p. 91. Heidegger says the very same thing of Hegel: “Die Vollendung der Metaphysik beginnt mit Hegels Metaphysik des absoluten Wissens als des Willens des Geistes.” Cf. also “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik”, VA II, p. 68. This is not some sort of inconsistency on Heidegger’s part; more the generality of his later thought. Moreover, as far as Heidegger is concerned, Descartes thinks the same thing as Hegel, with the exception that the latter lets the subjective unfold (itself) in a more radical and remarkable manner.

21. Cf. “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik”, p. 91: “... sich vollendende Metaphysik”. In addition to this formulation, Heidegger also employs the expression “sich vollendete Metaphysik”, a distinction of little import. What is significant, however, is the bond between traditional Metaphysics and technology which will be clarified in subsequent sections.

22. Heidegger himself poses the question in “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”, p. 98, as well as in N II, p. 141.

23. Cf. N II, p. 431: “... jedes von sich her Verweilende und also Vorliegende”.

24. Cf. N II, p. 429: “Das Jeweilige liegt von sich aus vor, ist das eigentliche *ὑποκείμενον*.”

25. N II, p. 430: “Das subiectum ist das im actus Untergelegte und Unterworfenene, dem anderes dann noch zufallen kann.” We notice that the words “Untergelegt” and “Unterworfen” are both past participles. Primordial

ὑποκείμενον is, however, always described by using the infinitive (Vorliegen) or the present participle (das Vorliegende).

26. In his Vorlesung "Der Europäische Nihilismus" (N II), pp. 141, 142, Heidegger, however, had already spoken of "sub-iectum" as "das von sich aus schon Vor-liegende"; thus had understood "sub-iectum" in union with primordial *ὑποκείμενον*. Cf. also "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 296. But this viewpoint abstracts from the significance of "causality" in the context of the Middle Ages which Heidegger accents in his "Der Wandel der *ἐνέργεια* zur actualitas", N II, pp. 410ff. On p. 415, Heidegger writes succinctly: "Die actualitas aber ist causalitas." And on the following page: "Aber auch in der actualitas, für die in jeder Hinsicht die causalitas bestimmend bleibt..." We noticed already that causality is understood in terms of Bewirken (Wirken).

27. In the case of *ὑποκείμενον*, Heidegger does not speak of "zufallen", but the *συμβεβηκότα* belong together with that which issues forth, which presences: they are "mitanwesend".

28. N II, p. 430: "Subiectum und substans meinen dasselbe, das eigentliche Ständige und Wirkliche, was der Wirklichkeit und Ständigkeit genügt und deshalb substantia heißt. Von der Substantia her wird alsbald das... Wesen des *ὑποκείμενον*, das von sich her Vorliegende, ausgelegt. Die *οὐσία*, Anwesenheit, wird als substantia gedacht."

29. Hence, it is undeniable that primordial *ὑποκείμενον* is sharply distinguished from the later notion of subiectum or substans – at least on the one hand (cf. Note 26). Odette Laffoucrière remarks that in the "School" Philosophy the aspect of *ὑποκείμενον* is maintained. Cf. *Le Destin de la Pensée et 'la mort de Dieu'* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 118. However true this may be, the radical difference between the two is Heidegger's primary focus, for the difference between "das Anwesende" and a "caused effect" signals for Heidegger no less than the difference between two experiences of Being's beingness. And yet as we pointed out above in Note 26, Heidegger occasionally characterizes sub-iectum in the same fashion as original *ὑποκείμενον*.

30. Cf. "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", p. 98.

31. The expression "from and out of himself" should indicate that the feature of *φύσις*, the self-emerging appearing, has shifted to man as subject.

32. Cf. "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", p. 99: "Freiheit als Selbstgewißheit". Also N II, pp. 142–43, 319–21.

33. In his use of the terms "Befreiung von" and "Befreiung zu", Heidegger wants to call attention to a certain "logic", a transition whose end-point is entailed by what was already given. It is now up to man, "vom sich her" (N II, p. 143), to provide what is "necessary" and "binding". For all other possibilities are wanting, granted of course that the new freedom must be a self-certitude.

34. N II, p. 143: "Jetzt heißt Freisein, daß der Mensch an die Stelle der für alle Wahrheit maßgebenden Heilsgewißheit eine solche Gewißheit setzt, kraft deren er sich selbst gewiß wird als das Seiende, das dergestalt sich selbst auf sich stellt."

35. This is already the second time we meet with this expression: "notwendige Folge". In later writings, for example, in "Zeit und Sein", p. 9, Heidegger

alters this, saying: "Die Folge der Epochen im Geschick von Sein ist weder zufällig, noch läßt sie sich als notwendig errechnen."

36. N II, p. 426: "Diese Forderung der vom Menschen selbst vollziehbaren Selbstsicherung seiner natürlichen Beständigkeit entspringt nicht einem Aufstand gegen die Lehre des Glaubens, sie ist umgekehrt die notwendige Folge dessen, daß die höchste Wahrheit den Charakter der Heilsgewißheit hat."

37. In "Der Wandel der Wahrheit zur Gewißheit", p. 426, Heidegger attempts to justify the mode of transition as follows: "der Mensch verhält sich aber nicht nur gläubig zu Gott und zur gottgeschaffenen Welt. Der Mensch verhält sich zum Wirklichen auch kraft des *lumen naturale*." As frivolous as this may sound, it nonetheless has its support in Descartes' *Meditations* themselves. We recall Descartes' confrontation with the Augustinian tradition – and this despite Descartes' general lack of sympathy with the "Renaissance". Cf., in this regard, Henri Gouhier, *Les Premières Pensées de Descartes* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1958).

38. But not *for* Descartes. Again, as in regard to Heidegger's Plato-interpretation, we must keep in mind that Heidegger is speaking of what in general came to dominate in the wake of the Cartesian Metaphysics. Unfortunately, Heidegger (to date, i.e. in the published writings) never penetrated to a more appropriate interpretation of Descartes' notion of "truth" – especially of that feature called the "eternal" and the role of the mind in this regard, namely, to "recognize" (not "to secure"). Had the "later" Heidegger expended efforts in this direction, the ensuing interpretation would have perchance been at variance with what is said in SZ – concerning "eternal truth", that is.

39. With regard to man's claim to a "self-grounding ground", cf. the study of John Sallis, "Towards the Movement of Reversal: Science, Technology, and the Language of Homecoming", *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970), pp. 138ff.

40. Cf. N II, pp. 148ff. This section contains Heidegger's most systematic treatment of the notion of "Vorstellen". Cf. also "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", pp. 80, 100ff; N II, pp. 295–301, 433, 435–56.

41. We recall the context of the Sophocles-interpretation where Heidegger points out insistently how Being disposes over *τέχνη*.

42. Cf. WHD, p. 16: "Im Vorstellen entfaltet sich das Vernehmen." But the comportment of Vernehmen is no longer felt in Vorstellen – and as we have shown in Chapter II, the unfolding of Vernehmen in Vorstellen has been mediated by Platonic *ἰδέειν*.

43. Cf. N II, pp. 435–36: "Im Wirken liegt der Wesenszug, den am ehesten vielleicht, weil nicht vorgehend, der Ausdruck 'auf-sich-zu' benennt."

44. We recall how Descartes, in reply to the first objection, insists that "ideas" are indeed "effects" (that is, have an "objective reality") and hence require a cause. In fact, barring this, Descartes would not have been able to enlarge the horizon of the criterion of "clearness" and "distinctness" via his first proof for God's existence (Meditation 3). Cf. E. Gilson, *Etudes sur le rôle de la Pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), pp. 202ff.

45. Cf. "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", p. 100, in which Heidegger briefly brings this to expression: "Das Vorstellen ist nicht mehr das Vernehmen des Anwesenden, in dessen Unverborgenheit das Vernehmen selbst gehört... sondern das Ergreifen und Begreifen von ... nicht das Anwesende waltet, sondern der Angriff herrscht." Cf. also N II, p. 295: "Das Vorstellen ist jetzt nicht mehr nur die Leitbahn zur Vernehmung des Seienden als eines solchen, das heißt des anwesenden Beständigen. Das Vorstellen wird zum Gerichtshof, der über die Seiendheit des Seienden entscheidet und sagt, daß künftighin als ein Seiendes nur gelten solle, was im Vorstellen durch dieses vor es selbst gestellt und ihm so sichergestellt ist." Cf. also the interesting text in "Möira", p. 33.

46. In addition to the term "Zustellen", Heidegger, in his characterization of the constituents of *Vorstellen*, makes use of the term "Versammeln". By way of *Vorstellen* the subject "gathers" "alles Gegenständliche in das Zusammen der Vorgestelltheit". Cf. "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", pp. 100–102, and "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 225. This is a manner of emphasizing the insoluble link between *Vorstellen* and its origin out of primordial *λέγειν*, but also the latter's radical transformation.

47. This is Heidegger's term for "abstracting".

48. This seems to forget Descartes' notion of truth, of necessary truth. Does the subject determine this or is it rather the case that the "subject" may come to recognize, by attending to, what is given? Does not Descartes himself even deny that the subject is "free" with regard to "necessary" ideas? Would not the clear and distinct manner in which something presents itself to the subject, thus impelling the subject to assent to its "truth", put in question Heidegger's entire Descartes-interpretation. In fact, so understood, that is, after the manner of Descartes, the putative process of securing would turn out to resemble, rather remarkably, Heidegger's account of original "Vernehmen". And yet, we must distinguish between the "givenness" of that which presences (*das Anwesende*) and that "givenness" of that which is represented (*das Vorgestellte*). Secondly, we must keep in mind that Heidegger's interpretation of Descartes (from 1936 onward) – in contrast to his Nietzsche-interpretation – speaks of what dominates in the tradition.

49. Cf. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 16.

50. We know, and Heidegger himself points it out (N II, p. 156), that *Vorstellen* (*penser*, *cogitare*) is understood by Descartes in a most general sense, including all acts of consciousness and not merely "thinking" in its narrower connotation. In fact, this is one reason why Heidegger prefers to translate "cogitare" with "Vorstellen" instead of "Denken". If one insists on rendering "cogitare" with "to think", then one feels justified in asserting that all manners of human relatedness to beings and to the self are derivatory of or grounded in "thinking" as a thematic grasping. This conviction would then reinforce the "current" Descartes-interpretation according to which Descartes came, doubted and thereby laid the foundation for a theory of knowledge – an interpretation, says Heidegger, which reads as a "poor novel" (FD, p. 77). According to Heidegger, Descartes' question is that of "Metaphysics", that is, concerning

“beings as such and as a whole” or of the “beingness” of beings, an interrogation which is not confined to the question about the possibility and extent of “Knowledge”.

51. It will be recalled that Descartes, in the first two Meditations, is not concerned with what Heidegger calls the securing of “objects”, but rather with the establishment of the “self” as any act of consciousness aware of itself – as that which is necessarily implied in each act of “thinking”, whether it be a question of “imaging”, “willing” or “conceiving”.

52. Heidegger rightly stresses the priority of the “Sich Vorstellen” as distinct from the “Vorstellen” of something. Cf. N II, pp. 153ff; “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”, pp. 100–101; “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik”, p. 66; FD, p. 81; N II, pp. 435–36.

53. N II, p. 296: “In solchem vor-sich-stellen stellt jedoch das Vorstellen je notwendig sich selbst *mit* vor; dies aber nicht nachträglich und gar als einen Gegenstand, sondern zuvor und als jenes, dem alles zugestellt sein muß und in dessen Umkreis allein ein jegliches sichergestellt sein kann.”

54. Cf. “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”, p. 100: “Das Subjectum, die Grundgewißheit, ist die jederzeit gesicherte Mitvorgestellttheit des vorstellenden Menschen mit dem vorgestellten menschlichen oder nichtmenschlichen Seienden, d.h. Gegenständlichen. Die Grundgewißheit ist das unbezweifelbar jederzeit vorstellbare und vorgestellte *me cogitare = me esse*.”

55. Cf. N II, p. 435.

56. Cf. N II, pp. 133, 134, 143, 148, 152, 157, 171. Heidegger, on these pages, employs two expressions: “von sich aus” and “von sich her”.

57. “Vorgestellttheit”. Cf. “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”, p. 102; “Moirä”, p. 33; N II, p. 162, 165, 166, 169, 171, 172, 181, 187–78, 190, 230, 427, 433.

58. But it is this occurrence at its most radical stage (Bestellen-Gestell) which Heidegger calls “das Rettende”.

CHAPTER IV

NIETZSCHE AND THE “CONSUMMATION” OF METAPHYSICS

The aim of Heidegger’s Nietzsche-interpretation¹ is to think the Nietzschean Philosophy as the consummation of Metaphysics.² Nietzsche’s Philosophy, that is, this specific manifestation of Being as beingness³ as the Will to Power, deserves a privileged place in much the same way and with as much justification as Plato (the “Beginn” of traditional Metaphysics) and Descartes (the “Beginning” of the “Consummation”). What constitutes this distinction and how this is to be understood will be the task of the present chapter.

And yet, with regard to the just-stated aim, the question seems urgent whether or not such a manner of interpretation requires, from the very start, a guiding clue? Or stated in terms so crucial to SZ, what constitutes the “Vor-habe” (or “Vor-sicht”) of Heidegger’s Nietzsche-interpretation? We read the following passage as expressive of the matter at issue:

The Greeks determined Being as the constancy of essence. This determination of Being remains intact throughout the entire History of Metaphysics.⁴

It hardly requires mentioning that Heidegger is referring to the philosophical quest after “Being”, after that which is stable and unchangeable, in contrast to the transitory. In the course of the present writing we have already encountered several instances of this, in *φύσις*, in *ιδέα* and in the Cartesian “representedness” – the grounding of the “truth” (that is, of “certitude”) of beings in the self-grounding “subject”.

Now it is striking that the above formulation is stated so pointedly with reference to Nietzsche. Striking – for is it not so that Nietzsche’s efforts palpably refute this Heideggerian conviction? What testifies to the feature of “constancy” or “per-

manence” of Being in the context of Nietzsche’s Philosophy? Does it not obtrude that this Philosophy is one of relentless “becoming” (Sein is Werden) and that in consequence Bäumler’s assertion⁵ that the themes of the Will to Power and the Eternal Return of the Same are at variance with each other receives its full vindication. Thus the most apt title for Nietzsche’s thought would run: “away from Being in the direction of becoming”.⁶

However, Heidegger refuses to acquiesce. For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s thought represents the “consummation” (“Vollendung”) (in its “Unwesen”) of Metaphysics in the very special sense that he overcomes, in a manner of speaking, the traditional dichotomy Being-Becoming, or to state it differently: Nietzsche attempts to interpret becoming as an eternal returning to itself. What could be more constant than an eternal becoming? And therewith Heidegger does not feel tempted to underplay (or exclude) the Will to Power, opting for the sole rights of the Eternal return of the same. Rather, what is consequential is to display the Eternal Return of the same as the inseparable manner of movement of the Will to Power.⁷ Thus it is the unity (not incongruence) of the two notions which is held fast.

In this connection we may recall a Nietzschean text which sets the background of Heidegger’s interpretation, that is, the so-called “Recapitulation”,⁸ which Heidegger describes as the assembling of the “Essential” in Nietzsche’s thought⁹ or the “summary of the principal points at issue”.¹⁰ Mindful of the text already cited in which it is stated that the “constancy of essence” persists steadfastly throughout the History of Metaphysics, the “Recapulation” stands out all the more conspicuously. It would be difficult to imagine Heidegger’s reaction upon having read the text for the first time.¹¹ It reads:

*To impress upon becoming the character of Being – this is the most exalted Will to Power . . . that everything recurs is the closest approximation of the world of becoming to that of Being: Summit of Meditation.*¹²

Hence, the most exalted Will to Power would consist in the possibility of a becoming which is characterized as “Being”, that is, as having the character of permanence or as an eternalized becoming. It remains now to examine Heidegger’s reasons for entitling Nietzsche’s Philosophy: “die ausgezeichnete Subjektivität”.¹³

A. FIRST APPROXIMATION TO THE NOTION OF THE WILL
TO POWER¹⁴

At the center of Heidegger's earlier analysis of the notion of the Will to Power stands the keyword "Entschlossenheit" which is immediately reminiscent of SZ¹⁵ and of EM.¹⁶ The current translation of "Entschlossenheit" with "resolve" is, with reference to SZ and even the present context, partially acceptable. In SZ, the term "Entschlossenheit" designates the pre-eminent form of Dasein's "openness" which then should give rise to something that may be termed "resolve", that is, the resolution to Dasein's ownmost Seinkönnen. Entschlossenheit involves the "openness" or "truth" of what was previously and "for the most part" "closed off", i.e. Dasein itself owing to the latter's deeply engrained manner of evading the "Self" and thus fleeing to the "world" of its "concern" therein to draw its "possibilities" in accord with the way of public "interpretedness". As far as SZ is concerned, Entschlossenheit signifies the highest possibility of the openness of Dasein which solicits then Dasein's "action". The prefix "ent" denotes the removal of closedness (Schlossenheit, Verschlossenheit) and for that reason we will translate the term in question with resolute openness.¹⁷

To arrive at this notion of resolute openness of the Will to Power, Heidegger begins by excluding views regarding the essence of the will itself and in the first place with the view that the will is some sort of independent "faculty".¹⁸ For Nietzsche, the will, construed in this way, is as remarked in the *Götzen-Dämmerung* an empty sound. "I laugh at your so-called free will and even at your unfree will; for me what you call your willing is a sort of insanity. There is no willing."¹⁹ There is no willing, that is, a willing which would be severed from what is willed, namely, "power". As Heidegger stresses, Will and Power, precisely on account of their inextricability, are the "same" ("dasselbe").²⁰ Another reason for which Heidegger cites these unmistakably Nietzschean words is for the purpose of undermining the common opinion that the will resembles a species of "cause". From Nietzsche's vantage point, the will is neither a "spiritual" faculty of the soul-element in man as disparate from his mechanical body and in virtue of which he would be free to

choose, nor is the will an effecting agent of sorts. Nor, thirdly, is the will to be likened to an act of “mere striving”, for as Heidegger writes:

In the mere act of striving after something we are not authentically brought before ourselves but we merely strive and go by means of such striving with resolute openness to the self – is always: to will beyond the self.²¹

In this somewhat unpolished but nonetheless revealing passage, Heidegger contrasts the mere act of striving – analogous to the “tranquilized willing” discussed in SZ (pp. 194–95) – and striving with resolute openness, the latter being the *conditio sine qua non* for the will as the Will to Power, that is, the precondition that the will, in becoming *itself*, transcend *itself* in willing.²² To be sure, the context of SZ is not irrelevant here: more precisely the working-out of the movement toward authenticity. According to SZ, the latter requires a certain willing beyond the “self” (the second self italicized above) – that is, beyond the “they-self” (Dasein as the “they-self”) which has always already “interpreted” itself in terms of the all-pervading publicness. And in analogy with the passage above, it is a resolutely open “Verstehen” (called “Vorlaufen”) which is constitutive for the “modification” of Das Man.²³

We note that Heidegger, in subsequent sections of N I and II and in other pertinent texts, refrains from the use of the expression “Entschlossenheit” – and this for obvious reasons. As the following interpretation will show, Nietzsche’s Will to Power bears little kinship to resolute openness. Contrarily, for Heidegger Nietzsche’s thinking of the interwovenness of the Will to Power and the Eternal Return of the Same amounts to a radical closedness. In the subsequent interpretation, it is not a will which strives with resolute openness which is requisite, but rather the demanded *mehr-wollen* – the will’s constant “self-overpowering” (“Übermächtigung”) – is thought in the light of that “value” called “Steigerung” which in itself implies a prior “Bestand”, that is, another “value” called “Erhaltung”.

B. THE WILL TO POWER AS THE MOST RADICAL
SUBJECTIVITY

Within the context of Heidegger's interpretation of traditional Metaphysics the Philosophy of the constant willing to Power occupies a rather special place. Heidegger sometimes calls it the "ausgezeichnete Subjektivität", which must be explored at this point.

Is it not so that Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Will to Power merits this distinction owing to the fact that he, in response to Descartes and for that matter in pointed opposition to the entire tradition, focuses upon the "body" (the "sensible"), thus complementing, as it were, the point of view of the ego cogito? Such a contention may have some justification and is, moreover, consonant with passages found in the Nietzsche Lectures.

Perhaps, one wants to reply: the essence of the matter at issue does not consist in positing the body in order to fulfill the Cartesian view (which after all would involve not having read Descartes' *Meditations* in the first place), but rather in the thesis to the effect that the Will to Power "posits" "values". Hence, the subjectivity peculiar to the Will to Power would mean that the latter posits for itself its own "conditions", that is, its own "values", thus precluding the possibility of any external grounding. This is certainly more fundamental, but is nonetheless of itself insufficient, for the Cartesian act of "Vorstellen" equally posits for itself its own conditions (the conditions of "certitude") – and "Vorstellen" is just as self-grounding as the Will to Power. Moreover, which reformulates the same, the former, just as the Will to Power, demands its own "securing" ("Sicherung", "sicherstellen"), which with regard to the notion of the Will to Power, is most often indicated by the term "maintaining" ("erhalten").²⁴ So it seems that the Vorstellen and the Will to Power have equal rights as forms of subjectivity, for both set their own "conditions", that is, both are self-grounding (or at least pretend to be) and both secure or maintain what has been "represented" ("das Vorgestellte"),²⁵ or in the case of the Will to Power, a certain quantum of power (or as N I often says: "das Festgemachte").

But in all that our question remains unanswered (or at most

half-answered): in what sense is the Will to Power to be considered as a pre-eminent form of "Subjectivity" so as to constitute the very consummation of traditional Metaphysics? We must now attempt to bring this clearly into view.

As a starting point, we will take up again the expression "Will to Power". Everyone readily understands this expression, for what else could be meant if not a striving toward power, that is, in view of the "exercise of violence"²⁶ – which striving would receive its impetus from the "feeling of a lack?"²⁷ For why would one strive if this feeling had not previously been brought into awareness? But such a version of the Will to Power, affirms Heidegger, smacks of Romanticism.

Indeed, it is true that "power" is that at which the will aims, but power as that at which the will aims is "unknown" ("unbekannt"). The adjective "unbekannt" – Heidegger also makes use of the clearer term "pre-positd" ("vorgesetzt")²⁸ – refers to an aim or goal already given. Such a goal, which would move the will after the manner of a *causa finalis*, would be "in itself". But this is equivalent to a denial of the Will to Power's essential character, for a goal which would be "unknown" to the Will to Power and toward which the Will would strive implies quite unequivocally that the directiveness of the Will to Power is dictated from without; that is, a goal lying outside the precincts of the Will to Power would be authorized to posit "conditions" for the latter as, for example, seems to be the case with regard to the traditional doctrine of morality up to the time of Kant.²⁹ In opposition, it must be stressed that the Nietzschean Will to Power is unqualifiedly "goalless" ("ziellos").³⁰ Heidegger writes as follows:

Considered strictly in the sense of the Nietzschean notion of the Will, power as a goal, may never be preposited for the act of willing as if power could be posited from outside the circuit of the Will.³¹

But this should not suggest that the Will to Power is absolutely wayward,³² for the term "goalless" (or "aimless") intends to exclude only those goals which would be imposed externally on the Will to Power. To be sure, the Will to Power orientates itself toward "goals", but these are self-imposed by the willing itself.

The discussion of goals is fundamental to Heidegger's interpretation, for the elimination of so-called "unknown", i.e. externally pre-positing goals, preserves the character of self-becoming of the Will to Power. Moreover, the notion of "goallessness" points in the direction toward which Heidegger's analysis would lead us; namely, toward the union of the Will to Power and the Eternal Return of the Same. As we have already noted, these two conceptions are all but incompatible, for the doctrine of the Eternal Return of the Same consists precisely in the incessant mobility³³ of the Will to Power, in the (self-) "overcoming" of this most basic drive of "Life". But what does the notion of the Will to Power involve, stated in a more positive fashion?

In the first place, the Will to Power involves the feature of "commanding" ("Befehlen"). However, to notice is that this commanding, which is integral to the Will to Power as well as its embodiment called the "Übermensch", consists in a self-commanding as distinct from the mere ordering-around of the other.³⁴ But what would be the purpose of one such self-commanding? Certainly, that the Will hearken to itself, that is, that it become "master over" ("Herr-sein über").³⁵ What is it over which the Will should become master? Essentially itself; sc. the Will must become itself, that is, the Will to more power. In this regard, Heidegger uses two expressions: "sich überlegen"³⁶ and "sich überwinden",³⁷ and in both cases the word "sich" is to be understood in terms of the quantum of power *already* in maintenance,³⁸ while the "über" refers to the increase (or "Steigerung") of that quantum. We have just named the two basic conditions whose interwovenness constitutes the Will to Power and which Heidegger duly thinks through, namely, "Erhaltung" and "Steigerung".³⁹ The Will to Power is a process of continual self-conquest, a self-becoming or a "self-empowering" ("sich ermächtigen") in view of its own "overpowering"⁴⁰ – and this is only possible "in that it commands at once increase and maintenance".⁴¹

The above concise formulation explicates the self-imposed goal of the Will to Power, namely its own overpowering, together with the "values" demanded for its constant but never closed achievement: maintenance and increase.⁴² How are the two

linked such that the Will to Power is at the same time the Eternal Return of the Same?⁴³ We may begin with the following assertion: "Power only makes power in that it becomes master over the level of power acquired at any time."⁴⁴ The passage most obviously expresses the first condition of the Will to Power, namely, maintenance. At any given time, Power, that is, the given state of the Will to Power, if it is to be a will to more power, must dispose over, must be master over the power which has already been accumulated. The reason for this is clear; barring maintenance – which is no mere storing-up for its own sake – the possibility of increase would have no ground to stand on.⁴⁵

But the second condition, namely, the just-mentioned "increase" likewise finds expression in the above text. Do not the words "je erreichte Machtstufe" indicate increase, for how would the already attained power-quantum have been reached if not through the process of "Steigern", self-increase or augmentation? In other words, the notion of increase is presupposed in order that there be, at any time, an "erreichte Machtstufe". What has already been attained must be maintained, that is, held fast and "secured". But how is the given level of power maintained or secured? Only in that more power is attained, that is, in that the entire process is intensified. Heidegger expresses this state of affairs as follows:

In order that the Will to Power as self-overpowering is able to transcend a particular level, this level must not only be attained, but equally held fast and secured. Only out of such a securing of power is it possible to heighten the already acquired power. Power augmentation is thus in itself at the same time again power-maintenance.⁴⁶

Only a securing of power enables a heightening of power, but the inverse is just as true; power-security itself is re-inforced in that the will wills beyond itself (its present Bestand). Thus, the last sentence above may also be read: power-maintenance is in itself power-augmentation – unless one contends that the Will to Power could be at a standstill; that is, not a constant return to itself.

The very same interpretation of "maintenance" and "increase" is stressed by notation #715 of the *Will to Power*:

The point of view of “value” is the point of view of *maintenance-increase conditions* in view of complex forms of relative duration of life within becoming.⁴⁷

Heidegger doubtless spies the essence of the matter when he sets this notation in the center of his interpretation of the Will to Power. Having emphasized the “goallessness” of willing and accordingly having pointed out that the Will to Power must continually posit its own constituting conditions – hence itself⁴⁸ – notation #715 appears all the more illuminating. The German word “Gesichtspunkt” (“point of view”) suggests, for Heidegger, a “seeing” which in turn should suggest to us (in the context of Heidegger’s interpretation of tradition) a sort of activity akin to *τέχνη*. On the basis of Chapter I (Part One), we recall that *τέχνη* is a sort of “seeing” – a “seeing” grounded in a “having seen”. Heidegger, in the three principal texts which discuss the Will to Power most penetratingly, avails himself of the very same language which is hardly coincidental. However, there is one basic difference between the “seeing” peculiar to the mode of “knowing” called *τέχνη*⁴⁹ and that seeing belonging to the “Wertsetzen” or self-positing of the Will to Power – and we might add that the difference is likewise that between Heidegger and Nietzsche. The “seeing” of the Will to Power posits before itself in the sense of *Vorstellen*⁵⁰ that which is said to be aimed at, that is, that which will be most conducive to the overall empowering of the Will to Power. We recall, however, that the sight called *τέχνη* is, on the other hand, subordinated and responsive to that which is “preordinating” (“das Vor-geordnete”). But in relation to the “positing” of willing that which is sighted or aimed at is nowhere pre-given,⁵¹ at least not as “value”, but only given as taken up by the Will to Power in view of its own self-production.⁵² Without doubt, what is thought in the Will to Power is essentially the process of its own self-grounding⁵³ or, to employ the term so crucial to the 19th century, the process of its becoming autonomous, of its self-positing.

But what does Nietzsche (on Heidegger’s thoughtful interpretation) mean by the turn of phrase: “complex forms of relative duration of life within becoming”? For any Nietzsche reader, the last word offers least difficulty (even if most essential) – “becoming” (“Werden”). And secondly, the word “Leben”, as

Heidegger does not fail to point out, most essentially signifies Will to Power and not merely the will to self-preservation. Yet Nietzsche – and this is also pointed out⁵⁴ – employs the word “Leben” in a more specific sense to say “our life”, man’s Being. Thus, “life”, or the “complex forms of Life” have a “relative duration” – and the complex forms in question are those constituted by the structure “Erhaltung-Steigerung”.⁵⁵ At any time, the Will to Power, that is, the always unachieved complex of what has been acquired and new possibilities of augmentation, must have a relative duration, if the Will to Power in general is always fundamentally a Will to more power. The relativity involved points to a subsequent stage, to a future increase of power. Thus at any given time, the Will to Power is relative to its own possibilities of acquiring more power: the Will to Power is never complete, never absolute in the traditional sense.⁵⁶ The above finds expression as follows:

The “complex forms of life” are dependent on conditions of maintaining and constantness – to such an extent that the permanent only is in order to become unpermanent in the very process of augmentation. The duration of these complex forms of life reposes in the reciprocal relation between augmentation (or increase) and maintenance. For this reason the duration is a relative one. It remains a “relative duration” of what is living, and that means of life.⁵⁷

Hence, the condition of augmentation (growth, increase) constitutes the “constancy” of the Will to Power, but at the same time accounts for the inconstancy of what has been maintained; inconstant precisely because ideally always in the process of self-positing.⁵⁸

C. THE WILL TO POWER AND THE ETERNAL RETURN OF THE SAME

How does Heidegger understand Nietzsche’s most questionable thought, namely, the notion of the Eternal Return of the Same? Up to the present day, the various interpretations of the Eternal Return are divided among themselves depending on whether the

individual writer privileges the famous #341 of *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, which is the key text (also the first in the published writings) of the so-called psychological or “existential” interpretation, or whether the interpreter prefers later texts, which give the Cosmological viewpoint.⁵⁹ Heidegger himself, after having discussed these various sets of texts,⁶⁰ offers a third possibility in his attempt to show that the two notions, the Will to Power and the Eternal Return, must belong in a unity.

From the very start of the Nietzsche-Lectures the inseparability of the Will to Power and the Eternal Return is underscored.⁶¹ They are called in Heidegger’s language the “same” (“dasselbe”) as distinct from indifferent “identity”. Nonetheless, the precise manner of their belonging-together is not elucidated prior to the section from “Nietzsches Metaphysik” entitled: ‘Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen’.⁶² Hitherto, it was often enough stated that the Will to Power represents the constitution or the “what” (“essentia”) of “beings as a whole”, while the Eternal Return exemplifies the latter’s manner of being (“Existentia”). To this, one may join numerous and relevant details, especially those expressed in “Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen”.⁶³ And yet the character of the union in question remained at a distance.⁶⁴ We will now endeavor to clarify this brief section from N II.

Heidegger begins by discussing, once more, the notion of “goal”, a point of departure which is obviously fitting. For, if as we have seen, the Will to Power has no externally imposed goals, it must, in its positing of itself (its “values”), return to itself, to its present reserve of maintained power, in order from this point of view to continue its process – its ceaseless process of the overpowering of itself (viz. its “je erreichte Machtstufe”) by empowering itself beyond itself.⁶⁵ But if this is so,⁶⁶ if the “goallessness” of the Will to Power necessitates its return, and if this return is incessant, which must be the case, for as Heidegger⁶⁷ reiterates in standing still the Will to Power would negate itself as its own overpowering, then we have attained the sense of the Eternal Return of the Same as Heidegger interprets it.

However, the Eternal Return is the Eternal Return of *the Same* – or more precisely stated in the case of Heidegger’s reading – the

Eternal Return *to* the same, this “same” simply referring to the *inconstant* constituent of the structure of the Will to Power, that is, to that which has been acquired and maintained. Heidegger writes:

The same that recurs only has a relative existence and is therefore that which is essentially without existence.⁶⁸

That is to say, “essentially without existence” in the sense of complete constancy, complete self-fulfillment. In the preceding section, we emphasized how and why “das Erhaltene” has a relative being, relative to possibilities, which, at any time, have not been realized. In the above text, Heidegger calls “das Gleiche” that which is relative in its existence. Hence the correlation which Heidegger discerns between the condition called maintenance and “the same” (which is not to be confounded with Heidegger’s own term “das Selbe”) appears undeniable. But what about the second condition fundamental to the Will to Power, that of increase or augmentation through which the necessary overpowering (“Worauf es ankommt”, N II, p. 284) is at all conceivable? *This is the Eternal Return proper*. The eternal self-increasing of the Will to Power must always return to its store of maintained power (its inconstant self at any time) and this is precisely what constitutes the constancy of the inconstant. Barring this eternal return, subsequent upon the latest acquisition of “power” as a result of having gone out from itself, what had been acquired could not be maintained. Hence, it is in virtue of the constant increase that maintenance is possible. *Both* the outward movement toward possibilities and the return movement make up that one condition called “Steigerung”. In this sense Heidegger writes: “the eternal Return is the most constant constancy of what is without constancy”.⁶⁹ The to and fro remains constant but that to which the fro-movement returns is always inconstant, that is, incomplete.⁷⁰

Thus we return to the two key texts, the guiding texts as far as Heidegger’s Nietzsche-interpretation is concerned:

*To impress upon becoming the character of Being – this is the most exalted Will to Power . . . that everything recurs is the closest approximation of the World of becoming to that of Being: Summit of Meditation.*⁷¹

And the Heideggerian text:

The Greeks determined Being as the constancy of essence. This determination of Being remains intact throughout the entire History of Metaphysics.

The metaphysical character of “Being”, its constancy, reaches its apex when it appears as the Eternal Return of the Same, the constant self-augmentation which always includes – and takes along with it as it were – the already attained level of power. Ultimately, this is the meaning of the designation of Nietzsche’s Philosophy as the “ausgezeichnete” Subjectivity, the philosophy of the process of eternal self-grounding.

D. THE “CONSUMMATION” AND THE “END” OF METAPHYSICS

In the preceding, we have remained attentive to the sense Heidegger gives to Nietzsche’s Philosophy as the “consummation” of traditional Metaphysics – and regarding the expression “Vollendung” we hope Sections B and C have sufficed. However, what does “Ende” signify, a term which Heidegger often employs and which we have avoided in the foregoing? The “consummation” of the tradition, that is, that the tradition has traversed its “predelineated possibilities”,⁷³ is at once the “End” of Metaphysics. Does this want to say that Philosophy with Nietzsche has reached its end, has simply become moribund? This would surely be fallacious, even absurd! For Heidegger, “end” does not signal a terminating point, but rather the “Not” of “another Inception” (“andere Anfang”)⁷⁴ – which Inception presumably would find its departure with Nietzsche. On the basis of the Nietzsche-Lectures and other texts this seems quite exact. However, it is around this time that Heidegger encounters technology and it is this latter which is to assume the role of mediator, as it were, to the new Inception.

NOTES

1. We refer especially to N I and N II and those texts which belong to the years 1936–46. In these texts it is Nietzsche's place within the tradition of Western Metaphysics which is determined. In addition to N I and N II, the following texts belong to the same context: "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", 73–76; "Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra", VA I, pp. 93ff, and the highly condensed essay "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", HW, pp. 193ff.

2. Heidegger calls this the "proximate goal" ("nahes Ziel") of his interpretation, that is, the "meditation of the inner unity of Nietzsche's Metaphysics as the consummation of Western Metaphysics". Cf. N II, p. 262. The more "remote goal" ("fernes Ziel") is described as a preparation for a "confrontation between the power of beings and the truth of Being". The expressions "power of being" ("Macht des Seienden") and "truth of Being" present themselves in their most radical form within the framework of modern technology, not to mention the fact that the expression "Macht des Seienden" adverts as well to the entire tradition. On the other hand, the expression "Wahrheit des Sein" – if it be permitted to anticipate the very context of technology (that is, the context of the confrontation between Gestell and Geviert) – refers to the Unconcealment of Being as Geviert. Cf. below, especially Part Two, Chapter III, and Part Three, Chapter II.

3. Heidegger does indeed and frequently refer to the "Will to Power" as "Seiendheit". Cf. N I, p. 464; N II, pp. 7, 10, 11, 13, 109, 226, 237; "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", p. 73. The very same is said in the expressions "Grundcharakter des Seienden", so frequent in N I, and in "Das Sein des Seienden".

4. Cf. N I, p. 655: "Die Griechen bestimmten das Sein als Beständigkeit des Wesens. Diese Bestimmung des Seins bleibt durch die ganze Geschichte der Metaphysik hindurch unerschüttert." It must be observed that this statement – that is, especially the notion of "constancy" – expresses a prevailing state of affairs. Heidegger is well aware of the intimacy, as he points out himself on several occasions, between Sein and Werden for the Greeks or to put it in terms equally familiar: the union of rest and motion.

5. Cf. N I, p. 30. Heidegger's indications with regard to the secondary literature at the time may be found especially in N I, pp. 13–14, 28, 29, 30–32, 256, 295, 318, 650, 655; N II, pp. 189–92. Cf. also Heidegger's *Spiegel* Interview, No. 23, 31 May, 1976, p. 204.

6. N I, p. 655: "Weg von Sein ... hin zum Werden."

7. Toward the end of the remarkable Vorlesung "Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen" (1937), N I, p. 467, Heidegger states this as follows: "*Wille zur Macht ist im Wesen und seiner inneren Möglichkeit nach ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen.*" As we discern in the following, this is to say that the Will to Power is essentially "Steigerung".

8. Cf. *Der Wille zur Macht*, #617.

9. Cf. "Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra", p. 112.

10. N I, p. 466. "Zusammennahme des Hauptsächlichsten".

11. Heidegger cites the text some ten times: N I, pp. 27, 466, 467, 656; N II, pp. 339, 337, 288; “Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra”, p. 112; WHD, p. 46; and “Der Spruch des Anaximander”, p. 306.

12. Cf. note above: “Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins *aufzuprägen* . . . das ist der *höchste Wille zur Macht* . . . daß *alles wiederkehrt*, ist die extremste *Annäherung einer Welt des Werdens an die des Seins: Gipfel der Betrachtung.*”

13. But the assimilation, as it were, of becoming to Being in the form of an eternal becoming of the Will to Power seems quite other than a “subjectivity”, unless the term Will to Power is solely applicable to man – which it is not. It was with this in mind that Heidegger coined the term “Subjektivität”.

14. The earlier approximation to the notion of the Will to Power may be found in two sections of the more extensive “Wille zur Macht als Kunst”, in N I, 1936–37. The first of these sections is entitled “Der Wille als Wille zur Macht”, pp. 46–53; and the second “Wille als Affekt, Leidenschaft und Gefühl”, pp. 53–66.

15. Cf. pp. 267ff.

16. Cf. pp. 16, 17.

17. Cf. John Sallis’ translation of VWV in *Martin Heidegger. Basic Writings*, ed. D.F. Krell, p. 133, where Sallis, in a note, comments upon the German “Entschlossenheit”. Furthermore, we notice how the texts in question clearly bear out this translation (“resolute openness”). For example, cf. N I, p. 63: “Im Wesen des Willens, in der Entschlossenheit, liegt, daß er sich selbst erschließt, also nicht erst durch ein dazukommendes Verhalten, durch ein Beobachten des Willensvorganges und ein Nachdenken darüber, sondern der Wille selbst hat den Charakter des *eröffnenden Offenhaltens.*”

18. In his brief remarks concerning traditional notions of the “Will” as a “faculty” and as a “cause”, Heidegger wants to guard against any attempt at deriving or deducing the notion of the Will to Power from anything which would be more primary. Quite to the contrary, both notions of the “Will” are grounded in the Will to Power. Cf. N I, p. 47.

19. N I, p. 48: “Ich lache eures freien Willens und auch eures unfreien: Wahn ist mir das, was ihr Willen heißt, es gibt keinen Willen.”

20. Cf. N I, p. 651: “Wille und Macht sind *dasselbe* in dem metaphysischen Sinne, daß sie in dem Einen ursprünglichen Wesen des Willens zur Macht zusammengehören.” Cf. also N II, p. 267.

21. Cf. N I, p. 51: “Im bloßen Streben nach etwas sind wir nicht eigentlich vor uns selbst gebracht, und deshalb ist hier noch keine Möglichkeit, über sich hinaus zu streben, sondern wir streben bloß und gehen in solchem Streben mit Entschlossenheit zu sich – ist immer: über sich hinaus wollen.” Moreover, Heidegger’s use of “wir” is sufficient to suggest the provisional character of the formulation. Later, Heidegger will not speak of “wir” in this context, but more generally of willing as constitutive of “Life” as a whole.

22. We notice that this transcending or this “über sich hinaus wollen” of the Will to Power is not equivalent to leaving something behind, but is, as we will see, a constant “Steigerung” of the “je erreichte Machtstufe” (Erhaltung) in view of fortifying the latter – which as Heidegger likes to put it is always “unbeständig”.

23. With regard to SZ and the notion of "Eigentlichkeit", we read two passages from N I, p. 63: "Im Wesen des Willens, in der Entschlossenheit, liegt daß er sich selbst sich erschließt, also nicht erst durch das dazukommende Verhalten, durch ein Beobachten des Willensvorganges und ein Nachdenken darüber, sondern der Wille selbst hat den Charakter des eröffnenden Offenhaltens." And on the following page: "Im Wollen kommen wir uns selbst entgegen als die, die wir eigentlich sind."

24. Even though Heidegger makes ample use of "sichern", "sicherstellen", "versichern", "feststellen". Cf., for example, N II, pp. 267–68: "Damit aber der Wille zur Macht als Übermächtigung eine Stufe übersteigen kann, muß diese Stufe nicht nur erreicht, sondern festgehalten und gesichert werden."

25. The use of the expression "Vorstellen" ("Vorgestelltes") is quite apposite in this context. However, Heidegger marks a shift of accent from *Vorstellen* (Descartes) to *Vorstellen* (Nietzsche). Cf. N I, p. 576. The term *Stellen*, in the context of the Nietzsche-interpretation, is more appropriately heard as *Setzen*.

26. Cf. N II, p. 263: "Ausübung von Gewalt".

27. The German reads: "Gefühl des Mangels". Cf. J.-P. Sartre, *L'Être et le Néant*, that is, Sartre's theory of consciousness which compares, not incidentally, with the Nietzschean viewpoint. According to Sartre, the *en soi* is a constant process of self-negation, that is, an attempt to negate, to "transcend" its "facticity" – which continual movement is grounded in the consciousness of "lack" (*manque*), the lack of its own self-unity.

28. Cf. N I, pp. 649–50.

29. Karl Marx succinctly sums up the collapse of this traditional perspective while at the same time announces what might be called the motto of the Philosophy of Subjectivity in the words: "Die Kritik der Religion endet mit der Lehre, daß der Mensch das höchste Wesen für den Menschen sei. . ." Cf. "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung", MEGA, I, p. 385. Indeed, it would be fitting and not difficult to place Feuerbach and Marx into Heidegger's interpretation of the tradition of Subjectivity. Along these lines, Heidegger himself, during a seminar in Zähringen (1973) called attention to the statement of Marx: "Radikal sein ist die Sache an der Wurzel fassen. Die Wurzel für den Menschen ist aber der Mensch selbst." Cf. *Vier Seminare*, p. 125.

30. Cf. N II, p. 286.

31. N I, p. 52: "Streng im Sinne des Nietzscheschen Willensbegriffes genommen, kann Macht nie zuvor als Ziel dem Willen vorgesetzt werden, als sei die Macht solches, was zunächst außerhalb des Willens gesetzt sein könnte." Cf. also N II, p. 284: "(the Will to Power) kennt nicht Ziele 'an sich', bei denen er ankommen könnte, um dabei stehen zu bleiben. Im Stillstand verleugnet er sein innerstes Wesen."

32. Cf. N II, p. 65.

33. Most often termed "Steigerung". Cf. also A. Bäumler, "Nachwort" zu: *Wille zur Macht* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 1964), p. 710.

34. In addition to the passages referred to by Heidegger, one might see *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, #347.

35. N I, p. 52; N II, p. 265, 306.
36. N I, p. 651; N II, p. 265; "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 216.
37. N II, p. 265; "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 216.
38. Even the "last man" or "bisherige Mensch" knows "Erhalten" – in fact, the last man "knows" only *Erhalten*, and hence, must be overcome.
39. The usual translations read "preservation" ("Erhaltung") and "enhancement" ("Steigerung"). The word "preservation" is to the point, but we will nonetheless prefer "to maintain", "maintenance", for the word "preserve" will be used to render the Heideggerian expression "Verwahren". Secondly, the expression "enhancement", although correct, appears to us to understate the matter at issue. We prefer the terms "increase", "augmentation", and "intensification". These indeed "enhance" the possibility of the Will's constant self-becoming.
40. We notice that the term "Übermächtigung" names most essentially the Will to Power, that which constitutes the Will to Power, and which includes both the conditions mentioned. Cf. N II, p. 36: "Macht kann sich nur in sich selbst, d.h. in ihrem Wesen halten, indem sie die je erreichte Machtstufe, als je sich selbst übersteigt und überhöht, wir sagen: *übermächtigt*."
41. N II, p. 268. The entire passage reads: "Die Macht kann sich selbst zu einer Übermächtigung nur ermächtigen, indem sie Steigerung und Erhaltung *zumal* befiehlt."
42. In "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", p. 75, Heidegger sees these two "conditions" predelineated in the original composition of the *Geburt der Tragödie*: "Hier ist vorgezeichnet, wengleich noch nicht klar gedacht und unterschieden und aus einheitlichem Grunde gesehen, daß der Wille der Bestandsicherung und Erhöhung *zugleich* bedarf."
43. In Heidegger's writings, there are three core-texts in which the "Will to Power" as the interwovenness of its own "conditions" is worked out: (1) a section from "Der Europäische Nihilismus" entitled 'Wertsetzend und Wille zur Macht', in N II, pp. 96–110; (2) a section from "Nietzsches Metaphysik", entitled 'Wille zur Macht', in N II, pp. 263–73; and (3) a section from "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", pp. 210ff.
44. Cf. N II, p. 266: "Macht machtet nur, indem sie Herr wird über die je erreichte Machtstufe."
45. Heidegger accents the necessity of "maintenance" in terms which deserve attention: "... nirgends aber ist Steigerung möglich, wo nicht ein Bestand als gesicherter und so erst steigerungsfähiger erhalten bleibt." Cf. "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 212. Also pp. 221ff, and N II, pp. 103, 104, 107. In relation to his analysis of modern technology, the word "Bestand" is interesting, for "Bestand" in the later context signifies no less than the manner of "unconcealment of beings". Cf. Part Two, especially Chapter III. With regard to the conditions in question, Heidegger clearly recognizes what is specific to the notion of "power", namely, *Steigerung*. In Nietzsche's works, this is expressed, perhaps for the first time (in published form), in #349 of *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*: "Sich selbst erhalten wollen ist der Ausdruck einer Notlage, einer Einschränkung des eigentlichen Lebens-Grundtriebes, der auf

Machterweiterung hinausgeht ... der große und kleine Kampf dreht sich allenthalben ums Übergewicht, um Wachstum und Ausbreitung, um Macht, gemäß dem Willen zur Macht, der eben der Wille des Lebens ist."

46. N II, pp. 267–68: "Damit aber der Wille zur Macht als Übermächtigung eine Stufe übersteigen kann, muß diese Stufe nicht nur erreicht, sondern festgehalten und gesichert werden. Nur aus solcher Machtsicherheit läßt die erreichte Macht sich erhöhen. Machtsteigerung ist daher in sich zugleich wieder Machterhaltung." Cf. also N II, p. 103, where a parallel text may be found. Also "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", pp. 218–19.

47. Cf. N II, pp. 110ff, 268ff; also "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", pp. 210ff. The German text reads: "Der Gesichtspunkt des 'Wertes' ist der Gesichtspunkt von *Erhaltungs-Steigerung Bedingungen* in Hinsicht auf komplexe Gebilde von relativer Dauer des Lebens innerhalb des Werdens."

48. Cf. "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 216, and SF, p. 241: "Der Wille zur Macht ist der Wille, der *sich* will."

49. That our reference to Greek *τέχνη* is by no means fortuitous is evidenced by the following passage: "Der Augenblick, die Hinsicht, der Gesichtskreis meint hier Gesicht und Sehen in einem von den Griechen her bestimmten, aber durch die Wandlung der *ιδέα* von *εἶδος* zur perceptio hindurchgegangen Sinne." Cf. "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 211. The transformation in question is clearly indicated on pp. 210–11, the key words being "setzen", "vorstellen". Cf. also N I, p. 489.

50. On p. 210 of "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", Heidegger says "vorstellendes Setzen" and, just as telling (on p. 221), "vorstellendes Herstellen". The latter is then interpreted in Heidegger's essay "Wozu Dichter". Cf. our Chapter II, Part Two.

51. How could the Will's own Übermächtigung ever be given once and for all, let alone pre-given in actuality?

52. This again is suggestive of the distance between the primordial and its devolution.

53. Heidegger clearly urges this point. Cf. "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 219: "Der Wille zur Macht hat seinen Grund nicht in einem Gefühl des Mangels, sondern er selbst ist der Grund des überreichsten Lebens." At least, in intention.

54. Cf. N I, pp. 334, 488, 573.

55. Analogous, even if remotely, to the Facticity-Existence structure of Dasein.

56. It is the notion of the Eternal Return which embodies a certain absoluteness, a self-positing, or to use a traditional term, an immanent absoluteness.

57. "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 212: "Die 'komplexen Gebilde des Lebens' sind auf Bedingungen eines Erhaltens und einer Beständigung angewiesen, so zwar, daß das Beständige nur besteht, um in der Steigerung ein Unbeständiges zu werden. Die Dauer dieser komplexen Gebilde des Lebens beruht im Wechsel-Verhältnis von Steigerung und Erhaltung. Sie ist daher eine verhältnismäßige. Sie bleibt eine 'relative Dauer' von Lebendigem und d.h. von Leben." Cf. also N II, pp. 105–6, 270.

58. Earlier we pointed out the importance of the Heideggerian notion of Beständigkeit (Beständigung) through which, even in the form of the Will to Power, a fundamental feature of *φύσις* raises its head.

59. Cf. B. Magnus, *Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy. Amor Fati, Being and Truth* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 9ff. Here Magnus discusses the diverse interpretations of the doctrine of the Eternal Return.

60. Cf. N I, pp. 269ff.

61. For example, N I, p. 27: "Was und Wie ist der Wille zur Macht selbst? Antwort: Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen." And again: "Nietzsche denkt und betrachtet . . . das Sein, d.h. den Willen zur Macht, als ewige Wiederkehr."

62. N II, pp. 283–91.

63. N I, pp. 255–472.

64. Even the essay "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", avoids broaching directly the theme of the Eternal Return.

65. Cf. N II, p. 285: "Deshalb gibt es für das Seiende als Wille zur Macht keine Ziele außerhalb seiner, zu denen es fort- und wegstreitet." We notice that the last two words above ("beyond itself") only mean beyond its present power-quantum.

66. Heidegger clearly connects "Ziellosigkeit" of the Will to Power with that of "Wiederkehr". Cf. N II, p. 286: "Wenn das Seiende als solches Wille zur Macht und somit ewiges Werden ist, der Wille zur Macht aber Ziellosigkeit fordert und das endlose Fortschreiten zu einem Ziel an sich ausschließt . . . dann muß das Seiende als Wille zur Macht im Ganzen das Gleiche wiederkommen lassen und die Wiederkunft des Gleichen muß eine ewige sein."

67. Nietzsche himself points out that maintenance alone is equivalent to standing still, to the negation of all creativity or life. Cf. *Der Wille zur Macht*, #205.

68. N II, p. 287: "Das Gleiche, das wiederkehrt, hat je nur verhältnismäßigen Bestand und ist daher das wesenhaft Bestandlose." The term "verhältnismäßig" implies not only "relative", but just as well "provisional". The acquired power is always provisional as "Bestand", that is, if ideally the Will is always to increase itself.

69. N II, p. 287: "Die ewige Wiederkehr ist die beständigste Beständigung des Bestandlosen."

70. Cf. R.L. Howey, *Heidegger and Jaspers on Nietzsche* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 91. Howey charges, albeit unfairly, that Heidegger, with regard to the crucial Nietzschean text which states that the return is the "most extreme approximation of a world of becoming to that of Being", "completely ignores the word 'approximation'". Certainly, Heidegger's frequent use of the term "unbeständig" suggests quite the contrary.

71. B. Magnus, as Heidegger, emphasizes this Nietzschean assertion that an eternal becoming is the closest approximation to "Being". However, for Magnus, who opposes Heidegger in this regard, the Eternal Return is essentially to be understood as an "existential imperative". Cf. B. Magnus, *Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy. Amor Fati, Being and Truth* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), esp. chapter 3, pp. 27ff.

72. We observe that we have not neglected to treat of Heidegger's interpretation of the Nietzschean notions of "truth", though not as "Gerechtigkeit", and "art", for these are respectively concrete specifications of the two basic conditions of the Will to Power, "Erhaltung" and "Steigerung".

73. Cf. "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", p. 75: "vorgezeichnete Möglichkeiten".

74. Cf. N I, pp. 259, 470, 654, 657; N II, pp. 23, 29, 205, 262; SF, p. 242; "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", p. 75. Also GA I, 9, p. 159. In Note b to the 1st edition (1929) Heidegger already speaks in these terms: the "preparation for an entirely other Inception" ("... die Vorbereitung des ganz anderen Anfangs").

PART TWO

FIRST APPROACH TOWARD THE QUESTION OF
THE ESSENCE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

In his essay “Andenken”, Heidegger notes: “But the source only reveals itself as source, when the stream and its emergence into the sea is experienced.”¹ With regard to Heidegger’s interrogation of the “meaning” or “truth” of Being, this passage expresses the reason why traditional Metaphysics must be traversed. In order to experience the “source” (Being itself), we must first attend to the stream which emerges from this source, together with the sea into which the stream flows (tradition in general, including modern technology). Or expressed otherwise, we must witness, as it were, the appearing of Being in or as “beings as such” – we must sight Being in that which it is not. As it is written in the SVG: “Now however we only experience the self-sending of Being at first in traversing the History of western thought.”² This says: Being only accords itself in a specific form of beingness, thereby holding onto its “fullness”. This is why we have begun with primordial *φύσις* – only to emphasize its chief transformations (*ἰδέα*, *Vorgestelltheit*, *Will to Power*), all of which, as modes of beingness, instance the “Being of beings”. We may continue along this way, for modern technology is the consistent outgrowth of the metaphysical tradition – the Metaphysics of the Age of “Information”. Modern technology, for Heidegger, is not merely the consummation of tradition: it is the most radical self-showing of Being amidst “beings”.

1. Cf. EHD, p. 123: “Aber die Quelle offenbart sich erst als die Quelle, wenn der Strom und sein Ausgang im Meer erfahren sind.”

2. Cf. SVG, p. 176: “Nun erfahren wir aber das Geschick des Seins zunächst nur im Durchgang durch die Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens.”

CHAPTER I

REMARKS CONCERNING SOME EARLIER TEXTS

In the following chapter we will stress some essential points regarding Heidegger's questioning about modern technology and will do so by using two earlier texts in which technology is discussed, namely, sections 4–6 from "Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen"¹ and a text called "Seinsverlassenheit und Irrnis".² Our exposition proposes to be as brief as possible, taking into account only what we assess as most fundamental.

A. A TEXT FROM *NIETZSCHE II* (pp. 20–29)

By way of introduction a compact notation found in a section of N II, entitled "Entwürfe zur Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik" (1941), is noteworthy. Here Heidegger notes: "Die Machenschaft (das Gestell)."³ This crisp saying is found at the end of a series of key expressions which designate varied metaphysical manners of Being's appearing. Such an end position does not signify that "Machenschaft" is one among diverse "Seinsweise", but rather distinguishes it (along with "Gestell") as the culminating point of an event which according to Heidegger originates with primordial *φύσις*.

The terminus "Das Gestell", which defies adequate translation,⁴ is at this point new to us. In later writings, notably in "Die Frage nach der Technik" and in "Die Kehre", the term "das Gestell" is used to express nothing less than the "essence" of technology as distinct from "technology" or "the technological". We will indicate here what "Gestell" signifies, only to return to it in Chapter III of this section.

Gestell signifies no less than a mode of Being's self-revealing, its most radical self-posing (Sich Stellen)⁵ in the modern world

which then summons forth human manners of revealing (*Entbergen*) the “real.” It is essential to maintain the distinction between the self-revealing and human manners of revealing, however these latter are to be specified. Otherwise, one tends to misconceive Heidegger’s assertions to the effect that *Gestell* is that which gathers (*Das Versammelnde*). But we know that within the context of Heidegger’s interpretation of *Metaphysics*, including modern technology as its most “consummated” form, Being as such – in unadulterated guise as it were – never shows itself. Rather, Being as “beingness”⁶ is the medium in which Being embodies itself, that is, the medium in which Being reveals itself by concealing itself. *Gestell* is thus a mode of Being’s beingness, a mode of Being’s self-concealment, and as such relates to the most radical of the acts of human *Stellen*, namely, to “*das Bestellen*”.⁷ However, the term “*Gestell*” is not to be found in the texts to be discussed; or more to the point, the sense of *Gestell* announces itself through “*Machenschaft*”, a term which plays a central role in the earlier texts. On numerous occasions Heidegger tells us that “*Machenschaft*” is a form of beingness,⁸ and thus the concise notation which brings *Machenschaft* into relation with *Gestell* (“*Die Machenschaft [das Gestell]*”).⁹

The text itself (N II, pp. 20–29) defends the thesis according to which the “Age of consummated Senselessness”, that is, the age following the reign of the Will to Power in which beingness reveals itself as *Machenschaft*,¹⁰ is not a fortuitous event, but much more incarnates the consistent fulfillment of the essence of a “concealed History”.¹¹ The so-called age, in which “senselessness” is brought to its climax, relates itself, to be sure, to modernity, to that which is most emphatically inaugurated by Descartes.¹² More proximately, however, the now prevailing “senselessness”, as Heidegger calls it borrowing the term from Nietzsche, originates in Nietzsche’s attempt to overcome Platonism, that is, the tradition, for which “Value” is determined externally – viz. by the metaphysical supersensuous or, considered in a more Christian perspective, by a Divine Being. But for Heidegger, this attempt to overcome tradition in the manner of a “reversal” (“*Umkehrung*”) aborts, for as the “re-evaluator of all values Nietzsche testifies to his ownmost belonging to

tradition and thereby to the abysmal separation from any possibility of another inception".¹³ Briefly, and Heidegger speaks here in a very simplified fashion, this is tantamount to "the last confirmation of the hegemony of Metaphysics in the form of Being's abandonment of beings".¹⁴

The same issue is taken up in section 5 but Heidegger endeavors to mark out more closely the historical origin of the reigning "senselessness". Accordingly, the decisive transformation of *ὑποκείμενον* to "subject" is brought into view (cf. Chapter III, Part One), a transformation "demanded" of Descartes.

Analogous to so many other concepts fundamental to the Heideggerian interpretation of traditional Metaphysics, the notion of *ὑποκείμενον* is thought to undergo a transformation from a most primordial meaning to its more modern recasting. In its most original and enlarged sense *ὑποκείμενον* signifies: "... that which is already lying-before in the unconcealed..."¹⁵ – a manner of definition which intends to remove us from the traditional framework of "causality". Accordingly, in the above formulation, no allusion is made to a cause, to an agent which "effects". Instead, what comes to mind is primordial *φύσις* which Heidegger determines as self-emergence (cf. Chapter I, Part One). But with the transformation of primordial *ὑποκείμενον* to subiectum, this character of self-emerging begins to fade. When Heidegger characterizes subiectum, he no longer employs the German term "von sich aus Verweilendes" or "das Vorliegende" (at least usually does not), but rather terms such as "das Untergelegte" or "das Unter-worfene",¹⁶ that is, that which, as a caused effect, is enabled to serve as the "ground" for the non-subsisting "accidents". This constitutes, in outline form, the second stage of the devolution of primordial *ὑποκείμενον* – a process in which the latter gradually relinquishes its originality.

However, the signification of primordial *ὑποκείμενον* is most decisively restricted when man, unique among all possible "substrata", appears on the scene as "subject". With the rise of the Cartesian Metaphysics, man is promoted to the rank of the unshakeable foundation of "truth" as "certitude" which implies the irremediable shift of the "von sich Her" character of *φύσις* to being-the-subject. It is in this event, namely, in the event of the

self-grounding of man as the “subject” which serves then as the ground of “truth”, that the tenure of “senselessness” has its embryonic manifestation.

But notwithstanding such a reminder, what fundamental signification of “senselessness” is expressed in section 5? Prescinding from the details, with which we are already conversant on the basis of Part One – that is, if we abstract from the various consequences and from the specific manners in which “beingness” is determined in the thinking of Descartes, of Nietzsche, etc., then the following may be said: “*The De-illumination of Being is the senselessness of beings as a whole.*”¹⁷

What should it mean that “Senselessness” is, in fact, a sort of eclipse of Being or the latter’s concealment? Is the expression “das Lichtungs-lose des Seins” to be equated with “senselessness” or is the latter a sequel¹⁸ of the former. We believe the second alternative is the more essential: that “senselessness” holds sway in the period of post-modernity is rooted in the “Lichtungs-lose des Seins”; that is, in Being’s refusal which then has as a consequence what is termed here “senselessness”. Heidegger confirms this in the following words:

Machenschaft, everywhere and always, pushes beings into a unique position and lets Being be forgotten. What really happens is Being’s abandonment of beings; that is, Being leaves beings to themselves and that means that Being therein refuses itself.¹⁹

The passage consists of two sentences, the second of which rectifies the former. On the basis of the first sentence, it seems that “Machenschaft” asserts beings in such fashion that Being gets shrouded in oblivion. But we know that according to later writings Being is not forgotten owing primarily to some sort of neglect on the part of man, nor is it veiled in obscurity subsequent upon the dominion of beings. “What really happens”, writes Heidegger, “is Being’s abandonment of being” – which does not suggest that Being is forsaken, as one is all too prone to think, but rather that Being abandons, as it were, beings, refusing itself or withdrawing. That means that beings are left to themselves to the exclusion, that is, the apparent exclusion, of Being itself – but the exclusion of Being is not to be ascribed to the reign of beings, but

much more to Being itself. Hence, the so-called “senselessness” is not to be grasped by appealing to the fact that man, at the outset of Modernity, becomes the “Bezugsmittle” for the “truth” of beings, but foremost with reference to Being’s own self-sending in accord with which Being, in its very act of self-revealing, withdraws itself into its own concealment.²⁶ *Machenschaft* is a manner in which Being as beingness remains concealed in its very act of giving itself.

However, Heidegger never speaks of Being’s concealment without at least making allusion to the “recovery” of this state of affairs. Granted Being’s utter refusal as *Machenschaft*, that is, its presence in absence, what should be done? To approach this matter, we recall certain expressions fundamental to Heidegger’s earlier notion of “truth” (to cir. 1936) – expressions according to which the happening of truth is likened to a sort of “robbery” (SZ, p. 222), a process of “wresting from” (“Entreißen”, “abringen”). This mode of expression is peculiar to SZ, to PL²¹ and is even employed in EM. And yet this manner of speaking is subsequently toned down – and quite consistently – owing to reflections on “recovery”, or more specifically owing to the emphasis placed on concealment as a character which belongs properly and inextricably to Being. Accordingly, any manner of speaking which would suggest that this seemingly “negative” feature – whether this be called “concealment”, “refusal”, “non-essence”, or “absence” – is to be thrust to the side appears incongruous. It is not so much a question of purging the truth of its non-truth, of a wresting-process through which concealment is overcome and truth won, but instead the task consists in “guarding” (“Hüten”) in the sense of “preserving” or “safe-keeping” it. This is well expressed in “Vom Wesen und Begriff der *φύσις*”: “Only what is revelation can be concealment. And therefore what is of import is not to overcome the *κρύπτεσθαι* of *φύσις* and to wrest it from the latter, but the much more difficult task consists in the letting be of *κρύπτεσθαι* as that which belongs to *φύσις*...”²² Thus, the putative “negative” aspect is not to be understood in any perjorative sense, but is much rather to be experienced as the negativity of Being, that is, as belonging essentially to Being’s very constitution. To experience this negativity of Being is to catch a glimpse of Being itself – and

hence the possibility of an “Eingehen ins Eigene” – which means ultimately the same as the initiation of “recovery”. In relation to the above quotation which ends with the significant words: “. . . and therein refuses itself”, what we have just brought forth is expressed as follows:

Inasmuch as this refusal is experienced, a self-illumination has happened, for one such refusal is not nothing, is by no means something negative, no failing, nor rupture. It is primordial, first revelation of Being in its worthiness to be questioned – Being.²³

With regard to man who is always already incorporated into the “appealing claim of Being” (“Anspruch des Seins”), it is exigent to become and to remain “inständig” in the “illumination of the self-concealing”²⁴ of Being itself or – as it is frequently termed in the later Heidegger – to learn to “dwell” therein.

B. “SEINSVERLASSENHEIT UND IRRNIS”

The second earlier text written during this period and which is germane to the question of technology is entitled “Seinsverlassenheit und Irrnis” and first appeared in a commemorative writing for “Ernst Barlach. Dramatiker, Bildhauer, Zeicher”.²⁵ Subsequently, the very same text was included in the collection of private notes published as “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik”, making up Roman numeral XXVI.²⁶

According to this extremely condensed text, technology is determined in view of its own activity. As a human manner of comportment toward beings, technology “consumes”, which consuming stands in service to the “subjectivity” of “overmanship” (“Übermenschentum”). Indeed, this consuming of beings appears to Heidegger as the unique means by which “man, enamored with himself, may still retain subjectivity in the form of overmanship”.²⁷ Assuredly, the term “overmanship” is only intelligible by recalling Nietzsche for whom the “overman” is unthinkable without reference, at once, to the “last man” or “man as he has been hitherto” (“der bisherige Mensch”). The “overman” is regarded as a sort of “saving bridge”, as a

transitional “figure” – that is, as the surmounting of the “last man”. In other words, the “overman” emerges only against the background of the previous dominion of the “last man” – in Heidegger’s sense the “subjectivity” of the tradition. Heidegger expresses this bond in the following way: “The complete liberation of undermanship corresponds to the absolute empowering of overmanship.”²⁸

But aside from this fundamental aim of sustaining a certain mode of subjectivity, for what purpose are beings consumed? Essentially, in the present text and only in the present text, the technological use of beings is geared toward the form of “technical potential” called “armament”.²⁹ Such a use, however, which is calculated in view of preparation for “armament”, is according to Heidegger, a “misuse” (“Vernutzung”),³⁰ for armament, as that which is intended, “aims at an absoluteness of augmentation and self-augmentation but in truth has goallessness as a goal”.³¹

Conspicuous in this regard is the extent to which Heidegger’s formulations are dependent on the language of Nietzsche. The word “Steigerung”, for example, refers clearly to the Nietzsche-Lectures according to which “augmentation” (or “increase”), as a “condition”, signifies the eternal circular-like movement of the Will to Power itself. In the present text, mention is also made of a circularity, the “circular movement of misuse”.³² As we will show in the following (especially in Chapter III, Part Two), even in the latter essay “Die Frage nach der Technik”, Heidegger retains this Nietzschean model in his depiction of the workings of technology – which certainly does not mean its “essence”.³³

However, what is essential is not so much Heidegger’s *provisional* description of technology, as this is expressed in #26 of “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik”, but rather the thesis which serves as the point of departure. Accordingly, technology, this “aimless”³⁴ squandering of beings,³⁵ is predetermined by the so-called “void of the abandonment of Being”. Or to state the matter in yet another fashion: the prevailing misuse of beings is only possible in the tow of the decisive event of Being’s abandonment.

Let us focus our attention on the expression “void of the abandonment of Being” or on the “void of Being” (“Leere des

Seins"). Since we are already familiar with the event of "abandonment", the term "void" should offer little difficulty. For what should ensue if Being withdraws itself – if not a "void"? The "void of Being" signifies then the absence of Being, that which prevails subsequent to the happening of Entzug. The so-called "void", as the expression itself suggests if we regard the genitive as active, represents the aftermath once Being has refused itself. (But we know that the so-called "Leere des Seins" is in itself Being's *Lichtung*, Being's self-illuminating clearing.) In the first text examined (N II, pp. 20–29), we saw how Heidegger unmistakably brought out the preordination of Being by emphasizing that "Machenschaft" is the correlate of Being's refusal. In the present text, the fundamental thesis is reiterated in the following manner.

The misuse of all raw materials, including the raw stuff called man for the technological production of the unconditioned possibility of a producing of everything, is, in a concealed manner, determined through the complete void in which beings, the stuff of what is real, hangs.³⁶

The first segment of the sentence simply characterizes technology and the purpose of its activity. But as the second half of the cited text elucidates, this "is determined" by something else, which is not imputable to technology itself – to wit, by the "void" attendant upon Being's "keeping to itself". Hence, it is incontestable that technology may not be lopsidedly regarded as something which is entirely manmade, that over which man disposes as he sees fit.³⁷ In this way Heidegger's earlier reflections on the problem of technology, as provisional as these may be in regard to expression, agree with and point to later endeavors. That which belongs to technology is to be considered in the framework of the Being-event, not merely in the sense that Being through and in technology embodies itself, but also in that technology's onslaught relative to beings originates in Being, i.e. in the latter's manner of "sending itself" – which is to say: from the event that Being, by preserving its ownmost for itself, refuses itself.

At this point Heidegger remarks that the "void of Being" must be "filled out". But how is this possible when this void as such cannot be experienced as the void *of* Being. Hence, deprived of

this experience, the filling-out process takes the form of the “ceaseless arrangement of beings in view of the constant possibility of ordering. . .”³⁸ It is in this regard that Heidegger characterizes technology as the “Organisation des Mangels”.³⁹ Is this simply because the abundance of beings is inadequate in order to compensate for the “Leere des Seins”? “Everywhere, where there are too few beings – and it is increasingly and everywhere always too few for the self-augmenting will to willing. . .”⁴⁰ Friedrich Jünger has emphasized the point that production is consumption, that is, the “Perfektion” of technology demands the depletion of raw material – which state of affairs remind us of the two basic “conditions” of the Will to Power.

However, from a more Heideggerian point of view, the genitive of the expression “Organisation des Mangels” may *also* be considered as active (subiectivus). That is, the organizing (the *Steigerung*) in question – the above-mentioned “ceaseless arrangement of beings” – originates in “der Mangel”. Thus, Heidegger, on the same page, remarks that technology as the “Organisation des Mangels” is “related to the void of Being but without knowing it”.⁴¹ Oblivious to itself as belonging to the void of Being, technology remains impotent to bring the void itself, as that of Being, into experience. Instead it undertakes incessantly to purvey what is lacking in view of procuring for itself a certain “security” (“Sicherung”).

Once more, we are especially reminded of the Nietzschean notion of the Will to Power which, according to Heidegger’s analysis, becomes “constant” (“beständig”) in that it “augments” itself without cease. Similarly, technology, as the “organization of scarcity” strives to make itself constant insofar as it, in the attempt to provide that what is lacking, is always out for “security”. The term “security”, which plays a significant role in Heidegger’s interpretation of tradition and technology,⁴² surely adverts to the metaphysical notion of “Vorstellen” which is just as well a process of “securing” of that which has been posited by the “subject” before the “subject”. In “Die Frage nach der Technik”, “security” is construed as a fundamental feature of the “revealing” of beings distinctive of modern technology – a revealing, however, which is tantamount to a “Verstellen” of the

more primordial truth of beings.⁴³ As we will not omit to accent, the “unconcealment of beings” as “Bestand”, that is, as the technological product of the act of “Bestellen”, embraces in itself the “concealment” of Being.

Notwithstanding the obvious provisional character of the earlier texts, these remain most instructive, for Heidegger, almost unabashedly, brings forth his fundamental hypothesis: any exclusively anthropological interpretation of modern technology falls short. This is not to suggest that technology, as Heidegger sees it, does not bespeak an excessive subjectivity. However, this enlarged complex of subjectivity is itself preordained by Being – by Being’s historical manner of presenting itself. As we have stressed in the foregoing, it is this apriority of Being, to which man has it to “respond”, which characterizes Heidegger’s investigation of technology from the earlier texts onward.

NOTES

1. In N II, pp. 20–29.
2. In “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik”, Roman numeral XXVI, pp. 83ff.
3. p. 471.
4. The usual English translation is “framing”, “enframing” or “framework” – all of which correspond well with the ordinary German signification, but less well with the sense intended by Heidegger. D.F. Krell attempts to give some justification to the translation as follows: “Its (the technological framework) attempt to enclose all beings in a particular claim – utter availability and sheer manipulability – Heidegger calls ‘enframing’, Ge-stell.” Cf. *M. Heidegger, Basic Writings*, ed. by D.F. Krell, p. 285. It is true that the technological activity which Heidegger will call Her-stellen, Bestellen or Herausfordern attempts to enclose beings in its own circuit – but the Ge of Ge-stell refers primarily to Being’s manner of concealment. It is only *as a consequence* of Being’s “according” itself as Ge-stell that the attempt is rife to enclose beings. With regard to the translation of Gestell, cf. also M.E. Zimmerman, “Beyond ‘Humanism’: Heidegger’s Understanding of Technology”, *Listening* No. 3 (1977): 79. Zimmerman translates with “disclosive framework”. The addition “disclosive” is interesting and correct, but one-sided, for the disclosing of Ge-stell, that is, the disclosure of the “Being of beings” as “Bestand”, is more fundamentally a *closing* which the following analysis will show. F. Dessauer, for his part, points out that the word “Gestell” was already used “als Bezeichnung des Technischen” by Ernst Kapp. But Heidegger certainly does not employ the word in this relation: “als Bezeichnung des Technischen”. Cf. F. Dessauer, *Der Streit um die Technik* (Frankfurt: Verlag Josef Knecht, 1958), p. 352.

5. As we will see later this *sich Stellen* (a term used by us) is a “Gewähren”.

6. It should always be kept in mind that “beingness”, as Heidegger uses this key term, invariably signifies, however indirectly, Being’s ownmost concealment or as he says appropriately at the outset of N II, p. 9, the “*verhüllte Wahrheit des Seins*” – but note well: “*verhüllte*”.

7. Heidegger also employs the terms “*Herstellen*” (esp. in “*Wozu Dichter*”) and “*Herausfordern*”.

8. Cf. N II, p. 23: “*Die Seiendheit ist sich selbst als der losgelassenen Machenschaft überlassen.*” Also p. 486: “*Im Wesen der Macht aber verhüllt sich die äußerste Loslassung des Seins als Seiendheit, kraft deren diese zur Machenschaft wird.*” Cf. also N II, pp. 26, 256, and 487. On the latter page, Heidegger notes: “*Die Preisgabe, in der das Sein sich zum äußersten Unwesen der Seiendheit (zur ‘Machenschaft’) losläßt. . .*” And a last relevant text may be cited from “*Die Überwindung der Metaphysik*”, p. 91: “*Die Machenschaft . . . entspringt dem Wesen der Technik, das Wort hier identisch gesetzt mit dem Begriff der sich vollendenden Metaphysik.*” However, here the expression “*Wesen der Technik*”, from which “*Machenschaft*” is said to stem, is to be understood in the sense – ultimately – of *φύσις*. What is said here of “*Machenschaft*” could just as well be said of *Gestell*. *Gestell*, emphasizes Heidegger, is the Essence of technology and yet in a more comprehensive sense and one which accords with the whole, *Gestell* is the final mode of the essence of technology, that is, of the historical self-concealment of primordial *φύσις*.

9. In regard to these pages of N II, cf. also F. Couturier, *Monde et Etre* (Montréal: Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1971), pp. 441ff.

10. Oftentimes, the *Nachfolger* of the Will to Power is called “*Der Wille zum Willen*”.

11. In this regard, it is clear that Heidegger is not dialoguing with Nietzsche himself, who equally, after his own fashion, experienced the event of Nihilism as a historical happening. The text suggests that it is E. Jünger (and his cousin F. Jünger) with whom Heidegger is speaking. Mention is made of the “total mobilisation” of life, which is surely an allusion to Jünger, to which the words are added: “. . . as if the total mobilisation were something in itself and not rather the organization of the unconditioned senselessness ensuing from the Will to Power . . .” Cf. N II, p. 21. Concerning the relationship between E. Jünger and Heidegger, cf. J. Palmier, *Les Ecrits Politiques de Martin Heidegger* (Lausanne: Editions de L’Herne, 1968), pp. 167ff.

12. Heidegger also mentions the eminent Leibniz. According to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Leibnizian Metaphysics, Leibniz assumes a sort of mediating position between Descartes and Nietzsche in that he construes the “beingness” of beings as the unity of “*Vorstellen*” and “*Anstreben*”. The latter expression represents the ancestor of the “condition” of the Will to Power called “*Steigerung*”. Cf. N II, pp. 436–50. For an earlier interpretation of Leibniz, cf. GA II, 26. In this lecture-course from the summer semester of 1928, Heidegger attempts to show how the Leibnizian Logic is rooted in the Metaphysics of the “*Monad*”. We know that earlier (around 1900) B. Russell, in his *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, represented precisely the opposite thesis.

13. N II, p. 23: "Als Umwerter alle Werter bezeugt Nietzsche ... seine endgültige Zugehörigkeit zur Metaphysik und mit ihr die abgründige Trennung von jeder Möglichkeit eines anderen Anfangs."

14. N II, p. 24: "... letzte Bestätigung der Vormacht der Metaphysik in der Gestalt der Seinsverlassenheit des Seienden".

15. Cf. "Der Spruch des Anaximander", p. 338: "ὕποκειμενον (bedeutet) das im Unverborgenen schon Vorliegende." Cf. also "Kants Thesis über das Sein", p. 303: "Dieses (ὕποκειμενον) ist das Zum-Voraus-schon-Vorliegende."

16. Cf. N II, p. 430: "Das subiectum ist das im actus Untergelegte und Unter-worfene, dem anderes noch dann zufallen kann."

17. N II, p. 26: "Das Lichtungs-lose des Seins ist die Sinnlosigkeit des Seienden im Ganzen."

18. Indeed, Heidegger uses this word on p. 26 (N II): "... die Sinnlosigkeit ist die vorgezeichnete Folge der Endgültigkeit des Beginns der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik." Cf. also "Wozu Dichter", p. 268.

19. Cf. N II, pp. 27–28: "Überall und stets drängt die Machenschaft ... das Seiende in den einzigen Rang und läßt das Sein vergessen. Was eigentlich geschieht, ist die Seinsverlassenheit des Seienden: daß das Sein das Seiende ihm selbst überläßt und *darin sich verweigert*."

20. Cf. SVG, p. 114: "Sein schickt sich uns zu, aber so daß es zugleich schon sich in seinem Wesen entzieht." Also BH, p. 166: "Zum Geschick kommt das Sein, indem es, das Sein, sich gibt. Das aber sagt, geschickhaft gedacht: Es gibt sich und versagt sich zumal." Moreover, the above-stated expresses lucidly enough the reason why we must disagree with any assertion to the effect that the "aggressive spirit of thought" or "calculative aggressiveness" is the "primary element" in Western Metaphysics. Cf. H. Alderman, "Heidegger: Technology as Phenomenon", *Personalist* No. 4 (1970): 536. What is "primary" with regard to thought, be it metaphysical or otherwise, is Being's manner to be.

21. Cf. p. 129: "Das Unverborgene muß einer Verborgenheit entrissen, dieser im gewissen Sinne geraubt werden."

22. Cf. p. 371: "Nur was Entbergung ist, kann Verbergung sein. Und daher gilt est nicht, das *κρύπτεσθαι* der *φύσις* zu überwinden und ihr zu entreißen, sondern das weit Schwerere ist aufgegeben, das *κρύπτεσθαι*, als der *φύσις* gehörend, ... zu lassen."

23. N II, p. 28: "Sofern diese Verweigerung erfahren wird, ist schon eine Lichtung des Seins geschehen, denn solche Verweigerung ist nicht nichts, ist nicht einmal ein Negatives, kein Fehlen und kein Abbruch. Es ist anfänglich, erste Offenbarung des Seins in seiner Fragwürdigkeit – das Sein."

24. Cf. N II, p. 28. The expression "Lichtung des Sichverbergens" is doubtless instructive. At first sight, it appears to be the expression of a contradiction. But, for Heidegger, as we have emphasized all along, the self-concealing of Being is "illumination" or "clearing" – is precisely the coming-to-appearance of Being after a certain fashion. According to Heidegger's notion of the "Self-Sending of Being" ("Geschick des Seins"), Being never sends itself without at the same time concealing itself – which pertains even to Being as "Ereignis" as indisputably brought out by "Zeit und Sein".

25. According to the Festschrift for E. Barlach, the text "Seinsverlassenheit und Irrnis" dates from the years 1939–40.

26. In VA I, pp. 83ff. In the following, the pagination will correspond to the "Überwindung der Metaphysik".

27. Cf. "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik," p. 83: "...der auf sich erpichte Mensch noch die Subjektivität in das Übermenschentum retten kann."

28. "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", p. 86: "Der bedingungslosen Ermächtigung des Übermenschentums entspricht die völlige Befreiung des Untermenschentums." The manner in which Heidegger formulates this sentence is significant. We observe that he does not say "Befreiung von", but rather uses the genitive, "liberation of undermankind". This, vaguely though, suggests his rapport to the given state of affairs which, in this context, is not to be overcome in the sense of eliminated but rather "recovered". The term "verwinden" ("Verwindung") corresponds to the meaning of the word "modification" in SZ.

29. Cf. "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", p. 84: "Dieser Gebrauch wird genutzt zum Nutzen der Rüstung." Cf. also Ernst Jünger, *Der Arbeiter*, Vol. 6 (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1963), #56, pp. 209ff. The first edition of this work was published in 1932 and offered impetus to Heidegger's own meditation on technology. Heidegger was drawn to Jünger's work not because he found something new in it which he would then take over, but rather owing to the fact that he discerned in Jünger a perspective analogous to his own. For Heidegger, Jünger's work stood apart amid technological treatments of technology, for Jünger detected "a reposing Being" ("ein ruhendes Sein", p. 41) or an "unmoved center" ("unbewegliches Zentrum", p. 214) hidden beneath the "surface". Concerning the notion of "armament", cf. also Friedrich Jünger, *The Failure of Technology* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1956), p. 168. This is the English translation of F. Jünger's *Die Perfektion der Technik*.

30. Cf. also "Wozu Dichter", p. 284: "Diese (Gegenstände) sind für die Vernutzung hergestellt. Je rascher sie vernutzt werden, um so nötiger wird, sie immer noch rascher und noch leichter zu ersetzen."

31. "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", p. 84: "... in der Unbedingtheit der Steigerung und der Selbststeigerung ausgeht und in Wahrheit die Ziellosigkeit zum Ziel hat."

32. p. 88: "Kreisbewegung der Vernutzung".

33. In the analysis of technology in "Die Frage nach der Technik", the two essential conditions (Erhaltung and Steigerung) of the Will to Power re-assert themselves, both being integral to the sense of modern "Bestellen". Cf. Chapter III of this section.

34. The "goallessness" in question in the present context is not exactly that so fundamental to Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's Will to Power. The term refers here to the simple incapacity on the part of technology to carry out that which is intended, namely "armament", in its "absoluteness".

35. In contrast to the "Brauchen" of the earth according to "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", p. 52: "Dieses Brauchen aber verbraucht und mißbraucht die Erde nicht als Stoff, sondern es befreit sie gerade zu ihr selbst."

36. "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", p. 87: "Die Vernutzung aller Stoffe, eingerechnet den Rohstoff Mensch, zur technischen Herstellung der unbedingten Möglichkeit eines Herstellens von allem wird im Verborgenen bestimmt durch die völlige Leere, in der das Seiende, die Stoffe des Wirklichen, hängt."

37. Heidegger frequently remarks that technology is "kein bloß menschliches Gemächte".

38. p. 87: "... unausgesetzte Einrichtung des Seienden auf die ständige Möglichkeit des Ordners."

39. According to Simon Moser, it is F.G. Jünger in his work *Die Perfektion der Technik*, who spoke of technology as the "Organisation des Mangels". Cf. Simon Moser, "Kritik der traditionellen Technikphilosophie", *Techne, Technik, Technologie* (Pullach: UTB Verlag, 1973), p. 69. Section 7 of this study deals with Heidegger's essay "Die Frage nach der Technik". Cf. pp. 61ff.

40. p. 87: "Überall, wo an Seienden zu wenig ist – und es ist wachsend überall immer für den sich steigernden Willen zum Willen alles zu wenig..."

41. Cf. p. 87: "Die Technik ist von da gesehen, weil auf die Leere des Seins wider ihr Wissen bezogen, die Organization des Mangels."

42. Cf. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 16: "Steuerung und Sicherung werden sogar die Hauptzüge des herausfordernden Entbergens."

43. Regarding the "Verstellen" of the "revealing" of modern technology, "Die Frage nach der Technik". Also Chapter II, Part Three.

CHAPTER II

TEXTS FROM "WOZU DICHTER"

Among those texts preceding "Die Frage nach der Technik", substantial passages from the essay "Wozu Dichter"¹ merit special attention, for in the first place, and quite generally, in the essay "Wozu Dichter", Heidegger brings together the notion of "Vorstellen", which plays the leading role in traditional Metaphysics, and that of modern "Herstellen", which term in our present context must be held apart from the original "Herstellen", that is, "Herstellen" in its Greek sense.² In this way, the putative gulf between the distinctive activity characteristic of modernity and that peculiar to human subjectivity in the post-Nietzschean period is bridged. In the essay "Die Frage nach der Technik", Heidegger singles out the term "Bestellen" (and "Herausfordern") instead of making use of the word "Herstellen", but nevertheless it is unmistakable that both have their point of provenance in the traditional, metaphysical way of "thought" (i.e. "Vorstellen").

A second reason for the central position given to the essay "Wozu Dichter" consists in the fact that it serves as an appropriate introduction to the later and systematic essay "Die Frage nach der Technik". The character with which modern Herstellen is suffused and which is brought to expression as "vorsätzliches Sichdurchsetzen" or as a "willing" resurges in the notion of technological Bestellen which becomes so decisive in the following. And then, too, "Wozu Dichter" begins to discuss, although summarily, the so-called "Danger" linked to modern technology, together with the possible "recovering" "Turn" (later called "diese Kehre"), both of which concern the later Heidegger considerably.

Foremost, however, the essay at hand bears witness to the pre-ordination of Being, which, from the very outset, sustains the

human, subjective element. But with regard to structure, “Wozu Dichter” differs somewhat from the more usual way of procedure in this context. More characteristically – a pertinent example is “Die Frage nach der Technik” – Heidegger carries out a regress from the given, i.e. technology as made manifest especially through human activity (“Her-stellen”, “Bestellen”), to the pre-given, i.e. Being in its specific manner of revealing itself, even if this revelation amounts to the most pertinacious concealment. We notice that “Wozu Dichter” begins with Being (“beingness” or the “Being of beings”) as “Wille”, as that in virtue of which human willing is such as it is. We must now turn to this notion of the Will.

A. THE WILL (DER WILLE) AND HUMAN WILLING (WOLLEN)

In the introductory section of this chapter we just employed the expression “post-Nietzschean” period which we believe to be singularly apt with regard to Heidegger’s Rilke-interpretation, for this names precisely the realm in which Heidegger considers Rilke. More specifically, it is the context of the “truth of beings” (“Wahrheit des Seienden”) which expression should not be confused with that of the “truth of Being”. That is to say, the present context is one of traditional Metaphysics, viz., the “representation” of “beings as such and as a whole”³ or to put it in another way: the transappearing of Being in its beingness as “Wille”.

It is in relation to certain of Rilke’s “improvised Verses”⁴ that Heidegger comes to characterize the “Will” together with human willing determinative for the technological age. Confronted with these “improvised Verses” (cf. Note 4), how does Heidegger arrive at the notion of the “Will”? He begins with the notion of “Nature” (line 1) only to apprise us that “Nature” signifies the common ground for man as well as for plants and beasts. Moreover, the word “Nature” is to be thought in the sense in which Leibniz understood “Natura”, that is, as the “Being of beings” (as beingness). And this latter, asserts Heidegger, is “der Wille”.⁵ There follows a passage in which Heidegger summarizes

the relation between Will and human willing in a manner which is most instructive.

The Will is the self-concentrating gathering of every ens to itself. Every being, as a being, is in the Will. It *is* as something willed. This should be taken as saying: that which is, is not first and only as something willed; rather, insofar as it is, it is itself in the mode of Will. Only by virtue of being willed is each being that which, in its own manner, does the willing in the Will.⁶

The text clearly expresses the subordination of human willing to “Will”, an expression which again refers to the notion of beingness, to Being’s historical (self-sending) way to appear.⁷ Human willing is what it is only *as* being willed by the Will; that is, human willing is, unawares, always already joined to the Will.⁸ It is true that the “es” refers to “das Seiende” (here the particular beings in question, man, plant, and beast), but as the last quoted passage confirms, the specific being intended is man – “der Wollende”. This same relationship between the Will and the willed is reiterated concisely, albeit most emphatically, in the following words: “. . . the metaphysical . . . willing of man remains only the willed counter-part to the Will in the sense of the Being of beings.”⁹ And then again in Heidegger’s brief discussion of “Nature”, that is, of “beings as a whole” (p. 257) as the “Venture” (“Wagnis”), this apriority of Being’s beingness as Will is brought out. Being as the Venture “gives” particular beings “over to the Venture”; that is, particular beings are ventured and *only out of this source* are they then venturing, do they “go *with*” the Venture. In “Die Frage nach der Technik”, Heidegger will urge the same point in different terms. Man challenges and “orders” “Nature” or the real, but does so only because in advance he himself is “challenged” (in “Wozu Dichter”, “ist gewagt” by the Venture or is only as “Gewilltes”), that is, delivered over to the mode of unconcealment that prevails in “Gestell”.

But having explicitated this preordination on the part of Being’s beingness as Will with relationship to human willing, it remains to sketch out what is distinctive of willing, this “going *with*” in contrast to the manner in which the other creatures relate to “Nature”.

B. HUMAN WILLING

Lines 7–8 of the “improvised verses” suggest that human willing “goes with” the Venture even more so and surely in a different manner than do plants and beasts. How does Heidegger construe the “mehr” of “*Mitgehen*”? He understands it “metaphysically”, that is, especially in terms of “representing” or “positing before” (“*Vorstellen*”), but one which is to be grasped in its unfolded sense: “representing” as an unconditional willing, a human willing whereby the “world” (also referred to as “*das Offene*”) is objectified and, as it were, placed at the disposal of man. Let us follow the extremely compressed text (pp. 265–68) in which Heidegger moves from *Vorstellen* through *Her-stellen* to the “commanding” willing.¹⁰

The first mark of distinction between the “going *with*” of plants and animals and that of man or rather what constitutes the “mehr” on the part of man is that human “going *with*” the Venture, with Nature, involves “representing” nature. By this means, Nature is summoned before man by man, that is, man objectifies the world – which is to say that the “world” or “Nature” is brought back to man. Hence the term *Her-stellen*, whose prefix denotes directionality back to the subject (as distinct from the prefix “*hin*”), and which suggests that “representing” (“*Vorstellen*”) is always already a “*Her-stellen*” or “*Zu-stellen*.” But Heidegger clarifies that *Her-stellen* is not merely another form of “mental” activity, but has to be grasped in its enlarged, that is, technological sense. Heidegger writes:

Where Nature is not satisfactory to man’s representations, he reframes or redispes it. Man produces new things where they are lacking to him. Man transposes things where they are in his way. Man interposes something between himself and things that distract him from his purpose. Man exposes things when he boosts them for sale and use. Man exposes when he sets forth his own achievement and plays up his own Industry.¹¹

By means of these varied modes of “*Her-stellen*”, which we translate with “modern producing”, the world is objectified, brought to its stand by and for man.¹² Are we then to understand

that the multifaceted modern producing supersedes the traditional “Vorstellen” from which it sprang? Can it ever be a question of simple supersession¹³ in the context of Heidegger and the tradition? It is patent that Her-stellen, modern producing, in whichever mode, presupposes and is accompanied by a certain “representing”, and here it would be advisable to construe “representing” in terms of preconception (perhaps even better: forecasting). Indeed, it is certain preconceptions of the “World”, which need not be thematic, which determine in advance the manifold ways of modern producing. Heidegger writes:

To bring something before the self in such a way that what is brought before as what has been represented in advance determines in all respects all modes of modern producing. . .¹⁴

The text speaks unequivocally. “What has been brought before” or “das zuvor Vorgestelltes” predetermines the diverse ways of modern producing – and this precedent preconception, as the text makes explicit in several passages, is the “World” pre-viewed as the objectifiable object for a subject. Furthermore, we note that the entire complex of human modes of activity constitutes what Heidegger in “Wozu Dichter” calls human willing.

How is this human willing to be understood which consists in the attempt to objectify everything (pursuant upon the pre-view of “World” as the “objectification of beings as a whole”) – and this, not merely “in mente”? Heidegger characterizes this modern willing as a “purposeful carrying-through” (“vorsätzliches Durchsetzen”)¹⁵ which is at the same time a “sich Durchsetzen”,¹⁶ that is: to the extent that man by means of modern producing carries through the objectification of reality,¹⁷ he thereby carries himself through, that is, asserts himself as the “producer” of what is.¹⁸ Hence, the whole of reality, at least as the “Vorsatz” (or “Vor-habe”) of human willing, stands under the “command” of technological willing.

But it is precisely at this point that Heidegger, in his characteristic manner, re-emphasizes the predetermination of the human element. The willing of this “sich vorsätzliches Durchsetzen” is one that is *already* willed.

This willing determines the nature of modern man, though

at first he is not aware of its far-reaching scope, nor could he already know today by what will, as the Being of beings, this willing is willed.¹⁹

“Wozu Dichter” does not tell us all too much about this mode of the Being of beings as Will but does seem to link the Will, which is a “Wille zum Willen”²⁰ and the “concealed essence of technology” (“verborgenes Wesen der Technik”, p. 267), nor does “Wozu Dichter” expatiate on this concealed essence of technology, which is to be interrogated in the following chapters. And yet the invariably essential is brought to expression:

But even this – that man becomes subject and the world object – is a *sequel* of the self-installing Essence of technology, and not inversely.²¹

C. THE “DANGER” AND THE “TURN”

According to “Wozu Dichter”, man “goes with” the “Venture”, that is, is more daring than the other creatures. But by the very same token man is, in a special sense, in “Danger”.²² What constitutes the “Danger” is intimated in the following words:

The threat which befalls the essence of man emerges out of this essence itself. However, the latter is grounded in the relation of Being to him. . .²³

Again we are confronted with two sentences the first of which expresses itself such that the second must rectify it. On reading the first sentence, it may appear that the *raison d'être* of the “threat” has its origin in man – in his technological frenzy of bringing “Nature” to an objective stand. However, if this were so, this would conflict with our interpretation thus far – and with Heidegger’s way of thought. Hence, the second sentence which clearly explicates that the threatened essence of man is grounded “in the relation of Being to him”. This expression re-institutes, as it were, the appropriate order. In relation to the preceding analysis bearing on the human way of producing the real, we may repeat this appropriate order as follows: man does not “posit” the world in the attempt to set the world out as the totality of producible (useable) objects owing to some inborn property of

his ownmost “nature”, but rather – to express the matter in a language which still requires clarification – as a comporting himself to Being (as “beingness” or as the “Being of beings”) which has “sent itself” as “Will”. Thus, only given this prior manifestation of concealed Being as Will does man relate himself to “reality” in the manner of “objectifying it”, that is, in the attempt to render it merely “subjective”.

It is in line with the above-stated that we interpret another key passage:

The Danger consists in the threat which concerns the essence of man in his relation to Being itself. This Danger is *the* Danger.²⁴

As Heidegger will later clarify, *the* Danger is the Danger of Being (active genitive) – or in less poetical language, the “self-concealing” of Being. Indeed, this is suggested in the sentence which directly follows the saying: “this Danger is *the* Danger”. Heidegger writes: “It (the Danger) conceals itself in the groundless Ground for all beings”.²⁵ We wonder whether the word “Abgrund” may be thought of here as some sort of “Abyss” (the current translation) – granting that the term “Abgrund” is used by Heidegger as a designation of primordial Being – and this long before the essay “Wozu Dichter”.²⁶ Moreover, the term “Abgrund” is a designation of one sense of “Ereignis”, as we will show in Chapter III of Part Three, and names essentially the “recovery” of “Grund” (a traditional notion of “Being”).²⁷ Does this have any bearings in “Wozu Dichter”? Is Heidegger making reference to the groundless Ground, to that which presupposes the “step backward”²⁸ behind the traditional determination of “Grund” – indeed behind (i.e. before) tradition in general? Does “Wozu Dichter” speak of a “Schritt zurück”? Surely, in the following passage:

But Being is the Ground of beings. Whoever is more daring than the Ground, ventures thither where everything concerning Ground is disrupted – namely in the groundless Ground.²⁹

No doubt but that the expression “wo es an allem Grund gebricht” states the event accented in “Der Satz der Identität”,

that is, the event of a “sich Absetzen” from the “Ground” to the “groundless Ground”.³⁰ And unmistakably, the so-called “venturing thither” names that “Schritt zurück” – from “Ground” (hence tradition) to Ab-grund, the “principle” of the recovery of tradition.

In addition to these words regarding “the Danger”, “Wozu Dichter” also offers a general sketch of what Heidegger will later call “*this turn*” (“Diese Kehre”).³¹ The latter is conceived of as the “recovery” of Being as Gestell which, in the essay “Die Frage nach der Technik”, is used to designate the “essence” of modern technology (cf. the following chapter). The “recovery” in question as it is outlined in “Die Kehre” comprises two movements: first a movement into the “Oblivion of Being”, which is mirrored in and maintained by traditional Metaphysics; and secondly a movement out of this “Oblivion” to Being’s “Wahrnis” (or “World” as “Geviert”). It is “this Turn” which is already adumbrated in “Wozu Dichter”.³² For the moment, we only wish to point in this direction reserving a more detailed analysis to subsequent chapters.

To accomplish this, we must notice two additional words, namely, “being without protection” (“Schutzlossein”) and the notion of “departure from” (“Abschied gegen”).

To the extent that man fixes himself to the purposeful self-assertion and thereby installs himself by means of unconditional objectification in the departure from the Open, he activates his ownmost being-without-protection.³³

In another passage of note, Heidegger contrasts “being-without-protection” and “being-secure”: “The more audacious daring brings about no protection. But it does make for a being-secure.”³⁴ Obviously, “being-without-protection” and “being-secure” are not mutually exclusive. The latter by no means excludes the former, but contrarily demands it – in much the same way that the “recovery” of Metaphysics demands Metaphysics. In that man is without protection, he is intimately bound to protection:³⁵ “In this manner of being unprotected, man remains, precisely after the fashion of deprivation, related to protection.”³⁶ Or as the poet (Rilke) himself confirms: “. . . what ultimately saves us, is our being without protection”. It is to

elucidate these poetical words of Rilke that Heidegger alludes to what is later called “*this Turn*”. How is it that our “being-without-protection”, our being-endangered, is able to save us? Heidegger begins to point the way when he writes:

Being without protection is only able to save, if the turning away from the Open is reversed such that it turns itself toward and in the Open. In this way, being without protection is, as reversed, the saving.³⁷

For the English reader it would be helpful to point out that the word “Bergen” means “to save”, “to rescue”, “to shelter”, but also, used reflexively, “to conceal”. And even though here and in several other passages, it is not used reflexively, the notion of “concealment” is hardly beside the point. For the origin of the “saving” in Heidegger is always that which for us remains, in its “surplus”, concealed. Therefore, it is advisable to leave to the verb “Bergen” its ambiguity.

And yet the passage in question seems to offer difficulties, for it suggests that the “saving” consists simply in turning over a new leaf. The attitude which drives man, that is, the technological Her-stellen or Wollen, which then constitutes the “Abkehr” or “Abschied gegen”, must be revised – a mode of comportment resembling Gelassenheit must take charge. And thus “being-without-protection” is converted into the saving. Certainly, this sounds correct. Nevertheless we must feel uneasy, for according to later texts it is Being which institutes, which initiates, what Heidegger will call “Das Rettende”.³⁸ (The “recovery” of Metaphysics is a matter for Being, even though man is “needed”.) Does “Wozu Dichter” really suggest something less radical or should we ask the question: how is “being-without-protection” to reverse itself? Is this to be achieved thanks solely and *in the first place* to the stalwart “will power” of man; man’s ability to transform his prevailing comportment of Wollen into one of “Entgegendenken”, into an “Er-innerung”, as “Wozu Dichter” prefers to call it?³⁹

The reply to our question may be found on pp. 276–77 where Heidegger emphasizes that “being-without-protection” is able to “save” only to the extent that “we have already turned it” (or converted it as it were).⁴⁰ Heidegger calls this “Gewendet haben”

that which is distinctive about “turning” (“Wenden”) and proceeds to interpret this as a “having seen” (“Gesehen haben”).⁴¹ Any “having turned” on the part of man is anchored in this already “having seen” the “Danger”. But how does the Danger *as* the Danger, that is, explicitly as such, become “visible”? In “Die Kehre”, Heidegger will speak of the lightning flash of Being; in “Wozu Dichter”, however, he simply writes:

... that which is Open itself must have turned itself toward us in such a way that we are able to turn the being-without-protection to it ...⁴²

Thus, any human “Gewendet haben” (p. 276) or “Gesehen haben” presupposes a “Zugedrehhaben” on the part of what Heidegger here calls “Das Offene” (in his sense). And it is in virtue of this that the “reversal” (“Umkehrung”) of being-without-protection is called “das Bergende”.

NOTES

1. In the “Anmerkungen” to HW, p. 345, Heidegger informs us of the date of “Wozu Dichter” as follows: “Der Vortrag wurde zum Andenken zu R.M. Rilkes zwanzigsten Todestag (gest. 29 Dez. 1926), in engstem Kreis gesprochen.” In this regard, cf. E. Heftrich, “Das Dichten des Dichtens und die Vollendung der Metaphysik”, *Die Philosophie und Rilke* (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1962), pp. 109ff.

2. In Heidegger’s writings the word “Her-stellen” has two basic senses: that invoked by “Wozu Dichter” which is discussed below and secondly “Her-stellen” in the sense of “Erscheinen lassen”, hence primordial “Her-stellen”. Concerning the latter, cf. especially N I, pp. 203ff; “Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις”, pp. 351, 359–60; also “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, pp. 35, 36, 37; “Das Ding”, p. 39. Cf. also GA II, 24, pp. 143ff. Here Heidegger employs the term “Herstellen” to express the “Grundverhaltung des Daseins” – but certainly not in the sense of modern producing.

3. Cf. “Wozu Dichter”, p. 254. Here Heidegger affirms the realm out of which Rilke’s fundamental sayings are to be interpreted: “Das ist die Wahrheit des Seienden, wie sie sich seit der Vollendung der abendländischen Metaphysik durch Nietzsche entfaltet hat. ... Wir sehen zu, wie sich für Rilke das Seiende als solches im Ganzen zeigt.”

4. We cite the German version of the verses found in “Wozu Dichter”, p. 255, or in *Rainer Maria Rilke. Werke in Drei Bänden* (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1966), Vol. 2, p. 211. We also mention here the English by Albert Hofstadter in his translation of “Wozu Dichter”, p. 99:

Wie die Natur die Wesen überläßt
 dem Wagnis ihrer dumpfen Lust und keins
 besonders schützt in Scholle und Geäst:
 so sind wir dem Urgrund unseres Seins
 nicht weiter lieb; *er wagt uns*. Nur daß wir,
 mehr noch als Pflanze oder Tier,
mit diesem Wagnis gehn; es wollen; manchmal auch
 wagender sind (und nicht aus Eigennutz)
 als selbst das Leben ist –, um einen Hauch
 wagender ... Dies schafft uns, außerhalb von Schutz,
 ein Sichersein, dort wo die Schwerkraft wirkt
 der reinen Kräfte; was uns schließlich birgt
 ist unser Schutzlossein und daß wir's so
 ins Offne wandten, da wir's drohen sahen,
 um es, im weitesten Umkreis, irgendwo,
 wo das Gesetz uns anrührt, zu bejahen.

5. Cf. p. 256: "Natur müssen wir hier in dem weiten und wesentlichen Sinne denken, in dem Leibniz das groß geschriebene Wort *Natura* gebraucht. Es bedeutet das Sein des Seienden. ... Das Sein des Seienden ist der Wille."

6. "Wozu Dichter", pp. 256–57: "Der Wille ist die sich zusammennehmende Versammlung eines jeden ens zu ihm selber. Jedes Seiende ist als Seiendes im Willen. Es *ist* als Gewilltes. Damit sei gesagt: das Seiende ist nicht erst und nur als Gewolltes, sondern es ist, insofern es ist, selbst in der Weise des Willens. Als Gewilltes nur ist es das im Willen je nach seiner Weise Wollende."

7. Heidegger frequently refers to the "Will" as a mode of "Seiendheit". Cf. N II, p. 7; "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", p. 73; "Nachwort" zu WM, p. 43.

8. Cf. p. 270: "Rilkes Gedicht denkt den Menschen als das Wesen, das in ein Wollen gewagt ist, das, ohne es schon zu erfahren, im Willen zum Willen gewillte wird."

9. p. 258: "... bleibt das metaphysische ... Wollen des Menschen, nur das gewillte Gegenspiel zum Willen als dem Sein des Seienden."

10. We do not mean thereby to suggest that there is an essential difference between the three. The latter is simply aged, and for that reason more radical, demanding immanent unconditionality.

11. With the exception of a few words, the English translation is that of Albert Hofstadter. Cf. "What are Poets for?" *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 110. The German text, p. 265, reads: "Der Mensch bestellt die Natur, wo sie seinem Vorstellen nicht genügt. Der Mensch stellt neue Dinge her, wo sie ihm fehlen. Der Mensch stellt die Dinge um, wo sie ihn stören. Der Mensch verstellt sich die Dinge, wo sie ihn von seinem Vorhaben ablenken. Der Mensch stellt die Dinge aus, wo er sie zu Kauf und Nutzen anpreist. Der Mensch stellt aus, wo er sein eigenes Leisten herausstellt und für sein Gewerbe wirbt." Cf. Peter Fürstenau, *Heidegger. Das Gefüge seines Denkens* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1958), pp. 48ff. With reference to this passage concerning the manifold senses of modern "Herstellen", Fürstenau

speaks of the "inauthentic" Technology, which he interprets as a later modification of "Geworfenheit". This line of interpretation has its justification as long as "inauthentic technology" is not confounded with "Ge-stell", that in virtue of which man is "thrown".

12. Heidegger writes, p. 266: "Das Offene wird zum Gegenstand und so auf das Menschenwesen zu-gedreht." In regard to "Das Offene", cf. A. De Waelhens, *Phénoménologie et Vérité* (Louvain-Paris: Nauwelaerts, J. Vrin, 1965), pp. 70ff.

13. In the sense of simple successive replacement.

14. "Wozu Dichter", p. 266: "Etwas vor sich bringen dergestalt, daß dieses Vorgebrachte als ein zuvor Vorgestelltes alle Weisen des Herstellens in jeder Hinsicht bestimmt..."

15. The adjective "vorsätzlich" is clearly ambiguous, meaning, on the one hand, "intentional", "purposeful", "deliberate", but, on the other hand, it refers to the prior "Entwurf" of "World" as the totality of objectifiable objects. The latter is the *Vor-satz* which "moves" the will in its Her-stellen.

16. In similar manner, traditional "Vorstellen" is at once and essentially a *sich* Vorstellen. Cf. Chapter III, Part One.

17. In lieu of the term "reality" ("Wirklichkeit"), Heidegger also uses the expression "Bestand". Cf. p. 266.

18. And thus, as "Die Frage nach der Technik" brings out, is blind enough to believe he thereby encounters himself.

19. "Wozu Dichter", p. 266: "Dieses Wollen bestimmt das Wesen des neuzeitlichen Menschen, ohne daß er zunächst um seine Tragweite weiß, ohne daß er heute schon wissen könnte, aus welchem Willen als dem Sein des Seienden dieses Wollen gewillt ist."

20. Heidegger uses this expression "Wille zum Willen" in three connections (1) In order to say "Will to Power" as the will to more power, as a will to become itself, to empower itself. (2) Secondly, the expression "Wille zum Willen" is used to state a mode of "beingness" which follows upon the Will to Power. In SF, for example, Heidegger speaks of the unfolding of the Will to Power into the unconditioned Will to Willing. (3) Thirdly, the expression "Wille zum Willen" is used most generally to designate the "Being of beings" in the period of Modernity to the present time.

21. "Wozu Dichter", p. 268: "Sogar dieses, daß der Mensch zum Subjekt und die Welt zum Objekt wird, ist eine Folge des sich einrichtenden Wesens der Technik, nicht umgekehrt" (my italics).

22. Cf. "Wozu Dichter", p. 270.

23. "Wozu Dichter", p. 270: "Die Bedrohung, die das Wesen des Menschen anfällt, steigt aus diesem Wesen herauf. Dieses beruht jedoch im Bezug des Seins zu ihm."

24. "Wozu Dichter", p. 273: "Die Gefahr besteht in der Bedrohung, die das Wesen des Menschen in seinem Verhältnis zum Sein selbst angeht. Diese Gefahr ist die Gefahr."

25. "Wozu Dichter", p. 273: "Sie (die Gefahr) verbirgt sich im Abgrund zu allem Seienden."

26. We cite only two telling texts: "Er (das Seinsverständnis) ist nicht das Letzte, sondern nur das Erste, von dem die Ergründung des Grundes ihren Ausgang nimmt für das Denken des Seins als Ab-grundes" (N I, p. 578). And on p. 654 of the same work: "Die Drehung: Seiendes – Sein, der Wendungspunkt der Drehung: die Wahrheit des Seins. Die Drehung ist keine Umkehrung, sie ist: Eindrehen in den anderen Grund als Ab-grund." Hopefully, Part Three will furnish sufficient illumination concerning these texts, the latter of which sketches the notion of "*Diese Kehre*".

27. And is itself the recovering Ground.

28. In "Wozu Dichter" this is called "Umkehrung" of which the human feature consists in "Er-innerung".

29. p. 273: "Aber das Sein ist der Grund des Seienden. Wer wagender ist als der Grund wagt sich dorthin, wo es an allem Grund bricht, in den Abgrund."

30. Cf. our last chapter.

31. The expression "Diese Kehre", which we will examine in the following, is used in "Die Kehre", p. 40.

32. Not to mention even earlier texts.

33. "Wozu Dichter", p. 274: "Insofern der Mensch sich in das vorsätzliche Sichdurchsetzen festsetzt und sich durch die unbedingte Vergegenständlichung in den Abschied gegen das Offene einrichtet, betreibt er selbst das eigene Schutzlossein."

34. "Wozu Dichter", p. 275: "Das wagendere Wagen stellt keinen Schutz her. Aber es schafft uns ein Sichersein."

35. Or put in Heideggerian, metaphysical terms: precisely in that we are caught up in an unconcealment of beings which conceals primordial Being, do we remain united to Being's "appealing Claim".

36. "Wozu Dichter", pp. 275–76: "Dergestalt ungeschützt, bleibt der Mensch gerade, in der Weise des Ermangelns, auf Schutz bezogen..."

37. "Wozu Dichter", p. 276: "Das Schutzlossein kann nur dann bergen, wenn die Abkehr gegen das Offene umgekehrt wird, so daß es sich dem Offenen zu- und in dieses wendet. So ist das Schutzlossein als das umgekehrte das Bergende."

38. Heidegger speaks also in "Wozu Dichter" of "Die Rettung", p. 284.

39. Cf. pp. 284ff.

40. "Wozu Dichter", p. 276: "Das Schutzlossein birgt nur, insofern wir es schon gewendet haben."

41. Distinctive of human *τέχνη*. Cf. Chapter I, Part One.

42. "Wozu Dichter", p. 277: "... das Offene selbst muß sich in einer Weise uns zugedreht haben, daß wir ihm das Schutzlossein zuwenden können."

CHAPTER III

THE ESSAY "DIE FRAGE NACH DER TECHNIK"

In Heidegger's published writings, the essay "Die Frage nach der Technik" offers the only study devoted to a systematic consideration of modern technology. In the year 1949, Heidegger held four conferences "Im Club zu Bremen" entitled: "the Thing, das Gestell, the Danger, the Turn". The essay which is here to be examined is the reworked version of the conference called "the Gestell" and most probably reproduces the main lines presented in the conference "The Danger", although Heidegger himself affirms that the latter from the fourfold series remained unpublished.¹ However this may be in fact, we will now make ourselves attentive to the published study "Die Frage nach der Technik".²

A. "TECHNOLOGY IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH THE ESSENCE OF TECHNOLOGY"

At the very opening of the essay one encounters this significant distinction between "technology" ("Die Technik") and "the technological" ("das technische") on the one hand and the "essence of technology" on the other.³ Heidegger remarks succinctly that technology, including the technological, is "not identical" ("nicht das Gleiche") with the essence of technology. And as far as sheer bulk is concerned, most of the essay in question addresses itself to technology or the technological, that is, up to cir. p. 24, at which point Heidegger begins discussing the essence of technology more explicitly. What the essay is intent on showing, at least on its initial level, is that the usual manner of looking at technology, which Heidegger calls the "instrumental" or "anthropological" conception of technology, is myopic –

myopic to the extent that it fails to take into view the presway of technology's essence, that is, Being's apriority with regard to the technological.⁴ But before examining Heidegger's interpretation of technology, we might heed the expression: "not identical with".⁵

Technology, together with the technological, is not identical with the essence of technology. Does such a manner of speaking intend to insert a wedge between two sides of a state of affairs or is it rather designed to suggest an intimate bond? Despite the difference between technology and its essence, the statement in question bespeaks a unity which is sufficiently evidenced by Heidegger's interpretation of traditional Metaphysics. But this unity is also suggested in the very manner in which Heidegger expresses the distinction, that is, he does not say, and it would be inexact to say, that technology is not the "same" as the essence of technology, understanding the expression the "same" ("dasselbe" or "das Selbe") in an Heideggerian fashion.

Heidegger makes frequent use of this term ("dasselbe"), applying it in diverse contexts. We have already caught a glimpse of this in Chapter I (Part One) and then again with reference to the Will to Power. The expression "the same" indicates in the first place an essential "belonging-together", but also a "fundamental distinctness" ("Grundverschiedenheit"). Thus, Heidegger avers in WHD, when discussing Parmenides' fragment 3, that τὸ αὐτὸ may be translated with "the same" ("dasselbe"), whereas "the identical" (das Gleiche) corresponds to the Greek ὁμοιον. He then asks how νοεῖν, apprehending, and Being could signify the "same", for patently they are quite distinct from each other. "However", they belong together precisely in this distinctness."⁶ And again in ID: "However the same is not identical. In the identical distinctness vanishes. But in the same distinctness comes to appearance."⁷ Such assertions could easily be accumulated but this is hardly necessary, for it is clear enough that the term "dasselbe" is understood in the sense of an essential belonging-together and secondly that Heidegger unmistakably contrasts "dasselbe" and "das Gleiche". Now it is surely not to be expected that this usage is set in brackets when it is said that technology is not identical with the essence of technology. From an Heideggerian angle, technology and the essence of technology are certainly

“the same” and following the brief indication given above, it is manifest that this does not signify their identification. Contrarily, they are fundamentally *distinct* precisely in being “the same”. But the question may be asked: how are technology and the essence of technology “the same”, how do they belong together in mutual concern,⁸ granted their distinctness? Hopefully, the foregoing has been suggestive of this, for has it not already become clear that technology germinates from and relates to, even if unwittingly, the “essence” of technology, that is, Being’s way to be? As we will notice more and more strikingly in the context of modern technology, the latter is to be understood in terms of Being’s manner of “enduring”, that is, Being’s way of according itself, of transappearing in Bestand.

B. THE “CORRECT” NOTION OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF CAUSALITY (*TÉXNH*)

As already mentioned, Heidegger, in the essay “Die Frage nach der Technik” attempts to expose the inadequacy of the current “representation” of technology which he terms the “instrumental” or “anthropological” conception. Consistently enough, to arrive at this latter notion, he begins with the traditional notion of “essence”. “As the essence of something counts, according to ancient teaching, *what* something is”,⁹ which “what” as Heidegger later remarks (p. 29) is precisely the term for “quidditas”. Thus, if we interrogate the “what” of technology, i.e. if we pose the question in a traditional manner, then two facile responses are forthcoming, namely: technology is “a means to an end” or technology is to be grasped as “an activity of man” (p. 6) – replies clearly implementing each other.

For to posit ends and to procure and utilize the means in their regard is human activity. The manufacture and utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and used things themselves, and the needs and ends that they serve all belong to what technology is. The whole complex of these apparati is technology.¹⁰

It is this above general characterization which Heidegger calls

the “instrumental” determination of technology and which is, as he remarks, perfectly “correct”; indeed, even “unheimlich” “correct”.¹¹ But what should the expression “correct” signify? Heidegger uses the word “correct” in various regards to say something like “insufficient” – insufficient in the sense of less essential and derivatory.¹² And yet what is “correct” in the sense of insufficiency merits nonetheless consideration, for it is only by going through “the correct” that we will be enabled to encounter “the true” (“das Wahre”) – a statement whose scope extends just as well to Heidegger’s interpretation of tradition in general.

Hence the task and the manner of procedure is prescribed, that is, in searching out the essence of technology, we must interrogate, in the first place, the “correct” or the anthropological-instrumental conception for the purpose of defining its limits; which means to “appropriate” (“to recover”) in a sense which will be elucidated in the following chapters.

Accordingly, Heidegger’s first step consists in inquiring about the term “instrumentality” characteristic of the “correct” view of technology, which leads directly to the analysis of “causality”. For, how else is an instrument to be defined, if not with respect to means and ends and what else is a means if not a kind of “cause” which “effects”? Not only are varied means themselves causes but likewise the ends, for the latter cause by provoking movement to themselves.

Traditionally, causality has been regarded as an “effecting” (“Bewirken”) from which ensued that the “causa efficiens” came to be considered as primary¹³ – which then amounts to saying that what is effected is relative to the subjective, since the efficient cause, for the most part, refers to man at work. But construed in this manner, causality has little, if anything, to do with the Greek conception.¹⁴

In “Die Frage nach der Technik”, Heidegger translates and interprets Greek *αἰτία* as “that to which something is indebted”,¹⁵ a being-indebted, which, as N II brought out, is quite distinct from a “Wirken” or “Bewirken”.¹⁶ We will follow Heidegger’s version of causality – a version set over against the traditional notion of “effecting”.

Heidegger uses the illustration of a silver chalice. According to the traditional conception, the chalice requires a “material

cause”, which designates that “out of which” the chalice is made. Expressed in Heideggerian language, which attempts to elicit a certain comportment of “Entsprechen”, the “material cause” is said to be “co-responsible” (“mitschuld”) in the fashioning of chalice. However, this co-responsibility should not suggest the “effecting” of the chalice, but is intent on evoking the sense of an “owing thanks to” (“Verdanken”) the silver for its share in the chalice’s appearing.

Secondly, the chalice has a “formal cause”, that is, that “principle” of definiteness which makes something to be what it is – which constitutes its belonging to a certain “class” – while at the same time distinguishes it from what it is not. On Aristotle’s view, *εἶδος*, that is, pure *εἶδος* is the most exalted instance of *οὐσία* – surely more so than the “composite” of matter – *εἶδος*. But the formal cause is the *εἶδος* of a composite. Heidegger’s description in this regard is noteworthy.

As a chalice that which is indebted to the silver appears in the Aussehen of a chalice, and not in that of a brooch or a ring. Thus the sacrificial vessel is at the same time indebted to the Aussehen (*εἶδος*) of chaliceness. The silver into which the Aussehen is admitted as chalice and the Aussehen in which the silver appears are both in their manner, co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.¹⁷

From a traditional perspective, the material and the formal cause have always been considered as especially interwoven with each other, that is, they are said to be “inherent” to the thing itself, while the remaining two are clearly “extrinsic”. Even Heidegger’s analysis accents this interwovenness – but differently. The Aussehen is admitted into the silver (material cause), but reciprocally the silver *as this definite* chalice only comes to appearance through or in (das worin) the Aussehen, that is, in virtue of the Aussehen. However, in Chapter II (Part One) we have already clarified that *εἶδος* is “universal” – which universality is made explicit in our present passage in the word “Schalenhaft”. That Heidegger would refer to the “universality” of *εἶδος* in a text in which he is clearly attempting to reformulate (re-interpret) the traditional “theory” of causality seems curious. After all, Heidegger, on several occasions, criti-

cizes this notion of “universality”, and moreover systematically refrains from its use.¹⁸ But this, in fact, is mere semblance, not even applicable to SZ.¹⁹ Heidegger’s critical remarks with regard to the notion of “Allgemeinheit” are efforts to undermine one possible (perhaps unavoidable) determination implicit in “universality”, that is, the determination of “indifference” (“Gleichgültigkeit”). Traditionally, the “universal”, “by definition”, applies indifferently to all members belonging to the same class, notwithstanding individual differences.²⁰ In regard to Heidegger’s concise description of the interpretation of the material and formal cause this feature of possible “indifference” has already been thrust aside, for both causes are co-responsible; neither being the “universal” under which the “particular” may be subsumed.

What about the traditional version of the final cause – that for the sake of which the process of bringing-forth is initiated in the first place? In this regard the tradition is taken to task, for *τέλος*, suggests Heidegger, does not signify “end” (in its usual sense), nor even “aim” in the sense of purpose. Rather, Greek *τέλος* refers to the boundaries within which the chalice *is* as chalice.²¹ Thus, in taking the tradition to task, Heidegger at once joins the tradition, for *τέλος* as that which “defines limits” converges, as it were, with *εἶδος*. This becomes evident when Heidegger remarks that the final cause (the *τέλος*) “confines” (“eingrenzt”) the chalice “in advance” (p. 9) within the realm of consecration. Certainly this makes the chalice as chalice definite. But the more essential is intimated in the expression “im voraus”. How would the *τέλος* confine “in advance”, if not in that the *εἶδος* of chalice were *sighted in advance*. It is the preview of *εἶδος* which gives it to *τέλος* to determine boundaries – that is, the context within which the thing is to function and it is for this reason that Heidegger asserts that the third “cause” contributes “above all” (“vor allem”) to the making of chalice.

This brings us to Heidegger’s depiction of the efficient cause, for it is the latter, beginning with the preview of *εἶδος*, who must “gather”. Heidegger does not say that the silversmith “represents” what is to be made only then to effect it, but the silversmith “considers” (“überlegt sich”) – which suggests a comportment of responsiveness to the pre-sighted *εἶδος*. Indeed, according to the

present text, “to consider” means as much as *λέγειν*, such as to institute the unity of the four modes of indebtedness to the chalice. But would this not be to privilege unduly the efficient cause? Heidegger remarks, for example, that the three previously mentioned modes of indebtedness owe their own participation in the fashioning of chalice to the “consideration” of the silversmith. But the silversmith is not solely responsible for the chalice as chalice – the silversmith is not the primary effecting agent – but instead the one who “gathers”,²² thus being dependent, most fundamentally, on the *εἶδος*. What was said in Chapter II (Part One) à propos the artisan in the context of Platonic *ἰδέειν* may be reiterated here: the silversmith is “subordinated”. In this sense, Heidegger goes so far as to speak of the “Aufsich-beruhen”²³ of the chalice.

But with that, Heidegger has hardly completed his analysis of “causality”, for its “essence” has remained unsaid. Taken in unison, what are the four modes of indebtedness – or as Heidegger puts it: “whence originates the unity of the four causes”?²⁴ What constitutes their unity? Has not the response already been furnished – is it not true that the silversmith is that from which the unity of the four causes derives; the silversmith as the “gatherer” of the other modes of indebtedness? However, why “gather” in the first place? Obviously, in view of making ready a sacrificial vessel – or as Heidegger says, in order to “let it come forth into presencing”.²⁵ Heidegger calls this “lassen” a “Ver-an-lassen” and states that the word names the “essence” of causality, thought after a Greek manner. The four modes of indebtedness are four modes of “Ver-an-lassen”. W. Lovitt, the competent translator of the English version, tells us that the prefix “Ver” is meant “to intensify the force of the verb”²⁶ – which we would not dispute. However, Heidegger, as we have seen, uses a series of words²⁷ prefixed with “ver” for the purpose of marking a transition in process – which appears also to be the case in our present context. Indeed, this becomes clear when Heidegger states that “Ver-an-lassen” is a mode of “bringing-forth” (“Her-vor-bringen”), a bringing-forth from there to here, that is, a movement from being concealed to one of unconcealment.²⁸ In other words, any “Ver-an-lassen” is a manner of human Entbergen, of ἀληθεύειν.

This *does* close Heidegger's analysis of "causality", according to the essay in question. The Greeks "understood" causality as a mode of revealing, of letting "truth" come forth, not primarily as an "effecting" – which conclusion, nonetheless, leaves us wary, for from an Heideggerian point of view, this analysis ceases abruptly. It is as if Heidegger is saying that human revealing, whether it be called causality or *τέχνη*²⁹ or otherwise, is autonomous, which would tend to be all too subjectivistic, however the efficient cause be construed. But we know that this is implausible; we know that for Heidegger no human manner of Entbergen can be self-contained. The whole of Heidegger's work speaks against it – and this is illustrated quite adequately by "Die Frage nach der Technik". In the subsequent sections of this essay, as we will see, it is urged that the "essence" of technology (also a mode of "revealing") is rooted in "Geschick", in Being's own self-sending – which is to say, as Heidegger often repeats, that the meaning of technology, as a mode of revealing (called "Herausfordern" and "Bestellen"), is no "human Tun", no human "construct".³⁰ This applies to "artistic" revealing, to that of poetry, "causality" or *τέχνη*, as well as to "das bestellende Entbergen".

C. MODERN TECHNOLOGY AS A MANNER OF "REVEALING"

Similar to *φύσις*, to *τέχνη* and to the four manners of "indebtedness", modern technology is likewise a "manner of revealing" ("Weise des Entbergens", p. 12), but in no wise a manner of revealing in the sense of "bringing-forth". Heidegger calls the manner of revealing, which is peculiar to modern technology, a "challenging" ("Herausfordern"). The latter term typifies the principal activity through which technology – the technological manner of revealing – relates to Nature. Nature in the most general sense is challenged – which signifies something quite different than "Lassen" – for example to supply energy. What is thus supplied, is then "stored-up", i.e. put on deposit for the purpose of some further use.

Belonging to the very same species of technological "Tun" is the so-called "ordering" ("Bestellen"),³¹ which refers us back to the traditional metaphysical notion of "representing" or "posit-

ing before the self" ("Vorstellen") and to the notion of "modern producing" ("Herstellen" or "Wollen") so central to the essay "Wozu Dichter". "Ordering", in the context of modern technology,³² is the unfolding of metaphysical *Vorstellen* – a more than able offspring, which "sets upon"³³ nature. What does this "setting-upon", this "Stellen" of "Bestellen" signify?

To elucidate the sense of "setting upon" Heidegger points out that the "stellen" in question is an "expediting" ("Fördern") in a twofold sense. The act of "setting-upon" first of all expedites in the sense of disclosing, of turning out, which sense coincides with the usual signification of the German term, meaning: "to attain something from the earth", hence to extract. To expedite in its first sense signifies then an extracting which discloses. In this connection, what is extracted is the natural energies in general, which are then "stored up". However, this storing up such that a certain "standing reserve" ensues, is not the end of a process, no more than the "Erhaltung"-condition of the Will to Power (cf. Chapter IV, Part One), but rather the precondition for the necessity of "driving forward" ("Vorwärts treiben"). This latter is the second sense of the setting upon of *Bestellen* as an expediting.³⁴

We notice that this designation of expediting (which explicates the "Stellen" of "Bestellen") calls to mind the "value" of the Will to Power known as "Steigerung" just as the process of "storing up", subsequent upon expediting in the first sense (extracting), resembles the second condition of the Will to Power, namely, "Erhaltung". As already seen in Chapter IV (Part One), the Will to Power is, in essence, a will to more-power, a constant process of self-augmentation analogous to the constant "driving forward" of technology.³⁵ By remaining static both processes would forfeit their specific manner to be. In view of emphasizing the definite character of the technological, the following texts are most apt.

The coal that has been hauled out in some mining district has not been produced in order that it may simply be at hand somewhere or other. It is being stored; that is, it is on call, ready to deliver the sun's warmth that is stored in it. The sun's warmth is challenged forth for heat, which in turn is

ordered to deliver steam whose pressure turns the wheels that keep a factory running.³⁶

And a second passage:

The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine. It sets the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the turbines turning. This turning sets those machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for which the long-distance power station and its network of cables are set up to dispatch electricity. In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears to be something at our command.³⁷

We cite these texts in testimony of the aspect of “driving forward” so fundamental to technological activity, but also in order to bring out another feature of modern technology. The product of the act of “ordering”, in German “das Bestellte” or “der Bestand”, in contrast to the “object” (or “das Vorgestellte”) of Vor-stellen, is something “gigantesque” (“Riesenhaftes”) – a word which may well sound strange, but for which Heidegger has a certain preference.³⁸ What has been “ordered” and which thus has a “stand” as being already in position, stands in service of a further act of stellen. This latter which itself “stands in the service of” is called the “standing reserve” (“Bestand”), a term characterizing the mode of “unconcealment” peculiar to the challenging sort of “setting upon”.³⁹ Heidegger writes: “This standing reserve no longer stands over against us as an object.”⁴⁰

However, it would be inexact to contrast Gegenstand-Bestand by attributing a certain independence to the object, stating then that the standing-reserve depends on the subjective, technological act of ordering, even if the latter brings the subjective into view in its most radical form. Pöggeler is certainly justified in affirming (as Heidegger does) that the “object”, “which still preserves a certain standing-over-against a representing subject”, “disappears” into objectlessness when the standing-reserve takes over.⁴¹ To be sure, the object as object for the subject disappears, but this has little to do with “Selbständigkeit” and “Unselbständigkeit”. The so-called “object” as well as the standing-reserve of technological ordering refer back to the

subject, whether this be individualized or taken as technological activity in general, and both moreover share the characteristic of being “secured”.⁴² Thus instead of speaking of the “disappearance” of the object in the objectlessness of the standing-reserve – as if the subject-object schema would be overcome – it would be more appropriate, in line with “Wissenschaft und Besinnung”, to express the process as one in which the traditional schema becomes all the more prominent (see below).

On reading the pages (14–17) we have just discussed, it is striking how frequently Heidegger employs the grammatical passive or, if the passive is not used, then use is made of an impersonal expression. The act of ordering sets upon nature; or the ordering as an expediting extracts; or “das Wasserkraftwerk ist in den Rheinstrom gestellt” (Zustandspassiv). That is to say, the individual man-subject is underplayed, which should hardly occasion astonishment – and it should not be construed as meaning that we are beyond the realm of subjectivity – for Heidegger’s immediate aim here is one of discrediting the anthropological determination of technology as definitive. On the other hand, modern technology is not a-human and, hence, we must inquire about the role of man within⁴³ the challenging “setting-upon” the real.

As a starting point the following question is posed: “Who accomplishes the challenging setting-upon through which what we call the real is revealed as standing-reserve?”⁴⁴ A correct reply is obvious: certainly it is man who pushes the way of technology forward. And yet Heidegger immediately adds: “Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit natural resources can this revealing which orders happen.”⁴⁵ It is the first segment of the sentence according to which man *is already challenged* that is of utmost significance. The sequence introduced by the sentence is nothing novel for us. The notion of “Her-stellen” which we met with in the essay “Wozu Dichter” was similarly preconditioned. In the essay “Die Frage nach der Technik”, the subordination of the subjective in line with which man is already challenged and reacts, so to speak, by “setting-upon” the real is bound up with the notion of “unconcealment” over which man does not dispose.⁴⁶ Obviously, everything now turns on an adequate understanding of the meaning of uncon-

concealment, but before attempting to elucidate the latter, we would do well to let Heidegger bring out, in a more forceful manner, unconcealment's pre-sway. Unconcealment, writes Heidegger,

has already come to pass so often as it (unconcealment) summons man to ways of revealing which are allotted to him. When man, in his own way, within unconcealment reveals that which presences then he responds to the appealing claim of unconcealment even where he contradicts it. Thus when man, in his research and examining, tracks down nature as a circuit of his representing-activity, he is already claimed by a mode of revelation which challenges him to assail nature as a mere object of this research until the object disappears in the objectlessness of the standing-reserve.⁴⁷

In the first place, we should consider the word "disappear" which Heidegger employs in the last sentence. We maintained earlier that such an expression is inappropriate and it seems to us inappropriate if it is thought that we are, with the Bestand of Bestellen, beyond the traditional, metaphysical context of the subject-object. The Heideggerian view which more adequately corresponds to the whole is expressed in an essay formulated during this same period as the essay on technology. We cite the relevant passage:

The subject-object relationship attains to its purest "form", that is, its ordering-character, in which the subject as well as the object get absorbed, thus becoming standing-reserves. This does not mean that the subject-object relationship disappears, but quite to the contrary: it now attains to its most radical domination which is predetermined out of Gestell.⁴⁸

Patently, the text does not confirm that the subject-object enclosure disappears, for Heidegger, on the contrary, speaks of its most unabated domination. It is not a question of "disappearing" – which word fits in poorly with any segment of the Heideggerian interpretation of tradition – but appropriate is perhaps the Hegelian notion of "Aufheben", as long as we do not conceive of the Heideggerian "teleology" as a movement from the less to the more fulfilled. We know that the "progression of

Being" ("Fortgang des Seins")⁴⁹ is one towards its "non-essence",⁵⁰ that is, toward the most extreme concealment of Being, which however is possibly to pass over into a third stage.⁵¹

Concerning the same passage on unconcealment, the words "bereits" and "schon" are likewise noteworthy, for they incontrovertibly accent the priority of unconcealment – the specific mode of unconcealment which stands as the precondition for the very manner of ordering on the part of man. If this is so in a sense which we have yet to consider, then it is implied that the essential nature of technology is not to be interpreted exclusively with reference to the activity of man. And in consequence, a purely anthropological, that is, "metaphysical", determination of technology would be insufficient.

Moreover, it would be mistaken to believe that Heidegger is simply, in this fashion, confronting the anthropological determination of technology. Rather, what is mirrored in this confrontation is the entire tradition, for it is the tradition of Western Metaphysics which has, from its start, tended to regard "Being" anthropologically, that is, strictly in terms of man and his doings. In this regard, Heidegger's critical point remains consistent throughout his work notwithstanding its manifold manner of expressiveness: Being in its unconcealment, which within the context of Metaphysics is its own concealment, is never purely anthropological, for the latter is specifically what it is out of Being.⁵²

D. THE NOTION OF "UNCONCEALMENT", ESPECIALLY THE THESIS THAT THE UNCONCEALMENT OF BEINGS IMPLIES THE CONCEALMENT OF BEING

It would be beyond our present aim to attempt, at this juncture, a throughgoing analysis of the Heideggerian notion of unconcealment in its manifold employment. Instead we propose to discuss one single thesis which has just been announced in the title of this section. Indeed, in the context of traditional Metaphysics and of modern technology, it is the above-stated thesis which is decisive, for it is undeniable that the peculiar unconcealment of beings as "Bestand" of "das Bestellen" signifies the concealment of Being.

We know, to put it somewhat differently, that the revealing of beings as “das Bestellte” dissimulates *realiter* “beings” in their more primordial truth as “Ding”. Moreover, the very same thing holds in regard to the “unconcealment of beings” within the circuit of traditional Metaphysics: the unveiling of beings as “object” or as “das Vorgestellte” means that Being remains aloof. It is true that we are expressing a rather early Heideggerian thesis, one which clearly comes to the fore in the lecture “Was ist Metaphysik” (1929). Is it not so that the “full” “Offenbarkeit” of beings, in WM, is attributed to “das Nichten” of Nothing – an “Offenbarkeit” which then has as an accompaniment the concealment of Being (of Nothing); indeed the *self*-concealing of Nothing, for clearly it is Nothing which “repels away from itself” in order thereby to illuminate beings with its own inconspicuous light. However, in this manner the light-according Nothing shrouds itself in darkness.⁵³ This same state of affairs may be expressed by recalling a key word which runs throughout Heidegger’s attempt to think unconcealment, namely, the word “worin”.⁵⁴ That “wherein” beings are unconcealed – this “in which” in the sense of “Lichtung” as “clearing” – holds itself concealed.

Before we survey only two passages, we must furthermore observe that the current assumption is spurious according to which the expressions “Unverborgenheit des Seins” and “Unverborgenheit des Seienden” are equivalent to each other. One such equation is only and especially tenable if the “unconcealment” in question refers to “das Seiende” (or “das Anwesende”) in its genuine truth. Thus, the two expressions in their meaning coalesce in the realm of the appearing of beings as “Geviert”, as “Ding”, or in relation to the genuine bringing-forth exemplified by the artwork.⁵⁵ However, when beings are revealed as “das Objekt” for a subject, which seems paradigmatic for traditional Metaphysics, or as “das Bestellte” in the orbit of modern technology, we may with Heidegger call this an “unconcealment of beings”, but this mode of unconcealment is tantamount to the concealment of Being. We briefly illustrate this with the help of two essential texts.

In the essay “Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus” Heidegger equates traditional Metaphysics with

“Nihilism”, for both in their *essence*⁵⁶ signify the “remaining aloof of Being”. Now it would be regretfully mistaken to believe that this “remaining aloof of Being” precludes the possibility of the “unconcealment of beings”,⁵⁷ for quite contrarily, this remaining aloof, from the beginning of Metaphysics to its “end”, concedes the “unconcealment of beings”. Heidegger writes:

Since beings as beings themselves have come to the unconcealed, that is, since this unconcealment happened, Metaphysics is. For Metaphysics is the history of this unconcealment of beings as such.⁵⁸

However, Metaphysics as the history of the unconcealment of beings or of the “truth of beings” is only on the presupposition that the unconcealment of *Being* reserve itself to itself;⁵⁹ hence on the condition of Being’s concealment.

And yet this so-called aloofness of Being determinative for traditional Metaphysics – this “Entzug” – is a “relation” (“Bezug”) to thought.⁶⁰

As this relation, Being, in the remaining aloof of its unconcealment, never leaves off from unconcealment, which in keeping to itself is only released as the unconcealment of beings as such.⁶¹

In the later essay “Zeit und Sein” and with referent to Being as Ereignis, this very same state of affairs is called Being’s “Expropriation” (“Sich Enteignung”) which is here referred to in the “nie Ablassen von”: that is, Being refuses to reveal itself as it is (and in its fullness), but rather “releases itself”, that is, accords itself in a certain “Gestalt”⁶² (its “Gabe” as “Zeit und Sein” speaks). Moreover, the above statement clearly evinces the distinction between unconcealment of Being and that of beings. Being in its unconcealment keeps to itself (that is, within the context of Metaphysics) – which means that it only gives itself through the unconcealment of *beings*, whose unconcealment is thus accorded. We notice, too, with respect to this passage (and with respect to the entire essay) the pertinent form of Being’s concealment (Being as beingness) is called the “unconcealment of beings as such”.⁶³ Hence, the sense of Heidegger’s characterization of the consummated “Epoche” of Metaphysics as “the

Epoche of the concealedness of Being in the unconcealment of beings”⁶⁴ becomes lucid.

The very same decisive event is expressed again in Heidegger’s essay “Der Spruch des Anaximander”. Heidegger writes:

The Greek, the Christian, the modern, the planetary, and that which is Western in the suggested sense are thought by us out of the fundamental feature of Being which the latter as *ἀλήθεια* rather conceals in its *λήψη* than unveils. And yet this concealing of its essence and of its essential origin is the characteristic in which Being primordially illuminates itself, so much so that thinking simply does *not* pursue it . . . *The unconcealment of beings, the luminousness accorded to them, obfuscates the light of Being.*⁶⁵

And on the following page, more succinctly:

In that it (*ἀλήθεια*) brings unconcealment of beings, it institutes first concealedness of Being.⁶⁶

The texts speak unequivocally: the light of the unconcealment of beings is an *accorded* light – and as both texts affirm, this at once serves to obscure Being itself in its truth (“Unverborgenheit des Seins”). Moreover, as the second text clarifies, the so-called “Verborgenheit des Seins” is not primarily the result of thinking, but rather *ἀλήθεια*, Being’s ownmost unconcealment first grounds the possibility of concealment (its very own).⁶⁷

With respect to Heidegger’s interpretation of traditional Metaphysics, what we have just stated expresses no less than its most fundamental and guiding thesis. Being as unconcealment (as self-revealing) gives itself within tradition as concealment. And yet as self-concealed (as a specific form of beingness), Being remains the reason for the possibility of the unconcealment of beings – even when beings are unconcealed by the predetermined technological *Bestellen*.

It is clearly this version of unconcealment just outlined that predominates in the essay “Die Frage nach der Technik”: the unconcealment of beings as “das Bestellte” or more generally as “Bestände” obscures the “truth”, that is, the unconcealment of Being – which then becomes all the more lucid when Heidegger interprets “Bestellen” as “Verstellen”. Indeed, as we have seen,

“ordering” is a mode of human revealing, but one which “disguises” or “dissimulates”. Secondly, and more specifically, we notice that Heidegger in the technology essay employs neither the expression “unconcealment of Being” nor the expression “unconcealment of beings”.⁶⁸ But this is hardly extraordinary, for Heidegger often speaks of unconcealment without attaching to it the genitive “of beings” or “of Being” – in which case, either may be meant depending on the context and what is being brought to expression. For example, in our present essay, Heidegger speaks of the “unconcealment in which the real always shows itself or withdraws . . .”⁶⁹ Or in the same vein: “. . . unconcealment in which all that is always shows itself. . .”⁷⁰ In both instances, Heidegger is referring to the unconcealment of Being, that is, unconcealment as a sort of “Lichtung” wherein beings are able to appear, either as unconcealed of themselves or unconcealed after the manner of human revealing. This is most crucial in the present essay – this is the mode of unconcealment which always in advance addresses itself to man the “Besteller” and clearly this mode of unconcealment is, from another perspective (*πρός ἀνθρώπων* as the “functionary” of technology) and in itself, concealed.

However, the notion of unconcealment of beings (although the exact expression is not employed) is likewise essential. For instance, Heidegger asks: “which mode of unconcealment is proper to that which comes to stand by means of the challenging setting-upon?”⁷¹ The reply has already been noted, namely, “das Bestellte” or “der Bestand”. That which has been ordered in its several senses (extracted, arranged – that is, put on deposit such that one now commands over it) designates the mode of unconcealment *of beings* proper to technological Stellen.

E. THE NOTION OF GE-STELL

Given the preceding and given the section in Chapter I of this Part on Gestell, we may be extremely concise here. But beforehand we should mention a usual way in which the term “Ge-stell” is explained. Often enough it is suggested that Gestell is to be

understood on the basis of *Bestellen*, the varied *Stellens* (human manners of *Stellens*, “*Vorstellen*”, “*Her-stellen*”, etc.) – which interpretation unwittingly would interpret Heidegger subjectivistically. However, our analysis has shown precisely the reverse: the diverse modes of human *Stellen* are to be understood out of the *Sich Stellen* (or *sich Versammeln*) of Being. It is in this sense that the word *Gestell* is said to signify “the gathering of that positing which then set-upon man. . .”⁷² The expression “*jenes Stellens*” does not refer to those human modes of *Stellen*, but foremost of *Gestell*’s *sich Stellen* which then sets-upon, that is, challenges man – “*den Menschen*”, which is here most appropriately stated in the Accusative. Or as Heidegger says again: *Gestell* means a “way of revealing”,⁷³ *not* however a manner of human *Entbergen* but a *Sich Entbergen*. This seems to us the more exact manner of interpretation, for Heidegger completes the sentence by clarifying that *Gestell* as a “way of revealing” rules in the essence of modern technology and “is itself nothing technological”.⁷⁴ Now would Heidegger assert that human *Entbergen* is “*nichts Technisches*”, especially after having analysed technology or the technological precisely in terms of the human mode of revealing called “*Bestellen*”? It is highly dubious. *Ge-stell* is the *Sich-Stellen* or *Sich-Entbergen* of Being in the Modern Age – Being’s manner of concealed unconcealment which summons up the technological as a manner of revealing beings.

But we may also approach the meaning of *Gestell* by recalling the two expressions “unconcealment of beings” and the “unconcealment of Being”. Clearly, *Bestand* corresponds to the former, while *Gestell* itself is simply another term for Being’s Unconcealment. Thus, we read the passage: “Within *Gestell*, unconcealment comes to pass according to which the workings of modern Technology reveals the real as standing-reserve.”⁷⁵ Patently, the word “unconcealment” signifies that *of Being* (Gen. *subiectivus*) – the precondition for the unconcealment *of beings* (Gen. *obiectivus*) as *Bestand*. *Gestell* is not simply the collectivity of “all the manners of setting upon”;⁷⁶ *Gestell* is the self-gathering in which Being as Being refuses itself.

NOTES

1. Cf. "Vorbemerkung" to "Die Frage nach der Technik".
2. In the German editions of Heidegger's work up to the present day the essay in question is available in VA I, pp. 5–36, and again in unaltered form in *Die Technik und die Kehre* (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1962). The latter edition, as the title suggests, includes a fundamental formulation of "the Turn". We might also mention the excellent English version by William Lovitt, whose translations are preceded by a sound and substantial "Introduction". Cf. *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. XIIIff. All page references will correspond to the German editions, both of whose pagination is the same.
3. Cf. pp. 5, 6. Also WHD, pp. 53, 54, 142, and "Wozu Dichter", p. 268. In "Die Onto-Theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik", p. 42, the distinction is that between "Technologie" and "das Wesen der Technik".
4. We have already mentioned that the term "essence", surely crucial in this Philosophy, does not merely refer to Being's "währen". Nor is essence (with regard to technology or otherwise) the "historic, essential unfolding" of technology. It is true that in several passages Heidegger connects the word "wesen" ("wesan") with "währen". But more than a "währen", "Wesen" in Heidegger's fuller sense signifies a "Gewähren", an according or giving on the part of Being itself; a self-according which is prerequisite for the "turn" to the new Inception.
5. Cf. M.E. Zimmerman, "Heidegger on Nihilism and Technique", *Man and World* 8 (1975): 394ff. In this lucid article (p. 395), Zimmerman (strangely enough) writes: "Heidegger claims that the essence of technology is technique (Technik)...", thereby referring us to the essay "Die Frage nach der Technik". This is obviously not what Heidegger claims.
6. Cf. WHD, p. 147: "Allein als diese Verschiedenen gehören sie gerade zusammen." Cf. also NI, p. 528. Even in "Die Frage nach der Technik", Heidegger remarks that the four "causes" are "verschieden und gehören doch zusammen".
7. ID, p. 35: "Allein das Selbe ist nicht das Gleiche. Im Gleichen verschwindet die Verschiedenheit. Im Selben erscheint die Verschiedenheit." Cf. also WHD, pp. 8–9, and "Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch", p. 67. Furthermore, we notice that Heidegger uses "das Selbe" in a second sense to designate "Being" which remains self-same in its fundamental constitution throughout the History of Metaphysics, differing in its manner of transappearing.
8. It might be mentioned that Heidegger associates "das Gleiche" with the term "Gleichgültigkeit" – with which he is fond of characterizing the traditional notion of *essentia*.
9. Cf. p. 5: "Als das Wesen von etwas gilt nach alter Lehre jenes, was etwas ist."
10. p. 6: "Denn Zwecke setzen, die Mittel dafür beschaffen und benützen, ist ein menschliches Tun. Zu dem, was die Technik ist, gehört das Verfertigen und Benützen von Zeug, Gerät und Maschinen, gehört dieses Verfertigte und

Benützte selbst, gehören die Bedürfnisse und Zwecke, denen sie dienen. Das Ganze dieser Einrichtungen ist die Technik.”

11. Cf. p. 16. In the SVG, Heidegger elucidates the term “unheimlich” in a way which is appropriate to the present context. That which is “unheimlich” is said to be what threatens the “Heimische” – which in turn directs us back to the same notion in SZ; more precisely to Heidegger’s analysis of “Angst”. In our particular context, what is to man “heimisch” would be his absorption in “Gestell”. The instrumental conception would be “unheimlich” to the extent that its inadequacy becomes explicit to man.

12. The word “richtig” was already used in SZ in this somewhat ironic sense. Cf. p. 398. Cf. also N I, p. 205: “Wir pflegen dieses griechische Wort (τρόπος) richtig, aber unzureichend durch ‘Weise’ und ‘Art’ zu übersetzen.” Also ID, p. 51.

13. Cf. “Die Frage nach der Technik”, p. 8: “Die causa efficiens, die eine der vier Ursachen, bestimmt in maßgebender Weise alle Kausalität. Das geht soweit daß man die causa finalis, die Finalität, überhaupt nicht mehr zur Kausalität rechnet.” Cf. also N I, p. 588: “Dagegen besagt die geläufige Bedeutung unseres Wortes ‘Ursache’ sogleich einseitig: das einen Effekt Bewirkende, die causa efficiens.” Moreover, it should be emphasized that Heidegger’s analysis of “causality” is not to be viewed in any confined sense, for “causality” (as a “Bewirken”) reflects something which characterizes the entire tradition, namely, its subjectivity. “Bewirken” is fundamentally the same as “Vorstellen”.

14. It is well known that Heidegger traces the Greek theory of causality back to Plato, that is, to the *idéa* as *ἀγαθόν*. Cf. N II, p. 414: “Zufolge der platonischen Bestimmung des Seins als *idéa*, d.h. als *ἀγαθόν*, entfaltet sich im Wesen des Seins die maßgebliche Rolle der *αἰτία*, wobei die Verschuldung als Ermöglichung nicht notwendig und ausschließlich schon den Charakter des machenden Bewirkens hat.” Hence, *αἰτία* signifies a “making possible” or as Heidegger often says a “tauglich machen” and yet a “machendes Bewirken”. In the Greek sense, *αἰτία* belongs to the same family as *τέχνη*, *νοεῖν*, *λέγειν*, or human *Sagen*, that is, it is a manner of “Erscheinen lassen”, or “Entbergen”. Furthermore, let it be noted that when Heidegger speaks of the traditional theory of causality he is referring, in a very general way, to the latinized version – but more importantly to the modern version. The latter lies latent in the transformed beingness of beings called “actualitas”. Cf. N II, p. 414: “Wenn das Sein sich zur Actualitas (Wirklichkeit) gewandelt hat, ist das Seiende das Wirkliche, ist es bestimmt durch das Wirken im Sinne des verursachenden Machens.” Cf. also “Vom Wesen und Begriff der *φύσις*”, pp. 315–16.

15. Cf. p. 8: “... das, was ein anderes verschuldet”.

16. Cf. N II, p. 414. Moreover, we recall that in “Wissenschaft und Besinnung”, “Wirken” is interpreted in a Greek-Heideggerian manner. Cf. pp. 41–42.

17. Cf. p. 9: “Als Schale erscheint das an das Silber Verschuldete im Aussehen von Schale und nicht in demjenigen von Spange oder Ring. Das Opfergerät ist so zugleich an das Aussehen (*εἶδος*) von Schalenhaftem verschuldet. Das Silber, worin das Aussehen, als Schale eingelassen ist, das

Aussehen worin das Silberne erscheint, sind beide auf ihre Weise mitschuld am Opfergerät.”

18. With regard to Heidegger’s determination of Being, “universality” is interpreted as the selfsameness of Being – its oneness in difference (various forms of beingness) throughout tradition.

19. In SZ Heidegger does not deny that “Being” is “universal”; he merely remarks that from this fact it does not follow that the concept of Being is the clearest. Nor, however, is Being’s universality that of a “genus” of sorts. Cf. esp. § 7, p. 38.

20. In this regard, we recall Hegel’s formulation of the Universal in *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Hamburg: Verlag Felix Meiner, 1952), p. 82: “Ein solches Einfaches, das durch Negation ist, weder Dieses noch Jenes, ein Nichtdieses, und ebenso gleichgültig, auch Dieses wie Jenes zu sein, nennen wir ein Allgemeines...” And Thomas Aquinas, in his *De Ente et Essentia*, chapter 3, also makes use of the term “indifferent”: “... quia unitas generis ex ipsa indeterminatione vel indifferentia procedit...” However, there is some difference between “indifference” in the sense of “indeterminate” and “indifference” in the sense “unconcerned”. But does not the latter – that is, “indifference” in Heidegger’s sense – follow from the notion of “indetermination”? One reason, one sufficient reason, for human “Vergeßlichkeit” (human indifference) toward Being – on Heidegger’s view – is precisely this supposed feature of Universality understood traditionally. How should this concern us?

21. Concerning the notion of *τέλος*, in addition the present context, cf. EM, pp. 46, 87; N II, pp. 404, 405; “Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις”, pp. 321, 354.

22. Cf. R. Schaeffler, “Martin Heidegger und die Frage nach der Technik”, *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 9 (1955): 121–22, where the author refers to the efficient cause as the “Diener” or “Wegbereiter”.

23. Cf. p. 9. In “Das Ding”, p. 39, Heidegger instead employs the term “Insichstehen”.

24. p. 10: “Woher stammt die Einheit der vier Ursachen?”

25. p. 10: “Sie lassen es in das An-wesen vorkommen.”

26. Cf. p. 9, note 8 of English edition.

27. Ver-setzen, Ver-eignen, Ver-gegenen. We may also recall what Heidegger says of Nietzsche’s “toller Mensch”: “Er ist ver-rückt. Denn er ist aus der Ebene des bisherigen Menschen ausgerückt...” Cf. “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’”, p. 246.

28. Cf. p. 11: “Her-vor-bringen bringt aus der Verborgenheit her in die Unverborgenheit vor.”

29. With regard to Heidegger’s *τέχνη*-analysis in “Die Frage nach der Technik”, we refer the reader to Chapter I, Part One.

30. Cf. p. 18: “So ist denn die moderne Technik als das bestellende Entbergen kein bloß menschliches Tun.”

31. We believe that the most adequate English translation is that of W. Lovitt, namely, “to order”. But “to order” in English is quite equivocal (as Bestellen in German). It is used currently in the sense of ordering something –

which implies that something is *on order* and is expected. Moreover, once what is ordered is received it is disposed over by the owner. Secondly, "to order" may signify to "set in order" as one orders a notebook or puts one's affairs in order. Thirdly, "to order" may mean as much as "to command", "to demand" – to order someone to do this or that. *All three significations are included in Heidegger's sense of "Bestellen".* As far as technological activity is concerned, nature as a whole is, as it were, "on order", that is, there for the varied purposes of technology. Secondly, what is on order, that is, in the process of being worked on, is to be ordered in the sense of arranged to suit one's future purposes. What has been ordered in this way is the actual Bestand (as distinct from the potential Bestand, that is, Nature in general prior to any Bestellen). The third signification above is also in tune with Heidegger's thinking – as far as modern technology is concerned, nature is under its command. Thus the word Bestellen preserves the Nietzschean sense of "Befehlen" which was employed in "Wozu Dichter" in the description of technological "Wollen".

32. Heidegger himself (p. 14) contrasts the "Bestellen" of modern technology with the "Bestellen" in the sense of "Hegen" and "Pflegen" – to cultivate and care for a field.

33. With regard to the German "Stellen" ("to set upon"), "Fördern" ("to expedite"), "Bestellen" ("to order") and "Bestand" ("Standing reserve"), we follow the translations of W. Lovitt.

34. Cf. p. 15: "Dieses Fördern bleibt jedoch im voraus darauf abgestellt, anderes zu fördern, das heißt, vorwärts zu treiben in die größtmögliche Nutzung bei geringstem Aufwand."

35. Concerning the notion of the Will to Power and its relation to technology, cf. "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", p. 74.

36. p. 15: "Die im Kohlenrevier geförderte Kohle wird nicht gestellt, damit sie nur überhaupt und irgendwo vorhanden sei. Sie lagert, d.h. sie ist zur Stelle für die Bestellung der ihr gespeicherten Sonnenwärme. Diese wird herausgefordert auf Hitze, die bestellt ist, Dampf zu liefern, dessen Druck das Getriebe treibt, wodurch eine Fabrik im Betrieb bleibt." Translation above is that of W. Lovitt, p. 4 of English version.

37. p. 15: "Das Wasserkraftwerk ist in den Rheinstrom gestellt. Es stellt ihn auf seinen Wasserdruck, der die Turbinen daraufhin stellt, sich zu drehen, welche Drehung diejenige Maschine umtreibt, deren Getriebe den elektrischen Strom herstellt, für den die Überlandzentrale und ihr Stromnetz zur Strombeförderung bestellt sind. Im Bereich dieser ineinandergreifenden Folgen der Bestellung elektrischer Energie erscheint auch der Rheinstrom als etwas Bestelltes."

38. Cf. VWV, p. 88; "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", pp. 87–88; SVG, pp. 60, 202; N II, p. 22; G, pp. 18, 19. In the latter (Gelassenheit), p. 18, Heidegger writes: "Die Natur wird zu einer einzigen riesenhaften Tankstelle zur Energiequelle für die moderne Technik und Industrie."

39. Cf. W. Biemel, *Heidegger* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1973), p. 115. In this work, Biemel cites a relevant passage from the "erste Ausarbeitung" of the essay "Die Frage nach der Technik": "Der Bestand bestellt. Er besteht, sofern er auf ein

Bestellen gestellt ist. In das Bestellen gewendet, ist er in das Verwenden gestellt. Das Verwenden stellt jegliches im vorhinein so, daß das Gestellte dem folgt, was erfolgt. So gestellt, ist alles: in Folge von. Die Folge aber wird zum Voraus als Erfolg bestellt. Der Erfolg ist jene Art von Folge, die selbst auf das Ergebnis weiterer Folgen abgestellt bleibt. Der Bestand besteht durch ein eigentümliches Stellen.”

40. Cf. “Die Frage nach der Technik”, p. 16: “Der Bestand steht uns nicht mehr als Gegenstand gegenüber.”

41. Cf. Otto Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1963), p. 244.

42. Cf. “Die Frage nach der Technik”, p. 39.

43. At this point the discussion will be restricted to the question of man’s involvement *within* Gestell as distinguished from the mode of comportment summarized by the expression “Gelassenheit” or “Entsprechen” (“Andenken”).

44. Cf. “Die Frage nach der Technik”, p. 17: “Wer vollzieht das herausfordernde Stellen, wodurch das, was man das Wirkliche nennt, als Bestand entborgen wird?”

45. Cf. “Die Frage nach der Technik”, p. 17: “Nur insofern der Mensch seinerseits schon herausgefordert ist, die Naturenergien herauszufördern, kann dieses bestellende Entbergen geschehen.”

46. Cf. p. 17: “Allein über die Unverborgenheit ... verfügt der Mensch nicht.” Or again on p. 18: “Allein die Unverborgenheit ... ist niemals ein menschliches Gemächte.” In “Wissenschaft und Besinnung”, p. 49, Heidegger asserts the same thing of “science”.

47. Cf. p. 18: “... (Unverborgenheit) hat sich schon ereignet, so oft sie den Menschen die ihm zugemessenen Weisen des Entbergens hervorruft. Wenn der Mensch auf seine Weise innerhalb der Unverborgenheit das Anwesende entbirgt, dann entspricht er nur dem Zuspruch der Unverborgenheit, selbst dort, wo er ihm widerspricht. Wenn also der Mensch forschend, betrachtend der Natur als einem Bezirk seines Vorstellens nachstellt, dann ist er bereits von einer Weise der Entbergung beansprucht, die ihn herausfordert, die Natur als einen Gegenstand der Forschung anzugehen, bis auch der Gegenstand in das Gegenstandslose des Bestandes verschwindet.” The so-called “Nachstellen” of Nature is especially discussed in “Wissenschaft und Besinnung”. However, it should not be thought that this is essentially different from technological Bestellen – nor that science itself is of another “essence” than technology.

48. Cf. “Wissenschaft und Besinnung”, p. 53: “Die Subjekt-Objekt Beziehung gelangt so erst in ihren reinen ‘Beziehung’, – d.h. Bestellungscharakter, in dem sowohl das Subjekt als auch das Objekt als Bestände aufgezogen werden. Das sagt nicht: die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung verschwindet, sondern das Gegenteil: sie gelangt jetzt in ihre äußerste aus dem Gestell vorbestimmende Herrschaft.” The crucial notion of Ge-stell will be taken up in the following.

49. Cf. “Die Erinnerung in der Metaphysik”, pp. 481ff.

50. Which is, at once, the place for the initiation of a new Inception.

51. The first two stages would consist in the primordial as distinguished from the Modern, while the third stage would mark the "recovery" of Gestell, that is, of tradition, the actualization of "*Diese Kehre*".

52. As V. Vitiello aptly remarks: "Non la tecnica . . . dipende dall'uomo, ma l'uomo dalla tecnica – o meglio dall'essenza di questa". Cf. "Scienza e Tecnica in Heidegger", *Il Pensiero* 18 (1973): 134.

53. Cf. WM, p. 11, where Heidegger speaks of the "helle Nacht des Nichts".

54. The notion of "wherein" ("worin") (or "in der", in which) is essential to Heidegger's working out of the question of Being's unconcealment (self-unconcealing) which as "Kants Thesis über das Sein", p. 306, states is that which "accords" "Anwesenheit" (its own). In regard to the "worin", to unconcealment as "der für das Erscheinen des Seienden gestiftete Raum" (EM, p. 144), cf. EM, pp. 47, 144; "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", p. 41: "Unverborgenheit" as an "offene Mitte"; also p. 42: "Wille zur Macht als Kunst", p. 80; "Der Europäische Nihilismus", p. 137: "Das Vernehmen des Anwesenden gründet auf dessen Verweilen innerhalb des Bezirks der Unverborgenheit." Cf. also "Die Seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus", p. 358: "Unverborgenheit" as the "verborgene Ortschaft"; "Der Spruch des Anaximander", p. 319ff, as "Gegend"; "Wissenschaft und Besinnung", p. 42; "Die Frage nach der Technik", pp. 17, 18; WHD, p. 144; "Hegel und die Griechen", p. 271; "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens", pp. 71ff. In all these diverse formulations, it is the unique geschickhafte character of Being that prevails.

55. Hence, it is understandable why and in which regard Heidegger in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", p. 59, writes: "Sie (die Wirkung des Werkes) beruht in einem aus dem Werk geschehenden Wandel der Unverborgenheit des Seienden und das sagt: des Seins."

56. That is, as the essay speaks: "Vom Sein her." To think the essence of Metaphysics or Nihilism is to think them "out of Being".

57. In "Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus", Heidegger uses the expression "Unverborgenheit des Seins" on pp. 353, 355, 358, 362, 367, 368, 371, 374, 378, 382, 394, 398. The expression "Unverborgenheit des Seienden" is found on pp. 350, 352, 358, 361, 370, 379, 383, 388, 391, 395.

58. Cf. "Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus", p. 355: "Seitdem das Seiende als das Seiende selbst ins Unverborgene gekommen ist. Seitdem diese Unverborgenheit geschieht, ist die Metaphysik; denn sie ist die Geschichte dieser Unverborgenheit des Seienden als solchen."

59. Cf. also pp. 377–78: "Die Weise der anfänglichen Ammutung ist das Ausbleiben der Unverborgenheit des Seins im Unverborgenen des Seienden als solches." And a parallel passage from "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", pp. 243–44: "das Wesen des Nihilismus beruht in der Geschichte, dergemäß es *im Erscheinen des Seienden* als solches im Ganzen mit dem Sein selbst und seiner Wahrheit nichts ist, so zwar, daß die Wahrheit des Seienden als solchen für das Sein gilt, weil die Wahrheit des Seins ausbleibt" (my italics).

60. In the essay under discussion, "Entzug" as "Bezug" is Heidegger's way of approaching the "saving", or the latter's precondition.

61. Cf. N II, p. 390: "Als dieser Bezug läßt das Sein auch im Ausbleiben seiner Unverborgenheit nie ab von dieser, die im Ansichhalten nur als die Unverborgenheit des Seienden als solchen losgelassen ist."

62. Cf. "Zeit und Sein", p. 23. According to this essay, it belongs to Ereignis to refuse its "schrackenlose" revealment. Moreover, this refusal to give itself in its plenitude, as it were, signifies the preservation of what belongs to Ereignis most properly (its "Eigenste"). In the essay "Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus", Heidegger even speaks of Being's "sich Sparen", Being's "Versprechen" – in refusal.

63. This form of beingness – the "unconcealment of beings" within the context of tradition – embraces all the former's diversified modes – including "Gestell".

64. Cf. N II, p. 395: "... die Epoche der Verborgenheit des Seins *in der Unverborgenheit des Seienden*" (my italics).

65. p. 310: "Das Griechische, das Christentum, das Neuzeitliche, das Planetarische, und das im angedeuteten Sinne Abendländische denken wir aus einem Grundzug des Seins, den es als die *Ἀλήθεια* in der *λήθη* eher verbirgt, als enthüllt. Doch dieses Verbergen seines Wesens und der Wesensherkunft ist der Zug, in dem das Sein sich anfänglich lichtet, so zwar daß ihm das Denken gerade *nicht* folgt ... *Die Unverborgenheit des Seienden, die ihm gewährte Helle, verdunkelt das Licht des Seins*" (my italics).

66. Cf. "Der Spruch des Anaximander", p. 311: "Indem sie (*ἀλήθεια*) Unverborgenheit des Seienden bringt, stiftet sie erst Verborgenheit des Seins."

67. With regard to this seemingly paradoxical state of affairs, cf. also WHD, esp. p. 144.

68. He does speak of the "unconcealment of what is ..." ("... die Unverborgenheit dessen, was ist ...").

69. Cf. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 17: "... die Unverborgenheit, worin sich jeweils das Wirkliche zeigt oder entzieht..."

70. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 26: "... die Unverborgenheit, in der alles, was ist, sich jeweils zeigt".

71. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 16: "Welche Art von Unverborgenheit eignet nun dem, was durch das herausfordernde Stellen zustande kommt."

72. Cf. p. 20: "Das Versammelnde jenes Stellens, das den Menschen stellt..."

73. p. 20: "... eine Weise des Entbergens".

74. p. 20. The entire sentence reads: "Ge-stell heißt die Weise des Entbergens, die im Wesen der modernen Technik waltet und selber nichts Technisches ist."

75. Cf. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 20: "Im Gestell ereignet sich die Unverborgenheit, dergemäß die Arbeit der modernen Technik das Wirkliche als Bestand entbirgt."

76. Cf. *Vier Seminare*, p. 129; also pp. 104, 126.

PART THREE

SECOND APPROACH TOWARD THE QUESTION
OF THE ESSENCE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE NOTION OF GESCHICK¹

In the later writings of Heidegger the notion of Being as *Geschick* is most crucial. Indeed, it is out of Being as *Geschick* that Heidegger thinks the essence of the work of art, the essence of modern technology and nihilism – thinks *Sprache*² and *History*.³ Moreover, Being as *Geschick* is that before which the entire tradition is summoned. Clearly it is Being's character of showing itself while concealing itself that prevails in the History of thought from *φύσις* to *Gestell*.⁴ In what manner? How does Being show itself so as to simultaneously conceal itself? How is Being's truth (*ἀλήθεια*) at the same time untruth – withdrawal or refusal? Beginning with the Platonic *ιδέα* – in fact, even to *φύσις* belongs concealment – that is, beginning with beingness as *ιδέα*, Being *as* Being has held itself concealed in the manner, however, of “arriving”⁵ in distinct modes of beingness.⁶ Beingness is the traditional, metaphysical manner of Being's presence,⁷ the traditional showing of Being itself – that as which Being reveals itself but such that this revealing is at once a self-concealing. Thus Being accords itself by not *fully* according itself, and consequently the significance of the “negative” as self-preserving concealment, a “negative” which is *not* to suggest deficiency. Rather, the “negative” of Being, its self-unconcealing as concealment, is Being's “surplus” (“Überschuß”) or plentitude.⁸

Is an analogous structure discernible in Heidegger's earlier writings, e.g. in *SZ*. Does not a similar structure show itself as *Dasein* itself – that is, does not *Dasein*'s *Erschlossenheit-Verschlossenheit* constitution, or as §44 puts it, *Dasein*'s being-in-truth and equiprimordially in-the-untruth, display a structure comparable to that which is called “*Geschick*” in later writings?⁹ And even if this similarity is given, does this mean that Heidegger, having laid bare the structure of *Dasein*'s Being in *SZ*, simply fobs

this same structure off on Being itself – employing thereby slightly altered terminology?¹⁰ In other words, is it so that the prime “existentials” of Dasein become the fundamental characters of Being itself as *Geschick* in Heidegger’s “later” thought,¹¹ as if the former (the “existentials”) served to determine the latter (the structuring of Being itself)? Or is the “Idea of Being in general” (“*Sein überhaupt*”), whose structure would be reflected (and uncovered phenomenologically) in Dasein and which already in SZ serves as “guide”, that which is pre-viewed? That is, is the Idea of Being in general, as pre-viewed, the ultimate “*Vor-habe*” of the interpretation of Dasein?

In §63 of SZ, which is referred to as a “*methodische Besinnung*” (p. 310), Heidegger speaks of the “idea of existence” in a manner which lets us recall our treatment of *τέχνη*.¹² Heidegger informs us that it is the “idea of existence” (as distinct from “*Vorhandenheit*” understood broadly) which has “guided” the Analytic – that which is viewed in advance, however indistinctly. But we may ask the question – indeed Heidegger himself puts the question: where does this “idea of existence” derive its justification, that is, its right as guide which is given in advance?¹³ May we reply by referring to that “pre-ontological” understanding of the “idea of existence” which belongs so essentially to Dasein? Indeed, this would be in order? Heidegger, before posing the question concerning the justification of the “idea of existence”, asks rhetorically: “Is not everything, even if dimly, illuminated by the light of the ‘presupposed’ idea of existence?”¹⁴ However, this of itself is insufficient, for the “presupposed”¹⁵ idea of existence presupposes the more comprehensive, even though unclarified, “idea of Being in general”. Thus, we would, with utmost reluctance, repeat what E. Tugendhat has maintained in his Heidegger-book, namely, that in SZ Dasein’s “*Erschlossenheit*” lacks all relationship to a “measure” (“*Maß*”)¹⁶ – which is not to say that we contend that this “measure” was or even could have been clearly and fully defined in SZ. One of the differences between the Heidegger of SZ and the so-called “later” Heidegger does not reside in the matter at issue (the “meaning” of Being or the “truth of Being”), but the manner of bringing this to explicitness and what itself becomes explicit in this very process of being brought to the surface. As far

as SZ is concerned, the question about the Being of Being must be prefaced by the question about Dasein's mode of Being – which question however must be guided, perhaps precariously, by the pre-viewed “idea of Being in general”.¹⁷ The subsequent probes, as we will endeavor to show, are more directly prefaced (whether explicitly or not) by the pre-viewed idea of Being, esp. as “Geschick” – which in turn suggests the prior becoming-clarified of the notion of Being itself. In a sense, Heidegger's *working out* of the meaning of Being remains throughout essentially *τέχνη*, that is, one which is grounded in a “Vorblick”. Prior to 1936, it is most lucidly in the works VWW and “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” that the idea of Being as Self-sending, as concealed self-showing, is gradually brought into focus. We will begin with SZ in order to follow the explicitation of Being as Geschick. In doing so, we will not only circumscribe the source from which the question of the essence of technology is to be posed: we will allow Being as Time (as its own “Reichen”) to come to the forefront. Finally, Being will show itself as “Ereignis” (Chapter III).

A. THE TRUTH-UNTRUTH STRUCTURE

1. *Sein und Zeit: Dasein's Openness*

Consonant with an expression from SZ, the being of Dasein¹⁸ is fundamentally constituted as equiprimordially being in-the-truth-in-the-untruth. The terms “truth” and “untruth” are synonymous with the frequent expressions “Erschlossenheit” and “Verschlossenheit” and it should be remarked that neither of the terms apply to what Heidegger calls “innerweltliches Seiende”, be this conceived as “zuhanden” or as “vorhanden”.¹⁹ Rather, openness and closedness make up essential determinants of Dasein's Being. In fact, implicit in the word “Dasein”, as Heidegger understands it, are the two determining features, for the “Da” of Dasein refers fundamentally to the feature of openness or “Aufgeschlossenheit” (SZ, § 28)²⁰ which however is “at first and for the most part” (“zunächst und zumeist”) pervaded by closedness.²¹ And at the very start, we observe that Dasein's openness makes no allusion to an “Urheber” (as in St. Augustine), but constitutes Dasein's ownmost Being.²²

A second introductory remark still concerns the expression “openness”. On the basis of several passages from *SZ*, it may appear that the term openness is that counterconcept to, but never truncated from, Dasein’s closedness. Accordingly, openness is constituted by the three existentials of attunement, primary understanding, and Rede, whereas Dasein’s accustomed tendency of being-closed is summarized in the term “fallenness”. Yet, on the whole, this manner of viewing the matter is insufficient for fallenness, and hence Dasein’s closedness permeates thrownness (or facticity) to which attunement relates, as well as existence which is primarily exemplified in primary understanding. It is evident from Heidegger’s initial analyses that attunement and primary understanding are – to use again a favorite expression – at first and for the most part in union with falling.²³ Thus, any juxtaposition of these two basic features (openness-closedness) is only conceptually possible (and misleading). And since Dasein’s openness already includes being closed off,²⁴ Heidegger may speak of the “openness of the they”²⁵ or the “openness of everyday Dasein”²⁶ – which expressions, however, effectively name Dasein’s “Da” as closedness.²⁷ In *SZ*, Heidegger sketches out Dasein’s openness in the fifth chapter of the first part entitled “Das In-Sein als Solches”. We will examine the sections on attunement, understanding and Rede and then briefly the existential called fallenness or falling.

*a. Attunement.*²⁸ From an “ontic” point of view, that is, here, from the perspective of lived existing,²⁹ attunement³⁰ is most familiar to every Dasein; in fact, attunement (as the index to thrownness)³¹ is the indispensable and most basic ground floor of Dasein’s fundamental constitution.³² Ontologically, however, the meaning of attunement is all but facile to thematize. What does attunement signify ontologically,³³ that is, thematically and with reference to Dasein’s mode of Being?

In the first place, the term attunement signifies the seeming banality that Dasein “always already” finds itself in a particular frame of mind, is always already “attuned” or “disposed” in a certain way, be this in pronounced fashion or in a manner of apparent indifference. Attunement is the ontological title characterizing all these sundry moods, the most conspicuous as well as

the most unapparent; the originary lived background against which any reflective or cognitive attitude is already set.³⁴ But what does attunement have to do with Dasein's fundamental constitution, with Dasein's Being – ontologically thematized by the equiprimordial³⁵ components: facticity, existence, and falling?

Attunement, or more precisely various manners of being-attuned, open or disclose Dasein to itself, that is, especially open Dasein to its facticity as Dasein's "that it is and has to be".³⁶ The expression "daß es ist", at least in its immediate context, is contrasted with Dasein's origin (Dasein's "Woher") and futural destiny ("Wohin") which, as compared with the "that it is" opened in mood, are fringed with obscurity.³⁷ But does this then suggest that attunement and what is revealed in being attuned, namely, Dasein's unyielding "daß es ist", should be likened to a cognitively known present state of affairs? Any alleged comparison between the putative "apodicticity"³⁸ of cognition and the relentless manner in which being-attuned brings Dasein face to face with itself, with its factual Being, would be misdirected. For one of the principal theses of the SZ period,³⁹ which is clearly illustrated in § 29, consists precisely in the originality of attunement, its primary revelatory character, which self-disclosure is "prior" to⁴⁰ all cognition.⁴¹ Any mode of cognition whatsoever, be it theoretically apodictic or most provisional (inductive), is only possible for an already attuned Dasein.

What about the factual "Zu sein hat", insoluble from the "daß es ist"? Does not the "Zu sein hat" also accent the implacability of factual Dasein? But how does Dasein have it to be? As far as SZ is concerned, there are two fundamental ways to be, which are by no means mutually exclusive, but which rather "modify" each other, even if one or the other way to be may and does ontically (i.e. as lived) predominate – namely, the authentic and the inauthentic mode of existing. When Heidegger speaks of Dasein's "Zu sein hat", he is referring to the possibility of tending toward "authenticity", of self-becoming – grounded in the owned-self as distinct from the "they-self" – *not* however as self-projection, but rather always as thrown projection.⁴²

This notion of "Zu sein hat", Dasein's task as it were, stands out most conspicuously when mention is made of the way in

which Dasein responds to the opening of the factual “daß es ist und zu sein hat”. We need only recall a fundamental idea of SZ, which already found expression in chapter 4 (division 1) and which may not be annulled here – sc.: “At first Dasein is the they-self and for the most part it remains so.”⁴³ Does not this general but in no wise necessary state of affairs prescribe the manner in which Dasein “at first and for the most part” comports itself to the opening of its Being as factual? For the most part, Dasein turns away from or avoids the opening of itself, of its facticity, which avoiding-tendency – surely the prevailing in SZ’s Analytic of Dasein – nonetheless reveals Dasein. Heidegger writes: “In the evading itself the Da is one which is opened”,⁴⁵ which is to say that Dasein, in the tendency of avoiding itself, opens itself as closed-off to itself.⁴⁶ But being closed-off belongs just as fundamentally to Dasein’s Da. Hence, Dasein’s characteristic comportment to the disclosure of its own facticity is expressed in terms of “Ausweichen” or “Fliehen vor” – expressions which Heidegger employs in one context, namely, that of inauthenticity or everyday falling.⁴⁷ Dasein flees before itself only to fall constantly into “publicness”. Thus it is sufficiently manifest that the initial treatment of attunement (§ 29) is somewhat one-dimensional, laying emphasis however on that which preponderates⁴⁸ – Dasein’s inauthentic manner to be.

But does this “Ausweichen” itself, if successfully executed, imply then that Dasein would be liberated from attunement, from moods in general? This could scarcely hold true, for Dasein, in fleeing, is itself always attuned. Dasein’s turning-away from that before which it has been brought, that is, to employ another expression no less appropriate, before its possible “Unhomeliness”,⁴⁹ is itself “what it is, always in the manner of attunement”.⁵⁰

There is yet a second feature accruing to the primary opening of Dasein’s Being as attunement. Heidegger remarks that attunement opens Being-in-the-world *as a whole*, meaning thereby Dasein’s self, Mitsein and world (or Dasein, Being-in, and world). According to SZ, Dasein’s Being is always already unified,⁵¹ a thesis frequently expressed in the “human sciences” but seldom in fact heeded. Is Heidegger merely emphasizing the need to guard against any fragmenting of Dasein’s Being such

that Dasein's unity would be impaired? Indeed! It is only on the "higher" level of reflection that Dasein gets dissected; only a rather dubious style of reflection discloses Dasein as an isolated "I" over against the "world", or as a spiritual mind somehow encased in a body-object.⁵²

b. Primary Understanding. The second "existential" integral to the constitution of Dasein's "Da" is called "primary understanding" ("Verstehen"). That is not meant in the traditional manner, denoting the faculty of "knowing", nor does the expression advert to any type of "explaining"⁵³ – and if it be insisted upon that the expression "faculty" be retained, then it must be asserted that primary understanding, as it is understood in SZ, is to be designated as Dasein's faculty of "possibility".⁵⁴ In Heidegger's sense, Dasein's understanding is not distinguished in that that which is understood is stamped with the approval: "theoretical knowledge", but understanding as a manner in virtue of which Dasein always already *is* and *will be*, is determined as Dasein's very "Seinkönnen" or "Möglichkeit", Dasein's Being-possible as distinct from anything "present-at-hand". "Dasein is always what it can be and how it is its possibility".⁵⁵

And just as it would be illicit to consider understanding from the derivatory standpoint of the "theory of knowledge", in the same way Dasein as possibility or as Seinkönnen is not to be regarded in the traditional manner, for the term "possibility" signifies neither that which is not yet real or actual – that which is merely possible or contingent in the framework of the traditional Ontology of "Vorhandenheit" – nor is any allusion made to "empty logical possibility". Rather, being-possible belongs to Dasein's "positive" Being, and is primarily related to Dasein's "existing". What does the latter term mean and what does existing, in its most basic and initial sense, have to do with "understanding"?

Indeed, lived existing, which is always in the manner of attunement, is one with primary understanding – which becomes patent as soon as we recall that understanding essentially signifies "projecting" ("Entwerfen"), the projecting of Dasein itself on possibilities.⁵⁶ Projecting as constitutive of primary understanding is factual,⁵⁷ but that upon⁵⁸ which Dasein projects itself and

as which it exists is not factual; is not that in the face of which Dasein has no choice. With regard to “the upon which” of projecting Heidegger writes the following instructive lines:

Primary understanding can place itself primarily in the openness of world, that is, Dasein can understand itself at first and for the most part out of its world. Or, on the other hand, primary understanding throws itself primarily into that for the sake of which, that is to say, Dasein exists as itself. Primary understanding is either authentic, that is, originating out of the Self as such, or inauthentic.⁵⁹

Surely, the “world” referred to here in the first sentence is that of “publicness”, the world of the “they-self” into which Dasein is always falling consequent upon its fleeing before itself already touched upon in § 29. The evasion of the self and the turning toward the world is equivalent to Dasein’s steady “falling” (falling away from the owned self). On the other hand, authenticity, as a possible way to be, is grounded in the “self”, i.e. the self which has been “retrieved” from the impersonal One – which possibility rarely becomes the prevailing state of affairs.⁶⁰ As understanding, Dasein can (and for the most part does) absorb itself⁶¹ in everyday “Man”, in its current “world”, from which it then draws “its” possibilities.⁶² But even so, this projecting upon “significance” (actually upon “insignificance”), upon “world”, does not exclude the possibility of Dasein’s projection upon its “existence” for whose sake Dasein always already is. And yet, as Heidegger clarified in the above-quoted passage, Dasein is capable of relating itself “primarily” to itself as Being-possible or on the other hand may divert itself from itself to the “world” of publicness.

Again, as in regard to the initial analysis of attunement, Heidegger affirms that projecting pertains to the unified basic constitution of Being-in-the-world – which seems to coincide poorly with his insistence on the possibility of the “primär” projection upon “significance” *or* upon the “Self”. Does this not thwart any attempt to hold fast Dasein’s unity? Certainly such an objection would have to be rejected, for the “primär” projecting upon world or upon the self entails the “modification” (p. 146) of the entirety, rather than the exclusion of the one side or the other.

The tendency away from the “world”, into which Dasein has already fallen, back to the self brings world, as it were, with it, together with *Mitsein*, but in such a manner that “world” and “Being-with” are “modified”. Obviously, the inverse movement implies the same state of affairs: the characteristic turning-away from “existence” and the consequent “absorption” in the “world” modify Dasein’s way to be in its entire unity. Any fragmentation of Dasein is only “theoretically” possible, that is, possible in the “light” of a reflection which is incapable of distinguishing the purely conceptual (the “abstract”) and the lived, and which is itself already inadvertently grounded in attuned primary understanding.

c. Rede. Equiprimordial with attunement and primary understanding, that is, neither derivatory nor merely adjunct to them, is the “existential” called “Rede”.⁶³ We must first inquire about the distinction *Sprache-Rede* which is already intimated in the above-mentioned equiprimordiality. Not to be forgotten is that “Interpretation” (“*Auslegung*”) and “assertion” (an “extreme” instance of Interpretation) are grounded in primary understanding and that language,⁶⁴ as far as chapter 5 is concerned, was first encountered as the third⁶⁵ component of assertion, namely, as “*Mitteilung*” (or “*Heraussagen*”). However, *Rede* is not grounded in attuned primary understanding but is equiprimordial with it. Heidegger writes, for instance, that *Rede* “already grounds Interpretation and assertion”.⁶⁶ Or as the *Logic Lectures* (1925/26) had already affirmed: “The fundamental movement: not from language to *Rede*, but from *Rede* to language.”⁶⁷

But what is to be said about assertions which seem to speak for the identification of *Rede* with language such as the following: “For the most part, *Rede* is expressed by being spoken out, and has already been so expressed. It is language.”⁶⁸ Notwithstanding possible appearances to the contrary, this statement hardly bespeaks any identification between *Rede* and *Sprache*: it merely explicitates a possibility (and one, moreover, which is not indispensable),⁶⁹ namely, that *Rede* may be expressed (however inadequately) – in fact, “for the most part” has always already been expressed, which in turn only entitles us to say that

expressed Rede is language. Secondly, the passage in question evinces another peculiarity with regard to the question about Rede and Sprache in SZ. When Heidegger speaks of Sprache as the expressedness of Rede, he is usually referring to the language of publicness (“modified” Rede), a language expressive of and caught up in the swirl of “falling”.⁷⁰ We notice how Heidegger begins the above-cited passage: “Die Rede spricht sich zumeist aus . . .” But “zumeist” in SZ, refers to Dasein’s “closest” way to be, the manner in which Dasein “shows itself for everyman, not always but ‘as a rule’”.⁷¹ And “as a rule” Dasein is not *itself* but the “they-self”. This central thesis of SZ may not be held in abeyance when discussing “Sprache”, that is, expressed Rede.⁷²

What then is Rede, if it is not an ornamental supplement to attunement and primary understanding and if is not straight-away (or in any way) to be identified with language? Heidegger calls it the “articulation” (“Gliederung”) of “understandability” or more to the point the “articulation” of the “openness” of Dasein’s Da in general.⁷³ Does the word “articulation” here refer to the possible articulation afforded by “language” or even that of “Auslegung”? This could not hold true, for as just stated, Rede is the ground of interpretation and assertion. There must then be a more primordial articulation – an implicit (tacit and well-nigh ineffable) articulation or cohesiveness of Dasein’s Da – and this is the existential Heidegger calls Rede. Dasein’s openness is always already articulated; it already forms a unity which is constantly held together, while the structured components are held apart. Indeed, according to Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein, it is impossible to separate (except conceptually) thrownness and existence, but at the same time they are distinct, and not merely for the concept. The togetherness of this structured whole is Rede,⁷⁴ that is, Rede in its primary sense.

d. Fallenness. From chapter 4 (division 1) onward the notion of Dasein’s fallenness colors every stage of the Analytic. At two particular intervals it is thematized, that is, especially in chapter 4 itself Heidegger, in an incomparable manner, discusses the “who” of Dasein and again in chapter 5 (“Das In-sein als Solches”), § B, entitled: “Das alltägliche Sein des Da und das Verfallen des Daseins”. Moreover, § 40 on “Anxiety” must be

considered as a core-text in this regard. In the following, we will set out to say the essential, omitting details, that is, the various constitutive expressions of fallenness will not be discussed.⁷⁵

In our section on “attunement” we already caught a glimpse of the essential character of fallenness – whereby we refer undoubtedly to Dasein’s “turning-away” or “fleeing”. The latter invariably, throughout SZ, characterizes the movement of falling. According to SZ, Dasein is in constant flight and we already know that the fleeing constitutive for Dasein’s falling is not a fleeing in the face of something threatening within-the-world, whether this be ready-to-hand or present-to-hand. Dasein, as falling, is not in flight *from* the world of everyday dealings, the totality of possible “involvements”. Quite to the contrary: Dasein, as falling, flees toward the world, that is, away from itself⁷⁶ as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. As stated in § 31, Dasein has always already, as factual, “gone astray and failed to recognize itself”.⁷⁷ Or again: “Dasein is from itself as authentic potentiality-for-being the self at first always already fallen away and has fallen into the ‘world’.”⁷⁸ Thus Dasein as openness, as its own Da, is essentially and most obstinately closed-off. As we stated previously and as is characteristic, the being-closed-off to itself (Dasein’s own alienation from itself in being “at home” in the they-self) does not nullify Dasein’s Da, Dasein’s openness – but *is this openness as modified*,⁷⁹ which moreover clearly implies the “Vorgängigkeit” of the possibility of authenticity. How could Dasein, always moodwise, flee before itself if it had not already been brought before its “unheimlich” self?⁸⁰

However, we may well wonder how this prevailing⁸¹ state of affairs has come to pass – how is it that Dasein has lost itself, has failed to win itself, that is, to “choose” itself? Should this occurrence be ascribed to Dasein’s facticity or to the feature Heidegger calls “existence” or to both? Surely, Heidegger tends to connect Dasein’s falling with Dasein’s facticity or thrownness,⁸² but just as fundamental to the Analytic is the insolubility of facticity and existence. Existing is always factual – but never purely factual – which in turn grounds the very possibility of Dasein’s “retrieval”. How may we express falling in terms of Dasein as thrown-existing?

From the start of SZ⁸³ Heidegger announces that Dasein –

factically – tends to understand or interpret (not grasp in the sense of theoretical Erfassen) itself out of its “world”. Indeed, the manner in which the world is understood is reflected back upon the way Dasein interprets itself.⁸⁴ Hence, Dasein’s own ontical self-understanding is a mirroring of Dasein’s understanding of the world (which then may be brought to ontological explicitation). Yet in stating this, it is not enough to call to mind the notion of the “worldhood of the world”, that “significance” within which Dasein primarily projects itself. Rather, the world in question, the world of everyday “concern” must be further determined as that of “publicness” – the mode of Being of the “they-self” (the “who” of Dasein as § 27 so incomparably expressed it).

As something factual, Dasein’s projection of itself understandingly is in each case already alongside a world that has been discovered. From this world it takes its possibilities, and it does so first in accordance with the way things have been interpreted by the “they”.⁸⁵

This is the world in which Dasein has always already grown up – a world whose “interpretedness” is guided, for the most part, by ambiguous “idle talk”.⁸⁶ And hence Dasein’s fundamental task, at least if Dasein is to be itself: to find itself again. This possibility is elaborated upon in chapters 1 and 2 of division 2 to which we must now turn.

e. Being-toward-Death and Resolute Openness (Entschlossenheit). At the outset of division 2 (“Dasein und Zeitlichkeit, pp. 231–437) Heidegger notices that hitherto the Analytic of Dasein has lacked “primordially” (“Ursprünglichkeit”), which term in the second division of SZ⁸⁷ comprises the notion of “authenticity” as well as that of “wholeness” (“Ganzheit”). In the first division, the Analytic centered primarily on the “inauthentic” Being of Dasein,⁸⁸ that is, the analysis interpreted Dasein in its “closest” way to be.⁸⁹

But what about the second dimension of primordially in regard to which division 1 remained incomplete – viz. “Ganzheit”? In division 1, Heidegger spoke frequently of Dasein’s “Ganze” (and “Ganzheit”). It was strictly maintained

that any primordial mode of “Erschließen” pertains to the “entire fundamental constitution of Being-in-the-world” (SZ, p. 144). However, in this regard the term “das Ganze” (“Ganzheit”) refers rather to Dasein’s unity, whereas the term “Ganzheit” as it is used in division 2 (chapters 1 and 2)⁹⁰ signifies something like Dasein’s wholeness or totality.⁹¹

Is Dasein, as thrown-projection, ever a whole? Indeed, the analysis of division 1 seems to have precluded this very possibility, for as long as Dasein exists in the manner of projecting itself on possibilities, that is, as long as Dasein is constantly “ahead-of-itself”, it remains incomplete. Is it conceivable that Dasein ceases to be “Being-possible”, ceases to understand itself toward possibilities? Solely the biological occurrence of Death would allow this. Dead Dasein, as far as thrown projecting is concerned, is terminated. Yet this has but little to do with Heidegger’s notion of “Ganzheit”. Heidegger’s analysis of Death concerns essentially Dasein’s constant “dying” (“Sterben”) which is no *fait accompli*, but rather an “existential”, a way to be of Dasein toward its Death. Thus, the first item of the Care-structure, namely, Dasein’s primary futural dimension (“Vorweg-sein”), hardly eliminates the possibility of bringing the whole of Dasein into view but is its very precondition. Dasein, as always already “ahead-of-itself”, constantly comports itself, in whichever mode,⁹² as Being-toward-Death.

Furthermore, this concise preliminary characterization, implicitly but surely enough, already obviates misoriented determinations of Dasein’s uttermost “noch-nicht” – that is, especially wards off the representation of Dasein’s “not-yet” as something “outstanding”. For this determination takes unwittingly for granted that Dasein, in its Being, is no different than a “Vorhandenes”.⁹³ Death as that to which dying (i.e. projecting) Dasein comports itself is termed, by Heidegger, more adequately a “Bevor-stand”. And yet as soon as we hear the latter as “something impending” or as “something standing before” we run the risk of objectifying the unobjectifiable – that is, we are still considering Dasein’s Being toward its “end” as Being *at* an end.⁹⁴ Hence, the necessity of underscoring the *toward* and *dying*⁹⁵ as manners in which Dasein comports itself rather than death as something waiting for Dasein or which Dasein awaits.⁹⁶

In the context of SZ, the “fact” of death means that Dasein is always already and constantly dying, that is, comporting itself within its world.

What does Heidegger want to say with the term *Bevor-stand*? Essentially, two points must be stressed: that Death as Dasein’s eminent *Bevor-stand* is a “possibility” as which Dasein always already comports itself and as which Dasein always *is* and secondly that the “standing before” in question is no standing before something, but rather Dasein as *Being-toward-Death* always already stands before itself.

Yet the very same could be said about any “possibility” *as* that which Dasein exists. Dasein is constantly standing before itself as thrown existing – even if in the manner of shunning. What then differentiates, at least formally, Death as a “possibility”? We open up the way by recalling that Heidegger, in existentially characterizing *Being-toward-Death*, claims that Death is Dasein’s most “preeminent” (“*ausgezeichnet*”) possibility.⁹⁷ Why most pre-eminent? Most pre-eminent since *Being-toward-death* expresses Dasein’s *most far reaching* possibility – an expression which Heidegger, in this context, refrains from using but which nevertheless adequately states the matter at issue. Dasein’s manner of comporting itself toward death – which comportment may not be confused with a theoretical self-observation – is Dasein’s most far-reaching possibility, for it embraces all other possibilities, it relates to all of Dasein’s varied possibilities.⁹⁸ That is to say, Dasein’s projecting itself *as* any single possibility is already (implicitly) a comporting itself as “dying” (understood existentially) – and if this be mistaken, then it would make little sense to characterize Dasein as *Being-toward-Death*. Dasein is “constantly”, although for the most part “inconstantly” *Being-toward-death*, and is so *in all its projectings*. *Being-in-the-world* as thrown projection is always *Being-toward-death*. It is in this sense that Death is Dasein’s pre-eminent possibility, and not in the sense of being the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein.⁹⁹

This brings us to Heidegger’s existential “pre-sketch” (“*Vorzeichnung*”)¹⁰⁰ of *Being-toward-Death* which qualifies Death as Dasein’s ownmost, non-relational, unsurpassable, certain and indefinite possibility. The first two characteristics mutually implicate each other, for Death can only be Dasein’s

ownmost possibility on the condition that Dasein is brought back from the “they” world. We notice how, with these two notions, Heidegger’s pre-sketch of Death has already burst beyond its bounds for non-relationality is only intelligible presupposing Dasein’s “retrieval” (“Zurückholen”) from the “world”; that is, it is only intelligible within the context of “Unheimlichkeit”; for Dasein as no longer at home in the world of publicness. And this too is the precondition for the “Eigenste” self (p. 253) as distinguished from the “standard self.”¹⁰¹

What is to be said, initially, about the concept of “un-surpassability” (“Unüberholbarkeit”), the third notion in the “Vorzeichnung” of Being-toward-death? Does this simply mean that every Dasein will die someday, that is, that Death is an inescapable factual necessity? But again this would be to misconstrue Death as a “possibility”, for Death is never something of sorts, but rather Dasein comporting itself toward itself – and this, most fundamentally, is what is unsurpassable.¹⁰² It is true that Dasein can never shake off its facticity. But just as fundamental is the unsurpassability of existing – of projecting itself on possibilities whether as the owned self or as the “theyself”. However Dasein fashions its Being-in-the-world, it must always comport itself toward its all-embracing possibility.

Lastly, Death is said to be “certain” (“gewiß”) but as certain, “indefinite”. The term “certainty”, which Heidegger with unexpressed reference to Nietzsche defines as a “Für-wahrhalten”,¹⁰³ is not to be understood in its “theoretical” sense. It is not so much a question of the mode of certitude that can be attributed to “Death”, whether apodictic or “merely” empirical, but again Dasein’s manner of comportment, Dasein’s lived manner of “holding” death “for true”; that is, holding death open as Dasein’s unique possibility. Hence, Heidegger’s distinction: in its primary sense, “certainty” (“Gewißheit”) signifies being-certain, as a way in which Dasein is; thus being-certain is an existential. But in a derived sense, certainty is a designation which is said of a “being” of which Dasein can be certain. Clearly, the two significations correspond respectively to authentic and inauthentic Being-toward-death.¹⁰⁴

Heidegger sets out in § 50, which we have been discussing, to connect Being-toward-death with the Care-structure and in

doing so, in preliminary fashion, began with the notion of “Bevorstand” which in turn brought to explicitness the existential pre-sketch outlined above. This cast light on death as Dasein’s “end”. But Dasein, as existing, is always already “thrown” Being-in-the-world and thus Dasein must exist as thrown Being-toward-Death. And as division I repeatedly emphasized, thrown existence is in general (but not necessarily, nor always) in the manner of falling. Heidegger writes: “Dasein is dying factically so long as it exists, but at first and for the most part in the manner of falling.”¹⁰⁵

How does Heidegger describe this fallen Being-toward-death, Being-toward-death as inauthentic, that is, in its prevailing mode? Characteristically, he begins with Dasein’s “closest” way to be, with Dasein’s average everydayness, reiterating the structure of falling as “versucherisch”, “beruhigend”, and “entfremdend”, which had already been conceptualized in division I, § 38, and which, moreover, is directed by “Idle Talk”. How does Idle talk disclose (that is, cover up) Dasein’s most far-reaching possibility?

Death is “interpreted” as an occurring event (“Ereignis”, p. 253, also “Begegnis” p. 252) – one with which, in its everyday “dealings”, Dasein is quite familiar. And as familiar, Death takes on the character of “inconspicuousness”, which expression calls to mind especially Heidegger’s world-analysis: more precisely it adverts to the manner of the being of a tool – the tool’s “Zuhandenheit”. In the context of Dasein’s everyday dealings, a tool is understood in view of its proper function within a larger reference-frame. As serviceable in its usual way, the tool is inconspicuous, having, as it were, “drawn itself back”.¹⁰⁶ However, tools of sundry sorts break down, they get lost, etc. – in which case, they are no longer apt for serving their specific purpose within their appropriate context, and thus cease to be “zurückgezogen”, coming rather to the fore *as*¹⁰⁷ that which can no longer cut or that which got lost and must be replaced. The tool has ceased to be “zuhanden”, to become merely “vorhanden”¹⁰⁸ (even if absent).

It is in an analogous manner that “idle talk” understands Dasein’s most critical possibility. Death is not yet at hand (p. 253) and as such it remains inconspicuous or, if one prefers, to

be “noch nicht vorhanden” is still to be “vorhanden”. And as “noch nicht vorhanden” Death concerns no one in particular. Heidegger writes: “the public Dasein-interpretation says: ‘one dies’, because therewith each other and the they itself can persuade itself: precisely it is never I, for this one is *no one*.”¹⁰⁹ But this manner of comportment toward death tends to cover up the character of this possibility as possibility, reducing it to a “thing” which as far as “publicness” is concerned, is, for the moment, irrelevant. If this is the unexpressed (for the most part) public interpretedness of death, would this not serve to intensify the “temptation” on the part of any individual Dasein to cancel its task of taking-up its most unique possibility? We notice here how the “they-self” – tacitly to be sure – has already purported to surpass death, that is, has already covered up death’s unsurpassability, in such a way, however, that it testifies to its covering-up as covering-up.

But now (still in the confines of the articulation of ambiguous idle talk) let us consider the eventuality that death confronts someone in particular, say a loved one. How would everyday “Fürsorge” comport itself? What characterizes everydayness *in any regard* is its tendency to close-off or cover-up the phenomenon and this obtains all the more so respecting death. Accordingly, idle talk endeavors to persuade the affected person that, after all, he will circumvent the grips of death, thus providing for a “constant tranquilization”.¹¹⁰

However, the very acme is attained when the impersonal one distorts possible anxiety in the face of death into fear of an oncoming event, for it is in this respect that everyday Dasein manifests itself as completely “estranged” (“entfremdet”) from its ownmost possibility. The expression Heidegger employs here is quite interesting – namely, “Umkehrung”, which raises the following question: does not the “Umkehrung” in question presuppose that “anxiety” in the face of death is effectively present – which seems excluded from the very outset. How could everyday interpretedness mutate anxiety into fear, if anxiety were not already “given”?

In Heidegger’s thought, whether in SZ or in regard to his later determination of Being itself, it is always Openness¹¹¹ which has a certain priority. In the context of SZ, Dasein’s predominating

evasive comportment, Dasein's closing itself off presupposes its openness or, to put it another way, presupposes the possibility of authenticity. This is why Heidegger says in § 44: "... only insofar as Dasein is open, is it also closed";¹¹² which statement, within the context of SZ, could *not* read: "... only insofar as Dasein is closed, is it also opened." More generally stated, the same thesis reads: "Inauthenticity has possible authenticity as its ground."¹¹³ This thesis pertains to the whole of the movement of SZ, including Heidegger's death analysis. "Fear", which in the framework of SZ exemplifies inauthentic attunement, is indeed grounded in anxiety – Dasein's possible authentic attunement in the face of itself. Or, as § 40 clarified, fear is anxiety, *as concealed*.¹¹⁴

If we prescind from the details of the texts in order to view the essential, the everyday, that is, falling comportment toward death may be characterized as a "covering-up evasion in the face of it". This is even manifest in the everyday concession pertaining to the "certainty" of death. As we have already noticed the they-self implicitly regards Dasein's death as something "Vorhandenes". It is this which prescribes the mode of certainty which may be imputed to death, for death as something present-at-hand, even if remotely and in a manner which concerns "nobody", must be empirically certain (SZ, p. 257), thus falling short of that privileged apodicticity. Heidegger refers to this as the "critical" determination of the certainty of death and makes, in its regard, two essential remarks. In the first place, it again clearly brings out everydayness' deeply seated misapprehension of Dasein's way to be in general; that is, it "understands" Dasein "categorically", instead of as "Being-possible". Secondly, the attribution of empirical certainty to death is, despite appearances to the contrary, simply another tactic by means of which Dasein "evades" (purports to surpass) its pre-eminent possibility. In general, "one" "knows" about death as an empirical state of affairs, but such knowing or having certitude is tantamount to evading "being-certain", that is, to evading the authentic comportment toward death. But evasion itself as "covering up" already discloses;¹¹⁵ attests to the certainty of death in a manner which is neither "apodictic" nor empirical (and certainly not "psychological"), but rather, if we may express it so: in the mode of contorted anxiety.

It is well known how the dominating theoretical-observing attitude is intolerant toward “indefiniteness”. For this reason, the certainty of death, for the “they”, must be rendered definite. Actually, this definiteness applies to death’s “when” which however has nothing to do with calculating the precise moment of death’s occurrence. The spokesman of the they-self, that is, idle talk, confirms: “... one dies also, but not quite yet.”¹¹⁶ With this “noch nicht” a certain definiteness is conferred on death, that is to say, stated negatively: it is *denied* that death as certain is possible at any time.

Above the point was made that, ontologically, inauthentic comportment is rooted in the possibility of the authentic, and thus we must ask how the latter is to be projected “existentially”. The ontical possibility of authentic Being-toward-death must be elucidated ontologically.

With regard to an authentic Being-toward-death, the foregoing sketch of inauthentic Being-toward-death serves as a point of departure, for in thematizing Dasein’s inauthentic comportment toward death, Heidegger has already suggested how authentic Being-toward-death may not be. That is, authentic Being-toward-death cannot evade or cover-up its ownmost possibility. To arrive at a more positive characterization of authentic Being-toward-death, Heidegger begins with the notion of Being-toward-death as being toward a possibility, toward “what is possible” (“zu einem Möglichen”).

What does this mean – being toward “what is possible” if not being out to actualize what is possible, the not yet actual? This would be appropriate, if it were a question of Dasein’s multiple dealings with the “ready-to-hand”. But Being-toward-death as Being toward what is possible has nothing to do with comportment toward the ready-to-hand but instead toward Dasein itself in its ownmost and far-reaching Seinkönnen. Nor does the counter-explanation hold, according to which Dasein’s Being-toward-death would consist in “pondering over” death. Certainly this would seem to maintain the possibility as possibility. But does not any species of “brooding” (or any observational reflection) about death objectify the possibility such that the possibility as possibility is, in reality, conjured away? Heidegger insists that death must be maintained “as” possible –

as that as which Dasein comports itself;¹¹⁷ a point which ontically offers no difficulty.

Heidegger defines Dasein's authentic comportment toward death as an "advancing to the possibility".¹¹⁸ What does such an expression signify? Does it not tend to objectify, even if in a different manner than "brooding over"? Certainly not, if we understand "possibility" *in terms of advancing* and not inversely: advancing in terms of a ready-made possibility. It is not some sort of pre-given possibility which predetermines Dasein's manner of advancing but much more advancing – Dasein's understanding itself in relation to death – constitutes the possibility as possibility. In other words, from an ontological point of view, the possibility is constituted and maintained in its peculiar Being by advancing, which surely does not suggest that death would not be "possible" barring Dasein's advancing. From an ontic perspective, the latter would be preposterous. But Heidegger, at this stage, is merely sketching out an existential-ontological Being-toward-death in its mode of authenticity. Advancing maintains (in fact, engenders) the possibility as possibility: constitutes the possibility as such. To work this out more definitely, Heidegger takes up the formal existential conception of death and characterizes it in view of Dasein's possible authenticity.

Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility. In advancing, it would *become manifest*¹¹⁹ to Dasein that it has wrested itself from the "they". But having wrested itself from the they signifies then that Dasein has been thrown back upon its own resources, that is, it may no longer derive "its" possibilities from publicness, but must become the source of being-possible, become itself. At the same time, this being wrested from the they-self, this being thrown back upon the self, suggests that Dasein has been "individualized". Hence, Dasein, if it is to comport itself authentically toward its most pre-eminent possibility, must do so "out of itself". In advancing, it becomes explicit to what extent "Sein bei" "falls short". As Heidegger summarizes: "Dasein can only be itself authentically, if it renders this possible on the ground of its own resources (by and of itself)."¹²⁰

But does "individualized" Dasein confront us with Dasein in isolation, Dasein alone as Being-in-the-world, instead of Dasein as absorbed "Being-alongside"? And would not Dasein then

have to find its world? Indeed, as individualized “concern” and “solicitude” with “world” and the “other” are no longer Dasein’s haven of security and “truth”: as individualized, Dasein no longer interprets itself in terms of the public “market”. However, this does not indicate that concern and solicitude have been thrust aside; what is at issue (again) is their “modification”. Together with Dasein’s authentic self-projecting upon its own “Seinkönnen”, world and Being-with are equally modified.¹²¹

In accord with the preliminary sketch, Dasein’s ownmost possibility is also unsurpassable. How would Dasein authentically understand itself toward death as its unsurpassable possibility? Unlike inauthentic evasive comportment, advancing, says Heidegger, “frees” Dasein “for” its ownmost possibility. Dasein becomes free for its own possibilities including its most eminent possibility since advancing, that is, Dasein’s authentic understanding itself toward death, has freed Dasein *from* the they-self. In this way, writes Heidegger again with implicit reference to Nietzsche, advancing hinders “any undue adherence to the already attained existence”¹²² – analogous to the Nietzschean “value” termed “Steigerung” which prevents clutching onto any already attained quantity of power (“die je erreichte Machtstufe”, cf. Chapter IV, Part One). That is to say, in Heideggerian terminology, advancing renders impossible any exclusive adherence to “facticity”.¹²³ Thus, Dasein would no longer be closed-off to its own self, Dasein would have become free for its most pre-eminent possibility together with those encompassed by the latter.

But herewith, that is, with this existential sketch of Being-toward-death – which merely shows that an ontical Seinkönnen, namely, an authentic Being-toward-death is possible “ontologically” – we are far from our goal. As Heidegger points out, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, from an existentiell-ontical viewpoint the existential projection remains a “fantastic over-exaction”.¹²⁴ We must broach the question about Dasein’s ontical¹²⁵ Being-toward-death, for as Heidegger urges in one of the opening sections (§ 3) of SZ, the existential-ontological is rooted in the ontical;¹²⁶ that is, in the pretheoretical stratum of lived experience (the *pre-ontological*). It should never be lost sight of that in the context of SZ the ontological is bound to the

ontical in the sense of the lived – but the latter may well, and usually does, dispense with the ontological.¹²⁷ Or put differently: the ontological must be checked out with the ontical, not vice-versa. Otherwise, the danger of a purely abstract, conceptual construction may ensue – however clever this may be.

This concrete possibility of Dasein's self-extrication from its "lostness" in the they is given attestation in the second chapter of division 2 of SZ, in which the summit of the conception of Dasein's "truth" is attained, expressed in the formula "resolute openness". However, this extrication is no slight undertaking, but requires Dasein's "self-retrieval" from the snares of Das Man. As Heidegger repeatedly accents, the fallenness into the they belongs to Dasein's most fundamental Being. In the section which we are now to discuss this is expressed most pregnantly as follows: "Care is thoroughly permeated in its essence with nullity."¹²⁸

Dasein has always already "neglected"¹²⁹ to "choose" itself, thereby enmeshing itself in the way of inauthenticity. Hence, the attempt at surmounting this entanglement in its inauthentic way to be must take its point of departure from this latter.¹³⁰ In accord with chapter 2 (division 2), the "neglect" to choose seems especially attributable to the domination of idle talk, which articulates thrown understanding in its "Verständigkeit". We know that "hearing", which is not to be confounded with "acoustical reception",¹³¹ is one of the fundamental possibilities of Rede (a manner in which Rede is as "articulation"). Moreover, we are acquainted with expressed Rede, that is, "language" which for the most part, in the context of the analytic, is idle talk. The latter likewise has its peculiar style of hearing which is characterized as a "Hinhören". In "pricking up" one's ears to the idle talk of the crowd, that is, in not tending to the "voice" of the authentic self, lies the most proximate reason for Dasein's "neglect" to choose.¹³² Assuming now that it is a question of the modification of the prevalence of inauthenticity, the initial task is manifest: the so-called "pricking up" of one's ears to the idle talk of the crowd, which implies the "inability to hear" ("überhören") the authentic self, must be disrupted in an "unmediated" ("unvermittelt")¹³³ fashion. That is accomplished by what Heidegger calls "conscience" or the "call" of conscience.

In this regard, the role played by Dasein is curiously doubled. In the first place, Dasein is the one “being-called”, for it is patently Dasein itself which is to be retrieved from its “lostness” in the they-self. But secondly, it is Dasein which is the “caller” – which stresses the above-mentioned “immediacy” of this happening.¹³⁴ What is it in regard to which the call calls? Dasein is summoned “to its own Self”.¹³⁵ And obviously so, for the call of conscience would be entirely superfluous if Dasein were primarily already in the manner of authentic Being. Moreover, the “Woraufhin” of being-called requires a superiority over that which is to be modified such that the impersonal One and what belongs to it will be “passed over” (“übergangen”) – which does not refer to a mere omission of something but rather serves to make manifest the “meaninglessness” (“Bedeutungslosigkeit”) of “Man”.¹³⁶

It is especially the notion of Dasein as the caller which calls for clarification. With this in view, Heidegger takes orientation from Dasein’s fundamental constitution, that is, from Dasein as essentially thrown projection held in articulateness by Rede. For the most part, Dasein does not take up its thrownness, but “flees” in the face of it, generating then itself as the “they-self”. Expressed differently, Dasein flees in the face of “Umheimlichkeit” made manifest in the fundamental mood of anxiety which confronts Dasein with the “Nichts der Welt”. On the other hand, if this latter explicitation is truly heeded, Dasein is turned back upon itself, that is, upon its own Seinkönnen. Granting that in the mood of anxiety the world of everydayness is put on display in its meaninglessness and granting equally that Dasein acknowledges this as such instead of endeavoring to cover it up, in its constant self-tranquilization, then Dasein will “individualize itself”, thus becoming a sort of matrix for a genuine self-world appropriation (or modification). As brought back to itself Dasein no longer feels “at home” in the impersonal One; the world of Das Man has become utterly “unfamiliar” to Dasein. We may say that a sort of *explicit* “alienation”¹³⁷ has come to the surface between Dasein facing possible authenticity and Dasein as the “they-self”. It is precisely this Dasein, to which the artificiality of the they-world is revealed, which is designated as the “caller”.

But we must, above all, inquire into the content¹³⁸ of the call – what does the call “give to understand”, that is, what is opened up to Dasein in the call? According to Heidegger, the call makes manifest to Dasein the latter’s most original “being-guilty”. However, “guilt” is here not to be construed as if Dasein has acted amiss, nor is “guilt” to be likened to some sort of “defect” (“Mangel”). Rather, “Being guilty” signifies ontologically “being-the-ground of a nullity”,¹³⁹ which raises two questions: is Heidegger able to suitably exhibit such a determination of “being-guilty” as Dasein’s Being, viz. in Dasein as Sorge, and secondly how would this “being-guilty” be existentially possible? The analysis, at this point, turns on three expressions, two of which are descriptions of Dasein: “Grund seines Seinkönnens” and “Sein des Grundes”. The third expression, which means *pure* self-projection and which is consistently denied of Dasein, reads: “Grund seines Seins”.

Heidegger embarks upon the discussion by affirming that Dasein is “not brought to its Da by itself”.¹⁴⁰ If not “by itself”, then presumably by another. Yet in the context of SZ, the suspicion that Dasein would be “brought” to its “Da” by another must be excluded. The passage in question does not make reference to another by whose mediation Dasein would be brought into its “Da”, but signifies Dasein’s incapacity of ridding itself of its thrownness – that Dasein is inexorably delivered over to it. To this extent and only to this extent is Dasein “Grundsein”.

But Dasein as thrownness is not only Grundsein in the sense of being factual through and through. Dasein is Grundsein as “Grund seines Seinkönnens”;¹⁴¹ that is to say, Dasein *exists* as factual, Dasein projects itself, albeit only and always as factual. Or as Heidegger remarks: Dasein is never existing “prior to (as if in separation from) its ground, but always only out of it and as it”.¹⁴² And consequently, as Dasein is never able to slough off its facticity, it is never completely master over its Being.¹⁴³ In fact, throughout SZ, Heidegger emphasizes that it is not a question of mastery over thrownness, but instead the latter is to be taken-up. Dasein is never “Grund seines Seins”, that is, is never pure self-projection, but is always the “Sein des Grundes”,¹⁴⁴ that is, as thrown projection.

Moreover, there is another sense in which this nullity suffuses Dasein's Being, namely, Dasein's projecting is perforce exclusive in the sense that Dasein, in its very projecting itself on possibilities, thereby excludes other projectings. Dasein is in relation to a possibility, that is, "it is constantly not another".¹⁴⁵

Hence, endemic to the structure of Dasein as thrown projection, as the "Sein des Grundes", is a decisive "Nichtigkeit". It is this which founds the very possibility of the "nullity" of falling.¹⁴⁶ It is in this manner that Heidegger presents the sense of "being-guilty" in its relation to Dasein's unitary structure – which presentation replies, at once, to our second question concerning how being-guilty is ontologically possible. Heidegger answers: as "Grundsein" of a "nullity".

Thus far, it has been shown that conscience, as a sort of call, reveals to Dasein its own "being-guilty", its inherent nullity, and that the latter is ultimately seated in Dasein's Being as Sorge. But what is Dasein to do confronted with this its own nullity? To be sure, two possibilities come to mind, the one being bound up with authenticity, the other with its modification. And since Heidegger is in search of an "attestation" of Dasein's authentic Seinkönnen, he will focus on Dasein's authentic mode of response to being-called.

According to Heidegger's exposition, conscience "discourses", not however in the manner of verbalizing, and thus an appropriate manner of "hearing" is, in the first place, mandatory. And if the "hearing" is proper to the matter at issue, it may not be a mere "listening to", but demands "action";¹⁴⁷ it demands, in other words, a self-projecting in correspondence to the explicitation of being-guilty.¹⁴⁸ But such a thrown-projecting with relation to what has been revealed to Dasein presupposes, in its turn, a certain "readiness" for its ownmost factual Being. Understanding the call, that is, projectingly responding to it, shows Dasein as "given over to its ownmost possibilities of existing".¹⁴⁹ This is also called "choosing", that is, Dasein wants to have such a conscience of its self as being-guilty. In consequence, the appropriate mode of hearing presents itself as a "wanting to have a conscience", which, from Heidegger's vantage point, is the ontological precondition for an ontical becoming-guilty, that is, Dasein's lived taking over of its nullity (essentially, its own facticity).

The manner of mood which is integral to the understanding expressed above is forthcoming, for in the context of SZ, the mood of anxiety serves as archetype. If Dasein takes in earnest its being brought before its Being, its Being as “nichtig”, then Dasein must already be dwelling, as it were, as “individualized”, in its “Unhomeliness”.

But care, in relation to which the full phenomenon of conscience is to be existentially conceptualized, embraces equally Rede. In this context, Rede plays the special role of retrieving Dasein from the enticement of idle talk – and this, not in that a counterspeech is held. Rather, Rede assumes the mode of “Reticence” (“Verschwiegenheit”) which seems singularly adapted to the anxiety-filled “wanting to have a conscience”. The “Rede of conscience”, emphasizes Heidegger, “never attains to utterance”,¹⁵⁰ nor should it, for Dasein is communing with itself.

Resuming what has been brought forth: the authentic openness of Dasein as Being-toward-death shows itself as a thrown self-projecting upon its ownmost “being-guilty” (its nullity) in the attunement of anxiety which is articulated by the mode of Rede called “being-silent”.¹⁵¹ One such pre-eminent openness of Dasein toward itself is termed “resolute openness”, which expresses Dasein’s “truth” most fully.

However, this does not mean that Dasein’s “untruth” has been jettisoned – even from the viewpoint of the ontological analysis – which would negate Dasein’s most basic structure. “Resolute openness”, just as openness, is equiprimordially “resolute closedness” (“Unentschlossenheit”). Heidegger writes at this point: “Dasein is always already and perhaps quite soon again in resolute closedness.”¹⁵² Secondly, it should be noticed that the exposition of the existential possibility of authenticity in the way of resolute openness does not attain to what Heidegger, in division 2, calls “primordially”, for this includes not only the authentic but also “wholeness”. In order to treat of primordially it would be indispensable to show the union of authenticity and wholeness (which is surely implicit in the above presentation), which Heidegger explicitly works out in § 62,¹⁵³ together with the temporal dimension of the whole. For our purposes however – which merely aim at explicating Dasein’s twofold, unitary structure – this is not necessary and will therefore be omitted here.

2. *VWW and the Notion of Truth*

Regarding the Heideggerian thinking of the meaning of Being, SZ is followed by crucial texts, namely, VWG, WM, VWW. From these we will select the latter for exploration in view of tracing out the truth-untruth structure. We will concentrate on fundamental passages from sections 2–7, letting the analysis be guided by what is said.

However, at the very start we might point to the somewhat unsettled character of the essay. One of the chief reasons for this is given in “Die Hinweise” to the text itself where we are apprised that VWW, as a conference, was first held in 1930, but the essay, in the form in which we now possess it, was first published in 1943. It is not unimportant to notice that in the intervening thirteen years the text had been re-worked considerably – not however, apparently, as a whole. Heidegger calls VWW the “mehrfach überprüften Text” – and a careful reading bears this out. In this regard, we would suggest the following. The original perspective focused especially on Dasein as the opening toward beings, that is, as letting-be which is simultaneously a not-letting-be. As Heidegger remarks in section 5, “letting-be is in itself at the same time a concealing”,¹⁵⁴ which means in context that Dasein’s standing open toward beings is at once a closing toward Mystery, the concealment of “beings as a whole”. Throughout VWW a pronounced contrast persists between “je das Seiende”, that is, specific beings toward which Dasein stands open and “beings as a whole” to which Dasein comports itself, albeit forgetfully.

But a more profound perspective consists in working out the ground of the possibility of the twofold structure of Dasein’s “opening”, as a letting-be which conceals, for this structure itself is the expression of a more original – a grounding – structure, namely, that of truth-untruth, revealment-concealment, of Mystery, or of “Errancy”. With reference to SZ it is the explication of this more primordial structure, manifest *in* Dasein but nonetheless more essential¹⁵⁵ than Dasein, that is unique.

a. The Inner Possibility of Accordance. According to tradition, “truth” signifies basically the correspondence between an assertion and what is expressed by the assertion. When we say “the

coin is round”, the assertion is “true” on the condition that the coin is indeed round – that is, the coin lying on the table, the coin as it is external to and independent from any assertion about it. In section 2, Heidegger poses the seemingly inane question: how is it that two dissimilar things, namely, an assertion and what the assertion refers to (the coin), stand in correspondence with each other? It is suggested that if two things “correspond” they must, in some sense, be similar. But the assertion itself which asserts that the “coin is round” is all but similar to the spatially determined coin lying on the table.

With regard to section 2 of VWW, it is all too facile to overlook this inconspicuous notion of similarity or being-alike which is mentioned in paragraph 1. However, this should not be passed over, for Heidegger interprets the “essence”¹⁵⁶ of truth in terms of similarity – the similarity (that is, the bond) between Dasein, that is, Dasein’s “openness of comportment” (“Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens”) and the “openness of the open region” (“Offenheit des Offenen”) in which “what is open” (“das Offenbare”) shows itself. Indeed, it is in view of this that Heidegger begins by determining the notion of “correspondence” (“Angleichung”) as a sort of “relation” (“Beziehung”). An assertion (hence Dasein as comporting itself) *relates* to what is said in the assertion or to be specific and to use the given example (“the coin is round”), we may say that an assertion “represents” (“vorstellt”) what “presents itself” (“Das Vorgestellte”).¹⁵⁷ We observe first Heidegger’s determination of “representing”: “representing means here ... letting the thing stand over toward as an object.”¹⁵⁸ Clearly, the word “lassen” suffices to suggest that “representing” does not coincide with the “zustellendes” “Feststellen” or “Sicherstellen” so characteristic of metaphysical “Vorstellen” (cf. Part One, Chapter III). Rather, through representing, something already present is allowed to “stand toward” (“Entgegenstehen”) – which refers us, in anticipation, to the notion of Seinlassen.

Moreover, if we consider the relation between human representing and what is already present, we are given a sort of context – the context in which representing and that which presents itself stand toward each other. Heidegger, however, does not call this a context, but instead an “open region” (“ein Offenes”),¹⁵⁹

remarking that the essential feature of this “open region”, that is, its “openness” (“Offenheit”), is not first brought about by the fact that man is disposed to represent “but always only as a realm of relatedness is entered into and taken over”.¹⁶⁰ Thus, this “open region”, as a “Bezugsbereich” together with its “content”, must be pre-given, and in consequence more basic than “Angleichung” is the “relation” between Dasein as representing (as opened toward) and what presents itself within the open region.

But what, more specifically, about this human comporting vis-à-vis what presents itself within the open region? Heidegger writes: “All comportment is distinguished by the fact that it, standing in the open region, always holds fast to what presents itself as such.”¹⁶¹ The text is obviously speaking about an open (“offenständig”) comportment to that “Offenbare”, for the first sentence of the following paragraph reads: “Comportment stands open to beings.”¹⁶² And hence the expression “Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens”. But is all human comportment, or is comportment even for the most part “offenständig” according to VWW? We must reply in the negative. In a more profound sense, man’s “Offenständigkeit” toward beings in their specificness embraces, as SZ so pointedly emphasized, a “closedness” – in the words of VWW: “Beharren auf das Gangbare” in its “Gangbarkeit” – which is constitutive for what Heidegger in VWW calls “Insistenz”.¹⁶³ Or as VWW briefly states: “Letting-be is in itself at the same time concealing”, that is, in letting specific beings be, in revealing these, letting-be at once conceals “beings as a whole”. But this does not come to expression in section 2.

We have just suggested that Heidegger is taking exception to metaphysical Vorstellen – which is already in evidence in the first segment of section 2. This becomes even more lucid in the latter segment when it is maintained that “das vorstellende Aussagen” receives its “directive” (“Weisung”) and *only in that* it receives this directive can it “direct itself” (“richtet es sich,” p. 80) toward beings, toward “das Offenbare”. Moreover, only on such a ground (Dasein’s “sich richten”) can it be said that an assertion is “richtig”, correct or true.

Clearly, then, if this is sound, the notion of “correctness”

(“Richtigkeit”) in the present context is derivative of the “sich richten” of Dasein as comporting itself toward beings.¹⁶⁴ But does this not re-shift emphasis back to man – is not “truth” (or “correctness”) left to man’s private discretion? Does not man become the “standard” – which would surely be an inconsistency within this Philosophy?

In this connection, we observe that even if the correctness of assertion depends on the said “Offenständigkeit”, this latter is referred to that which presents itself of itself. Thus, if man is to become anything like a “standard” it is only by “letting himself be assigned”¹⁶⁵ a pre-given standard. “Open comportment must let itself be assigned this standard.”¹⁶⁶ Otherwise, it would scarcely be “opened”. And further: “open comportment must take over a pre-given standard for all presenting.”¹⁶⁷

At issue here is the manner in which “das Offenbare” becomes the standard, the pre-given standard for any assertion which includes the “Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens”. But notwithstanding, we seem to be back where we started from – placing the essential at man’s disposal. That which is manifest becomes the standard, but only presupposing the “Offenständigkeit” of human comportment. Is the manifest such *of itself* or does this Offenbare, in order to be as such, require human “Offenständigkeit”? Both, but an Aristotelian distinction may be apt – one which mostly remains tacit in Heidegger’s published writings, namely, the distinction between $\tau\eta\ \phi\acute{o}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ and $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$.¹⁶⁸ The relation in question involves the transition from beings which are present $\tau\eta\ \phi\acute{o}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ to beings as such $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$. How can that which presences¹⁶⁹ become the standard, that is, how can man let himself be referred to what is already manifest of itself, if the latter as such has not become “explicit” to him?¹⁷⁰

Thus prior to assertion and its “intentionality”¹⁷¹ and as a condition for the correctness of assertion, a prethematic manner of relation is established between Dasein’s open comportment and what presents itself as that toward which the former is opened.

b. The Ground of the Possibility of “Richtigkeit” (section 3). If the word “Richtigkeit” above simply referred to “correctness” of an assertion, then the third section would appear slightly redundant,

for section 2 has just shown that such “correctness” is grounded in an already given context, namely, Dasein’s standing open toward that which is open within the “open region” – all of which, with regard to assertion, is *pregiven*. But the word “Richtigkeit” in the above title does not refer to the correctness of assertion, but rather to the self-directing of Dasein toward beings. In section 3 (first paragraph) Heidegger intimates this in the expression “das sich freigegeben”, which is itself grounded in Dasein’s *Freisein*. Thus Heidegger concludes quite consistently: “The openness of comportment as the inner condition of the possibility of correctness is grounded in *Freiheit*.”¹⁷² The openness of comportment makes possible Dasein’s self-directing, which in its turn grounds the possibility of the correctness of assertion – all of which came to expression in section 2. However, as the above passage clarifies, openness of comportment itself is grounded in *Freiheit*.

But perplexity is compounded if we think of “*Freiheit*” as “Freedom” in any current sense. *Freiheit* as the “essence” of truth means Dasein’s opening¹⁷³ as that out of which a “*sich richten*”, a “*sich freigegeben*”, is first possible. Thus, the term “*Freiheit*”, as used in *VWW*, is quite analogous to the term “*Erschlossenheit überhaupt*” as it is worked out in *SZ* and which signifies Dasein’s basic structure as thrown projection. In the context of *VWW*, *Freiheit*, too, refers to Dasein’s opening, inclusive of Dasein’s being closed-off, called “*Insistenz*”. How is Dasein’s “opening” as the essence of truth to be defined more closely?

c. The Essence of Dasein’s Opening (Freiheit). Section 4 discusses Dasein’s opening as *Seinlassen*. But in paragraph 1, before mentioning Dasein’s letting-be, Heidegger states something which is decisive for the entire essay. In section 3 he had maintained that the essence of truth (*Aussage-Wahrheit*) resides in Dasein’s opening. However, it appears now that this human opening is, as the ground of “openness of comportment” and hence of “correctness”, “only because it receives its own essence from the more primordial essence of uniquely essential truth”.¹⁷⁴ Thus, the statement that “*the essence of truth is Dasein’s opening*”¹⁷⁵ is given a provisional character, for it too (Dasein’s

opening itself) is *grounded*. Heidegger even alludes to this provisional character in the sentence which directly follows the above saying in regard to the “more primordial essence”. Heidegger writes: “Opening was at first defined as opening for that which is open of an open region.”¹⁷⁶ But “at first” is not to say “ultimately” or *as* the most primordial notion of truth and therefore in pursuing the text we must attempt to disclose what Heidegger is referring to with the expression “das ursprünglichere Wesen”.¹⁷⁷ Heidegger, however, despite what one may prefer, does not rush headlong into the question about this more primordial essence of truth, but rather begins to specify the character of human opening.

Dasein’s opening, which “in each case” (“je”) grounds its open comportment toward beings, is more closely determined as a “letting-be” – an immensely ambiguous term in VWW.¹⁷⁸ Standing within the open region, Dasein lets beings be. But letting-be in the sense intended here does not make allusion to some style of passivity on the part of Dasein, nor to some sort of attitude of indifference.¹⁷⁹ Letting-be, says Heidegger, is to be understood as a “letting-oneself-in-with beings”.¹⁸⁰ Again, however, the text is hardly precise. Heidegger merely mentions that this “sich einlassen” steps back (“zurücktreten”) so that beings may make themselves manifest. Clearly then letting beings be as a “sich einlassen” which steps back cannot be likened to the “efficient cause” of that which is open. As already mentioned, that which is open is open of itself – but not necessarily to us. More precisely, the so-called letting-be as a stepping-back describes the process whereby that which is open or manifest of itself becomes explicitly so to us – means something to us, is recognized by us. Not only does Dasein in such a way let that which is manifest be – that is, explicitly, but in this very same process Dasein itself is “transposed” (“versetzt”) within the open region.¹⁸¹ This so-called “transposition”¹⁸² – an expression already met with and interpreted in Chapter I (Part One) – is the way to what Heidegger called authenticity in SZ, which becomes evident when Heidegger, in the same paragraph, calls this “versetzen” Dasein’s being-exposed, constitutive for “ek-sistence” as distinct from “in-sistence”.

Moreover, we suggest that what is foreshadowed here is *one*

version of Ereignis (to be treated in final chapter). Ereignis according to one of its versions (we will distinguish two versions) involves a proper relation between man and Being, such that Being comes into its own (ins Eigene) on the one hand and man is accorded what is proper to his essence on the other. In VWW, the initiation of Ereignis, in this sense, would refer to the *explicitation*¹⁸³ of “das Offenbare” as such which signifies at once the possibility of Dasein’s ek-sistent comportment, that is, Dasein, as exposed and open to the already manifest, is already outside itself.

But this, whatever interest it may bear, does not bring us nearer to what Heidegger calls the “more primordial essence”. In this direction, we must heed the following text: “the essence of human opening viewed from the point of view or in view of the essence of truth shows itself as the exposure in the revealedness of beings.”¹⁸⁴ We must notice that the phrase “Wesen der Wahrheit” does not refer to human opening but rather to the previously mentioned “more primordial essence”, which in this sentence is called the “revealedness of beings”. And we would do well not to regard the word “erblickte” as just another ordinary German expression of which Heidegger conveniently avails himself. The word is obviously Platonic (cf. Chapter II).¹⁸⁵ Thus, the passage in question says the following: the essence of human opening viewed from the perspective of the more primordial essence of truth,¹⁸⁶ that is, from the perspective of that which is *already* in view, signifies that Dasein, in order to be the Da of Sein, is already exposed within the “revealedness of beings”.

That the expression “the revealedness of beings” refers to the more primordial essence is again suggested in paragraph 7 but in the latter it is called “die Entbergung des Seienden”: “Human opening thus understood as the letting-be of beings fulfills and completes the essence of truth in the sense of the revealment of beings.”¹⁸⁷ And further: “. . . truth is the revealment of beings, through which an openness presences. In the latter’s open region all human comportment and its stance is exposed. For this reason, man is in the manner of ek-sistence.”¹⁸⁸

Up to this point, we have had the complex including Dasein as opening, as seinlassend toward the manifest within the open region and its openness. Does the term “revealment” merely

reiterate the same state of affairs? And if so why would Heidegger remark that it is through revelation that an openness presences or unfolds?¹⁸⁹ Is this not rather the in advance sighted essence of truth which Heidegger mentioned in paragraph 3 and which we have already understood as one expression of the “more primordial essence”? Do the two verbs “erfüllt” and “vollzieht” mean as much as “is mirrored”? Human opening as letting-be mirrors or embodies, as it were, the essence of truth in the sense of “Entbergung”. But we must determine whether this is borne out by the essay as a whole.

To our questions, paragraph 9 – which at first, in this respect, appears regressive – begins to clarify that letting-be is simultaneously a *not* letting-be (ein Nicht Sein-lassen) and hence Dasein’s opening is associated with a “closing”. Now if it is true that human opening defined as a letting-be mirrors a more primordial opening (namely, Entbergung) and if Seinlassen is simultaneously a not-letting-be, then it would seem to follow that a more primordial closing of sorts must be brought to light. And indeed, this is initiated in section 4, especially in paragraph 9.

We begin with a passage regarding not-letting-be: “Beings are then covered-up and disguised. Semblance comes to power. In it, the non-essence of truth comes to the forefront.”¹⁹⁰ Again we are faced with an immensely compressed text – and also with one which, if understood straightforwardly, must be called provisional, for the first sentence quoted above says that “beings are then covered-up and disguised” – that is, in consequence of Dasein’s not-letting-be. But in Chapter I (Part One) we pointed out that “Schein” is rooted in the “appearing” of *φύσις*, not in anything which may be called a human “nicht Seinlassen”. Of course, it will be retorted that VWW is earlier than EM. Nonetheless we must ask whether VWW bears out our suggestion that not-letting-be is *not* the origin of “Schein”. Is it not evident that “Schein” according to VWW must rather be rooted in concealment (or concealedness) as this is thought in VWW, in the so-called “untruth” or “non-essence” so essential to “truth”? This is not only borne out by the whole but clearly by the immediate sequel to the text quoted: “in ihr gelangt das Unwesen der Wahrheit zum Vorschein”. The “ihr” is a feminine dative and refers back to the term Freiheit used in the first sentence of

paragraph 9 (not to the subject of the previous sentence: “*der Schein*”). Surely, for how else would truth-untruth come to manifest itself if not in *Da-sein*? But we are not told what the non-essence is – we are only told that this non-essence “cannot first arise subsequent upon mere human incapacity and negligence”.¹⁹¹ Does this not sufficiently suggest that our suspicion above is solidly warranted? What Heidegger calls “*Semblance*” is not ultimately rooted in *Dasein*’s not-letting-be (nor in *Dasein*’s insistence) – but the possibility of these latter is itself to be searched out in the non-essence of truth (untruth proper).

But let us return to Heidegger’s saying that the non-essence of truth cannot simply be attributed to human incapacity. This is an extremely fundamental Heideggerian thesis, already brought out in *WM*,¹⁹² and which is maintained and emphasized throughout to the end. The so-called non-essence is, as it were, “*equi-primordial*” with essence. Both are determinations of Being – not of human ingenuity. That untruth may not simply be imputed to the human element is further accented when Heidegger writes: “Untruth must rather come out of truth.”¹⁹³ But in addition to its immediate intention, this passage expresses another fundamental idea of this Philosophy – already explicit, as we pointed out in *SZ*: what is stated is not the derivation of untruth from truth, but intended is rather an assertion as to the priority of truth, of unconcealment. Being, for Heidegger is, in the first place, unconcealment and only as such does it conceal itself.¹⁹⁴ (From the other end of the spectrum, that is, from *our* point of view, it is concealment which is the manifest.)

Moreover, the above passage, which for the first time in *VWW* asserts the total structure of truth-untruth, emphasizes that essence and non-essence “belong” inseparably “together”,¹⁹⁵ that is, are not related to each other indifferently. Hence, “truth” can no longer be conceived as that which is “wrested” from untruth, unconcealment that which has canceled concealment once and for all.¹⁹⁶ With the close of section 4 we have arrived at what Heidegger calls the “full essence of truth”,¹⁹⁷ that which has been sighted in advance¹⁹⁸ in the sketching of the structure of human opening. We must read sections 5–7 in the attempt of bringing this prior structure to light.

d. The Essence of Truth (section 5). Thus far, Heidegger has made allusion to a “more primordial truth” – that is, not merely more primordial than Aussage-Wahrheit, but also more primordial than human opening. In section 4 this was called “Entbergung” to which intimately belongs a more primordial notion of “untruth” (or “Verbergung”, which term is however not employed in section 4). Section 5, which consists of only two paragraphs, continues this reflection on the “full essence of truth”, but alters somewhat the terminology. “Entbergung des Seienden” is now termed “die Offenbarkeit” and the notion of “Verbergung” (or “Verborgenheit”) comes to explicitation.

Concerning the notion of “openedness” (“Offenbarkeit”) – which accords to human opening its essence, that is, its possibility of being, as open compartment toward that which is manifest, the ground of Aussage-Wahrheit – Heidegger suggests that this openedness “prevails” (“waltet”, p. 88) *in any case*. What should this mean “in any case”, an expression which we ourselves introduce? Heidegger names two situations: (1) a first in which beings are not very familiar to man and scarcely “known” in a scientific manner: (2) and a second situation – a modern technological situation – in which the familiar and the known have become “unübersehbar”,¹⁹⁹ a situation in which nothing can withstand the “business of knowing”, the business of “objectifying thought”. In both situations openedness “prevails”, but differently.²⁰⁰ Within the second situation, where “the technological (technical) mastery over things bears itself without limit”,²⁰¹ openedness seems to amount to “nothing” (“Das Nichts”, p. 88); that is to say, within the context of this second situation openedness as such remains concealed.

This segment of section 5 (paragraph 1), which could be called the earliest text on technology, makes explicit a fundamental thesis of Heidegger – one already outlined in Chapter III, Part Two. The technological (scientific) unconcealment of beings is concomitant with the concealment of Being (“Offenbarkeit” as “Nichts” in our present context). Moreover, the process was introduced as early as WM according to which “das Nichts”, in repelling away from itself toward beings, makes these all the more manifest (grants this possibility) but at the same time conceals itself.

However, this first paragraph of section 5 is very misleading, for it is not the case that “openedness” is, as it were, driven away in that “technological mastery” dominates. In this regard, we must notice how Heidegger in paragraph 1 states that human opening “has already tuned in all comportment to beings as a whole”.²⁰² But we already know that this “abstimmen” on the part of human opening cannot be the last word – which Heidegger then makes amply clear in paragraph 2 in which it is maintained that human opening is always already “thoroughly attuned” (“durchstimmt”, p. 88) by “openedness”. Yet this again raises a question: if this is so, why would something like situation two dominate – why would the “openedness” (for the most part) be equivalent to Nothing? Heidegger, as early as VWW, has only one reply: openedness is at the same time concealment, that is, Being is Nothing. In other words, when it is said that human opening is “thoroughly attuned” by openedness, we must understand that to embrace concealment. “Offenbarkeit” as such remains of itself concealed.

In paragraph 2 this is even elucidated. Speaking of openedness as that which thoroughly attunes, Heidegger notices that from the point of view of “everydayness” (he says “everyday calculations and preoccupations”)²⁰³ openedness as “das Durchstimmende” is an abstract, irrelevant state of affairs.²⁰⁴ That is to say, in the context of “alltägliches Rechnen”, openedness is the concealing of beings as a whole: “That which attunes, however, is not nothing whatsoever, but a concealment of beings as a whole.”²⁰⁵ Again we encounter the full structure of the essence of truth: openedness-concealment. And since openedness itself is that which attunes (das Stimmende) or that which thoroughly attunes, concealment, that is, the concealment of openedness as such, cannot be understood “vom Seienden her” (in this case, exclusively or primarily vom Dasein her).

However, and we must not shy away, the last segment (last three sentences) of section 5 seem to protest vigorously against what has just been stated – which was surely said in accord with the text. Heidegger writes:

Precisely in that letting-be, in particular comportments, lets in each case, beings be to which it relates itself, thereby revealing beings, it conceals beings as a whole. Letting-be is

in itself at the same time a concealing. In the ek-sistent opening of Dasein, the concealment of beings as a whole comes to pass, is concealedness.²⁰⁶

On the one hand, this is all very consistent: letting-beings-be reveals beings but it thus brings about the concealment of beings *as a whole*.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, the passage under consideration clearly contrasts the letting-be of “je das Seiende” with “das Seiende im Ganzen” which latter then gets concealed by the former. Moreover, the first two words (“Gerade indem”) are to be given their full force. Thus letting-be of “je das Seiende” is in itself at the same time concealing of beings as a whole. And the last sentence concludes that concealment *comes to pass* in Dasein’s ek-sistent opening. But the words “come to pass” (“sich ereignet”) is more to the point (as distinguished from “Gerade indem”), for it means as much as “is mirrored in”, “is expressed in”. As we will show, on the basis of VWW, the most that may be said is that concealment is reflected in Dasein’s opening, *not grounded therein*. It is clearly the “Gerade indem” and what is implied by it that is bothersome. This is why Heidegger himself noted the segment in question in a manner to be discussed in the following section.

e. Untruth as Concealment. We begin section 6 by heeding a note found in the Gesamtausgabe edition of VWW which relates to the transition from section 5 to 6. Heidegger writes: “Between sections 5 and 6 the leap in the turn which comes to presence within Ereignis.”²⁰⁸ Does this remark have its support in the text itself or is it simply based on a momentary enthusiasm on Heidegger’s part? We believe that the note is quite exact, or to be more precise, we assert that what Heidegger here calls “Die Kehre” is indeed in evidence in the transition from section 5 to 6, that is, especially in the last few sentences of section 5 and in the first paragraph of section 6.

In the concluding sentences of sections 5 it was maintained that the letting-be of individual beings is accompanied by the concealment of beings as a whole. Indeed, as we have stressed in concluding Section d, it is as if human letting-be were the fundamental reason (“Gerade indem”) for concealment. But we suggested that this view obviously stands in need of re-interpretation – which is the task of section 6.

Section 6 accomplishes this by first asserting that the “concealment of beings as a whole, untruth proper, is older than every openedness of this or that being”.²⁰⁹ And Heidegger adds: “It (concealedness or untruth) is also older than letting-be itself which in revealing already holds concealed and comports itself toward concealment.”²¹⁰ These two sentences correct the ending of section 5 which clearly intimated that the letting-be of “je das Seiende” entails the concealment of beings as a whole. If the concealment of beings as a whole is “older” than the “openedness of this or that being”, then clearly letting-be of “je das Seiende” could not bring about “concealment”. After all, concealment is “älter” – hence prior to what Heidegger now calls, *employing the word differently*, “die Offenbarkeit”.²¹¹

The second sentence quoted above reiterates the first but in doing so alludes to two crucial expressions: “It (concealedness or untruth) is also older than letting-be which in revealing already holds concealed and comports itself toward concealment.” We observe how cautious the latter portion of this assertion reads as compared with the concluding sentences of section 5. Letting-be as revealing beings (in any manner whatsoever) “holds concealed”. To hold concealed does not say simply: to conceal, but rather suggests that what is held concealed is already of itself concealed – which must be the case if concealment is indeed “älter”²¹² than any species of Seinlassen. Moreover, human letting-be in revealing “comports itself toward concealment”, that is, is always already and unwittingly related to concealment or as WM speaks: “Dasein means: being-retained in Nothing.”²¹³ hence, the expression “Verbergung des Verborgenen” (or “Geheimnis”) which is clearly tautological if it is true that “das erstlich Verborgene” (p. 89) is indeed concealment itself. As far as human letting-be is concerned what remains concealed to it is concealment itself – that is, concealment as the ground of its peculiar Seinlassen; especially of its feature of “Insistenz”. Again the need of referring to WM is irresistible. It is the “nothing” which refers us to beings – which is to say (perhaps in an exaggerated manner) that the “turning-away” from nothing is itself instigated by “nothing”.

But that letting-be unawares comports itself toward concealment precludes the very precondition for the possibility of what

Heidegger calls “Die Kehre” – which in a slightly later context may be expressed as follows: in relating to beings (even if in the manner of metaphysical “Vorstellen”), man is always already bound to Being itself (even if as concealment, Untruth, or Unwesen). Heidegger himself says in the SVG: “. . . as soon as beings as such in their Being appear, the shine of Being itself is in play – concomitant with this appearing of beings.”²¹⁴ This passage itself is to be understood within the thick of traditional Metaphysics, that is, in the context of the representing of “beings as such”. Even here Being itself (as absent) is in play – otherwise, anything resembling the “other Inception” has no ground to stand on. It holds true throughout Heidegger’s unified, if tortuous, Denkweg that man’s only access to Being is through beings and this is why the manner of comportment toward beings is so decisive.²¹⁵ We may then conclude the first segment of section 6. Concealment – mystery for man – must be a self-concealment and thus prior to any human letting-be whatsoever – which term “prior” should not suggest that concealment exists somewhere in isolation in order then to descend, manifesting itself in Dasein’s Seinlassen and Nicht-Seinlassen. The remainder of section 6 shores up, unquestionably, the interpretation just presented, as we will briefly illustrate.

We just noticed that “letting-be” comports itself toward concealment. But what sustains this bond between letting-be and concealment? Heidegger himself poses the question and replies as follows:

Nothing less than the concealment of the concealed as a whole, of beings as such, that is, the Mystery²¹⁶

Hence, again the distance (not the rupture) between VWW and SZ (at least with regard to what is explicit) is unmistakable. At each turn, Heidegger is quick to correct a possible impression: in general that Seinlassen as a letting-be and a not-letting-be *is its own ground*. As far as VWW is concerned, the sustaining ground is called Mystery, concealment, or revealment (or in section 7, “Die Irre”). Thus, man’s so-called “residence in the readily available”,²¹⁷ Dasein’s “Umtrieben an das Seiende”,²¹⁸ of which both VWW and WM speak, directs us back to mystery (or as WM calls it “Das Nichts”). “In that mystery denies itself in

and for oblivion, it leaves historical man standing in the context of the readily available...²¹⁹ This hardly says that historical man turns away from Geheimnis, but inversely, it is mystery which refuses its presence. Thus, the first segment of the above passage refers to Being's "keeping to itself", its ownmost self-conservation in oblivion (*λήθη*). This is likewise suggested by a preceding statement. Heidegger remarks that Being's *λήθη* bestows "on the apparent disappearance of what is forgotten" ("das Gewesene", not "das Vergangene") a "presence" ("Gegenwart") which is proper to it; a concealed presence.²²⁰ Again we meet with an event in which oblivion becomes manifest in Dasein's forgetfulness.

f. Untruth as Errancy. In section 7, Heidegger specifies somewhat Dasein's insistenz – Dasein's being in the untruth as SZ had it. As insistent, Dasein is engulfed in the most "readily available beings" – Dasein is caught up in the dictates of the "market". But man, says Heidegger, insists only by being already ek-sistent, an assertion which echoes SZ: "But only insofar as Dasein is open, is it also closed."²²¹ Man is constantly (for the most part) turned-toward available beings which brings with it, so it seems, a turning-away from mystery. But this Zu and Weg-turning has its ground in²²² a "turning to and fro proper to Dasein". Heidegger calls this "das Irren", still descriptive of what was called in SZ "Das Aufgehen im Man" (or more specifically "Neugier") – or more generally Dasein's constant falling. But are we restricted to Dasein's fundamental, most basic constitution, that is, is "die Irre" (not Dasein's "Irren") simply another word for "fallenness"? This may seem to be a correct perspective, for Heidegger states unequivocally that "Errancy belongs to the inner constitution of Dasein".²²³ However, the appropriate viewpoint is suggested by the last sentence of paragraph 2. Here "die Irre" signifies the very same thing as the "concealment of beings as a whole" which is concurrent with the disclosure of specific beings; hence with Dasein's letting-be of "je das Seiende". We should heed Heidegger's exact words:

The concealment of concealed beings as a whole prevails in the revealment of specific beings which as forgetfulness of concealment becomes Errancy.²²⁴

Once again, we notice the correlation between the concealment of beings as a whole and the revealment of specific beings.²²⁵ However, a striking difference in formulation comes to the fore, for it is not said, as it had been previously, that letting-be of “je das Seiende” at the same time conceals beings as a whole. Indeed, *this very possibility is excluded*. It is excluded by the contention that human “erring” (human error) is grounded in errancy,²²⁶ which the remainder of section 7 stresses. Errancy holds sway, that is, holds itself concealed amidst the revealment of specific beings. Hence, man is dominated by “errancy” and is therefore led astray. Errancy, as understood by section 7, signifies a concealed clearing²²⁷ or place of illumination (analogous to Heidegger’s notion of Nichts or Lichtung) – that within which Dasein as ek-sistent, “insists”. Heidegger calls it “das Offene” (p. 92) or the “open place” (“die offene Stätte”, p. 92), that which provides access to beings and thus grounds the possibility of Dasein’s letting-be but which itself recedes into the background. Thus, errancy is the ground of human error in being the concealed “open place” for beings.

However, even here in VWW – and not for the first time²²⁸ – Heidegger makes his characteristic allusion to what he will later call the saving, the possibility of “*this turn*”. In “leading astray”, errancy at once grants man the possibility of *experiencing* errancy itself.²²⁹ That is to say, as other passages bring out: what is needed is to experience (in contrast to any calculative thinking) concealment *as* concealment.

In closing we may return to the question of the “full” essence of primordial truth – which is expressed variously in VWW. Certainly this is not human Freiheit, but rather the latter’s source of possibility: truth-untruth, revealment-concealment, mystery or errancy. According to VWW, the essence of truth is Being in its unconcealment (inclusive of its ownmost concealment), which however holds sway, that is, only comes to make itself manifest in Dasein’s twofold Seinlassen, or in the structure ek-sistence-insistence.

3. Truth-Untruth according to “*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*”

In view of exhibiting the notion of Being as Geschick, the essay on the origin of the work of art²³⁰ will prove instructive. It may

be said that in “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” the structure characteristic of *Geschick* makes itself manifest in the notion of “truth” as “unconcealment” which itself is to be understood as the intimate union of “illumination” (“Lichtung”) and “concealment”. And it is this union called the “primal contention” (“*Urstreit*”) which comes to appearance in and is the “origin” of the work of art as the reciprocity of “world”-“earth”.²³¹ We begin with the traditional notion of truth as this is commented upon in “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” and then briefly the essence of truth, that is, the original bond between illumination and concealment will be discussed.²³²

In the essay *VWW* we noticed how Heidegger relates the conception of “directionality”, which is itself presupposed for the “correctness” of assertion, to the “*Offenständigkeit*” of human comportment and how this, in its turn, was determined as *Dasein*’s “opening” – an “opening” which is ultimately grounded in *Entbergung-Verbergung* or in the “mystery”. A similar path is taken in “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” with one significant difference: the way from “*Richtigkeit*” leads *directly* to the “full” structure of truth which in this work is called unconcealment (illumination-concealment, truth-untruth). That is, Heidegger does not elaborate on the structure of *Dasein*²³³ – on *Dasein*’s *Freiheit* as the revealing letting-be of beings which is at the same time a not-letting-be. Rather the essay in question affirms straightaway, as it were: “Illumination (which provides or is the clearing) . . . is in itself at the same time concealment.”²³⁴ Quite definitely, this is not a description of *Dasein*’s most primordial constitution, *Dasein*’s openness-closedness, or *Dasein*’s being-in-the-truth-untruth equiprimordially – the here stated “*zugleich*”. Nor is Heidegger referring to the structure of *Dasein*’s *Seinlassen* as expatiated upon (perhaps to excess) in *VWW*. What speaks in the above formulation from “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” is the structure of unconcealment – Being’s unconcealment as that which shines through in the unconcealment of beings. But before we take more cautious account of this, we should briefly examine Heidegger’s treatment of the traditional notion of truth.

Traditionally, that is, metaphysically, truth, that is, a true proposition, has been understood in terms of its “directionality”²³⁵ or its “intending” of what is already unconcealed. This

manner of formulation which coincides with that of “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” (pp. 40–41) already suggests the link between a proposition and the unconcealed “Worüber” of that proposition. Thus, in our very assertion of the traditional notion of truth as “adequatio”, we are already presupposing that which is unconcealed – or more generally the unconcealment of beings. But from the perspective of “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” this is highly insufficient, even though “correct”, for it is not we who pre-suppose truth as unconcealment, but rather it is we who are already pre-positing, that is, “exposed” (“Ausgesetzt”) within unconcealment. We cite the crucial passage at length:

But it is not we who presuppose the unconcealment of beings, but the unconcealment of beings transposes us in one such essence that we are sub-positing with regard to unconcealment when it comes to our representing. Not only must that be unconcealed in whose direction a mode of knowing directs itself but also the entire realm within which this directing moves must, as a whole, run its course in the unconcealed and we could not even presuppose, if it were not the case that something is already open toward which we direct ourselves; that is to say, if the unconcealment of beings had not already exposed us within that which is lighted in which all beings stand-in, and out of which they draw themselves back.²³⁶

The saying according to which we are “sub-positing” (“nachgesetzt”) in regard to unconcealment reiterates what Heidegger’s Plato-interpretation (for one) already made explicit – *ιδέιν* rightly understood is always subordinated to the *ιδέα*. But now it is not only a question of a pre-giveness, but also of a “within which” which is more clearly accented in the Reclam edition in which Heidegger, in the first sentence of the passage cited above, inserted the word “eingesetzt”.²³⁷ That is, the expression “unconcealment of beings” is here ambiguous. On the one hand, reference is made to beings which are unconcealed and on the other to that in virtue of which or that in which this is possible. This is the only way we are able to discern how Heidegger could speak of the “toward-which” (“wonach”) of a knowing proposition (“Erkenntnis”) and at the same time of that in which we are already exposed (or the mentioned “Bereich”).

Moreover, it is not inconsequential to explicate how the text de-emphasizes the role of man with regard to truth in general – in contrast to SZ and even to VWV. Indeed SZ tells us as “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” that “it is not we who pre-suppose ‘truth’; but it is ‘truth’ that makes it at all possible ontologically for us to be able to be such that we ‘presuppose’ anything at all”.²³⁸ And yet the meaning of this statement from SZ and the similar passage cited above from “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” is altogether distinct. In the above passage from SZ, Heidegger is simply referring to Dasein’s openness (its “truth”) as that which enables it to “presuppose” in the first place. We recall how, according to SZ, any theoretical stance whatsoever is thought to be grounded in Dasein’s primordial “interpretation”, that is, in Dasein’s “primary understanding”. Furthermore, as distinguished from VWV, it is no longer Dasein’s Seinlassen of beings which is emphasized but instead, in keeping with “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, if anything lets beings be, it is “unconcealment” (or illumination) in whose lightedness all beings “stand in”, and out of which they draw themselves back. Hence, any unconcealment of *beings*, according to “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, presupposes²³⁹ unconcealment or illumination as a sort of self-illuminated place, wherein beings appear.²⁴⁰ But this self-illuminated clearing in which beings are able to show themselves is “at the same time”²⁴¹ “concealment” – something like a “Nothing”.²⁴² How should this notion of “Nichts” or concealment be viewed?

All along we have accented that concealment is a fundamental feature of Being, Being’s ownmost way to be within tradition. We have mentioned often enough that Being as self-concealing conceals itself in that it provides an open space for beings – a manner of determining Being which reaches back to WM. In this regard, the essay “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” could be very confusing, that is, if we do not hold apart concealment, which is illumination or unconcealment, but to us seems like “Nothing”, and the manner in which concealment *holds sway*, namely, as “refusal” (“Verweigerung”)²⁴³ which terminus in this essay embraces “sich versagen” and “verstellen”. Now concealment which is at once illumination (the “primal contention”) is not both (versagen and verstellen) in one or the other form, but

rather the ground of the possibility for either – a considerable difference. Or to put it otherwise, illumination-concealment manifests itself as concealing in the way of “sich versagen” or “verstellen” – and presumably in numerous other modes. This is why Heidegger speaks of truth-untruth or of the “primal contention”²⁴⁴ as a “happening”, that is, its coming to pass as particularized for us.²⁴⁵ The latter (that is, the specific showing) as “Streit” is grounded in “Urstreit” (truth-untruth, illumination-concealment). It is this “primal contention” which is crucial, for it is this which lets “art” let the work be in that it (the “primal contention”) “happens”, that is, is mirrored in the relationship “world”-“earth” constitutive for the work-being of the work of art. The work of art is able to realize and to express “truth” in virtue of the latter itself as “primal contention”.

In this sense, we must re-think the statements which introduce sections 2 and 3 of the essay. At the outset of section 2, Heidegger says that “the origin of the work of art is art”²⁴⁶ and beginning section 3: “the origin of the work of art and of the artist is art”.²⁴⁷ But what is art as origin? That which mediates (lets happen) truth, understood as Urstreit, in the work.²⁴⁸ Thus, art is a mode of “letting-appear” (“Erscheinen Lassen”),²⁴⁹ of *τέχνη* in its original and most comprehensive sense – and as such is given over to the truth of Being. The *Ur*-sprung of art itself is the *Ur*-streit.

B. THE SELF-REVEALING SELF-CONCEALING OF BEING ITSELF

Having observed the twofold structure of Being in SZ, VWW, and in “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, we will now turn our attention to texts²⁵⁰ dating from 1938 in which Being as *Geschick* is thought.²⁵¹ The following introductory remarks may prove helpful.

In Heidegger’s published writings, there is no “treatise” devoted to the concept of “*Geschick*”, which state of affairs is hardly eclatant, for if this were otherwise, it would run contrary to a fundamental thesis regarding the character of Being as such. Being, for Heidegger, never simply *is* and thus may never be

elaborated upon in the manner of some object immediately given for description. Being only gives itself or accords itself, that is, Being is not in separation from its own embodiment at any given time.²⁵² Hence, the most we can do is to attend to this manifestation, which, as insistently brought out, instances Being's presence in absence, Being's "incalculable fullness", as SF remarks.²⁵³ Or we may focus attention on the whole, as it were, in abstraction from the details pertinent to the distinct specifications of beingness. To some extent the first alternative has already been accomplished (Part One). But does Heidegger himself ever attempt to view things more generally – does he ever concentrate on that which prevails throughout tradition? Clearly so, and two remarkable illustrations of this are the essays "Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus" (1944–46) and the work the SVG (1956). It is owing to their comprehensiveness that we will select these two writings as focal points.

A second introductory comment concerns linguistic expression. In our present context and dating from cir. 1936, Heidegger frequently employs two expressions, namely, "Geschichte des Seins" and "Geschick des Seins". These are meant synonymously, which, however, compels us to regard the genitive of the expression "Geschichte des Seins" as active (as a gen. subiectivus) – as the "Geschichte" which belongs to the manner of Being in its ownmost self-sending. More appropriately, the term "Geschichte" in the later Heidegger names that of "thought" or "thinking" (Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens) which is, as Heidegger remarks in BH,²⁵⁴ in "Die Frage nach der Technik",²⁵⁵ and repeatedly in the SVG,²⁵⁶ rooted in Geschick.

The clarification of the notion of Being as its own self-sending should afford us a second and new perspective from which the Heideggerian reflections on technology may be elucidated. As already suggested (rather emphatically) the phenomenon of technology does not exhaust itself as the "End" of a metaphysical tradition which "represents" beings, thus setting up its own tribunal for the "Being of beings". Technology, in its "essence", belongs just as well to Being as Geschick. Or to express the two perspectives by employing Heidegger's terminology: in Parts One and Two we have approached technology, for the most

part, “vom Seienden her”. Now it remains to consider technology “vom Sein her” – more precisely, out of Being as its own self-sending (as “das Ankommende”) which expression means as much as Being as “die Lichtung des Sichverbergenden”. In the context of tradition, the self-sending of Being is that which Heidegger, in “Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik” (N II), terms the historic “progression” (“Fortgang”) of Being²⁵⁷ – albeit as beingness, Being’s concealed manifestness.

1. “*Die Seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus*”

a. *The Determination of Nihilism or Metaphysics.* In his essay “Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus”, Heidegger investigates the “essence” of Nihilism, that is, it is of importance to view Nihilism “vom Sein her”,²⁵⁸ not merely to define it “in terms of beings”. At the outset, Heidegger poses the question of whether or not Nietzsche was ever really in a position to experience Nihilism in order then to set about “overcoming” this “most uncanny” of guests. But in the questioning itself, it is “assumed” (“unterstellt”) that Nihilism concerns “beings as such” and hence that nihilism would signify that there is nothing doing with beings²⁵⁹ (the nihil des Seienden). Yet it is undeniable that Nietzsche, from an Heideggerian angle, busied himself most penetratingly with beings; so much so that Heidegger resumes Nietzsche’s “most fundamental experience” (“Grunderfahrung”) as follows:

Beings (for Nietzsche) are beings as the Will to Power in the manner of the Eternal Return of the Same.²⁶⁰

Nietzsche, together with the entire tradition, inquires about “beings as such” – and in consequence this thinking would with little justification be designated as nihilistic, presupposing that the “Nihil” is that of beings. But, in spite of Nietzsche’s (and the tradition’s) preoccupation with beings, the Metaphysics of the Will to Power is nonetheless, for Heidegger, throughout nihilistic and thus entirely impotent to “overcome” nihilism. Indeed, as Heidegger states here, Nietzsche’s Philosophy is not only nihilistic, but is the very “consummation of authentic nihilism”.²⁶¹ Heidegger’s verdict is yet more severe: Nietzsche’s thought represents the “ultimate entanglement in nihilism”²⁶² –

and this even if Nietzsche was mindful of “beings as such”. More to the point: it is *for this very reason* that Nietzsche’s thought is nihilistic. For to “think” beings, that is, to represent “beings as such”, is equivalent to not heeding Being as Being, which not-heeding at this stage in the essay is determinative for “authentic Nihilism”.²⁶³ Therefore, it is manifest that the initial (the current) representation of nihilism, following which “fundamentally it is nothing (doing) with beings as such”,²⁶⁴ is inadequate. Essential nihilism, that is, nihilism conceived of “vom Sein her”, is precisely this preoccupation with beings whereby Being itself, as Heidegger will say, “remains aloof” (“ausbleibt”).

But again we are faced with a viewpoint which seems Heideggerian and yet is not. Again, it is as if the metaphysical “to do” with beings entails Being’s neglect – and hence Being “remains aloof”. We have always emphasized the inverse: it is Being’s “Ausbleiben” or “Entzug” which gives, as it were, the preoccupation with beings as such. Thus, when Heidegger in the present essay and in “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’”²⁶⁵ asserts that essential nihilism consists in the event “that it is nothing (doing) with Being”, we must understand this to say, not that “thought” refuses to follow Being, but rather and primarily the “es ist mit dem Sein nichts” refers to Being’s ownmost *sich Nichten*, Being’s self-concealing.

How does Heidegger go about re-evaluating his initial determination of “authentic” or “essential” nihilism, which, as we say, can be misleading, for one is misled if one stops short. He begins with the assertion that, although Nietzsche’s *Metaphysics of the Will to Power* incarnates the consummation of nihilism, it by no means constitutes the “ground of authentic nihilism as such”.²⁶⁶ Heidegger does not inform us forthwith of this “ground”, but does point to the confines within which it is to be sought. Authentic nihilism, in its historic coming to be, “must already prevail, even if unconsummated, in the *Essence* of the precedent *Metaphysics*”.²⁶⁷ But where, more exactly, within the context of *Metaphysics*? Heidegger’s reply is concise:

*Metaphysics as Metaphysics is the authentic Nihilismus.*²⁶⁸

Or again:

... the *Metaphysics of Plato* is no less nihilistic than that of Nietzsche.²⁶⁹

How should this obtain – how is it that the entire tradition is to be branded as authentic nihilism, surely for many an odious thesis; seemingly just another teutonic extravaganza? Heidegger’s first answer, as is often the case, is not his final consideration: it is on account of the metaphysical manner of questioning that Metaphysics throughout is nihilistic. The “Leitfrage” of Metaphysics – what is “das Seiende”²⁷⁰ – wards off any consideration of the “Grundfrage”.

Already the question of Metaphysics does not attain to Being itself.²⁷¹

Again Heidegger notes:

Does Metaphysics think Being itself? No and never. It rather thinks beings with respect to their Being . . . Being as such is not that which is questioned. Hence, Being itself, within the context of Metaphysics, remains unthought.²⁷²

For the present, we must leave open the question of whether or not Metaphysics has thought (and perhaps quite significantly) Being itself. Instead, and in view of our more immediate purpose, we will ask about the last sentence of the above passage – or more precisely we must ask why Being remains “unthought” in Metaphysics, if indeed this be the case.

b. The “Remaining Aloof” of Being Itself. Thus far, our question seems to admit of a ready reply: that Being remains unthought within Metaphysics as a whole must result from the metaphysical manner of questioning; traditional *Vorstellen* is not equal to its ownmost task. But even though this seems entirely “correct”, it expresses a mere consequence. That Being itself, from the very start of Metaphysics, remains unheeded is not primarily to be charged to metaphysical thinking. Rather, Being itself gives itself as that which “remains aloof”, is as “withdrawal”. Heidegger remarks:

If this be the case, then the “remaining aloof” would not originate with a manner of thinking which omits something.²⁷³

Or again in a text whose final section runs parallel to the present essay, namely, in “Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’”:

Then it would lie with the essence of Being itself that it remains unthought – because Being itself withdraws itself. Being withdraws itself in its truth. It shelters itself, as it were, in the latter (its truth) and conceals itself in such a sheltering.²⁷⁴

It is Being itself which accords itself as “remaining aloof” – which determination of Being must now be considered more closely. In this regard, Heidegger introduces the significant notion of “unconcealment”. We may begin with the following passage:

In the meantime, however, it has become clear that Being itself presences as unconcealment in which beings come to presence.²⁷⁵

We have already (in Chapter III, Part Two) called attention to the crucial distinction: unconcealment of beings and unconcealment of Being. The latter is said in the above words “Being itself presences as unconcealment”. But this unconcealing of Being itself (Being’s presencing) provides the possibility of the Unconcealment of beings (Gen. obiectivus) – provides that “in which beings come to presence”. The word “inzwischen” (“in the meantime”) refers us back to preceding passages (pp. 351ff) which urge what we have already seen, namely, that Being itself is the very “same” as unconcealment, that as “revelment” Being itself presences as that of and for beings.²⁷⁶ Now as Heidegger has already stressed, Being itself “remains aloof”, which is to say, if Being and unconcealment are indeed the “same”, that Being’s unconcealment is at once concealedness.

To the extent that in unconcealment its own “un” with respect to itself remains away – remains along with the concealedness of Being, the remaining aloof shows the character of concealment.²⁷⁷

This is, no doubt, a rather curious manner of suggesting that Being’s unconcealment is at the same time concealment. Nevertheless, we observe anew the most fundamental structure of Being as *Geschick*; a structure which is retained by the Notion of Being as *Ereignis*. And, it bears reiteration that this concealment – or as Heidegger also says here, this “*Sichentziehen*”²⁷⁸ of Being

– is Being’s manner or presence²⁷⁹ in tradition, not as itself but as beingness or as the Being of beings.²⁸⁰

c. “*Inauthentic Nihilism*”. Thus far, we have ascertained that “nihilism” signifies essentially Being’s Ausbleiben or its Entzug and that this does not occur as man fails to turn himself sufficiently toward Being (however true this may be in the second place). Heidegger re-emphasizes this point as follows:

The essence of nihilism is not at all the (exclusive) affair of man, but that of Being itself and therefore indeed an affair of the essence of man – and only in this sequence, at once, an affair of man: and presumably not merely one among many.²⁸¹

The “sequence” noted here is not merely peculiar to our present essay on nihilism, but remains constant throughout Heidegger’s “later” Philosophy. Man in his “essence” is *apportioned* a relation to nihilism which Heidegger calls “Auslassen” and which is determinative for “inauthentic Nihilism”. According to the text, the word “inauthentic” means that the “authentic”, i.e. Being as of itself remaining aloof, is “omitted” by metaphysical thinking. This omission does not constitute authentic nihilism, but rather is its complement. “. . . Being itself remains aloof and in remaining aloof leaves metaphysical thinking to its own kind, that is, to omit this remaining aloof as such.”²⁸²

Moreover – and this is also a crucial point which will be emphasized and maintained – even an “overcoming” of this “Auslassen” is impossible for man *on his own*; that is, such an “overcoming” is only possible in “that in advance Being itself, in unmediated fashion, exacts of the essence of man to experience for once the remaining aloof of the unconcealment of Being as such as the arrival of Being itself. . .”²⁸³ It is not only Being itself, the self-preserving *Gewesenes*, which of itself withdraws, but it is equally Being which must initiate its own coming, its own arrival. From the years 1936 onward, it is clear that Heidegger’s determination of Being, in order to be adequate to a “recovery” of the Metaphysics of subjectivity, must display Being in its self-determination – which however is not to impose a sort of

“dualism” into the Heideggerian Philosophy²⁸⁴ but rather intends to assert a priority.

2. *The Principle of the Ground and Being's Self-Sending*

The lecture-course *Der Satz vom Grund* spells out two formulations of Being's *Geschick*, the first of which reiterates that manner of expression already found in earlier writings.²⁸⁵

Being sends itself to us but in such a way that it at the same time already in its essence withdraws.²⁸⁶

We will discuss this formulation in union with Heidegger's interpretation of the Leibnizian principle of the sufficient Ground.²⁸⁷

But we must notice a second formulation which defines *Geschick*:

Being sends itself to man in that it, lighting itself, cedes a *Zeit-Spiel-Raum* for beings as such.²⁸⁸

Clearly, the two formulations intend to express the same state of affairs, with however a shift in accent. For the first tends to emphasize Being's withdrawal or refusal, while the second stresses Being's “recovering” function – Being, as that which lights itself (and as such conceals itself), cedes a place for the appearing of beings as such. However, the expression “*das Seiende als solches*” names indisputably the very subject matter of “Metaphysics”, which leads us to think that the so-called “*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*” signifies not merely this or that “clearing” for beings – but more fundamentally Metaphysics itself. The latter is the context in which Being gives itself, but as or through “*das Seiende*”.²⁸⁹ Metaphysics is that which is grounded in Being as Being.

a. *The First Formulation*

Being sends itself to us in such a way that it at the same time already in its essence withdraws.

But how does Being “send itself” to us?²⁹⁰ As we have already brought out: in manifold fashions, epitomized in the terms “*Das*

Seiende als solches" or "Seiendheit". In the SVG, Heidegger discusses this peculiar manner of Being's self-giving in connection with an "assertion" ("Aussage") standing in the center of tradition, namely, the principle according to which all beings have their sufficient ground or nothing is without its ground. Surely, it is here a question of beings, which, considered with Leibniz, interrogates the ultimate ground of beings in general. "Nothing is without its ground" – the assertion read in this manner is referred to as the "first key" ("erste Tonart") of the principle of the Ground.

However, perhaps if we read this "assertion" differently, it will be suggestive of something else. Perhaps, the negatively expressed assertion about beings will transform itself into a "saying" about Being; that is, declares Heidegger, if we heed the formulation as follows: "Nichts ist ohne Grund", which is designated as the "second key". It may be instructive at this point to ask about Heidegger's language regarding the second key.

The Principle of the Ground heard in its second key is a "saying about Being" ("Sagen vom Sein")²⁹¹ or as Heidegger frequently says a "Satz vom Sein".²⁹² At one point, he employs the expression "Sage".²⁹³ The word "Satz" is ambiguous, for it not only refers to the sentence (to the "Grundsatz": Nichts ist ohne Grund) but also to "Satz" in the sense of "Sprung".²⁹⁴ Indeed, it is the second signification which is here the more fundamental. Thus, the principle of the ground heard in its second key signals a "Satz vom Sein", that is, a "Sprung" from "Being", in its traditional meanings to Being as "Ab-grund". To hear the principle of the ground in its second key prepares the "Schritt zurück".

As for the expression "Sagen vom Sein" and "Sage", it should be noted that Heidegger employs this term ("Sagen") in the sense of "erscheinen lassen", "sehen lassen".²⁹⁵ But just as we must distinguish between λόγος (λέγειν) and human λέγειν, so "die Sage" must be distinguished from human Sagen, for the latter as a mode of Entsprechen is as a response to die Sage, that is, to Being's self-showing.

What does the principle of the Ground say, heard in accord with the second key? What is the sense of the so-called "period of incubation" of which the SVG speaks? Regarded as an "asser-

tion”, the period of incubation of the principle adverts to the long time-span (“seit je”, says Heidegger) in which man, without expressly tending to it, stood in the wake of the principle of the ground and its thematization by Leibniz. However, what is meant by this incubation period, if we listen to the principle in its second key, viz., as a “saying” about Being itself? In this case, the period of incubation is not interpreted as a time-span of implicitness, but now signifies “an epoche during which Being as Being withdraws itself”²⁹⁶ – thus Being’s withdrawal *such that* the principle of the ground could only be heard in its “first key”. And yet, we know that, for Heidegger, within tradition in general there can be no complete veiling of Being by Being. Rather, the latter, in its withdrawal or self-concealing, makes itself manifest.²⁹⁷ As Heidegger states in the text, wherever and whenever beings are in focus, as obtains with respect to the principle in question according to its traditional signification, the “trans-appearing” of Being is, simultaneously, at play.²⁹⁸ At play, however, as *Geschick*, that is, predominately as withdrawal “in virtue of which there is the incubation period of the principle of the ground”.²⁹⁹

We may surmise that the so-called “incubation period” terminates with Leibniz’s explicit formulation of the principle and hence that the “Entzug” would be overcome. However, this assumption is, for Heidegger, gratuitous, for with the explicitation of the principle of the sufficient ground, the “sleep” of Being does not cease but instead becomes all the more profound. With the formulation of the principle of the ground, Being as the Being of beings appears as “Objectivity” of objects,³⁰⁰ which, on Heidegger’s view, means nothing other than the coming forth of a new epoch of withdrawal peculiar to modernity. Heidegger calls it the epoche of the “deepest sleep”, the epoch³⁰¹ in which the most extreme retreat of Being onsets, Being according itself in its own illumination as self-concealment.

b. The Second Formulation. According to the second formulation cited above, Being as *Geschick* lights itself, thus providing a *Zeit-Spiel-Raum* for the appearing of beings. As mentioned earlier, this second formulation accents the notion of Being as the condition of the possibility of “recovery” and less directly (but

nonetheless) the event of concealing. This is obvious, for in order that “beings” appear in any manner whatsoever, a “place” for this appearing must already be given, or concomitantly given. However, it is the *source* of this giving which is crucial. As the text says: Being lights itself. Now it is tempting – and it would even be consistent with other texts – to identify this self-lighting of Being with the illuminated clearing itself for beings and then to proceed to interpret the passages in question as simply expressive of the “ontological difference”. Furthermore, a yet greater temptation ensues, namely, to interpret the “ontological difference” as a simple declaration about the distinction between Being and beings – without however heeding the difference *as* difference, that is, *not* merely as the difference between Being and beings, but as the difference (a third element as it were) which grounds the possibility of the union between Being *and* beings,³⁰² the difference as difference which grants the possibility of the distinction between the two, while at the same time providing for their unity (occasionally called the “Austrag”). In other words, the second formulation of *Geschick* bears on the fundamental Heideggerian endeavor of “*Verwindung*”, if Being comes to light as “*Ab-grund*”, as a sustaining, albeit groundless ground.³⁰³ Thus, the second formulation of *Geschick* joins the frequently recurring passage of the SVG: “*Sein und Grund: das Selbe*”.³⁰⁴ This does not merely say that Being and ground, although distinct, belong together, but more: Being and ground (or more precisely Being *as* Ground understood traditionally) belong together out of a third, namely, Being as “*Ab-grund*”. In closing the Lecture-course, Heidegger hints at this as follows:

Being as grounding has no ground, but rather plays as groundless ground that game, which as *Geschick*, passes on to us Being and Ground.³⁰⁵

It is not difficult to discern that the passage equivocates on the word “*Sein*”. We must return to this Heideggerian attempt to ground tradition (from Parmenides onward) in our final chapter. For the moment, it suffices to have displayed the structure of Being as *Geschick* in order from this perspective to interrogate the *essence* of technology.

C. CONCLUSION: A NOTE ON THE TIME OF BEING

It is only now that we are prepared to survey the notion of the time of Being in texts subsequent to SZ – that is, it is only on the basis of our treatment of Being's *Geschick* that the notion of Being's temporality may be elucidated. Indeed, the two sets of expressions³⁰⁶ which recur throughout Heidegger's writings and which characterize Being as *Geschick* correspond (even if roughly) to Being as “Das Kommende” or “Ankommende” (“Ankunft”), that is, to Being as futural *and* to Being as “das Gewesene”, which we interpret as the self-gathering accord.³⁰⁷ As far as the later texts are concerned, the temporality of Being may be expressed in the following manner: as a constant arriving out of “das Gewesene”.³⁰⁸ Does this suggest that “Das Gewesene” has taken on priority – which, if accurate, would seem to reverse the structure of temporality in SZ – or is it more exact to assert that the structure presented in SZ has been retained? The latter option seems to us the more precise: in SZ and in later texts it is the futural dimension which is primary, that is, in both contexts it is the futural feature which temporalizes the “past”. On Heidegger's account neither *Dasein* nor Being itself would have a “past”, barring their essential futurity. We may recall how SZ insists that *Dasein*'s “having been”, “in a certain way”, issues from the future. That is, if the “having been” is given, this is only possible on the ground of *Dasein*'s (futural) projecting, *Dasein* as temporalizing the future. In fact, in line with SZ, and from an “ontological” viewpoint, the “having been” of *Dasein* is the already temporalized future.

Analogously, according to later texts, Being presences, that is, temporalizes³⁰⁹ or sends itself, thus constituting itself as *Ankunft*, as essentially futural, an arriving which is a “coming toward us” (“auf uns zukommen”). But this is also to temporalize itself as “das Ge-wesene”. Would $\varphi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ have given way, in a certain fashion, to $\dot{\iota}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\alpha$, unless it had projected itself, had sent itself as “Erscheinen”? But in this manner, $\varphi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ as *having projected* itself becomes “das Ge-wesene” out of which it then arrives. The same may be said of all the, by now somewhat notorious, “Epochen” of Being. Being as self-revealing (arriving) temporalizes its own “Gewesenes”, which expression, generally

but essentially, coincides with the sense of “concealment”.³¹⁰ Being as presencing so as to arrive, in diversified modi, is *as* self-gathering accord.

What about the essay “Zeit und Sein”? Does not this essay sharply distinguish between Being as *Geschick* and Time, which twofold then “belongs together” in *Ereignis*? But if we take a second look, it becomes clear that the just stated is all too conceptual – the “understanding”³¹¹ is all too much at work here. According to “Zeit und Sein”, time is not distinct from “Being”, but rather expresses Being (*Geschick*) as temporalizing itself, as *Reichen*, as a reaching us as the “*nähernde Nähe*” which arrives in order to enrich us.³¹² If this is an adequate interpretation of the three concepts discussed in “Zeit und Sein”, namely and in this order, Being-Time-Ereignis, then the title is as it should be: Time (Being in its temporalizing *Reichen*) and Being (as *Ereignis*).

NOTES

1. With regard to this concept in the Philosophy of Heidegger, the process of leveling has already begun. It consists essentially in the assertion that the occurrence of “withdrawal” (“concealment”) is merely *for* “reflection”, that which is to be thought “evades” thought; total reflection is impossible – and hence the origin of the notion of concealment.

2. This is lucid from the event that the “essence of language” (“*Wesen der Sprache*”), as remarked in “Hegel und die Griechen”, p. 271, is anchored in the prevailing rule of *ἀλήθεια*, of Being as self-unconcealing. This is another manner of affirming (cf. “*Das Wesen der Sprache*”) that the “*Wesen der Sprache*” is to be the “*Sprache des Wesens*” (Gen. *subiectivus*). Moreover, it is only on this fundament that we may begin to plumb the Heideggerian statements that “*die Sprache*” (in its “essence” as “*die Sage*”, the *λόγος* which “lets appear” and *bewegt*) “keeps to itself”. Somewhat earlier and on numerous occasions Heidegger had thought this (*das An Sich Halten*) as a fundamental feature of *Geschick*. All is, however, seriously twisted when we consider “*Sprache*” as human *Sprechen* and this as most essentially “*Ausdruck*”.

3. Concerning the relation *Geschick* – *Geschichte*, cf. below.

4. Cf. J.J. Kockelmans, “Heidegger on Time and Being”, *Martin Heidegger: in Europe and America* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 65. We agree entirely with Kockelmans’ words: “When the meaning of Being lets a determinate signification of Being become the standard signification, then it “groundlessly” bars other significations and even itself *as* the ground of the manifold possible other significations. It is in this sense that Being shows and

hides itself at the same time. . . .” Thus the various “determinate significations”, which we refer to as modes of *Seiendheit* (cf. Note 6 below), amount to Being’s manner of concealment.

5. We may note here that the “Entzug” of Being is also Being’s “arrival” (“Ankunft” or “Ankommen”) as “das Gewesene”.

6. We notice in passing that Heidegger refers to all metaphysical determinations of the “Being of beings” as *Seiendheit*. Concerning the Platonic *idéa* as *Seiendheit*, cf. “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”, p. 84; N II, pp. 23, 217, 225, 235, 254, 410; *Was ist das – die Philosophie* (Pfullingen: G. Neske, 1956), p. 15; Aristotle (*ἐνέργεια*) and *Seiendheit*, cf. N I, p. 601; “Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις”, p. 323; N II, pp. 15, 213, 228, 410; “Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung”, p. 179; Actualitas as *Seiendheit*, cf. N II, p. 416; Descartes (*Vorgestelltheit*), cf. N II, pp. 162, 164–66, 169, 171, 181; Kant and *Seiendheit*, cf. N II, pp. 231, 232, 298; Hegel, cf. N II, p. 299; “Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung”, pp. 122, 136, 169, 171, 172, 180; Nietzsche’s Will to Power as an expression of the *Seiendheit* of beings, cf. Chapter IV, Part I, Note 3; Leibniz, cf. N II, pp. 238, 438, 441, 442. Expressions such as *Subjektivität*, *Subjektivität*, *Wirklichkeit*, *Wille*, and *Gegenständigkeit* likewise name, albeit more comprehensively, specifications of *Seiendheit*. This should suffice to suggest that the word “*Seiendheit*” is not “merely” Heidegger’s translation of Aristotle’s *οὐσία*.

7. Thus, there is little wonder that Heidegger in numerous texts tends to use the words *Seiendheit* and *Anwesenheit* in a synonymous sense.

8. The notion of “surplus” is most appropriate with regard to Heidegger’s determination of Being and may be interpreted from various perspectives of the Heideggerian Philosophy as a whole. We confine ourselves to the most general (and we believe the most essential) determination of Being as *Geschick* – or to the relation between Being itself and beingness (the Being of beings) within tradition. In relation to any traditional specification, Being itself, as showing itself, is *excessive*, as it were, and hence concealing – given and yet not given. The word itself (“surplus”, “excess”) is reminiscent of Husserl; more precisely, Husserl’s notion of “categorical intuition” to which Heidegger significantly refers. In this regard, cf. the valuable contribution of J. Taminaux, “Remarques sur Heidegger et les Recherches logiques de Husserl”, *Le Regard et L’Excédent* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 156ff.

9. Heidegger employs the word “*Geschick*” in SZ itself – but in a sense not to be confounded with its subsequent usage.

10. Instead of “erschlossen” – “sich entbergen”, “sich lichten”, etc., and instead of “verschlossen”, Being’s “sich verbergen”, “an sich Halten”, “verweigern”, etc.

11. F. Von Herrmann tested this thesis in his work *Die Selbstinterpretation Martin Heideggers* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1964). More recently, however, Von Herrmann has emphasized the “mit thematisch sein” of Being in general in the frame of the Existential Analytic. Cf., for example, *Subjekt und Dasein* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1974), p. 72. This emphasis on the co-thematization of “*Sein überhaupt*” or of the “*Erschlossenheit*” of Being stands in opposition to a series of publications, esp. the work of

G. Brand, *Die Lebenswelt. Eine Philosophie des konkreten Apriori*, esp. pp. 118–37. Also W. Schulz, “Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort M. Heideggers”, *Heidegger. Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werkes* (Köln: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1969), pp. 95ff, according to which SZ represents the last work of the Philosophy of Subjectivity. Cf. also E. Tugendhat, *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976), pp. 90–91, Note 14. Here Tugendhat suggests that the discourse on Being in the later Heidegger is an “Erweiterung” of what had already been found in SZ, namely, that Being means primarily “Erschlossenheit”.

12. It seems to us that SZ is an illustration of what Heidegger calls in subsequent texts (analysed in Chapter I, Part One) *τέχνη*. This is not merely to say that *τέχνη* is another version of fundamental concepts central to SZ, but rather that the Analytic of Dasein is made possible not merely by that “Vorblick” of the “idea of existence” but by that of “Being in general”.

13. Cf. SZ, p. 313: “Woher nimmt sie (namely the Idea of Existence) ihr Recht?”

14. SZ, p. 313: “Ist nicht alles schon, wengleich dämmerig, erhellt durch das Licht der ‘vorausgesetzten’ Existenzidee?”

15. “Presupposed” (“vorausgesetzt”), not in the sense of setting up a supreme principle from which “propositions” would be deduced, but in the sense of “primary understanding” which may unfold in interpretation; perhaps even thematically.

16. Cf. E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1967), p. 364. Gerd Haefner, for his part, bluntly states the above’s extreme antithesis: “Das Dasein ist vor allem Anfang an vom ‘Sein’ her definiert.” Cf. *Heideggers Begriff der Metaphysik* (München: Beckmanskolleg Verlag, 1974), p. 18.

17. To speculate as to the more precise character of this “idea of Being” would be somewhat difficult, for SZ only offers – and only could have offered – suggestive remarks. It would be equally difficult to determine the mode of relation between the “idea of Being” and the analysis of Dasein. Is this to be understood in a Platonic-Hegelian sense? But we feel justified in asserting that the stage of questioning reached by 1936 is, at the very most, only implicit in SZ.

18. With regard to the meaning of “Dasein” in the questioning of Being, cf. John Sallis, “Where does ‘Being and Time’ begin”, *Heidegger’s Existential Analytic* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), esp. section 4, pp. 36ff.

19. To which applies the corresponding terms “Entdecktheit” – “Verborgenheit”. Cf. SZ, pp. 222–23.

20. Concerning Dasein’s “Lichtung”, not Being’s, cf. p. 133. Also GA II, 26, where Heidegger explains the meaning of “Dasein”.

21. Cf. SZ, p. 222.

22. In SZ, p. 133, Heidegger expresses this as follows: “*Das Dasein ist seine Erschlossenheit.*”

23. This comes out in Heidegger’s first sketch of attunement, for as attuned Dasein tends mostly to “avoid” itself or to “flee” before itself. And understanding, which as projecting, i.e. transcending itself in drawing its possibilities from

the "besorgte Welt", from the world of publicness (for the most part), reveals Dasein, once more, as in the manner of falling.

24. Analogous to Being's self-revealing which embraces, at once, a self-concealing; or as unconcealment is already concealment.

25. SZ, p. 167: "Erschlossenheit des Man".

26. SZ, p. 173: "Erschlossenheit des alltäglichen Daseins".

27. Our manner of formulating the relation *Erschlossenheit* and *Verschlossenheit* is less abstract than, for instance, characterizing *Erschlossenheit* as the all-embracing structure under which *Erschlossenheit* and *Verschlossenheit* may be subsumed. Even a later Heideggerian manner of expression seems more appropriate: *Erschlossenheit* ist zugleich *Verschlossenheit*.

28. Translations of "Befindlichkeit" in English vary: "state of mind", "Ontological disposition", "mood", "attunement" and "affectivity", to name the most frequent.

29. Cf. Husserl's notion of "straightforward acts", the lived as distinct from the "reflected".

30. In § 29, Heidegger uses three expressions: "Befindlichkeit", "Stimmung", and "Gestimmtheit".

31. Or as E. Tugendhat remarks: Attunement is already Dasein's "response" to being-thrown. Cf. *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1967), p. 312.

32. Even if inextricable from "Verstehen" (hence from "existence").

33. In SZ, Heidegger uses the word "ontological" in two basic senses: (1) as that which pertains to Dasein's Being, and (2) "ontological" in the sense of "theoretical", thematic, explicitly interpreted. Ontic likewise is used in two senses: (1) in the sense pertaining to "beings" regardless of their Being and (2) the ontic to designate something like the "lived."

34. Indisputably, one of the fundamental theses of § 29 concerns precisely attunement's primordiality in contrast to the fragmenting "certainty" of "reflection".

35. "Gleichursprünglich", which means not only equally primary or basic, but also (which follows) underivable from one another.

36. The "Daß es ist und zu sein hat". The "has to be" is more accurately understood as: has it to be.

37. SZ, p. 134: "Das pure 'daß es ist' zeigt sich, das Woher und Wohin bleiben im Dunkel."

38. Cf. SZ, p. 136.

39. An instructive example is Heidegger's Logik Lecture course. Cf. GA, 21.

40. Cf. SZ, p. 136. Heidegger uses the word "vor".

41. "Vor" with regard to Dasein's Being – *πρότερον τῆ φύσει* and not chronologically.

42. Jean Beaufret has forcefully and lucidly expressed this. Speaking of Heidegger's notion of Dasein as "Existenz", Beaufret remarks: "Rien n'est plus

loin de la classique création de soi par soi..." Cf. "Heidegger et le problème de la Vérité", *Introduction aux Philosophies de l'Existence* (Paris: Editions Denoel, 1971), p. 136. An English translation by F.A. Elliston is available in *Heidegger's Existential Analytic*, pp. 197ff.

43. SZ, p. 129: "Zunächst ist das Dasein Man und zumeist bleibt es so." And even more emphatically at a later stage of the "analytic". Having arrived at the pre-eminent expression of Dasein's "Eigentlichkeit", namely, at "resolute openness" ("Entschlossenheit"), Heidegger remarks: "Das Dasein ist je schon und demnächst vielleicht wieder in der Unentschlossenheit." Cf. SZ, p. 299.

44. Heidegger even goes much further: even Dasein's very manner of being-attuned is prescribed by the "they". Cf. p. 170: "Das Man zeichnet die Befindlichkeit vor, es bestimmt, was man und wie man "sieht"."

45. SZ, p. 135: "Im Ausweichen selbst ist das Da erschlossene."

46. In § 40 (on Angst) Heidegger explains this more fully. Cf. pp. 184–85.

47. We notice that in § 29 itself, when summarizing the three principal theses set forth regarding attunement, Heidegger confirms: "Die existenziale Verfassung dieses Ausweichens wird am Phänomen des Verfallens deutlich werden." Cf. SZ, p. 139; also p. 184.

48. In general but not exclusively the same may be said of the first part of SZ (to § 45) – as Heidegger himself points out. Cf. p. 233.

49. Dasein's fleeing in the face of the self, in the face of its ownmost Being-possible, is tantamount to the flight *from* "Unheimlichkeit" – its "not being at home" in individualizing "Angst" – *to* the "at homeness" provided by "publicness", the context of Das Man. Cf. esp. § 40, p. 189. Cf. also p. 192.

50. SZ, p. 135: "Diese Abkehr ist, was sie ist, immer in der Weise der Befindlichkeit."

51. This is why Heidegger uses the words "modify", "modification". Any modification involves the whole – that is, nothing constitutive of Dasein's Being may be thrust to the side or excluded. The possibility of existing authentically, e.g. does not exclude the possibility of inauthenticity, but rather modifies it.

52. This reminds us of Hegel's worthy distinction between "Verstehen" and "Vernunft" – and G. Marcel who, under the influence of Hegel and especially of Bradley, attempts to work out an analogous distinction, namely, that between primary and secondary reflection, the former sundering, while the latter reunifies.

53. Both of which are possible derivatives of primary understanding.

54. Cf. H.G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1965), p. 245.

55. SZ, p. 143: "Dasein ist je das, was es sein kann und wie es seine Möglichkeit ist."

56. Cf. SZ, p. 145: "... als geworfenes ist das Dasein in die Seinsart des Entwerfens geworfen."

57. In a sense, Dasein as factual understanding, as its own Seinkönnen, exists as what it is *not*: "das, was es (Dasein) in seinem Seinkönnen *noch nicht* ist, *ist* es existenzial". Cf. SZ, p. 145. This is why, at least partially, Heidegger will call Dasein "Das Sein des Grundes". In the same way, J.-P. Sartre defines

Dasein (or “consciousness”): “it is what it is not and is not what it is.” That is, Dasein is not merely and solely its facticity (it is not what it is) but is likewise to be understood as “transcendence” (it is what it is not). Cf. J.-P. Sartre, *L'Être et le Néant* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1943), pp. 33, 97, 115ff. Cf. also K. Hartmann, *Sartre's Ontology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 61ff.

58. Language here in any case is misleading, for it distinguishes Entwerfen and that upon which is projected (the possibility) – as if the possibility were given at first and then Dasein decides to move in its direction. Thus, language converts the possible into the “vorhanden”.

59. Cf. SZ, p. 146: “Das Verstehen *kann* sich primär in die Erschlossenheit der Welt legen, d.h. das Dasein kann sich zunächst und zumeist aus seiner Welt verstehen. Oder aber das Verstehen wirft sich primär in das Worumwillen, d.h. das Dasein existiert als es selbst. Das Verstehen ist entweder eigentliches, aus dem Selbst als solchem entspringendes, oder uneigentliches.” Cf. also p. 221.

60. Curiously enough, M. Stassen, in his book *Heideggers Philosophie der Sprache in 'Sein und Zeit'* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1973), p. 119, appeals to the text cited above (Note 59) as testimony of Heidegger's so-called “subjectivism”: “Es mag genügen zu vermerken, daß Heideggers Subjektivismus hier seine unseres Erachtens klarste Formulierung erfährt: ‘das Verstehen ist entweder eigentliches, aus dem eigenem Selbst als solches entspringendes oder uneigentliches.’” Thereupon, Stassen writes: “Der Ursprung des uneigentlichen Verstehens ist das Subjekt, der Grund des uneigentlichen Verstehens der Welt.” But how arbitrary it is to identify Dasein and Subject, for one such identification misapprehends entirely Heidegger's analysis of attunement, primary understanding and Rede, that is, misapprehends their relation to cognition in general.

61. In this passage, p. 144: “... kann es (Dasein) sich verlaufen und verkennen.”

62. Which possibilities have already been sketched in advance by the fashion “things” have been “interpreted”. Hence the word “its” written by us in quotation marks, for the possibilities in question are precisely *not* those of Dasein *itself* but dictated in advance by the “they-self”.

63. The inappropriateness of this term “Rede” (usually translated with “Discourse”) has already been pointed out, for such an expression tends to obscure the prelinguistic character of “Rede”. Cf. G. Nicholson, “The Meaning of the Word ‘Being’”, *Heidegger's Existential Analytic* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), esp. pp. 182–83.

64. Cf. Paul Ricoeur, “The Task of Hermeneutics”, *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 154–55. Paul Ricoeur reminds us that SZ is “so little a Philosophy of Language ... Language, in the period of *Being and Time*, remains a second level of articulation...”

65. Following “Aufzeigen” and “Prädikation”. Cf. SZ, § 33. Also GA II, 21, Logik, pp. 127ff.

66. SZ, p. 161: “(Rede) liegt ... der Auslegung und Aussage schon zugrunde.” Cf. also p. 160: “Das existenzial-ontologische Fundament der Sprache ist die Rede.”

67. Cf. GA II, 21, p. 134: "Die grundsätzliche Bewegung: nicht von Sprache zur Rede, sondern von Rede zur Sprache."

68. SZ, p. 167: "Die Rede spricht sich zumeist aus und hat sich schon immer ausgesprochen. Sie ist Sprache." Cf. also pp. 161, 272, 349.

69. In division 2, Heidegger affirms more than once that Rede need not come to utterance. Cf. p. 271. Cf. also I. Bock, *Heideggers Sprachdenken* (Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain, 1966), p. 17. The author clearly acknowledges the distinction Rede-Sprache, but also contends that in Heidegger there is not a "sprachfreier Begriff der Rede". However, concerning the possibility of authenticity, it is precisely such a mode of Rede which is imperative – as division 2, chapter 2, of SZ clarifies.

70. Jan Aler has done well to point to this more explicitly. Cf. his interesting article, "Heidegger's Conception of Language in Being and Time", *On Being and Language* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 49ff.

71. SZ, p. 370: "Zumeist bedeutet: die Weise, in der das Dasein nicht immer, aber 'in der Regel' sich für Jedermann zeigt."

72. The relation between Sprache and Rede may be likened to that between *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*. The *ἰδέα* shows itself in *εἶδος* but as "obfuscated". In analogous manner, Rede, that is, the Logos of Dasein's openness in general, shines through in "Sprache" – even if this is filtered in the expressedness of publicness.

73. Cf. SZ, p. 349: "Die volle ... Erschlossenheit des Da erhält durch die Rede die Artikulation."

74. Some have translated the German "Rede" with Logos and on our view this has its justification. Recall Heidegger's treatment of the "Logos" in § 7 in which he translates Logos as Rede, as a primary *δηλοῦν*, which grounds the possibility of derivatory signification. Cf. also p. 159.

75. Especially the modifications of Rede, Understanding, and interpretation, viz., Gerede, Neugier, and Zweideutigkeit, will not be discussed systematically.

76. Cf. especially § 40. On p. 185 Heidegger formulates succinctly: "Im Verfallen kehrt sich das Dasein von ihm selbst ab."

77. Cf. SZ, p. 144: "... hat das Dasein sich je schon verlaufen und verkannt."

78. SZ, p. 175: "Das Dasein ist von ihm selbst als eigentlichem Selbstseinkönnen zunächst immer schon abgefallen und an die 'Welt' verfallen."

79. In § 40, p. 184, Heidegger even employs the word "privation".

80. In a sense this ontical being-closed-off is Dasein's very access to itself – existential-ontologically. Cf. p. 185: "Die existenziell-ontische Abkehr gibt ontologisch das Wovor der Flucht als solches zu fassen." But the "Wovor" of fleeing is the self in its authentic possibility for Being in the world.

81. Cf. SZ, p. 181: "Das Selbst aber ist zunächst und zumeist uneigentlich, das Man-selbst. Das In-der-Welt-sein ist immer schon verfallen."

82. Cf. § 38, pp. 175ff. Also pp. 231, 256, 424.

83. Cf. pp. 15, 21, 22, 58, 120, 141, 239, 270, 321, 337, 387.

84. Cf. SZ, p. 16.

85. SZ, p. 194: "Das verstehende Sichentwerfen des Daseins ist als

faktisches je schon bei einer entdeckten Welt. Aus dieser nimmt es – und zunächst gemäß der Ausgelegtheit des Man – seine Möglichkeiten.”

86. Cf. pp. 167ff. In the context of SZ, for the most part language is Idle talk. It is not incidental that Heidegger, at the beginning of § 35 (Gerede), writes: “Die Rede spricht sich zumeist aus und hat sich schon immer ausgesprochen. Sie ist Sprache.”

87. In division 1, the term “primordially” means “most basic”, and hence “underived”, “a priori”.

88. Cf. SZ, p. 232: “Die bisherige Interpretation beschränkt sich, ansetzend bei der durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit, auf die Analytik des indifferenten bzw. uneigentlichen Existierens.”

89. That the first division is oriented toward Dasein’s “inauthenticity” becomes especially obvious with chapter 4, in which Heidegger clarifies that the “who” of Dasein is the “they-self.”

90. Of course, this does not obtain when Heidegger begins to explicate the theme of “temporality”, for it is Dasein’s temporalizing which “makes possible” the unity (Einheit) of the always already unified Care-structure.

91. This is even generally so when Heidegger begins to speak of the “Ganzheit” (pp. 181ff).

92. Whether authentically or evasively.

93. Cf. § 48.

94. This is also discussed in § 48.

95. We believe that the word “zum” (toward) is, for the most essential part, inept, for Death, if meant ontologically, is not something that is approached – but what Dasein already *is and has to be*. More appropriate would be the translation Being-as-death, i.e. Dasein’s Being-as-dying, understood as projecting. The expression Being-unto-death, like Being-toward-death, conceals the same misunderstanding. However, we will retain the usual translation, noticing that when the word “toward” is employed it is the *Vorweg-sein* which is emphasized, not some *prægiven* “to which”.

96. Heidegger himself sees that the term “Bevorstand” is scarcely an improvement over the term “Ausstand”. He points out, for instance, that something ready-to-hand (the remodeling of a house, p. 250) or present-at-hand (a “storm”, p. 250) may stand before Dasein. But Death, existentially understood, does not stand before . . . Rather, Dasein always stands before Death, that is, comports itself toward Death.

97. Cf. SZ, pp. 248, 251, 261, 263.

98. Cf. James Demske, *Being, Man and Death* (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 1970), pp. 26, 31.

99. To accent, as Heidegger on occasion does and most secondary studies do, Death as the possibility of the impossibility of existing is misplaced. Indeed, this tends to completely misapprehend “death” understood existentially. Surely Heidegger is not concerned with the impossibility of existing, but rather with Dasein as *Seinkönnen*, as existing. Some have even connected the “schlechthinige Unmöglichkeit” of Dasein in death with Dasein’s “schlechthinige Verschlossenheit”. On our view, this represents a twofold misunderstanding, a

first regarding "death" itself and a second regarding the notion of "Verschlossenheit". According to SZ, Dasein, that is, existing Dasein, can only be verschlossen as erschlossenes – not as dead. Concerning the view just mentioned, cf. F. Von Herrmann, "Zeitlichkeit des Daseins und Zeit des Seins", *Subjekt und Dasein* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1974), p. 85.

100. This is set out in § 50 and 52.

101. We borrow this apt expression "standard self" from the article of E.G. Ballard, "On the Pattern of Phenomenological Method", *Martin Heidegger: in Europe and America* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 187.

102. From the denial of this would issue the thesis that Dasein is simply "vorhanden".

103. As far as Heidegger's Death-analysis is concerned, the expression "Für-wahr-halten" intends the pre-thematical comportment toward death as distinguished from any theoretizing about Death's certitude. Nietzsche's own notion of "Für-wahr-halten" is to be understood in relation to the notion of the whole of Being as Becoming, as "Chaos". Since this is so, "certitude" is merely a useful "belief", a "Für-wahr-halten". Hence, "truth", which would presuppose a static reality, is a "lie". Heidegger discusses this notion of "truth" as "belief" in N I, pp. 508ff, 535ff.

104. Authentic Being toward death "advances" toward its Death, while the "they-self", as is characteristic, misapprehending the Being of Dasein as a "Vorhandenes", regards Death as something which is "certain".

105. SZ, pp. 251–52: "Dasein stirbt faktisch, solange es existiert, aber zunächst und zumeist in der Weise des Verfallens." We notice how this assertion supports our interpretation of death as Dasein's most far-reaching possibility.

106. Cf. SZ, p. 69: "Das Eigentümliche des zunächst Zuhandenen ist es, in seiner Zuhandenheit sich gleichsam zurückzuziehen, um eigentlich zuhänden zu sein."

107. We recall that it is in the context of Heidegger's world-analysis, and precisely in reference to the transition from Zuhandenes to Vorhandenes, that the hermeneutical "as" is made explicit for the first time in SZ.

108. This, of course, is not the only sense of this term "vorhanden". More often, it is used in its broader sense equivalent to traditional "Existencia", the subsistence of the "thing" in general.

109. SZ, p. 253: "Die öffentliche Daseinsauslegung sagt: 'man stirbt', weil damit jeder andere und man selbst sich einreden kann: je nicht gerade ich; denn dieses Man is das *Niemand*."

110. SZ, p. 253: "Das Man besorgt dergestalt eine ständige Beruhigung über den Tod."

111. This is the only way in which we could justify construing "Sein-Bei" in SZ as Dasein's "Being-open-for" as Biemel interprets it in his article "Heidegger's Concept of Dasein", *Heidegger's Existential Analytic* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), pp. 122–23. It would correspond much more accurately to SZ to say that Sein-bei is tantamount to Dasein's Closedness which, as pointed out above, modifies Dasein's openness. Concerning the rapport

between Sein-bei and Verfallen, cf. SZ, pp. 164, 175, 192, 250, 277, 311, 317, 328, 337, 422.

112. SZ, p. 222: "... nur sofern Dasein erschlossen ist, ist es auch verschlossen." Or as VWW speaks: "Aber er insistiert nur als der schon existente" (p. 91).

113. SZ, p. 259: "Uneigentlichkeit hat mögliche Eigentlichkeit zum Grunde."

114. Cf. p. 119: "Furcht ist an die 'Welt' verfallene, uneigentliche und ihr selbst als solche verborgene Angst." The very same may be said of the relationship between "authenticity" and "inauthenticity" or between Dasein's openness and closedness. We may not give way to the temptation of conceptually juxtaposing these features – nor, however, of reducing one to the other.

115. Cf. SZ, p. 135: "Im Ausweichen selbst *ist* das Da erschlossene."

116. SZ, p. 255: "... man stirbt auch einmal, aber vorläufig noch nicht."

117. SZ, p. 261: "Im Sein zum Tode ... muß die *Möglichkeit* ungeschwächt als *Möglichkeit* verstanden, als *Möglichkeit* ausgebildet und im Verhalten zu ihr als *Möglichkeit ausgehalten* werden."

118. Cf. SZ, p. 262ff: "Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit". We will follow Demske in his translation of "Vorlaufen" with "advancing". We find that the English "anticipation", the more usual translation, resounds too statically. It is not a question of anticipating something, but of comporting the self as Seinkönnen.

119. In Part Two of this writing, we emphasized how crucial it is to view the "danger" as "danger". Similarly, with regard to our present context: Dasein as the they-self must be made manifest to itself. Without hesitation, we would call this the hermeneutical "as" – the primordial "as" of "interpretation" as distinct from the apophantical "as". In this regard, we must guard against understanding the "as", the explicitness attached to interpretation as one which has already shifted us to the theoretical plane. The explicitness of interpretation is not the same as that possible for thematization.

120. SZ, p. 263: "Dasein kann nur dann eigentlich es selbst sein, wenn es sich von ihm selbst her ermöglicht."

121. Cf. SZ, pp. 297–98.

122. Cf. SZ, p. 264: "... jede Versteifung auf die je erreichte Existenz."

123. "... je erreichte Existenz" is equivalent to the factual.

124. SZ, p. 266: "phantastische Zumutung".

125. The two senses of the "ontical" mentioned earlier (Note 33) are clearly in evidence in the Death-analysis. In § 49, for instance, Heidegger distinguished an existential analysis of death, that is, one grounded in "existentiality", in the Care-structure of Dasein, and thereupon various ontical perspectives. Ontically, death is considered as "demise" ("Ableben"), not as a manner in which Dasein comports itself toward itself. But this meaning of the ontical has little to do with the ontical in the sense of a lived comportment, that is, with the pre-ontological.

126. Cf. SZ, p. 13: "Die existenziale Analytik ihrerseits aber ist letztlich

existentiell, d.h. ontisch verwurzelt." Again the second sense of "ontical" is meant – that is, pre-ontological.

127. Cf. SZ, p. 316. On this page, Heidegger, after having reiterated the foundational character of the ontic, affirms that the "existentielle Wahrheit" does not need the "ontological truth".

128. SZ, p. 285: "Die Sorge ist in ihrem Wesen durch und durch von Nichtigkeit durchsetzt." As we will see, this is another way of characterizing Dasein as thrown projecting.

129. This notion of "Versäumen" is not essentially different than Dasein's "Ausweichen" or "Fliehen". Indeed, in evading, Dasein neglects to choose itself.

130. The very same movement pertains to the later Heidegger – the "Verwindung" must take its start from Being's uttermost "concealment", which concealment presupposes Dasein's unconcealment. As Heidegger writes in regard to Heraclitus' fragment 123: "Nur was Entbergung ist, kann Verbergung sein." Cf. "Vom Wesen und Begriff der *φύσις*", p. 371.

131. Cf. SZ, p. 163.

132. Ultimately, such a "Versäumen" is rooted in the Care-structure, especially in Dasein's thrownness.

133. SZ, p. 271. The German term used is "unvermittelt" and suggests to what extent SZ is out to display Dasein in its self-determination (in the sense of the 19th century). Cf. also note below.

134. Cf. p. 278: "So bedarf es denn keiner Zuflucht zu nichtdaseinsmäßigen Mächten..."

135. SZ, p. 273: "... auf das eigene Selbst".

136. That is, it refers to the "Nichts" made explicit in Anxiety. Cf. SZ, p. 186: "Die innerweltlich entdeckte Bewandtnisganzheit des Zuhandenen und Vorhandenen ist als solche überhaupt ohne Belang."

137. As the they-self, Dasein is always already alienated – from its owned self.

138. At this stage, Heidegger also discusses the "how" of the call which may be characterized by the expression "Schweigen". Cf. SZ, p. 273: "*Das Gewissen redet einzig und ständig im Modus des Schweigens.*" Or on the same page: "Der Ruf entbehrt jeglicher Verlautbarung." In "Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik" (N II, pp. 481ff), Heidegger speaks of the "Anspruch der lautlosen Stimme des Seins". Cf. also the "Nachwort" zu WM, pp. 102, 104. In the same direction, we may recall Heidegger's insistence that "Sprache" does not exhaust itself as "Ausdruck".

139. SZ, p. 283: "Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit".

140. SZ, p. 184: "... nicht von ihm selbst in sein Da gebracht".

141. Cf. p. 284.

142. SZ, p. 284: "... vor seinem Grund, sondern je nur *aus ihm* und als dieser".

143. The sense of "nie mächtig werden", p. 284.

144. Thus, Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is delivered over to its "ground". Cf. in this regard, F. Wiplinger, *Wahrheit und Geschichtlichkeit* (Freiburg-

München: Karl Alber Verlag, 1961), p. 255. Wiplinger suggests that the notion of Dasein as the Seins des Grundes refers us to another notion, viz., to a "Grund des Grundes": hence to an "Abgrund" which must be thought as "Being itself." Cf. our introduction to this section. Also with regard to this segment of SZ, cf. Otto Pöggeler, "Sein als Ereignis", *Zeitschrift für phil. Forschung* 4 (1959): 614–15.

145. SZ, p. 285: "... ständig ist es eine andere nicht". But this same "Nichtigkeit" of the project is the ground of the possibility of Dasein's "Freedom". "Die Freiheit ist nur in der Wahl der einen, das heißt im Tragen des Nichtgewählthabens und Nichtauswählenkönnens der anderen." In VWG, *Wegmarken*, p. 63, Heidegger calls this character of restriction which is coupled with "Entwurf" and which hardly cancels Dasein's freedom, "Entzug" – a usage which hardly coincides with the later meaning of that term.

146. Cf. SZ, p. 285: "Und sie (die Nichtigkeit der Geworfenheit und des Entwurfs) ist der Grund für die Möglichkeit der Nichtigkeit des uneigentlichen Daseins im Verfallen." We notice that Heidegger in this sentence speaks of two "Nichtigkeiten". The first "sie" and the "Nichtigkeit" of inauthentic Dasein in falling, which is obscured in the English translation (p. 331).

147. "Handeln", says Heidegger. Cf. SZ, p. 288.

148. It is only at this stage of the Analytic that Dasein has become *self-aware*.

149. SZ, p. 287: "... hörig seiner eigensten Existenzmöglichkeiten". In contrast to the possibilities drawn from publicness.

150. SZ, p. 296: "Die Gewissensrede kommt nie zur Verlautbarung."

151. Cf. David Krell, "Death and Interpretation", *Heidegger's Existential Analytic* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), p. 254.

152. SZ, p. 299: "Dasein ist je schon und demnächst vielleicht wieder in der Unentschlossenheit." At this point, we call attention to a passage in which Heidegger suggests that this fullest expression of Dasein's "truth" (Entschlossenheit-Unentschlossenheit) not only "guarantees" an understanding of the Being of Dasein but just as well of "Being in general". Cf. SZ, p. 316. Cf. also A. Rosales, *Transzendenz und Differenz* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 189ff.

153. That is, the union of "resolute openness" and "advancing" is worked out in § 62. Indeed, according to SZ, "resolute openness" is the correlate of advancing, while advancing itself names Dasein's relation to its most far-reaching possibility. Hence the union between possible authenticity and wholeness.

154. Cf. p. 88.

155. We recall how Heidegger in VWG speaks of the "more primordial essence", that is, more primordial than the essence of truth as "Freiheit".

156. In a way, it is surprising that Heidegger uses the term "essence" (in sections 1, 2, 3) in its traditional sense. In section 3, after having clarified that the essence of truth is "Freiheit", Heidegger writes: "'Wesen' ist dabei verstanden als der Grund der inneren Möglichkeit dessen, was zunächst und im allgemeinen als bekannt zugestanden wird." And in the new GA edition of

VWW (Vol. 9, p. 177), Heidegger notes the second word of the essay (that is, "Wesen") as follows: "Wesen: 1. Quidditas, das Was – *κοινόν*; 2. Ermöglichung – Bedingung der Möglichkeit; 3. Grund der Ermöglichung". Thus, the three features of the traditional notion of "essentia". Furthermore, we observe that this note is to the 3rd edition (1954) – which again may occasion astonishment, for is it not so that Heidegger clearly rejects, i.e. re-interprets the traditional notion of "essence"?

157. In the present context, it is patent that neither "Vorstellen" nor "das Vorgestellte" are to be construed in their "metaphysical" sense. Hence, the justification for the translation (John Sallis' translation) of "das Vorgestellte" as "what presents itself". In this sense, we also notice Heidegger's use of the term "Das Anwesende" and "das Offenbare".

158. VWW, p. 79: "Vorstellen bedeutet hier . . . das Entgegenstehenlassen des Dinges als Gegenstand."

159. We adopt John Sallis' translation. Cf. John Sallis, "On the Essence of Truth", *Martin Heidegger. Basic Writings*, ed. D.F. Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 117ff.

160. VWW, p. 80: ". . . sondern je nur als ein Bezugsbereich bezogen und übernommen wird".

161. VWW, p. 80: "Alles Verhalten aber hat seine Auszeichnung darin, daß es, im Offenen stehend, je an ein Offenbares als ein solches sich hält."

162. Cf. VWW, p. 80: "Das Verhalten ist offenständig zum Seienden."

163. And which SZ characterizes with the expression "Uneigentlichkeit".

164. As Heidegger confirms on p. 80: "Die Aussage hat ihre Richtigkeit zu Lehen von der Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens." But this "Offenständigkeit" is a more general manner of naming Dasein's sich richten within the open region toward that which is manifest.

165. Cf. p. 80: "sich anweisen lassen".

166. VWW, p. 80: "Das offenständige Verhalten selbst muß dieses Maß sich anweisen lassen."

167. VWW, p. 80: "Es muß eine Vorgabe des Richtmaßes für alles Vorstellen übernehmen."

168. Cf. N II, 216ff; cf. also GA II, 26, pp. 184ff.

169. Heidegger uses the term "Anwesendes" on p. 80.

170. We use the word "explicit" in an Heideggerian sense according to which reference is never made primarily to a theoretical Erfassen, to a reflective, objectifying comportment, but rather to the fundament from which this is derived.

171. Cf. GA II, 26, p. 124: "Als Urteilen über Seiendes ist das Urteilen über . . . in sich bezogen auf Seiendes. Diesen Bezug nennen wir die Intentionalität. Urteilen über . . . ist in sich intentional."

172. Cf. VWW, p. 81: "Die Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens als innere Ermöglichung der Richtigkeit gründet in der Freiheit."

173. We know, moreover, that this corresponds to the German language: frei, das Freie, im Freien, all of which suggest openness.

174. Cf. VWW, p. 83: "Die Freiheit ist nur deshalb der Grund der inneren

Möglichkeit der Richtigkeit, weil sie ihr eigenes Wesen aus dem ursprünglicheren Wesen der einzig wesentlichen Wahrheit empfängt."

175. VWW, p. 81: "*Das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Freiheit.*"

176. VWW, p. 83: "Die Freiheit wurde zunächst als Freiheit für das Offenbare eines Offenen bestimmt."

177. Clearly the German adjective "ursprünglicher" is in the comparative.

178. Its ambiguity comes out lucidly when Heidegger maintains that the Seinlassen of beings is at the same time the concealing of beings as a whole.

179. In a Randbemerkung to the 1st edition (1943), Heidegger notes: "Seinlassen: 1. nicht negativ, sondern gewähren – Wahrnis." Cf. GA I, 9, p. 188. However, we notice that Heidegger uses here Sein-lassen in a sense which is not that of VWW, for according to VWW human Seinlassen does not "accord" die Wahrnis – but *is* accorded the latter (called in VWW the Mystery or Errancy). Our analysis will bring this out.

180. "... sich einlassen auf das Seiende".

181. We recall the text from EM, p. 129, in which the term "versetzen" is used in the same sense as here: "Der Logos als Sammlung, als das Sich-sammeln des Menschen auf den Fug, versetzt den Menschen allererst in sein Wesen und stellt es so in das Un-heimische..." The same term "Versetzen" will also be used, and in an allied sense, in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes".

182. In section 7 of VWW, Heidegger will speak of "die mögliche Versetzung in das Unumgängliche".

183. As we will discern in the following two chapters this notion of becoming explicit is crucial in regard to the possibility of Ereignis.

184. VWW, p. 84: "... das auf das Wesen der Wahrheit hin erblickte Wesen der Freiheit zeigt sich als die Aussetzung in die Entborgenheit des Seienden."

185. Which is illuminating with regard to Heidegger's "Weg" (Method) in SZ as well as in the later writings.

186. That is, "vom Sein her", that is, from Being which is "sighted" in advance.

187. VWW, p. 86: "Die so verstandene Freiheit als das Sein-lassen des Seienden erfüllt und vollzieht das Wesen der Wahrheit im Sinne der Entbergung von Seiendem."

188. VWW, p. 86: "... die Wahrheit ist die Entbergung des Seienden, durch die eine Offenheit west. In ihr Offenes ist alles menschliches Verhalten und seine Haltung ausgesetzt. Deshalb ist der Mensch in der Weise der Ek-sistenz."

189. Sallis translates "west" with "unfolds".

190. VWW, p. 86: "Das Seiende wird dann verdeckt und verstellt. Der Schein kommt zur Macht. In ihr gelangt das Unwesen der Wahrheit zum Vorschein."

191. VWW, p. 86: "... deshalb kann auch das Unwesen der Wahrheit nicht erst nachträglich dem bloßen Unvermögen und der Nachlässigkeit des Menschen entspringen."

192. We recall Heidegger's question in WM: "However, what should it mean that primordial anxiety only occurs in rare moments?" (p. 13). Heidegger's *immediate* reply implicates Dasein's "Umtrieben an das Seiende",

which, analogous to Dasein's "Irren" (not "Irre") in VWW, seems to amount to an "Abkehr vom Nichts". But as mentioned this is merely the first reply, that is, the less essential reply. There follows: "Es – das Nichts in seinem Nichten – verweist uns gerade an das Seiende." Hence, we are continually referred to beings by Nothing; Dasein's "Umgetriebenheit" is occasioned, as it were, by Being's concealment – in this context, by Nothing's repelling away from itself.

193. VWW, p. 86: "Die Unwahrheit muß vielmehr aus dem Wesen der Wahrheit kommen."

194. Various expressions of this priority run throughout Heidegger's writings.

195. Cf. p. 86, where the term "Zusammengehören" is employed.

196. Heidegger will still persist, albeit rarely, in using such expressions (such as "entreissen", "enstringen") – not in the intention of suggesting that "concealment" is to be thrust aside, but rather in order that it be maintained in proper balance with unconcealment. This attempt is especially in evidence from 1936 onward.

197. Cf. p. 87: "... das volle Wesen der Wahrheit".

198. We observe how Heidegger here employs the term "Vorblick", p. 87.

199. In other texts on technology, Heidegger prefers the term "riesig".

200. Heidegger, without elaborations, remarks that the "Offenbarkeit" "prevails" more essentially in situation #1 (analogous to the rapport Geviert-Gestell).

201. p. 88: "... sich die technische Beherrschbarkeit der Dinge grenzlos gebärdet."

202. VWW, p. 87: "... hat die Freiheit alles Verhalten schon auf das Seiende im Ganzen abgestimmt."

203. VWW, p. 88: "alltäglichen Rechnens und Beschaffens".

204. VWW, p. 88: "(die Offenbarkeit des Seienden im Ganzen) fällt dann zumeist auch wieder mit dem Gängigsten und Unbedachttesten zusammen."

205. VWW, p. 88: "Dieses Stimmende jedoch ist nicht nichts, sondern eine Verbergung des Seienden im Ganzen."

206. VWW, p. 88: "Gerade indem das Seinlassen im einzeln Verhalten je das Seiende sein läßt, zu dem es sich verhält, und es damit entbirgt, verbirgt es das Seiende im Ganzen. Das Seinlassen ist in sich zugleich ein Verbergen. In der ek-sistenten Freiheit ereignet sich die Verbergung des Seienden im Ganzen, ist die Verborgtheit."

207. We recall again the analogous state of affairs brought out by "Die Frage nach der Technik". In the context of modern technology, beings are revealed by bestellende Herausforderung but this unconcealment of beings as Bestand means, at once, the concealment of Being – what Heidegger here calls "das Seiende im Ganzen" (a usage which does not coincide with its later employment).

208. Cf. E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Heidegger und Husserl* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1976), p. 363. Tugendhat characterizes the "Kehre" carried out in VWW as one between VWG and VWW. According to VWG, "truth" resided in "Freiheit" as a structure of Dasein, whereas in VWW

Freiheit itself, as the "essence of truth", is rooted in "dem ursprünglicheren Wesen".

209. VWW, p. 89: "Die Verborgenheit des Seienden im Ganzen, die eigentliche Un-wahrheit, ist älter als jede Offenbarkeit von diesem und jenem Seienden."

210. VWW, p. 89: "Sie ist älter auch als das Seinlassen selbst, das entbergend schon verborgen hält und zur Verbergung sich verhält."

211. In section 5, Heidegger spoke of the "Offenbarkeit des Seienden im Ganzen", whereas here in paragraph 1 of section 6 he contrasts "concealment of beings as a whole" and "die Offenbarkeit" of this or that being. Moreover, it is only in this sense that Heidegger could suggest that concealment is prior to openness.

212. We agree completely that the word "älter" means not only "according to time" but also and more essentially *τῆ φύσει*.

213. WM, p. 12: "Dasein heißt: Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts."

214. SVG, p. 97: "... sobald Seiendes als solches in seinem Sein erscheint, ist beim Erscheinen des Seienden das Scheinen des Seins im Spiel."

215. For certain manners of human comportment toward beings tend rather to block access to Being.

216. VWW, p. 89. We cite also Heidegger's posing of the question: "Was verwahrt das Seinlassen in diesem Bezug zur Verbergung? Nichts Geringeres als die Verbergung des Verborgenen im Ganzen, des Seienden als eines Solchen, d.h. das Geheimnis."

217. p. 90: "Ansässigkeit im Gängigen". We adopt the translation of John Sallis.

218. Cf. WM, p. 13. On p. 92 of VWW, Heidegger speaks of Dasein's "Umgetriebenheit" as "das Irren", grounded in "die Irre". WM calls it "Das Nichts".

219. Cf. VWW, p. 91: "Indem das Geheimnis sich in der Vergessenheit und für sie versagt, läßt es den geschichtlichen Menschen in seinem Gangbaren ... stehen."

220. Cf. p. 91.

221. Cf. SZ, p. 222.

222. Heidegger says "folgt", p. 92.

223. Cf. p. 92: "... die Irre gehört zur inneren Verfassung des Daseins."

224. VWW, p. 92: "Die Verbergung des verborgenen Seienden im Ganzen waltet in der Entbergung des jeweiligen Seienden, die als Vergessenheit der Verbergung zur Irre wird."

225. Which is again stated in the first sentence of paragraph 6.

226. Cf. VWW, p. 92, where Heidegger states expressly that errancy is the "Grund des Irrtums".

227. Within the context of Heidegger's Philosophy, this expression "concealed Clearing" is clearly tautological.

228. This is the second time Heidegger refers to "this turn" in VWW. The first occurs when he defined the "non-essence" of truth as a "vor-wesendes Wesen". The "vor" here means prior ("in nature") to essence in the sense of

“Das Allgemeine”. But secondly and more importantly, the “vor” suggests the conversion from Unwesen to Wesen. Heidegger even tells us this explicitly (p. 90). “Für den Wissenden allerdings deutet das ‘Un’ des anfänglichen Unwesens der Wahrheit als der Un-wahrheit in den noch nicht erfahrenen Bereich der Wahrheit des Seins (nicht erst des Seienden).”

229. Cf. VWW, p. 93: “Als Beirung schafft die Irre aber zugleich mit an der Möglichkeit, die der Mensch aus der Ek-sistenz zu heben vermag, sich beirren zu lassen, indem er die Irre selbst erfährt. . . .” With reference to this text, it must be kept in mind that “Ek-sistenz” includes “Insistenz”.

230. In HW, pp. 7–68, and dates from the years 1935–36. Moreover, H.G. Gadamer is responsible for a separate edition in Reclam-Verlag (1960), in which a “Zusatz” (pp. 95–101) composed in 1956, is added. Concerning Heidegger’s general intention in this study H.G. Gadamer writes: “Heideggers Aufsatz beschränkt sich . . . nicht darauf eine angemessene Beschreibung vom Sein des Kunstwerkes zu geben. Es ist vielmehr sein zentrales philosophisches Anliegen, das Sein selbst als ein Geschehen der Wahrheit zu begreifen.” Cf. “Zur Einführung”, p. 118.

231. Cf. Otto Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1963), p. 252; and Dieter Sinn, “Heideggers Spätphilosophie”, *Philosophische Rundschau* 14 (1967): 131, 143. It is often suggested that the notion of “Erde” in “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, as “das Sich Verschliessende”, adumbrates the notion of “Erde” of the “Vierung”. But such a suggestion has its limits. In “Das Ding”, for instance, no allusion is made to “Erde” as the self-closing and in “Bauen, Wohnen, Denken” the “earth” is described as follows: “Die Erde ist die dienende Tragende, die blühende Fruchtende, hingebreitet in Gestein und Gewässer aufgehend zu Gewächs und Getier” (p. 23). The reason for the stated suggestion is that up until recently the essay “Die Frage nach der Technik” had been neglected. A pertinent example is the book of V. Vycinas, *Earth and the Gods* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), in which the author distinguishes three world Begriffe, excluding however the world of *Technik*. But the world as “Geviert” is inappropriately grasped unless the world of Gestell is taken into consideration. It is this latter which may be placed in analogy with the notion of “Erde” in “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”. The illumination-concealment contention of the essay on the essence of the work of art is later expressed as the relationship Geviert-Gestell, between “Das Ding” and “Das Bestellte”. It may also be pointed out that Heidegger in “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” refers to the earth as “das Bergende” (which in this case would inadequately be translated as “concealing”). But Gestell is “das Bergende” according to the later context, that is, it is Gestell which is that which conserves in itself that which saves.

232. In “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” (again) both notions of unconcealment (of Being and beings) are at play. On the one hand, unconcealment refers to the self-illumination or clearing, the “open place” or “illuminating center”, which as far as human “Erkenntnis” is concerned, seems to amount to “Nothing” (p. 41). But within this unconcealment, this unconcealed site as

Clearing, are beings able to be unconcealed. "Dank dieser Lichtung ist das Seiende ... unverborgen." Hence, the unconcealment "in which" (that is, *of* Being) is the precondition for the unconcealment of beings – also, as we will see, the precondition for their concealing.

233. To explain this by clarifying that "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" is indisputably a confrontation with traditional "Aesthetics" is unsatisfactory. This is only the initial level of the essay in question, surely not its most profound stratum. Moreover, "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" is not, most essentially, concerned with the work of art as such, but rather with its origin, that is, its origination out of and its letting appear of Being as unconcealment. With regard to the "overcoming" of "Aesthetics" in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", cf. Calvin O. Schrag, "The Transvaluation of Aesthetics and the Work of Art", *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 3 (1973): 109ff.

234. p. 42: "Lichtung ... ist in sich zugleich Verbergung." In our present context, this is the *geschickhafte* expression of unconcealment.

235. We run the risk of misconstruing Heidegger's words about "Richtigkeit" when we continually translate it with "correctness" – which is sometimes correct. However, it often happens that the intentionality of a proposition is being accented – its directing itself toward the unconcealed, its already bearing in itself this unconcealed.

236. "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", p. 41: "Aber nicht wir setzen die Unverborgenheit des Seienden voraus, sondern die Unverborgenheit versetzt uns in ein solches Wesen, daß wir bei unserem Vorstellen immer der Unverborgenheit nachgesetzt sind. Nicht nur, das, wonach eine Erkenntnis sich richtet, muß schon irgendwie unverborgen sein, sondern auch der ganze Bereich, in dem dieses Sichrichten nach etwas sich bewegt ... muß sich als Ganzes schon im Unverborgenen abspielen. Wir wären mit all unseren richtigen Vorstellungen nichts und wir könnten auch nicht einmal voraussetzen, es sei schon etwas, wonach wir uns richten, offenbar, wenn nicht die Unverborgenheit des Seienden uns schon in jenes Gelichtete ausgesetzt hätte, in das alles Seiende hereinsteht und aus dem es sich zurückzieht." In line with the later version (Reclam) edited by Gadamer, we have changed one word: "versetzt uns" for "bestimmt uns". We have already, in Chapter I, encountered this word *versetzen* and have offered some clarification as to its meaning.

237. p. 55 (Reclam edition): "... in die Unverborgenheit ein- und ihr nachgesetzt bleiben." For the English reader we notice that the dash after "ein" is a substitution for "gesetzt".

238. SZ, pp. 227–28: "Nicht wir setzen die 'Wahrheit' voraus, sondern *sie* ist es, die ontologisch überhaupt möglich macht, daß wir so *sein* können, daß wir etwas 'voraussetzen'."

239. This is what Heidegger means by statements in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" which seem to identify Unverborgenheit des Seins and Unverborgenheit des Seienden. Cf., for a clear indication of this, p. 49. Here Heidegger states that the essence of the "unconcealment of beings" belongs to Being itself (hence to unconcealment) which itself "lets happen" the "Spielraum der offenen Stelle".

240. Varied expressions, suggestive of the "Wherein" are employed: "offene Stelle" (pp. 41, 42), "Lichtung" (pp. 41ff): the encircling "lichtende Mitte" (p. 41), "der Spielraum" (p. 42), "worin" (p. 49). We notice, moreover, that the two terms "Offenheit" and "das Offene", as used in the essay on art, must be held distinct. Cf. pp. 49ff.

241. "Zugleich", p. 42. As we will see, this is a key word in Heidegger's working-out of the notion of *Geschick*.

242. Cf. p. 41: "Diese offene Mitte ist daher nicht vom Seienden umschlossen, sondern die lichtende Mitte selbst umkreist wie das Nichts, das wir kaum kennen, alles Seiende."

243. We notice that Albert Hofstadter, who is responsible for the fine English translation, renders "Verweigerung" with "denial".

244. Heidegger, in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", speaks of *Urstreit* and *Streit* which termini offer translation difficulties. It can be somewhat misleading to translate with "struggle" or "battle", for it is not a question of overcoming concealment such that illumination would reign undisputed. Rather, as Heidegger significantly points out, "contention" must be maintained (p. 38), that is, both essential components of the contention must be retained in correspondence to the "primal contention" which is reflected. Or as he will say later on in the essay: "... der Streit ist die Innigkeit des Sichzugehörens der Streitenden."

245. It is not the work which is "primary" but rather what comes to appearance through the work. Cf. E.F. Kaelin, "Notes toward and Understanding of Heidegger's Aesthetics", *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, ed. E.N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 74.

246. p. 29: "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes ist die Kunst."

247. p. 46: "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes und des Künstlers ist die Kunst."

248. Or as Heidegger states at the start of section 3: "Der Ursprung ist die Herkunft des Wesens, worin das Sein eines Seienden west."

249. On p. 64, Heidegger employs the term "entspringen lassen".

250. Fundamental in this regard are: "Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus", N II, pp. 335-98; "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", pp. 243-45; "Der Spruch des Anaximander", pp. 310-11; BH, pp. 158, 161-62, 165-68; 194-95; WHD, pp. 3-6, 51-52; and the Lecture-Course in its entirety.

251. As this chapter has already made evident, the character of Being as geschickhaft - which has so little to do with "destiny" - came to the fore long before 1938.

252. Cf., however, *Die Kunst und der Raum* (St. Gallen: Erker Verlag, 1969), p. 13.

253. Cf. p. 241: "... die unberechenbare Fülle..."

254. p. 166.

255. p. 24.

256. Cf. SVG, p. 109: "Vielmehr bestimmt sich das Wesen der Geschichte

aus dem Geschick des Seins." Cf. also pp. 120, 130, 144, 157, where the formulation is repeated. Cf. also "Zeit und Sein", pp. 8–9. Here Heidegger notes: "Das Geschichtliche der Geschichte des Seins bestimmt sich aus dem Geschickhaften eines Schickens . . . Seinsgeschichte heißt Geschick von Sein . . ."

257. At the start of his "Die Lehre des Seins", Hegel describes the movement of "Being" in a manner comparable to (and also to be contrasted with) the Heideggerian manner of formulation. Hegel writes: "Diese Fortbestimmung ist in Einem ein Heraussetzen und damit Entfalten des an sich seienden Begriffs und zugleich das Insichgehen des Seins, ein Vertiefen desselben in sich selbst." Cf. *Ency.* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1939), § 84.

258. In this essay, the expression "Vom Sein her" is quite frequent: cf. pp. 346, 350, 355, 362, 394.

259. Cf. N II, p. 336.

260. N II, p. 337: "Das Seiende ist das Seiende als der Wille zur Macht in der Weise der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen."

261. N II, p. 341: "... die Vollendung des eigentlichen Nihilismus".

262. N II, p. 340: "... die letzte Verstrickung in den Nihilismus". Cf. also "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 214.

263. Again this will have to be re-evaluated in the following. The not-heeding of Being itself accompanies Being's ownmost "Ausbleiben".

264. p. 336: "... es mit dem Seienden als solches im Grunde nichts ist."

265. Cf. "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 245: "Aber das Seiende ist, was es ist und wie es ist, aus dem Sein. Gesetzt, daß am Sein alles 'ist' liegt, dann besteht das Wesen des Nihilismus darin, daß es mit dem Sein selbst nichts ist." The parallel text from "Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus" is found on p. 338.

266. Cf. N II, p. 342.

267. N II, p. 342: "... muß schon, wenngleich unvollendet, im *Wesen* der vorausgehenden Metaphysik walten."

268. N II, p. 343: "*Die Metaphysik ist als Metaphysik der eigentliche Nihilismus.*"

269. N II, p. 343: "... die Metaphysik Platons ist nicht weniger nihilistisch als die Metaphysik Nietzsches."

270. Cf. N I, p. 459. To ask about beings (das Seiende) as beings is to ask about the "beingness" of beings, or about the "Being of beings".

271. N II, p. 346: "Schon die Frage der Metaphysik reicht nicht zum Sein selbst."

272. N II, p. 345–46: "Denkt die Metaphysik das Sein selbst? Nein und niemals. Sie denkt *das Seiende* hinsichtlich des Seins . . . Das Sein ist als solches nicht das Befragte. Darum bleibt das Sein selbst in der Metaphysik ungedacht." Cf. also "Der Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik", p. 8: "Die Metaphysik denkt, insofern sie stets nur Sein als das Seiende vorstellt, nicht an das Sein selbst." It may be noticed that this description of Metaphysics does not merely represent an earlier period (or "middle period") of the Heideggerian manner of thinking, but remains decisive throughout the whole. In the later and significant essay "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens", p. 77,

Heidegger reiterates: "Aber Hegel fragt auch nicht, sowenig wie Husserl, sowenig wie alle Metaphysik nach dem Sein als Sein. . ."

273. Cf. N II, p. 353: "Steht es so, dann entstammt das 'ungedacht' nicht einem Denken, das etwas unterläßt."

274. p. 244: "Dann läge es im Wesen des Seins selbst, daß es ungedacht bleibt, weil es sich entzieht. Das Sein selbst entzieht sich in seiner Wahrheit. Es birgt sich in diese und verbirgt sich selbst in solchem Bergen." We translate here "Bergen" with "shelter", and not with the more current "to conceal". In this passage, Heidegger does not want to say conceal or hide twice. We notice furthermore that on the same page, Heidegger employs the expression "das sich verbergende Bergen". This hardly means the self-concealing concealing. As already mentioned, Heidegger's use of "Bergen" is equivocal. Concealment is always already a "Bergen", a "Wahrnis" – Being refusing its fullness, keeping itself to itself.

275. N II, p. 353: "Inzwischen wurde jedoch deutlicher: Das Sein selbst west als die Unverborgenheit, in der das Seiende anwest."

276. Cf. N II, p. 351.

277. N II, p. 354: "Insofern in der Unverborgenheit ihr eigene 'Un' hinsichtlich ihrer selbst wegbleibt und es bei der Verborgenheit des Seins bleibt, zeigt das Ausbleiben den Zug der Verbergung."

278. N II, p. 355.

279. Or "das (sich) Verwahren des Seins". We insert das "Sich" here, for it is not a question of human Verwahren or Bewahren. The latter pre-supposes Being's sich Verwahren as concealment.

280. Cf. N II, p. 355: "... in ihr (Verbergung) west dergleichen wie ein Sichertziehen des Seins selbst, so zwar, daß es dergestalt zugleich in einer Sicht bleibt – als das Sein des Seienden."

281. N II, p. 362–63: "Das Wesen des Nihilismus ist überhaupt nicht die Sache des Menschen, sondern die des Seins selbst und darum allerdings die Sache des *Wesens* des Menschen und erst in *dieser* Folge zugleich eine Sache des Menschen; vermutlich sogar nicht nur eine unter anderen."

282. N II, p. 361: "... das Sein selbst ausbleibt und ausbleibend das Denken der Metaphysik seiner Art überläßt, nämlich dieses Ausbleiben als solches auszulassen."

283. N II, p. 367: "... daß zuvor das Sein selbst unmittelbar dem Wesen des Menschen zumutet, erst einmal das Ausbleiben der Unverborgenheit des Seins als solches als eine Ankunft des Seins selbst zu erfahren. . . ." In making the same point in "Die Kehre", Heidegger employs the term "unvermittelt" instead of "unmittelbar". Both terms are meant to stave off any association with a "cause" which might serve to "effect" Being's self-Wandel. Cf. our final chapter.

284. That between Being as self-determining and man. Actually, we admit, the term "self-determining" is precarious, for Being does not determine itself in independence from man. Moreover, we point out that this manner of priority has been noticed and well put by J.L. Mehta. Cf. *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 241.

285. For example, in N II, p. 359: "... im Sein selbst, das sich als solches entziehen kann und entzieht, indem es sich im Seienden als solches zeigt"; in "Der Spruch des Anaximander", p. 310: "Das Sein entzieht sich, indem es sich in das Seiende entbirgt"; in BH, p. 166: "Zum Geschick kommt das Sein, indem es, das Sein, sich gibt. Das aber sagt, geschickhaft gedacht: Es gibt sich und versagt sich zumal." Cf. also "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'", p. 244, and G, p. 24.

286. SVG, p. 114: "Sein schickt sich zu uns, aber so, daß es zugleich schon in seinem Wesen entzieht." This formulation repeats itself throughout the Vorlesung the SVG.

287. In the Lecture-course itself, the structure of *Géschick* is discussed, however summarily, not only with reference to Leibniz, but also in connection with primordial *φύσις*, Kant and with Modernity in general, that is, the appearance of the Being of beings as Objectivity.

288. SVG, p. 129–30: "Sein schickt sich dem Menschen zu, indem es lichtend dem Seienden als solchem einen Zeit-Spiel-Raum einräumt." The word "einräumen" used here means as much as the Heideggerian Leitwort: "Gewähren". Cf. also p. 109: "Das Sein lichtet sich und lichtend dem Zeit-Spiel-Raum einräumt, worin Seiendes erscheinen kann."

289. Moreover, in passing we mention that the two formulations of SVG, as far as accent is concerned, aim correspondingly at what Heidegger calls "Die Gefahr" and "Das Rettende". Indeed, "Gefahr" is most essentially an expression for the ownmost of Being, namely, its concealment, while "das Rettende" involves the "recovery" of Metaphysics.

290. Concerning the more precise connotation of "Sich schicken", "Zuschicken", cf. SVG, p. 108; also "Zeit und Sein", p. 8. In this latter passage, Heidegger clarifies "das Schicken" as Being's manner of "giving" ("Geben"), which giving however is inseparable from a "Sich zurückhalten".

291. Cf. SVG, pp. 90, 107, 134, 151, 157.

292. Cf. SVG, pp. 97, 105, 115, 118, 129.

293. Cf. p. 174. But perhaps most appropriately is the genitive subiectivus employed on p. 108: "Das Sagen des Seins."

294. In addition to the SVG, cf. also "Der Satz der Identität", p. 20.

295. Cf. SVG, p. 179. Also "Hegel und die Griechen", pp. 270–71: "Sagen, althochdeutsch sagen, bedeutet: zeigen, erscheinen- und sehenlassen." Cf. also "Das Wesen der Sprache", pp. 214–15; "Das Wort", pp. 222, 237; "Kants Thesis über das Sein", p. 306; "Anhang" to *Phänomenologie und Theologie*, in GA I, 9, pp. 74, 76.

296. SVG, p. 97: "... eine Epoche in der das Sein sich als Sein entzieht."

297. Cf. SVG, p. 99: "Entzug des Seins waltet nur so, daß jeweils das Sichentziehende zugleich und gerade in einem Vorschein bleibt." This statement relates to every "epoche" within tradition, to "Metaphysics" as a whole – as interpreted by Heidegger.

298. Cf. SVG, p. 97. In Heidegger's exact words: "... sobald Seiendes als solches in seinem Sein erscheint, ist beim Erscheinen des Seienden das Scheinen des Seins im Spiel."

299. SVG, p. 98: "... kraft dessen es die Incubation des Satzes vom Grund gibt." Again, Heidegger emphasizes that the so-called incubation period is not to be accounted for by referring to man's "finitude". "Vielmehr liegt es im Wesen des Seins, das als das Sichentbergen sich so entbirgt, daß zu diesem Entbergen ein Sichverbergen und d.h. Sichentziehen gehört" (SVG, p. 122). *Moreover this last quoted passage expresses perfectly what we have meant by the priority of Entbergung, of unconcealment.* And the very same thing we said about the text from SZ, p. 222, namely that it cannot be reversed, so this is true of the above text. Heidegger *does not* say that Being is Self-concealing and as self-concealing self-revealing, but inversely. When Heidegger does seem to assert some priority of Concealment, then what he has in mind is the latter's closeness *to us*. We must always take our point of departure from Being's concealment – this is, for us, most proximately (also most remotely) "present".

300. We know that "Gegenständigkeit" names a specification of "Seiendheit". Cf. N I, p. 584; N II, p. 298; and "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung", p. 161.

301. It is well known that the term "Epoche" refers to the "An Sich Halten" of Being itself.

302. A pertinent illustration of this is provided by the essay "Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik". Cf. also our last chapter.

303. In the later writings, this source of "belonging-together" is expressed in varied manners, as "Austrag", "Differenz", "Ereignis", "Abgrund", as "Unverborgenheit" – and that which is held in unity is interpreted variously: Being and thought, Being and beings, Time and Being, all of which signify, in effect, a tradition which begins not with Plato but with Parmenides.

304. Or the expression: "Zum Sein gehört Grund."

305. SVG, p. 188: "Sein als gründendes hat keinen Grund, spielt als der Abgrund jenes Spiel, das als Geschick uns Sein und Grund zuspielt."

306. Sich zuschicken, sich entbergen, sich lichten, sich geben, und sich verbergen, verweigern, an sich Halten, sich sparen.

307. We observe here that *wesen*, employed by Heidegger, signifies "währen" which in turn is always a "Gewähren", an according. Hence, the reason for our translation of *Ge-wesen* as self-gathering accord. As in SZ, the later texts distinguish between *Ge-wesen* and *Vergangen*. Cf. "Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus", p. 388; "Wozu Dichter", p. 295; "Die Sprache im Gedicht", p. 57; "Grundsätze des Denkens", p. 35; and "Zeit und Sein", p. 13.

308. Cf. "Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus", p. 388: "... das *Ge-wesen*, aus dem und als welches die Ankunft des Seins selbst ist." Also, "Die Sprache im Gedicht", p. 57: "Aber die wahre Zeit ist Ankunft des *Gewesenen*. Dieses ist nicht das *Vergangene*, sondern die *Versammlung* des *Wesenden*, die aller *Ankunft* vorausgeht, in dem sie als solche *Versammlung* sich in ihr je Früheres zurückbirgt."

309. That is, as "Das Wesen der Sprache", p. 213, clarifies, "aufgehen läßt" – what "Zeit und Sein" calls "Reichen".

310. In addition to the preceding study in its entirety and Chapter I, Part Three, in particular, cf. "Wozu Dichter", p. 295: "Das *Wesende* der *Ankunft*

versammelt sich in das Geschick zurück . . . Das Ge-wesene dagegen (in contrast to “das nur Vergangene”) ist das Geschickliche.” However, Ankommend is likewise always in a concealed manner.

311. In an Hegelian sense.

312. The German Reichen, to reach, and the adjective reich, rich. According to “Zeit und Sein”, Reichen names the unifying principle of Ankunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart, the manner in which Anwesen is made present to us – is given over to us (“gereicht”).

CHAPTER II

BEING'S SELF-SENDING, THE DANGER, AND THE SAVING

The entire essay "Die Frage nach der Technik" is centered around the theme of Gestell as belonging inseparably to Being's ownmost manner of sending itself. From the outset of the essay this is suggested in the emphasis that man, prior to all his ordering of nature in general, is himself *already* put to the challenge. And it is for this reason that what is essential to modern technology may not be reduced to the purely anthropological, to the doings and machines of man. Man is already, in the very process of ordering, drawn into the "appealing claim" ("Anspruch") of Being, regardless of whether he is able to attend to this or not. On the one hand, man is related to something which is not of his own making,¹ but on the other he neglects, or is for sundry reasons, unable to take this into view.

If we now remind ourselves of Being's *Geschick*, the very same state of affairs may be expressed as follows. In the domain of modern technology, Being (that is, beingness) reveals itself, but at the same time conceals itself in that it appears in and through the guise of Bestand, thus, as it were, refusing its more primordial truth. It is clear that what we have brought out with regard to the self-sending of Being in general, namely, that it is thoroughly suffused with concealment, applies *mutatis mutandis* to Being's "Schickung" as Gestell. This is why the essence of technology is clarified as the "Danger", which in Heideggerian language, refers to Being's most radical concealment. Gestell is primarily "Danger", the most stubborn refusal of primordial Being (or primordial unconcealment) which however preserves in itself that which saves. As we will observe, the most radical concealment of Being bestows the highest possibility of unconcealment.

A. BEING'S SELF-SENDING AND THE DANGER ("DIE FRAGE NACH DER TECHNIK", pp. 24ff)

In the preceding, *Gestell* as the essence of technology has already been discussed and the attempt was made to show how this is to be understood, namely, as belonging within the larger compass of Being as its own Self-Sending. In the later section of "Die Frage nach der Technik", this insertion of *Gestell* in *Geschick* is brought to expression as follows: "The essence of modern technology lies in *Gestell*. *Gestell* belongs within Being's self-sending of revealment."² Or as it is stated differently on the same page: "The essence of technology lies in *Gestell*. The holding sway of *Gestell* belongs to Being's self-sending."³

Now it is this character of Being as its own Self-sending, which, through and in *Gestell* (or as *Gestell*), leads to what Heidegger calls the "Danger". Heidegger points out that "*Geschick*" brings man onto a way of revealing, that is, Being's self-sending, the manner of Being's appearing "in" beings, is given over to the human manner of revealing and thus presents itself as the "Danger". We attend to the passage in which Heidegger introduces for the first time (in the essay "Die Frage nach der Technik") the Danger.

Precisely because the latter (namely *Geschick*) brings man onto a way of revealing, man himself, thus underway, stands confronted with the impending possibility of only pursuing and occupying himself with what is revealed in ordering and from this ground of taking all standards. But in this way, another possibility is shut out: namely that man rather – and increasingly so and always more primordially – lets himself in with the essence of the unconcealed and unconcealment, in order to experience the needed belongingness to revealing as his essence.⁴

Geschick, more specifically *Gestell*, preordains the manner of revealing, that is, preordains "ordering", for after all man *is brought* onto a way.⁵ But in this manner, the possibility of a one-sidedness occurs, that is, that solely the unconcealment of "das Bestellte" enters into man's purview, while another, perchance more primordial relation to essence tends to be excluded.⁶ Thus,

“man is endangered out of *Geschick*.”⁷ It is foremost the self-sending of Being, in the form of *Gestell*, which is Danger; in fact, states Heidegger, *Gestell* is *the* Danger, the highest danger, which then concerns man in a twofold fashion.

In one of the earlier chapters we mentioned the chief distinguishing mark between *voεĩv* and the metaphysical manner of relating to Being. We emphasized that *voεĩv*, the primordial manner of comportment, is “for the sake of Being”, given to Being’s prevailing apriority, while the metaphysical, whether it be called a *Vorstellen*, *Herstellen*, or a *Bestellen*, wills Being as its product. Now in the essay in question, this metaphysical way to be is expressed tellingly. When man, who is himself in danger of being assimilated to *Bestand*, becomes the “Besteller” of *Bestand*, the “semblance” is forthcoming that what is (what is ordered) *is only as his* “construct” (“*Gemächte*”). And this, in its turn, lures one into the illusion that man encounters everywhere, that is, in his product (“*das Bestellte*”), solely *himself*. We underscore the word *self*, a term so essential to this Philosophy. Does man find himself in *Bestand*? Or is finding the self precisely what *Bestand* hinders in the most insidious way possible?⁸ Are we not rather reminded of the fundamental saying of SZ that *Dasein* first has to “find itself”, since always already, as factual, lost in the “they-self”, in the world” of everyday “*Besorgen*” – on which ground *Dasein* then “understands” and “interprets” itself? Analogously, in *Gestell*, in the unconcealment of *beings* as *Bestand*, man hardly finds *himself*, that is, his truer self which, according to the text at hand, refers to man as the one who is “addressed” (“*der Angesprochene*”) and thus has it to respond in the sense of “*Entsprechen*”.

Man stands so decisively in the wake of the challenging of *Gestell* that he is unable to apprehend the latter as an appealing claim, that he even is unable to perceive himself as the one being addressed. . .⁹

We should not understand this to mean that man is absolutely unable to respond, to apprehend himself in the midst of *Gestell* as the one being addressed;¹⁰ this possibility is not excluded. But nonetheless, if we might make use of a phrase from SZ, man is “at first and for the most part” entangled in *Geschick* as *Gestell*, in

the technological unconcealment of beings. This indicates that a manner of illumination is needed, a *contrast* must be made *explicit* to man such that man may begin to assume a more appropriate relation to Gestell.

Secondly, Heidegger points out that the domination of Gestell and its manner of revealing, its “ordering” in its manifold senses, shuts out any other manner of revealing – and perhaps a more primordial manner.¹¹ This other mode of revealing is summed up in the word *ποίησις*, a way of Entbergen which brings forth into presence.¹² Moreover, Gestell and its special manner of revealing is blind to itself, that is, blind to its own manner of revealing.

Where ever Gestell holds sway, stirring and securing of the standing-reserve mark all revealing. These no longer even allow their own fundamental feature to appear, that is, this revealing as such.¹³

Gestell is blind to itself precisely because it is blind to all other manners of revealing: it is unable to “see” itself in its own light owing to its lack of relationship to the “other”. It lacks all measure – *except its own*, which then only serves as a self-distortion. This is admittedly a curious mode of “revealing” which does nothing more than to unidimensionally “disguise” (“*verstellen*”) and to block a more primordial experience of “truth”. In short, Gestell, which belongs to *Geschick*, “disguises the shining and presway of truth”.¹⁴ Thus, Gestell, embracing the manner of revealing which it demands, turns out to be the “most extreme danger”, the most radical withdrawal of Being.¹⁵

B. BEING’S SELF-SENDING AND THE SAVING

But with that we have hardly heard Heidegger’s final verdict regarding technology – far from it. The self-sending of Being as the danger, the utter refusal of Being, does not bespeak a situation of despair,¹⁶ nor one of resignation, but rather signals Being’s most conspicuous transappearing. As Heidegger forcefully states: “Withdrawal is *Ereignis*.”¹⁷ This does not refer to any and all withdrawals;¹⁸ for instance, Being’s withdrawal, exemplified in its appearance as *ιδέα* or as “*actualitas*” did not

spell out "Ereignis",¹⁹ but rather gave way to other and progressively radical modes of withdrawal up to our present day which witnesses, on an Heideggerian view, Being's most pronounced "keeping to itself" in the form of Gestell. It is at this intersection, at this stage of Being's most radical concealment, that Heidegger senses a "sudden" ("jäh") turn-about, an appropriating or recovering turn. In consequence, Gestell is occasionally referred to as a sort of "prelude" ("Vorspiel")²⁰ to Ereignis, or to express the matter differently: as the "Saving". "Where the Danger is, there too emerges the Saving", wrote Hölderlin.²¹ In this poetical saying resounds an initial and essential Heideggerian idea, which may be formulated as follows: in the utmost refusal of Being lies latent the possibility of Being's ownmost showing, an epiphany of Being's more primordial truth.²² And this happening must take as its point of origin Being's concealment, not owing to any Heideggerian predilection, but much rather owing to the pervasiveness of concealment to which man's engulfment in the technological way to be has to be ascribed. That man, for the most part, persists in his absorption in the "publicness" of the "they" does not only pertain to the context of SZ, but equally to Heidegger's later reflections.²³ The expression "wohnen" does not express the way man is for the latter Heidegger, but is the expression of man's ownmost task in preparing for Being's advent.

Concerning now the irruption of the "Saving" out of Refusal, what is of paramount importance is to recognize the refusal *as* the refusal *of* Being, which recognition (or explicitation) has a two-fold consequence: first, to bring to light, and thus to make thought-provoking, Being as far as man is concerned; and secondly, to shift emphasis from man (the supposed "Lord" of the earth) to Being, since the preordaining refusal or withdrawal must be viewed as a fundamental feature of Being itself and not the mere result attendant upon man's technological activity.

But how is man to catch sight of the concealment of Being amidst Gestell *as* that of Being? In "Die Frage nach der Technik" itself Heidegger merely gives a sort of pointer which is then discussed in "Die Kehre". He writes: "But could not then a sufficient glimpse into Gestell as belonging to Being's self-sending as a manner of revealing shed light upon that which saves

in its emergence.”²⁴ The key word is “Blick”, for as we will show, it is the “Einblick in das, was ist” which first accords a glimpse into the essence of Gestell, that is to say, accords the initial possibility of experiencing the Danger *as* the Danger which implies the possibility of “recovery”. As mentioned, Heidegger takes this up in “Die Kehre” which remains to be examined in the following chapter. Presently, however, we must consider an important segment of “Die Frage nach der Technik” in which the notion of “essence” itself is thematized.

C. THE NOTION OF ESSENCE (WESEN)

The discussion bearing on “Das Rettende” is interrupted with the following question: “However, how should we be able to view the saving within the essence of technology as long as we are not mindful to the sense of essence according to which Gestell is genuinely the essence of technology?”²⁵ The initial task, which has been thus far postponed, would be to elucidate the notion of essence itself so as to better understand what is at issue in the questioning. By way of a first approach, Heidegger mentions only and quite generally the traditional notion of “essentia”²⁶ for the purpose of showing up the notion of essence as “that which accords” (“das Gewährnde”). For Heidegger, Gestell, as the essence of technology, cannot signify a universal genus, applying randomly and indifferently to everything technological, for in this case “the steam engine, the radio transmitter, the cyclotron (would be) a Gestell”,²⁷ that is, there would be an indefinite series of Gestells. According to the analysis, this remark, namely, that Gestell as the essence of technology is not some general concept or series of such concepts hovering over the technological, bears considerable weight. “If we heed this, then we may observe something which is astonishing: it is technology itself which demands of us that the current sense of ‘essence’ be thought in another sense.”²⁸

But what is this novel conception of essence which becomes explicit, if we reflect on Gestell as the essence of modern technology? To begin, we notice that in the expression “essence of technology” the term “essence” itself is interpreted in its active

sense, rather than in its substantive meaning,²⁹ which correlates well with the active character of Being thus far accented. In line with its verbal signification, the German “wesen” connotes the same as “währen”³⁰ which signifies generally “to endure” (to continue, to last) – but enduring not solely in the sense of mere continuation. In Heidegger’s sense, “to endure” wants to say fundamentally more. Let us illustrate this by deliberating on the formulation “the essence of technology”, and in the first place, let us hear, instead of “Wesen” “währen”. In this case, however, according to the text, the “enduring” of technology shows itself to be an “accorded enduring” (“ein gewährtes Währen”). Heidegger writes: “Only that which is accorded endures. The primordial enduring out of the Primal is the according.”³¹ Hence, what endures as the essence of technology is already what has been accorded or to put it otherwise: already has its origins in that which accords. Furthermore, as originating out of that which accords, the accorded (“Das Gewährte”), in its turn, is able of itself to accord in an active sense, in the sense of “Schenken”. That which has been accorded has issued forth from the self-giving of Being and in the modern era “endures” in the form of the world of Gestell – the essence of technology. As such, Gestell is able to accord. But to accord what? Perhaps the shining forth of that which saves. What else should that which has been accorded accord, if not the very possibility of a more primordial experience of Being amidst Bestand? The challenging sort of manner of revealing discussed in the foregoing, works unwittingly to accord with the same force as a “bringing-forth”; presumably even more so. To the question: “If this mode of Self-sending, as Gestell, is the most extreme danger, may we nonetheless call this sending an according?” Heidegger replies with an emphatic affirmation.³² As already stated, if that which has been accorded (the Gestell in this context) embodies the most radical danger, then the possibility appears all the more imminent that that which has been accorded will accord. And what will be thus accorded is “that which saves”. How this saving is to be viewed more closely is the theme of the following chapter.³³

NOTES

1. This is a favorite theme in the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, namely, what Marcel calls "humility" – or rather the ground of "humility".

2. p. 25: "Das Wesen der modernen Technik beruht im Gestell. Diese gehört in das Geschick der Entbergung."

3. p. 25: "Das Wesen der Technik beruht im Gestell. Sein Walten gehört in das Geschick."

4. pp. 25–26: "Weil dieses den Menschen jeweils auf einen Weg des Entbergens bringt, geht der Mensch, also unterwegs, immerfort am Rande der Möglichkeit, nur das im Bestellen Entborgene zu verfolgen und zu betreiben und von da her alle Maße zu nehmen. Hierdurch verschließt sich die andere Möglichkeit, daß der Mensch eher und mehr und stets anfänglicher auf das Wesen des Unverborgenen und seine Unverborgenheit sich einläßt, um die gebrauchte Zugehörigkeit zum Entbergen als sein Wesen zu erfahren."

5. In the last sentence of the above quote, the named Entbergen does not refer to human Entbergen in the manner of "ordering" or "challenging", but to "Entbergen" in the sense of das Sichtenbergende.

6. If it is difficult to experience this *excluding* character of modern technology, then this is merely testimony of its overwhelming dominance.

7. p. 26: "... ist der Mensch aus dem Geschick gefährdet".

8. In this regard, we would refer the reader to the important study of E.G. Ballard, *Man and Technology* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978).

9. Cf. p. 27.

10. The "caller" here is surely not Dasein.

11. Cf. p. 27: "Wo dieses (Bestellen) herrscht, vertreibt es jede Möglichkeit der Entbergung." Again Heidegger accents that *crucial excluding character of technology*.

12. That is, not only the manner of bringing-forth already discussed – "art", τέχνη, "causality" – but also "das Welten der Welt als Geviert". In "Hölderlins Erde und Himmel", p. 17, Heidegger affirms that the Gestell disguises World as Geviert; that is, a more primordial conception of that which presences ("das Anwesende").

13. Cf. p. 27. In the first sentence of "Die Kehre", Heidegger expresses the same state of affairs as follows: "Das Wesen des Gestells ist das in sich gesammelte Stellen, das seiner eigenen Wesenswahrheit mit der Vergessenheit nachstellt, welches Nachstellen sich dadurch verstellt, daß es sich in das Bestellen alles Anwesenden als den Bestand entfaltet, sich in diesem einrichtet und als dieser herrscht."

14. Cf. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 27: "Das Gestell verstellt das Scheinen und Walten der Wahrheit."

15. In a discussion with R. Wisser, Heidegger confirms: "Ich spreche nicht von einer Verfallsgeschichte, sondern nur vom Geschick des Seins insofern als es sich mehr und mehr im Vergleich zu der Offenbarkeit des Seins bei den Griechen entzieht – bis zur Entfaltung des Seins als Bestand für die technische

Bewältigung der Welt. Also: es ist nicht eine Verfallsgeschichte, sondern es ist ein Entzug des Seins, in dem wir stehen." Cf. *Heidegger im Gespräch* (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1970), p. 70.

16. Cf. Walter Bröcker, *Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965), pp. 31–32, Bröcker writes: "Aber in Wahrheit hat kein Denker unseres Jahrhunderts hoffnungsvoller in die Zukunft der Menschheit geblickt als er" (namely, Heidegger). Cf. also E.G. Ballard, *Man and Technology* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978), pp. 1ff. Unlike Heidegger who looks to the "anderer Anfang", Ballard suggests the possibility of a passage from a "technological culture", whose unique end is "progress", to what he calls "technism". Cf. esp. chapter 7.

17. WHD, p. 5. Or as Heidegger often remarks: refusal is not nothing, but rather "die härteste Offenbarung des Seins". Cf. "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", p. 104. Also N II, p. 368: "Im Ausbleiben als solchen verbirgt sich die Unverborgenheit des Seins, und zwar als das Wesende des Seins selber." Also "Die Kehre", p. 46.

18. Any and every shining-forth of Being, be it as "Vorgestelltheit" or as "Ereignis" itself as the "groundless ground", is affected with withdrawal or concealment – a point which obviously presents difficulties with regard to the possibility of a new Inception.

19. But certainly did adumbrate Ereignis.

20. Or "Vorschein". Cf. "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", p. 70; ID, pp. 22, 24, 25, 27; G, p. 26; *Heidegger im Gespräch*, p. 73. Also GA I, 5 (Holzwege), Randbemerkung a, p. 26; "Das Gestell als äußerste Vergessenheit und zugleich als Wink in das Ereignis." Cf. also *Vier Seminare*, pp. 104–5.

21. Nietzsche, for his part, writes: "Wo Gefahr ist, da bin ich dabei, da wachse ich aus der Erde." Cf. K.G. W. VIII, 3, 373, 20(119), Summer, 1888.

22. That is, the Untruth preserves in itself the self-illuminating arrival of truth.

23. To be sure, the character of "publicness" is seen in a different light.

24. Cf. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 28: "Könnte dann aber nicht ein zureichender Blick in das, was das Gestell als Geschick des Entbergens ist, das Rettende in seinem Aufgehen zum Scheinen bringen."

25. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 29: "Wie sollen wir jedoch das Rettende im Wesen der Technik erblicken, solange wir nicht bedenken, in welchem Sinne von 'Wesen' das Gestell eigentlich das Wesen der Technik ist."

26. In addition to the texts in "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 29, "Essentia" is discussed in the following passages: N II, pp. 400–401, 345; "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", p. 39. In these passages Heidegger brings to expression two features of "Essentia", namely, that of "Allgemeinheit" and secondly the notion of "Möglichkeit" of the real. Moreover, as we know, Heidegger sees their origin in Platonic thought, in the notion of *idéa*, as "Was-sein" and in the *idéa* as *ἀγαθόν*, as that which "tauglich macht". In this regard, cf. EM, p. 150; N II, pp. 225–26, 229, 413; PL, pp. 133–34.

27. Cf. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 29.

28. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 30: "Beachten wir dies, dann trifft uns

etwas erstaunliches: die Technik ist es, die von uns verlangt, das, was man gewöhnlich unter 'Wesen' versteht, in einem anderen Sinne zu denken." This statement is slightly exaggerated, for Heidegger's *Denkweg* had already made the demand to think "essence" in its new signification. Essence, as that which accords, does however seem to have its highest possibility of manifestation in the context of technology. For it is in this context that "Essence" accords itself in such a manner as to present the possibility of "This turn".

29. Cf. N II, p. 362; WHD, p. 143; "Das Wesen der Sprache", p. 201. E. Schöfer has pointed to VWW as the writing in which this verbal sense of "Wesen" is clearly made use of. Cf. *Die Sprache Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1962), p. 95. This, of course, is not to mention SZ.

30. Cf. "Die Frage nach der Technik", pp. 30ff.

31. Cf. "Die Frage nach der Technik", p. 31: "Nur das Gewährte währt. Das Anfängliche aus der Frühe während ist das Gewährende."

32. Cf. p. 32. This accorded according refers to the "sameness" ("das Selbige") which shows itself in various manners within the "History of Thought", and should be understood out of its origin in *φύσις*. Cf. SVG, pp. 109–10. When speaking of the two features of Being's *Geschick*, that is, of the latter's self-revealing self-concealing, Heidegger points out that: "In beiden waltet auf verschiedene Weise das . . . Gewähren, in beiden, d.h. auch im Entzug, hier sogar noch wesentlicher." More essentially, precisely because as Entzug (as Gefahr) – all the more prominently.

33. As a designant of Being, the term "Gewähren" takes us back to PL where Heidegger translates Plato's *παρέχον* (VI, 508, 1 sq) with Gewähren. Cf. PL, pp. 132, 134–37, 140.

CHAPTER III

TECHNOLOGY AND EREIGNIS

The theme concerning the essence of technology stands in close kinship with what Heidegger calls "Ereignis" as the texts "Die Kehre" and "Der Satz der Identität" make amply clear. At this point, we will examine this relationship which demands that we first of all, however summarily, explore the notion of Ereignis itself. The first stage of this investigation will consist in considering some relatively early passages, while in the second we will tend to three central texts in which the relationship technology-Ereignis is brought to expression.

A. PRELIMINARY

The term "Ereignis" has formed part of Heidegger's philosophical terminology for some time,¹ although its signification was not made thematic prior to the essay "Der Satz der Identität" (1957). For instance, in the Nietzsche-Lectures Heidegger speaks of the "Ereignis" of Nihilism: "One of the essential formulations which characterizes the Ereignis of Nihilism reads: God is dead."² Or: "With Nihilism Nietzsche means the historic fact, that is, the Ereignis, that the highest values are devalued."³ Provisionally, it may be well to pursue these statements⁴ by recalling Heidegger's conception of Nihilism, whose most notable expression, we believe, is to be found in the essay "Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus" (in N II). In this essay, the term Ereignis is infrequent and yet its essential meaning is present. Let us listen to some pertinent passages which will bear this out.

In the essay on Nihilism, Heidegger distinguishes between an "authentic nihilism", that is, a nihilism understood "out of Being" ("vom Sein her"), and an "inauthentic nihilism", which is

regarded with exclusive reference to beings (“vom Seienden her”). As already brought out in an earlier chapter, authentic nihilism adverts to Being’s “remaining aloof” or “withdrawal” insofar as Being appears through “beings as such”. Heidegger, to determine “authentic nihilism” more closely, also makes use of other formulations. For example: “What belongs properly to it (to nihilism in its “essence”) is the remaining aloof of Being itself.”⁵ The capitalized word (in the German) “Eigene” obtrudes, for it is clearly suggestive of the essential meaning of the role of Ereignis – as we will discover shortly. In the same essay Heidegger writes: “Man becomes essential, in that he properly (that is, in a fashion befitting his essence) enters into his essence.”⁶ And according to this essay, the “Eigene” of man consists in what Heidegger calls “Entgegendenken” (a thinking which goes to the responsive encounter to Being) whose task it is to follow-up, in being drawn-in, “Being in its self-withdrawing”. If we are on the right path, that is, in case the word “Eigene” is intimately bound up with what Heidegger calls Ereignis, then it seems safe to assert that Ereignis suggests an “entering into what is proper” (“Eingehen ins Eigene”). We may also provisionally assume that Ereignis makes reference to the most primal source of this “Eingehen ins Eigene”, for the prefix *Er* corresponds to the “nominalpräfix” *Ur*. *Er-eignen*⁷ then would constitute the Ureignis, the most original ground of “recovering”. Appealing to the two texts cited above, we may say that Being’s remaining aloof is inherently proper to nihilism (interpreted “vom Sein her”) and that that which is proper to man consists in “letting oneself in with” (“Sich einlassen”) the former in the manner of “Entgegendenken” (“Andenken”). Hence, the possibility of an “Eingehen ins Eigene”, which on the one hand pertains to the essence of nihilism, while on the other constitutes what is essential to man. It seems to be a question of an appropriate relationship between Being and man, corresponding to which Being enters into what is intrinsically proper to it, and at the same time man takes up his “Eigenes”. In this regard, however, what does the word “appropriate” mean?

“Appropriate” (or what is proper to) suggests that respecting the unity Being-man, the primacy belongs to Being, instead of the assertion of the determination of Being by thinking (as *Vorstellen*

or human revealing as *Bestellen*) as the tradition had it. For Heidegger it is always the task of "thinking", most generally called "Entsprechen", to respond to Being, to let itself be held to Being.

Secondly, Ereignis, if it has to do with a sort of entering into "Das Eigene",⁸ signals a sort of "expropriation" ("Enteignung"), a term which in later writings becomes central. What does "expropriation" refer to in earlier texts? One of the more enlightening passages, in which the term, "Enteignung" is employed, is found in "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik".

The overcoming of Metaphysics is thought in terms of historic Being. This overcoming is the first sign of the primordial recovery of the Oblivion of Being. More primal, even if more concealed than this first sign, is that which shows itself in it. This is Ereignis itself. To a metaphysical mode of thought, that which looks like a first sign of something else only comes into account as the last mere semblance of a more primordial illumination. The overcoming remains only thought-provoking insofar as we remain mindful of the recovery. This earnest thinking is at the same time mindful of the overcoming. Such thought, which remains mindful of, experiences the unique Ereignis of the expropriation of beings, wherein the need of the truth of Being and thus the primordialness of truth illumines itself and thus provides illumination, in departing, for man in his essence. The overcoming is the delivering over of Metaphysics to its truth.⁹

The passage would require detailed and careful scrutiny, for it is a highly condensed version of the later text "Die Kehre", especially of the notion of "*diese Kehre*" which will be discussed in the following. For the moment, we only draw attention to the expression "Ereignis of the expropriation of beings". What is the sense of this expropriating of beings, of seemingly taking something away from beings? To seek out a response to this question, we appeal to another text from "Der Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik", which was written during this same period. In the text, a certain "confusion" is pointed out, which however is to be thought of as "Ereignis".

... Metaphysics nowhere responds to the question concerning the truth of Being because it never asks this question. It does not ask the question because it only thinks Being in that it represents beings as such. Metaphysics really means beings as a whole, but speaks of Being. It names Being but means beings as beings. From its beginning to its consummation, the assertions of Metaphysics, strangely enough, move within the medium of a thoroughgoing confusion of beings and Being. However, this confusion is to be thought as Ereignis...¹⁰

Admittedly a curious saying! The metaphysical confusion between Being and beings as such¹¹ is to be thought of as Ereignis and according to the notation from "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik" Ereignis involves the "expropriation of beings". The so-called "confusion" between Being and beings may well signal Ereignis, but only on the condition that we note that the confusion is to be attributed to Being itself. As we have brought out, on several occasions, what is imperative is to experience the confusion of *Being* (Gen. subiectivus).¹² And indeed in the continuation of the passage just cited, Heidegger confirms that the confusion in question "cannot by any means have its ground in the mere negligence of thought nor in the superficiality of saying".¹³ Viewed *essentially*, the confusion calls forth an "expropriation" through which beings must forfeit their predominance with which they had been privileged in traditional Metaphysics. But such an expropriation would then imply an "entering", on the side of Being, into its ownmost, into what belongs properly to it – for in Metaphysics, as this is interpreted by Heidegger, since the very beginning, an expropriation of Being¹⁴ happens in favor of beings.

But what about the curious word "abschiedlich" employed in the first text cited above? The primordialness of truth should illumine itself and in such a way should illuminate man in his essence. What does this word "abschiedlich" want to tell us? We should turn our attention to another text – perhaps the earliest in which "Ereignis" is expressed thematically and in which the word "Abschied" occurs.

What happens (in the History of Being)? ... Nothing

happens, but *Ereignis comes to pass*. Carrying out the Illumination, the Inception takes leave. . . . The History of Being, which historically is known as Metaphysics, has its essence therein that a progression out of the Inception comes to pass. In this progression Being releases itself in beingness and refuses the Illumination of the primordialness of the Inception. Beingness, beginning as *idéa* initiates the primacy of beings.¹⁵

Accordingly, it is Being which takes leave,¹⁶ that is to say, releases itself or gives itself through the specification of beingness as *idéa* – which thus gets the traditional primacy of beings off to a good start. This very same event, which describes Being's original concealment (the beginning of Being's *Ge-wesen*) – Being's self-release and its transappearing or presencing as beingness – is called in "Zeit und Sein" the "self-expropriating of Ereignis" ("Sichenteignen des Ereignisses") which means, then, that Being as Ereignis refuses its full presence; in other words, the self-expropriating of Ereignis is tantamount to withdrawal, initial Refusal.¹⁷ But this latter is also that which, in departing, provides the above mentioned Illumination, notwithstanding the decisive event that it itself remains concealed.

B. TECHNOLOGY AND EREIGNIS ACCORDING TO "DIE KEHRE"

Thus far, we have pointed to two fundamental features belonging to what Heidegger calls Ereignis, features which will remain decisive in the elaboration of this reflection.¹⁸ For Heidegger modern Technology is closely united with the notion of Ereignis which is already manifest in the essay "Die Frage nach der Technik" and even more so in "Die Kehre". In fact, it may be said that these two essays present a first sketch of Ereignis, involving a twofold "Eingehen ins Eigene" on the part of Gestell and of Geviert. In other words, according to these two essays, Ereignis indicates something like an *appropriate relation* between these two with regard to man's recognition, instead of the *exclusion* of Geviert by the unrelenting prevalence of Gestell.

According to Hölderlin's verse the danger and the saving

belong inseparably together. And we have suggested that the so-called danger refers to Being's self-concealing which in the domain of technology reaches its extreme point. The Gestell not only thwarts the coming about of any other manner of revealing but even obturates access to itself as a disguising mode of revealing.¹⁹ Nevertheless it is always possible, even anticipated, that the danger convert itself, as it were, into its apparent opposite, into the saving. This is the fundamental thrust of the laconic expression "Withdrawal is Ereignis", or the frequent saying: "Refusal is not nothing. . ." Thus we are confronted with two formulations expressive of the same reflection: the danger at its extreme embraces, in itself, the saving; and withdrawal (or concealment) is Ereignis.²⁰ The two say the "same" to which the essay "Die Kehre" bears witness in a remarkable way. In the first place, then, we should attempt to clarify Heidegger's formulation of the danger and how this harbors in itself the saving, whose meaning is summed up in the term the "Safe-keeping of Being" ("Wahrnis des Seins"), that is, Being as "das Gewesene".

The first sentence of "Die Kehre" describes Gestell, that is, formulates the essence of technology as the danger:

The essence of Gestell is the setting upon, gathered in itself, which pursues its ownmost essential truth with oblivion – which mode of pursuing thereby disguises itself in that it unfolds as the ordering of all that is present as standing reserve, establishes itself in the standing reserve and dominates as such.²¹

Throughout this writing we have emphasized that "refusal", "concealment" or "withdrawal" belong to Being itself and may not be attributed to the subjective, to man. This is expressed quite clearly in this first sentence (and throughout "die Kehre"). It is essential to Gestell that it pursues itself,²² its own essential truth with "oblivion", another term designating Being's ownmost concealment (and not the Vergeßlichkeit of man). But Gestell pursues itself in such a way that it (the "Nachstellen" of Gestell) disguises itself, as that which is in pursuit of Being's exclusive concealment, through the revealing of beings as Bestand.²³ The danger, that is, Gestell, consists in the self-concealing of its own essence and secondly in its concealing of the truth of beings in

that these only come to appearance via the ordering as ordered within the standing reserve. Owing to this, owing to the revealing of beings as Bestand – and this in abundance – the danger, seething beneath the surface as it were, does not become explicit.²⁴ Thus, the impression prevails that technology is man's own doing and nothing more – an impression which serves only to aggravate the radical disguise at play here.

However, Heidegger pointed out that Gestell belongs to Geschick, belongs to the manner in which Being, as *das gewesen Gewährende*,²⁵ sends itself and has sent itself since its initial welling-forth as φύσις. Albeit in prevalence today, Gestell is *one* mode of Being's presence, having its provenance in antecedent sendings and for that reason we may anticipate a "change over" ("Wandel") out of Gestell as the unidimensional masking of Being through Bestand.²⁶ At the horizon of Gestell stands another mode of Geschick (presumably) as which Being will send itself at the fitting moment.²⁷ And although Heidegger is willing to anticipate the oncoming, the arrival of a Geschick (or Schickung) out of Gestell, he cautions not to construe this as the would-be elimination of technology.²⁸ As we have stressed, it cannot be a question of even undermining technology.²⁹ Rather, Ereignis, at least in the context of the texts under discussion, consists in the right relation between Gestell and Geviert,³⁰ reminiscent of the relation and role played by concealment and illumination in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes".³¹

However, if another "Schickung" of Geschick stands at the horizon of Gestell, then this is only as a possibility, a possibility whose realization reverts primarily to Being's own "Entwurf", to Being's own "movement". At this point, it is precisely the movement of Being as Danger which is emphasized. The movement specific to the danger is characterized as a "self-turning" ("sich kehren") which is essentially a "turning-into" ("einkehren"), synonymous with the term "Eingehen in" which we discussed in the opening section above. How does Being as Danger turn itself so as to "turn in"?

According to the text, it seems that Being as Danger turns itself away from its own oblivion to or toward the truth of its essence, which is here called the "Safe-keeping of Being".³² But this turning to the truth of its essence exemplifies "*this* turn" ("*diese*

Kehre”),³³ that is, the turning into oblivion, a turn moreover – this is surely being reflected here – set in motion by the “Beginn” of Metaphysics. If we are mindful of Heidegger’s interpretation of Metaphysics, then we may recall that Being’s oblivion has endured hitherto. It is, then, not astonishing that Heidegger, in “Die Kehre”, speaks of Being as “Wahrnis”, that is, Being’s own safe-keeping of itself (or its own Verwahren).³⁴ In its metaphysical, concealing presence, Being has kept itself safe – Being has, as expressed in “Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus”, “saved” itself up.³⁵ And now this so-called turn, around which everything is concentrated, hinges on the becoming explicit of the danger as the danger. How does this come to pass? In the explicitation of the danger as the danger what or who takes the initiative? Is it some extraordinary “mortal” or “overman” who apprehends the danger as danger, proclaiming it then to the world – which would certainly, in any event, only turn a deaf ear – or is it Being which somehow expresses itself? In keeping with Heidegger’s tenacious opposition to the Philosophy of Subjectivity, i.e. to the pretentious idea that “thinking were its own sustenance”,³⁶ were its own ground and source, it is Being itself which initiates “diese Kehre”.³⁷ How does Heidegger describe this initiation?

In the context of modern technology, the safe-keeping of Being, that is, “world,” is being “set after” (“nachgesetzt”) by the danger, that is, by Being as Gestell – or Being’s safe-keeping is being pursued with oblivion. However, this self-pursuing on the part of Gestell is at once a turning itself toward Being’s Wahrnis. It is within the orbit of Being’s most persistent turning to oblivion that Being’s Wahrnis makes itself explicit, that “World” as “Geviert” comes to pass (possibly). Why that is the case, why Being’s Wahrnis is latent in Being’s turning to oblivion or why this turning to oblivion amounts to Being’s “Einkehr” – actually the arrival of World within the prevailing of Gestell – may only be surmised. We may assume that the dearth of Gestell (Being as one-sidedly danger) is in the final analysis revealing, self-revealing precisely owing to the intensity of the affair, which would then make the latter conspicuous. It is questionable that Heidegger could make a case of it – at least one which would share anything approximating to theoretical rigor (which expect-

tation on the part of some would be a misapprehension of the “Sache” at issue in the first place). Heidegger is merely re-emphasizing his hope-filled thought that “withdrawal is Ereignis”, that “das Gewesene” is “Ankunft”.

In the present context, this is intimated in that Heidegger speaks of the “favor” (“Gunst”) which is saved up in the most extreme refusal of Being, a favor which is not yet accorded,³⁸ and which consists in the conversion from Being’s concealment to its more primordial truth, the arrival of “Welt”³⁹ – not however in the sense that the latter would totally supersede Gestell, but instead in the sense that Gestell would cease to be exclusive of all other modes of revealment.

Moreover, if Ereignis comes to pass, it could only do so, emphasizes Heidegger, “unmediated” (“unvermittelt”)⁴⁰ or “jäh”.⁴¹ Again both terms serve to fend off any association with “causality”:⁴² *this* turn has nothing to do with an effecting agent which would precede Being’s manner of sending itself, nor would any “effect” trail after.⁴³ Within *this* turn, Being illumines itself, thus providing its own brightness. Heidegger calls this “sich lichten”, a “lightning flash” (“Blitzen”), which, analogous to any strike of lightning, illuminates what is in its area – but also shows itself, even if less conspicuously. This self-showing Heidegger calls “World” or more precisely the “in-flashing of world” (“Einblitz von Welt”) in “die Verwahrlosung des Dinges” (p. 44). What is this latter, if not the “thing’s” utter disregard, the utter neglect of the thing, amidst the standing reserve of Gestell? Heidegger writes: “In-flashing of World within Gestell is the In-flashing of the truth of Being in truthless Being.”⁴⁴ This is what Heidegger, in “Die Kehre”, calls Ereignis or “Insight into that which is”,⁴⁵ which more appropriately, however, describes the inauguration of Ereignis. Why would such an in-flashing of world within Gestell be called Ereignis – presumably something quite decisive – or “Insight into that which is”, understanding that the word “Insight” does not refer to human “insight”, but names a possibility imparted by Being itself?

The so-called in-flashing of world within the all-pervasive domination of Gestell is called Ereignis since it is such an in-flashing which is to make explicit the danger *as* danger, Gestell *as* Gestell. And this, insofar as a sort of *contrast* is instituted – the

contrast between the “truth of Being”⁴⁶ and the “truthless Being” (Gestell). Prior to this in-flashing of world, the truth of Being within the confines of the supreme reign of Gestell is obscured, or rather at the point of total exclusion. Thus, in virtue of the in-flashing, the truth of Being would be able to show itself, and to so such that it “relates itself” to Gestell.⁴⁷ This “Blitzen” of the truth of Being so that Gestell, the truthless Being, becomes explicit in what it is (namely, “die Verwahrlosung des Dinges”), is the very first ingredient of what Heidegger calls the happening of Ereignis – according to the formulation proffered by “Die Kehre”.⁴⁸

C. TECHNOLOGY AND EREIGNIS ACCORDING TO “DER SATZ DER IDENTITÄT”

The text we just examined thinks the “recovery” of traditional Metaphysics, including its most potent offspring, namely, das Gestell. No less essential for the question about technology and Ereignis is the essay “Der Satz der Identität” which is also directed at a “recovery” of tradition. In fact, the reflections on Ereignis offered by “Der Satz der Identität” belong to the context of Heidegger’s last attempt to recover (not to do away with) Metaphysics. The conception of Ereignis as groundless ground or as a sort of third element⁴⁹ in which “Being” and “thinking” belong together presents a further determination of Ereignis. In the context of “Die Frage nach der Technik” and “Die Kehre”, including the pertinent essays on the “Thing”,⁵⁰ Ereignis begins with *this* turn,⁵¹ with the appropriation of the technological world of Bestand, that is, with the expropriation of the latter as the sole and exclusive criterion for the unconcealment of beings. By way of this expropriation, a right relationship would be instituted between Gestell and Geviert, that is, both would enter into what is proper to each. And this “Eingehen ins Eigene” (or “Einkehr”) constituted, at least, the initiation of what Heidegger calls Ereignis: constituting at once the “recovery” of Gestell – and that means of traditional Metaphysics. But in “Der Satz der Identität”, Heidegger’s formulation of the question of Ereignis and recovery differs somewhat or rather takes a “step backward” to the recovering “third element”.

Heidegger embarks upon his way with a general characterization of the customary interpretation of the principle of Identity which states that all beings are identical with themselves. "To each being as such belongs identity, its oneness with itself."⁵² Hence, the unity of Identity forms an essential trait of the "Being of beings"; being identical with itself is part and parcel of the beingness of beings, a positive manner of stating the traditional principle of contradiction.

But prior, in a sense, to tradition Parmenides had already experienced identity, experienced it in a fundamentally different way. Parmenides, suggests Heidegger, did not represent "identity" metaphysically as a fundamental feature of the "Being of beings" but rather thought identity as that which (or to which) Being belongs.⁵³ The same ($\tau\acute{o} \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$), which is expressed in the Parmenidean fragment 3 which Heidegger here re-interprets, does not simply signify that Being and apprehending (*voeiv*) belong together in the sense made explicit by EM and other texts. Rather, the "same", that is, "identity" is here thought as that *in which* or *out of which* Being and apprehending originate as unified, in the first place. The language of "Der Satz der Identität" and its fundamental intention compel us to conceive of identity or sameness as a sort of third element⁵⁴ and not simply as the peculiar manner of relatedness between "Being" and "apprehending", Being and thought. The following text, not to mention the whole, bears this out: "Thinking and Being belong together in the Same and out of this Same."⁵⁵ Heidegger's entire discussion of the term "Zusammengehörigkeit", in "Der Satz der Identität", tends in this direction.

Traditionally, it seems, it is the "zusammen" which is emphasized, that is, the "together" in the sense of mediated unity, as "synthesis". But there is another possibility, that is, to think the togetherness in question in terms of "belonging". The word "belonging" ("Gehören") reflects back upon that Identity as that in which Being and apprehending belong. Or to express the matter differently: *to represent* belonging together in a traditional fashion would be to assimilate components into a unity; *to experience* the belonging together in a more original manner, however, would mean to uphold the *difference* between Being and apprehending in their common rootedness in their source,

namely, in the “Gehören” (or “Das Selbe”) which Heidegger will shortly interpret as Ereignis: that which lets Being and apprehending relate to, that is, to concern one another mutually.

But thinking and Being is another way of saying man and Being, assuming that “thinking”, that is, responding to Being after a fashion (and not the more contracted style of domineering conceptualization), is the distinctive feature of man. Heidegger discusses here (pp. 17–19) this *belonging* together very briefly and in a manner which could be misdirecting – if we overlook the difference in “Der Satz der Identität” between the terms Being and Ereignis. As far as “Der Satz der Identität” is concerned the two are not identifiable. The bond between man and Being, which are always already “assigned” (“übereignet”) to each other, refers us to the “appropriating” (“Vereignen”) of Ereignis, to Ereignis as that out of which it is given to man and Being (historically and traditionally) to belong together. Heidegger cautions twice (pp. 18, 19) against attempting to think the relationship man and Being either in terms of “Being” (understood traditionally) or in terms of man. The relationship is neither to be understood in terms of Being – that is, here the “Being of beings” – nor in terms of man in their interplay, but rather out of a third element, a point which becomes increasingly lucid with the movement of the essay itself, a movement moreover which bears in itself the transformation of thinking.⁵⁶ For, to conceive of the togetherness of man and Being in terms of either one or the other amounts to an adherence to the attitude of representational thinking towards whose recovery the essay (among others) is oriented. In this respect, what is required is the “Schritt zurück”, the “Sich Absetzen” from the long engrained traditional attitude, which would then allow “entry” in the domain of “Belonging” (das Gehören as original and according Gewesenes), which in the present essay signifies to move away from “Vorstellen” and the metaphysical conception of Being as “Ground” in order then to spring into the “groundless ground.” It need not be said that the term “Abgrund” is not to be thought of as some sort of “abyss” (the current translation), but rather as expressing Ereignis itself. The term “Abgrund”⁵⁷ characterizes Ereignis as the recovery of the metaphysical “Being of beings” as “Grund”, fundamentally as “substantia”, as “subject”.

At this point, however, Heidegger speaks of the “Absetzen” as a spring into a realm of the mutual “assignment” of man and Being,⁵⁸ as into a realm in which we have already been allowed entrance. It is not accidental that Heidegger uses here the *Zustandspassiv* – “wir sind schon eingelassen” (p. 20), and on the preceding page: “Man and Being are assigned to one another”,⁵⁹ for this being assigned suffices to suggest that which “appropriates” (“Vereignen”, in an active sense), namely, Ereignis.⁶⁰ The spring is a spring into the constellation of man and Being in which we always already are, but in which we have not yet learned to “dwell”. Let us approach “Ereignis” by going through Heidegger’s condensed discussion about technology and Gestell.

As in “Die Frage nach der Technik”, Heidegger begins with comments concerning the anthropological determination of technology, which interpretation is unable to catch sight of the constellation of man and Being, that is, of that which rules in this constellation. To represent technology as the total complex of man and machines is to remain shackled to the pretense that technology is exclusively of man’s making. Thereby, however, “we fail to hear the appealing claim of Being, which speaks in the essence of technology”.⁶¹

Despite the familiarity of this thought a word of clarification is in order. Heidegger uses here the expression “Anspruch des Seins” – Being addresses itself to man in the orbit of technology. And we asserted earlier that in this essay the term Being and Ereignis should be held apart, which for the most part holds true. However, in the expression “Anspruch des Seins”, the term Sein refers to Ereignis and not to “Sein” as that which, together with man, is challenged. What addresses itself to man within the context of man and Being, which Heidegger here calls Gestell, is Ereignis – the mentioned “Anspruch” is then that of Ereignis, the appealing claim of Being which appropriates.

This begins to become clearer when Heidegger speaks of the mutual challenging of man and Being in the context of modern technology. On the one hand, says Heidegger, “Being” is challenged – and it would be licit to assert that the Herausforderung under which “Being” stands is comparable with the same idea in “Die Frage nach der Technik”.⁶² And on the other, man, as the earlier essay brought out, is “challenged”,

that is, exacted to secure all beings in the manner of ordering. It is basically this context of the mutual challenging that Heidegger calls Gestell in "Der Satz der Identität".

We would expect at this stage a discussion of Gestell as Gefahr. However, any such discussion is omitted, and rather, what comes to the fore is Gestell as the place of the "saving", the place for the initiation of the recovery of tradition; that is, the mutual "assignment" of Being and man within Gestell is reflected in the mutual Herausforderung.

Gestell as the mutual face to face of man and Being is not "something ultimate" ("ein Letztes"), but refers us, if we attend to its essence, to this "Ultimate" (p. 24). What is this ultimate, as it were, concealed behind the reciprocal relationship of man and Being; concealed indeed behind *voεiv* and *εivαι* of which Parmenides speaks? Heidegger calls it Ereignis and it is imperative here to understand Ereignis as the "groundless ground" which accords itself and thereby sustains the mutual assignment of man and Being within Gestell. Sustained by Being as Ereignis, Being and man (i.e. Tradition) are brought into their own,⁶³ reach each other genuinely, that is, not merely and exclusively in the manner of Bestellen.

In concluding this section, we may recall what was said earlier about identity. On an Heideggerian reading of Parmenides' fragment 3 identity or sameness designates that in which (not as which) or out of which *voεiv* and *εivαι* (hence tradition) are enabled to relate to one another, while remaining distinct. This interpretation of the Parmenidean fragment, with which the essay begins, prefigures the notion of Ereignis. For it is Being as Ereignis which "lets" man and Being belong together. Heidegger's attempt to "recover" tradition consists in his grounding Metaphysics with "Abgrund", the ground without ground,⁶⁴ that first source out of which Being and man are bound to one another.

Now it is manifest: Being belongs together with thinking in an identity, whose essence originates out of a Belonging-together which we call Ereignis.⁶⁵

In "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens", this very same function is assumed by what Heidegger calls

“unconcealment” – or Illumination (Clearing) which “accords” the “belonging together of Being and thinking” (p. 75). And again on the following page of this essay, Heidegger writes: “Unconcealment is, as it were, the Element in which (in virtue of which) there is Being as well as thinking and their belonging-together.”⁶⁶ These different formulations intend basically the same thing: to recover, to appropriate Metaphysics⁶⁷ with a notion of Being (call it Ereignis, Unverborgenheit, Austrag, Verhältnis, etc.) which is groundless – but which is, and this notwithstanding any assertions to the contrary, an ultimate ground.

NOTES

1. In a note to BH, Heidegger remarks that the term “Ereignis” has been a “Leitwort” of his thinking since 1936. Cf. GA I, 9, p. 316: “Nur ein Wink in der Sprache der Metaphysik. Denn ‘Ereignis’ seit 1936 das Leitwort meines Denkens.” Cf. also “Der Weg zur Sprache”, p. 260, note 1.

2. N I, p. 183, from the years 1936/37: “Eine der wesentlichen Formeln zur Kennzeichnung des Ereignisses des Nihilismus lautet: ‘Gott ist tot’.”

3. N I, p. 183: “Mit Nihilismus meint Nietzsche die geschichtliche Tatsache, d.h. das Ereignis, daß die obersten Werte sich entwerten.” Cf. also pp. 185, 254, 402.

4. Similar statements abound in Heidegger’s writings.

5. N II, p. 360: “Das ihm (dem Nihilismus) Eigene ist das Ausbleiben des Seins selbst.”

6. N II, p. 358: “Der Mensch wird wesentlich, indem er eigens in sein Wesen eingeht.”

7. To express the verbal *er-eignen*, Heidegger makes use of a series of words: *vereignen*, *übereignen* (often in the “Zustandspassiv”), *enteignen*, *zueignen*.

8. Ereignis itself is not only the process of “Eingehen ins Eigene” but is also that which “allows” or “lets” (“läßt”) this occur; in the last analysis, the source of the “Eigene”. Moreover, Heidegger will use the term “Ereignis” to signify the “Eingehen ins Eigene” (hence “Verwindung”) *post factum*.

9. Cf. “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik”, pp. 70–71: “Die Überwindung der Metaphysik wird seinsgeschichtlich gedacht. Sie ist das Vorzeichen der anfänglichen Verwindung der Vergessenheit des Seins. Früher, obzwar auch verborgener als das Vorzeichen, ist das in ihm Sichzeigende. Dies ist das Ereignis selbst. Das, was für die metaphysische Denkungsart wie ein Vorzeichen eines anderen aussieht, kommt nur noch als letzter bloßer Anschein einer anfänglicheren Lichtung in den Anschlag. Die Überwindung bleibt nur insofern denkwürdig, als an die Verwindung gedacht wird. Dieses inständige

Denken denkt zugleich an die Überwindung. Solches Andenken erfährt das einzige Ereignis der Enteignung des Seienden, worin die Not der Wahrheit des Seins und so die Anfängnis der Wahrheit sich lichtet und das Menschenwesen abschiedlich überleuchtet. Die Überwindung ist die Überlieferung der Metaphysik in ihrer Wahrheit."

10. p. 11: "... die Metaphysik antwortet nirgends auf die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seins, weil sie diese Frage nie fragt. Sie fragt nicht, weil sie das Sein nur denkt, indem sie das Seiende als das Seiende vorstellt. Sie meint das Seiende im Ganzen und spricht vom Sein. Sie nennt das Sein und meint das Seiende als das Seiende. Das Aussagen der Metaphysik bewegt sich von ihrem Beginn bis in ihre Vollendung auf eine seltsame Weise in einer durchgängigen Verwechslung von Seiendem und Sein. Diese Verwechslung ist freilich als Ereignis zu denken..." Cf. also BH, p. 170, where Heidegger also speaks of this fateful "Verwechslung".

11. In the context of Heidegger's interpretation of traditional Metaphysics the term "das Seiende", "das Seiende als solches", and "das Seiende als solches im Ganzen" all function in the same manner. In fact, it is not infrequent that Heidegger uses "Sein" (but more often "das Sein des Seienden") to refer to "das Seiende" – and not to Being itself, to that which has held itself concealed (and as such present) in the "Anfängnis".

12. This was pointed out with reference to the unity Gefahr-Rettung.

13. Cf. "Der Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik", pp. 11–12: "Sie (die Verwechslung) kann ihren Grund keineswegs in einer bloßen Nachlässigkeit des Denkens haben oder in einer Flüchtigkeit des Sagens."

14. Initiated by Being itself.

15. Cf. N II, pp. 485–486: "Was geschieht? Nichts geschieht, *das Ereignis er-eignet*. Der Anfang nimmt – austragend die Lichtung ... den Abschied Diejenige Geschichte des Seins, die historisch als Metaphysik bekannt ist, hat ihr Wesen darin, daß ein Fortgang aus dem Anfang ereignet. In diesem Fortgang entläßt das Sein sich in die Seiendheit und verweigert die Lichtung der Anfängnis des Anfangs. Die Seiendheit, beginnend als *idéa*, eröffnet den Vorrang des Seienden."

16. The manner of expression differs but the meaning is the same as that stated in our treatment of unconcealment.

17. Regarding the term "enteignen" ("Enteignung"), cf. N II, p. 468, "Die Überwindung der Metaphysik", pp. 71, 82; "Das Ding", "Der Satz der Identität", p. 29; "Die Sprache", pp. 28, 29. In addition to the sense touched on above in reference to the expression "Enteignung des Seienden" and the "Sichenteignen des Ereignisses", Heidegger employs the verb in the sense of "becoming free for", that is, a kind of expropriation which frees for; *a freeing from directed at a freeing for*. Cf. above noted pages of "Das Ding" and "Die Sprache". Also the GA edition of SZ, p. 252, where Heidegger notes the "Unzuhaue" accomplished by "Angst" with the simple word "Enteignis". Dasein has been freed from the "world" of Das Man, individualized, and thus free for self-world appropriation.

18. Even if the meaning of the term "expropriation" seems to shift as indicated above.

19. Or as Heidegger succinctly puts it in SF, p. 243: "Es (Sein) hält sich in einer Verborgenheit, die sich selber verbirgt."

20. We notice that in "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken", Heidegger defines "retten" as follows: "... etwas in sein eigenes Wesen freilassen". Essentially this is the meaning of the role of the "Ver-eignen" of Ereignis (used actively and not, as is frequently the case, as a Zustandspassiv: "... ist ... vereignet").

21. Cf. "Die Kehre", p. 37: "Das Wesen des Gestells ist das in sich gesammelte Stellen, das seiner eigenen Wesenswahrheit mit der Vergessenheit nachstellt, welches Nachstellen sich dadurch verstellt, daß es sich in das Bestellen alles Anwesenden als den Bestand entfaltet, sich in diesem einrichtet und als dieser herrscht."

22. Cf. "Wissenschaft und Besinnung", where Heidegger uses the term "Nachstellen" in a somewhat varied sense.

23. A concealing, disguising mode of Entbergen as we saw earlier.

24. In "Die Kehre", Heidegger's notion of the hermeneutical "als" comes clearly to the forefront.

25. This is our composition.

26. Heidegger employs the word "vermuten", to suppose or to assume. Since Gestell is tied to Geschick, we *may suppose* a sending out of Gestell into another mode of Being's beingness. As we recall in this regard, Heidegger, somewhat earlier, spoke of the "Schickungen" as following one another with necessity (the expression used was "notwendige Folge"). This is revised here and then anew in "Zeit und Sein", p. 9.

27. Cf. p. 37: "Das Geschickliche geht in sich jeweils auf einen ausgezeichneten Augenblick zu..."

28. Cf. p. 38: "Wenn ein Wandel im Sein, d.h. jetzt im Wesen des Gestells, sich ereignet ... dann sagt dies keineswegs, die Technik ... werde beseitigt. Sie wird weder niedergeschlagen noch gar zerschlagen."

29. In this regard, cf. B. Romano, *Tecnica e Giustizia nel Pensiero di Martin Heidegger* (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, 1969), pp. 185ff. Here Romano discusses the mistaken belief that Heidegger calls for the radical rejection of the contemporary world.

30. A right relation granted by Being's "Aufblitzen". Cf. below.

31. At this point in "Die Kehre", Heidegger, for some two pages, discusses the role of man with regard to Being's Wandel. We will return to this section in conjunction with the last two pages of the essay.

32. Cf. p. 40: "Als die Gefahr kehrt sich das Sein in die Vergessenheit seines Wesens von diesem Wesen weg und kehrt sich so zugleich gegen die Wahrheit seines Wesens." Lovitt, whose translation of "Die Kehre" is very commendable, renders "gegen" with "counter to", which is surely correct. On the other hand, we would point out the ambiguity of the word "gegen" in Heidegger's philosophy. "Gegen" not only, nor even most fundamentally, means "counter to", "against", but also "toward". In turning away from its oblivion, Being turns "toward" ("gegen") the truth of its essence. This seems to be the sense intended, for in several passages of "Die Kehre", Heidegger speaks of the movement *from* Vergessenheit *to* (or toward) Being's truth, Being's unconcealment as "Wahrnis".

33. The expression "jene Kehre" does not occur in the essay.
34. Cf. "Die Kehre", pp. 39ff.
35. Cf. p. 369: "... das Sein selbst spart sich selbst in seinem Ausbleiben ..."
36. Cf. the study of John Sallis, "Language and Reversal", *Martin Heidegger: in Europe and America* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 138.
37. Cf. P. Chiodi, *L'Ultimo Heidegger* (Torino: Taylor, 1969), p. 105. Chiodi sees the matter perspicaciously when he writes: "Anche l'oblio è affare dell'essere, ed il capovolgimento dall'epoca della povertà estrema in una nuova parusia dell'essere non è in potere dell'uomo."
38. Cf. p. 42: "... die noch ungewährte Gunst".
39. Cf. p. 42: "Im Wesen der Gefahr west und wohnt eine Gunst, nämlich die Gunst der Kehre der Vergessenheit des Seins in die Wahrheit des Seins. Im Wesen der Gefahr, wo sie als die Gefahr ist, ist die Kehre zur Wahrnis, ist diese Wahrnis selbst, ist das Rettende des Seins."
40. We find it interesting and characteristic that Heidegger in SZ uses the term "unvermittelt" with regard to Dasein's becoming authentic. Similarly, this process is unmediated.
41. In a somewhat later text, namely, the SVG, p. 160, Heidegger elucidates the meaning of "jäh": "Das Jähe ist das Plötzliche, das nur dem Anschein nach dem Steten, d.h. Ausdauernden widerspricht. Ausgedauert wird das je schon Währende. Im Plötzlichen aber wird das schon Währende, bislang jedoch Verborgene erst gewährt und sichtbar." Cf. also "Das Ding", p. 54.
42. Cf. p. 43: "Der Weise, wie es, das Sein selber, sich schickt, geht nichts Bewirkendes als Sein voraus und folgt keine Wirkung als Sein nach."
43. As "Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik", p. 485, expresses it: "Die Würde ist das Edle, das ereignet, ohne des Wirkens zu bedürfen."
44. "Die Kehre", p. 44: "Einblitz von Welt in das Gestell ist Einblitz der Wahrheit des Seins in das wahrlose Sein." Obviously, the order here is irreversible, owing precisely to Gestell's prevalence; in other words to speak of the in-flashing of Gestell within "Welt" would be non-sensical.
45. "Die Kehre", p. 44: "Einblick in das, was ist – dieser Titel nennt jetzt das Ereignis der Kehre im Sein, die Kehre der Verweigerung seines Wesens in das Ereignen seiner Wahrnis."
46. In "Die Kehre", "Welt" or "Wahrnis des Seins", Being's self-keeping or self-preserving.
47. Cf. "Die Kehre", p. 44: "Einblick in das was ist, ist das Ereignis selber, als welches die Wahrheit des Seins zum wahrlosen Sein sich verhält und steht." The contrast we mentioned is further brought out in the following: "Erst wenn Einblick sich ereignet, lichtet sich das Wesen der Technik als das Gestell, erkennen wir, wie im Bestellen des Bestandes die Wahrheit des Seins als Welt verweigert bleibt, merken wir, daß alles bloßes Wollen und Tun nach der Weise des Bestellens in der Verwahrlosung beharrt." We notice how the very first word "Erst" brings out the need of Being's self-initiation. Moreover, and more essentially, the text clarifies the manner of *explicitation* through which Gestell as Gestell shows itself.

48. But in unity with this first ingredient, man is called upon – certainly not as the one who “effects” the in-flashing of world, but rather as the one who “prepares” for it and prepares it. Heidegger often speaks of a “preparatory thinking” which expresses man’s task within the possible happening of Ereignis.

49. Concerning Being as a third element, cf. WHD, p 147: “Allein als diese Verschiedenen (namely *voεiv-εivαι*) gehören sie gerade zusammen. Aber wo und wie? Welches ist das Element, worin beide zusammengehören? Ist es das *voεiv* oder das *εivαι*, oder keines von beiden? Also ein drittes, das in Wahrheit für beide das Erste ist, aber das Erste nicht als ihr Synthesis, sondern erstlicher noch und anfänglicher denn alle Thesis.” It seems to us undeniable that Heidegger in later writings such as WHD, “Der Satz der Identität”, “Die Onto-Theologische Verfassung der Metaphysik”, “Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens”, and in “Zeit und Sein” emphasizes “Being” as “ein Drittes”. We also recall a text found in N I, p. 528, in which Heidegger is discussing Parmenides’ fragment 3 – the same fragment discussed in “Der Satz der Identität”. He translates as follows: “Dasselbe aber ist Vernehmung sowohl als auch Sein. Es ist dasselbe – will sagen: es gehört im Wesen zusammen; Seiendes ist nicht Seiendes seiend, d.h. anwesend, ohne Vernehmung ... Seiendes ist nur, wo Vernehmung und Vernehmung nur, wo Seiendes. Der Spruch meint ein Drittes oder Erstes, das die beiden trägt: die *ἀλήθεια*.” Cf. also SF, p. 237: “Liegt es am ‘Sein’ – das Wort nennt jetzt ... jenes fragwürdige Selbe, worin das Wesen des Seins und das Wesen des Menschen zusammengehören.” But Being as Ereignis, Austrag, as *ἀλήθεια*, as a sort of third element, that is, as other than the traditional, metaphysical Being of beings or beingness and thinking, as the receding “carrying out” of this metaphysical unity, is nothing novel. Being as unconcealment which historically conceals itself was always thought, by Heidegger, as other than any of its specification (modes of beingness) and the corresponding styles of thought. However, in the later writings, especially those mentioned above, Heidegger attempts a “step backward” to the source of tradition; to the groundless ground which grounds the bond of “Being” and “thinking” traditionally “interpreted”. Cf. also N II, pp. 208ff.

50. Especially “Das Ding” and “Bauen, Wohnen, Denken”.

51. This is not to suggest that the later essay has nothing to do with “*Diese Kehre*”, which would surely be a mistaken view. In “Der Satz der Identität” something akin to “diese Kehre” will be expressed in terms of the “Sich Absetzen” from representational thinking, together with the notion of Being as “Ground”, to the “experiencing” of Ereignis as “Abgrund”.

52. Cf. “Der Satz der Identität”, p. 12: “Zu jedem Seienden als solches gehört die Identität, die Einheit mit ihm selbst.”

53. Cf. “Der Satz der Identität”, p. 14: “Das Sein gehört in eine Identität.”

54. In addition to the texts mentioned in Note 49 of this section, cf. the essay “Moirā”, pp. 45–46.

55. “Der Satz der Identität”, p. 14: “Denken und Sein gehören in das Selbe und aus diesem Selben zusammen.” Cf. also pp. 15, 16. The expressions “in das Selbe” and “aus diesem Selben” mean something other than “als das Selbe”.

We note, too, that Heidegger here translates *voeiv* with *Denken* instead of the more usual "Vernehmen" (or *In-die-Acht-nehmen*). This suggests already what the essay is about: the recovery of tradition as a whole, not merely in departure from Plato.

56. Heidegger suggests at the outset (as is also the case with regard to "Die Frage nach der Technik") that the reader attend to its movement as a whole rather than to its details.

57. It is to be noticed that Heidegger uses the term "Abgrund" here in two senses. If we "represent" the springing metaphysically, hence traditionally, then the spring seems to spring into an "Abgrund", in the sense of something abyss-like, for the Abgrund for metaphysical thinking is abysmal (p. 20). But then later in this same essay (and surely long before the essay) Heidegger clarifies Abgrund as Ereignis. Cf. p. 28: "Doch dieser Abgrund ist weder das leere Nichts noch eine finstere Wirrnis, sondern: das Ereignis."

58. On these pages, Heidegger briefly speaks of the mutual assignment of man and Being; man is called in his genuine essence, the "relation of response" ("Bezug der Entsprechung") who is open to Being, who stands in preparation for the advent of Being. The text, which seems to be displaced, is to be set in contrast with the mutual *Herausforderung* of man and Being of which the essay speaks – the prevailing state of affairs.

59. "Mensch und Sein sind einander übereignet."

60. We note in advance that Heidegger clarifies that the constellation of man and Being is not a "Letztes", but rather refers us to this "Letztes". Cf. p. 24.

61. Cf. "Der Satz der Identität", p. 22: "Man überhört den Anspruch des Seins, der im Wesen der Technik spricht."

62. However, the source of the mutual *Herausforderung* is expressed differently. That this is so, becomes evident when Heidegger states that "der Mensch dem Sein vereignet . . . ist". Yet what does the "Vereignen" is Ereignis; the source of the transition (suggested by the prefix *ver*) to *das Eigene*. On p. 27 this is expressly stated: "Das Ereignis vereignet Mensch und Sein in ihr wesenhaftes zusammen." In "Die Frage nach der Technik", the source in question was called "unconcealment" as addressing itself to man within *Gestell*.

63. Mindful of the essay "Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik", especially of the notion of *Austrag* or *Unterschied* – which again bring Ereignis to expression – we may state that the being brought into ownness, into what is proper to Being and man consists in their separateness, but at once, in their mutual tending toward one another. "Austrag" or "Unterschied" (i.e. Ereignis) according to the above-mentioned essay, is the sustaining source, the ground of the traditional "Sein des Seienden", that which grounds the distinction between Being and beings but likewise that which unites the two throughout tradition.

64. Cf. Pietro Chiodi, *L'Ultimo Heidegger* (Torino: Taylor, 1969), p. 43. Chiodi rightly points out that Abgrund has nothing to do with the privation of ground, but rather is the giving of ground. Abgrund "non è privazione di Grund ma donazione di Grund, di fondamento".

65. "Der Satz der Identität", p. 27: "Jetzt zeigt sich: Sein gehört mit dem Denken in eine Identität, deren Wesen aus jenem Zusammengehören stammt, das wir das Ereignis nennen."

66. Cf. p. 76: "Unverborgenheit ist gleichsam das Element, in dem es Sein sowohl wie Denken und ihre Zusammengehörigkeit erst gibt."

67. Cf. also "Zeit und Sein". Regarding Ereignis, the same mode of expression is employed.

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NOTES

1. Those works published by Heidegger during his lifetime.
2. This, together with the previously listed works, have recently been republished as *Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1978).
3. On occasion, we will list the edition used by us. For a chronology of Heidegger's writings, cf. W.J. Richardson, *Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 675ff; also Hans-Martin Saß, *Heidegger-Bibliographie* (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1968), pp. 5-21.
4. Division One consists of the republication of Heidegger's writings with selected "Randbemerkungen".
5. Division Two will include Heidegger's Vorlesungen, 1923-44.

INDEX

- Abgrund, 121, 210, 212, 260, 262, 267
 n.51, 268 n.57, 268 n.64. *See also*
 Groundless ground
 Actualitas, 9, 56 n.27, 61, 62, 65, 70 n.8,
 148 n.14, 215 n.6, 242
 Alderman, H., 112 n.20
 Aler, Jan, 220 n.70
 Ἀληθεια, ἀληθευειν, 3, 26, 27, 30 n.23, 40
 n.141, 40 n.155, 135, 144, 157, 214 n.1,
 267 n.49
 Anwesen, 45, 54 n.4, 69. *See also*
 Presencing
 Anwesenheit, 31 n.34, 54 n.4, 54 n.7, 215
 n.7. *See also* Presence
 Apprehending, 3, 14, 34 n.67, 46, 130. *See*
 also Vernehmen and νοειν
 Aquinas, Thomas, 71 n.16, 149 n.20
 Aristotle, 23, 24, 33 n.47, 37 n.119, 40
 n.149, 56 n.27, 60
 Art, 202, 246 n.12; as aesthetics, 21–22,
 23, 38 n.126, 38 n.129, 231 n.233
 Attunement, 160–63, 166, 167, 216 n.23,
 217 n.31, 218 n.47, 219 n.60. *See also*
 Befindlichkeit
 Austrag, 12, 15, 212, 263, 267, n.49, 268
 n.63
 Authenticity, 161, 164, 167, 174, 181, 182,
 188
 Αὐτό, τὸ, 14, 15, 130, 259

 Ballard, E.G., 222 n.101, 246 n.8, 247 n.16
 Bäumler, A., 77, 92 n.33
 Beaufret, Jean, 217 n.42
 Befindlichkeit, 217 n.28. *See also*
 Attunement
 Being, 6, 104, 115, 120, 157
 as according itself, 15, 40 n.155, 131,
 147 n.4. *See also* Gewähren
 as clearing, 142, 198, 229 n.227, 230
 n.232
 as enduring, 9, 15, 131, 245
 as illuminating, 199, 201, 202, 211, 230
 n.232, 263
 as keeping to itself, 7, 9, 197
 as remaining aloof, 143, 205–8
 as self-concealing, 6, 7, 23, 102, 110,
 112 n.24, 121, 159, 202–12
 as self-illuminating, 108, 112 n.24, 251,
 253
 as self-revealing, 6, 101, 116, 202–12
 as self-sending, 99, 105, 108, 111 n.24,
 117, 136, 159, 202–12, 239–44. *See*
 also Geschick
 as third element, 267 n.49. *See also*
 Ereignis
 as withdrawing, 108, 206, 209, 211, 214
 n.1, 242, 254, 257
 Being of beings, IX, 43, 47, 49, 59, 63, 99,
 110, 117, 120, 121, 126 n.20, 208, 211,
 215 n.6, 233 n.270, 260
 Being-toward-death, 168–82, 221 n.95,
 222 n.99, 222 n.103; as authentic,
 175–82; as inauthentic, 175–82
 Beingness, IX, 7, 43, 47, 49, 57 n.32, 59,
 63, 65, 66, 69, 75 n.50, 99, 102, 104, 111
 n.6, 117, 121, 126 n.20, 143, 148 n.14,
 157, 203, 204, 208, 233 n.270, 239, 253.
 See also Seiendheit
 Bergen, 234 n.274
 Bestand, 93 n.45, 110, 126, 131, 138, 140,
 141, 145, 146, 150 n.33, 228 n.207, 241,
 254. *See also* Reserve
 Bestellen, IX, 5, 39 n.137, 43, 47, 66, 75
 n.58, 110 n.4, 113 n.33, 115, 136, 137,
 140, 141, 144, 146, 150 n.31, 150, n.32,
 241, 251. *See also* Ordering
 Biemel, Walter, 37 n.119, 150 n.39, 222
 n.11
 Boeder, H., 32 n.38
 Boehm, R., 36 n.100
 Bröcker, Walter, 247 n.16
 Burnet, John, 11, 29 n.11, 32 n.45, 33 n.50

 Causality, 27, 30 n.13, 41 n.157, 56 n.27,
 61, 62, 63, 70 n.4, 103, 132–36, 148
 n.14, 246 n.12, 257

- Challenging, 136–41, 246 n.5, 261. *See also* Herausforderung
- Chiodi, Pietro, 266 n.37, 268 n.64
- Cleve, F., 13, 33 n.47, 34 n.59
- Closedness, 159–68, 222 n.111. *See also* Verschlossenheit
- Concealment, 39 n.139, 43, 66, 105, 110, 111 n.6, 116, 123, 141, 142, 157, 183, 190, 192, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 201, 202, 207, 211, 214 n.1, 217 n.24, 224 n.130, 228 n.196, 234 n.279, 235 n.289, 236 n.299, 239, 247 n.18, 253. *See also* Verbergung
- Couturier, F., 111 n.9
- Danger, 115, 120–24, 129, 223 n.119, 239–44, 253, 254, 256, 257
- Dasein, 31 n.29, 35 n.79, 37 n.110, 79, 80, 157–98, 217 n.42
- Δεινόν, 17–21, 37 n.102
- Demske, James, 221 n.98, 223 n.118
- Descartes, René, 59–69, 71 n.20, 73 n.37, 73 n.44, 74 n.48, 74 n.50, 75 n.51, 77, 102, 104, 111 n.12, 215 n.6
- De Waelhens, A., 126 n.12
- Differenz, 15
- Δίκη, 3, 16, 17–20
- Εἶδος, 26, 27, 40 n.148, 47, 51, 55 n.19, 56 n.25, 58 n.43, 133, 134, 135, 220 n.72
- Eigentlichkeit, 92 n.23. *See also* Authenticity
- Ek-sistence, 188, 189, 194
- Ἐνέργεια, 9, 59–61, 70 n.8, 215 n.6
- Enteignung, 264 n.17. *See also* Expropriation
- Entschlossenheit, 79–80. *See also* Resolute openness
- Entsprechen, 34 n.66, 40 n.153, 151 n.43, 210, 241
- Entzug, 108, 205, 215 n.5. *See also* Being as withdrawing
- Ereignis, 9, 30 n.21, 34 n.65, 35 n.80, 112 n.24, 121, 143, 189, 194, 214, 227 n.183, 242, 243, 247 n.18, 249–63, 263 n.1, 263 n.8, 265 n.20, 267 n.49, 268 n.62, 269 n.67; as third element, 258–63
- Erhaltung, 80, 83, 91 n.22, 93 n.39, 96 n.72, 113 n.33, 137. *See also* Maintenance
- Errancy, 183, 197–98
- Erschlossenheit, 158, 159, 187, 216 n.11. *See also* Openness
- Essence, 52, 147 n.4, 225 n.156, 244–45, 248 n.28
- Essentia, 44, 45, 51, 52, 54 n.4, 147 n.8, 247 n.26
- Eternal return of the same, 78, 80, 84, 86–89, 94 n.56, 204
- Existence, 94 n.55, 163, 166, 167, 177, 180
- Expropriation, 143, 251, 252, 264 n.17, 264 n.18. *See also* Enteignung
- Facticity, 94 n.55, 160, 161, 163, 164, 167, 171, 180, 181
- Fallenness, 160, 161, 166–68, 216 n.23
- Feuerbach, Ludwig, 92 n.29
- Fink, Eugen, 38 n.130
- Fürstenau, Peter, 125 n.11
- Gadamer, H.G., 38 n.129, 70 n.6, 230 n.230
- Gefähr, 31 n.32. *See also* Danger gegen, 17, 18, 36 n.87, 265 n.32
- Geschick, 9, 157–214. *See also* Being as self-sending
- Gestell, 9, 36 n.93, 75 n.58, 90 n.2, 101–2, 110 n.4, 111 n.8, 117, 122, 126 n.11, 145–46, 148 n.11, 151 n.43, 151 n.48, 152 n.51, 153 n.63, 157, 228 n.200, 230 n.231, 239–46, 253, 254, 255, 256, 258, 266 n.44, 266 n.47
- Geviert, 90 n.90, 122, 142, 228 n.200, 253, 255
- Gewähren, 147 n.4, 235 n.288, 236 n.307, 244–45, 248 n.33, 255. *See also* Being as according itself
- Gewesenes, 197, 208, 213, 215 n.5, 236 n.307, 237 n.310, 253, 254, 255, 257
- Gilson, E., 73 n.44
- Gouhier, Henri, 73 n.37
- Groundless ground, 121, 122, 258, 260, 267 n.49. *See also* Abgrund
- Guthrie, W.K.C., 29 n.11, 33 n.47
- Having-seen, 21, 24, 40 n.145, 124
- Hegel, G.W.F., 71 n.20, 149 n.20, 218 n.52, 233 n.257
- Heidel, W.A., 29 n.11
- Heraclitus, 10–17, 31 n.31, 34 n.63
- Herausforderung, 111 n.7, 115, 136–41. *See also* Challenging
- Hermeneutical, 222 n.107, 223 n.119, 265 n.24
- Herstellen, IX, 50, 66, 94 n.50, 110 n.4, 111 n.7, 115, 118, 119, 123, 124 n.2, 126 n.15, 137, 139, 241
- Hervorbringen, 6. *See also* Ποίησις
- Hirsch, Walter, 53 n.2
- Hofstadter, Albert, 125 n.11, 232 n.243
- Howey, R.L., 95 n.70
- Husserl, Edmund, 215 n.8, 217 n.29
- ὑποκείμενον, 60, 63, 72 n.26, 72 n.27, 72 n.29, 103, 112 n.15

- Ἰδέα*, IX, 7, 9, 16, 22, 30 n.23, 38 n.121, 40 n.148, 40 n.152, 43–53, 54 n.4, 55 n.19, 56 n.29, 57 n.32, 57 n.34, 57 n.36, 57 n.40, 58 n.46, 59, 65, 70 n.8, 77, 94 n.49, 99, 148 n.14, 157, 200, 213, 215 n.6, 220 n.72, 242, 247 n.26, 253
- Ἰδέιν*, IX, 14, 22, 40 n.145, 43–53, 55 n.18, 56 n.29, 73 n.42, 135, 200
- Idea of Being in general, 158, 159, 216 n.17
- Idea of existence, 158
- Inauthenticity, 162, 164, 178
- Increase, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 93 n.39, 107. *See also* Steigerung
- Insistenz, 185, 187, 195, 197
- Intentionality, 186, 226 n.171, 231 n.235
- Interpretation, 165, 201
- Jaeger, Werner, 29 n.11, 32 n.45
- Jünger, E., 111 n.11, 113 n.29
- Jünger, F., 109, 111 n.11, 113 n.29, 114 n.39
- Kaelin, E.F., 232 n.245
- Kehre, *diese*, 251, 256
- Kirk, G.S., 32 n.38, 32 n.45
- Kockelmans, J.J., 214 n.4
- Krell, D.F., 110 n.4, 225 n.151
- Kube, Jörg, 37 n.100
- Laffoucrière, Odette, 72 n.29
- Language, 32 n.40, 32 n.41, 165–66, 177, 219 n.64, 221 n.86
- Ἀέγειν*, IX, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17, 18, 33 n.54, 35 n.83, 41 n.158, 48, 67, 69, 74 n.46, 135, 148 n.14
- Leibniz, 111 n.12, 116
- Letting-be, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196
- Lichtung, 198, 199, 204, 231 n.234. *See also* Being as self-illuminating, Being as illumination, Being as clearing
- Ἄλογος*, 3, 9–17, 31 n.38, 33 n.58, 43, 56 n.28, 214 n.2, 220 n.72
- Lovitt, William, 147 n.2, 149 n.31, 150 n.33, 265 n.32
- Machenschaft, 38 n.132, 101–2, 104, 105, 108, 111 n.8
- Magnus, B., 95 n.59, 95 n.71
- Maintenance, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 93 n.39, 93 n.45, 107. *See also* Erhaltung
- Marcel, Gabriel, 34 n.66, 218 n.52, 246 n.1
- Marcuse, Henri, 56 n.28
- Marx, Karl, 92 n.29
- Marx, Werner, 30 n.16
- Mehta, J.L., 234 n.248
- Metaphysics, IX, 5, 6, 7, 43, 46, 55 n.18, 56 n.27, 62, 63, 71 n.21, 74 n.50, 77, 78, 89, 90 n.1, 90 n.2, 99, 102, 103, 116, 122, 130, 141, 142, 143, 144, 147 n.7, 196, 205, 206, 208, 209, 233 n.272, 235 n.289, 251, 252, 256, 258, 263, 264 n.11
- Minar, Edwin, 31 n.38
- Modification, 80, 113 n.28, 164, 167, 177, 178, 179, 181, 218 n.51
- Moser, Simon, 114 n.39
- Nicholson, G., 219 n.63
- Nichts, das, 23, 39 n.139, 192, 198, 201. *See also* Nothing
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 33 n.49, 63, 77–89, 102, 104, 106, 111 n.12, 171, 177, 204–5, 222 n.103, 247 n.21
- Nihilism, 143, 157, 204–9
- Νοεῖν*, IX, 3, 6, 14, 15, 17, 41 n.158, 46, 47, 48, 67, 130, 148 n.14, 241, 262, 268 n.55
- Nothing, 142, 195, 228 n.192. *See also* das Nichts
- Nullity, 178–82
- Ontical, 178, 217 n.33, 223 n.125
- Ontological, 177–78, 217 n.33
- Ontological difference, 212
- Opening, 187–94, 199
- Openness, 159–68; priority of, 173–74, 222 n.111. *See also* Erschlossenheit
- Ordering, 136–41, 145, 149–50 n.31, 239, 240, 242, 246 n.5, 255, 262. *See also* Bestellen
- Ὀυ̅σια*, 9, 31 n.34, 54 n.7, 60, 64, 133, 215 n.6
- Parmenides, 3, 13–16, 34 n.63, 259
- Φύσις*, IX, 3, 4–10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 21, 26, 28 n.2, 28 n.3, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 54 n.4, 56 n.29, 61, 63, 65, 69, 71 n.9, 72 n.31, 77, 95 n.58, 99, 101, 111 n.8, 157, 213, 248 n.32
- comprehensive character of, 4
- as keeping to itself, 9
- as lingering, 9, 71 n.10
- as returning to itself, 9
- as self-concealing, 9
- as self-emerging, 5, 29 n.12, 103
- as self-unconcealing, 7
- Plato, 43–53, 55 n.21, 77, 148 n.14, 268 n.55
- Pöggeler, Otto, 138, 225 n.144, 230 n.231
- Ποιησις*, 6, 242

- Presence, 45, 47, 48, 54 n.7, 60, 64, 208, 242, 256. *See also* Anwesenheit
- Presencing, 47, 60, 214. *See also* Anwesen
- Reality, 59–62, 70 n.2, 70 n.4, 126 n.17
- Recover, recovery, X, 105, 106, 121, 122, 123, 132, 208, 211, 235 n.289, 251, 258, 262, 268 n.55. *See also* Verwindung
- Rede, 33 n.58, 165–66, 178, 179, 182, 219 n.60, 219 n.63; as distinct from language, 165–66, 220 n.69, 220 n.72, 220 n.74, 220 n.75
- Reinhardt, Karl, 32 n.45
- Representedness, 44, 48, 57 n.32, 69
- Representing, 44, 49, 118, 136, 184. *See also* Vorstellen
- Reserve, 87, 137, 138, 139, 255, 257. *See also* Bestand
- Resolute openness, 79–80, 91 n.17, 168, 182, 218 n.43, 225 n.153. *See also* Entschlossenheit
- Richardson, W.J., 39 n.136
- Ricoeur, Paul, 219 n.64
- Romano, B., 265 n.29
- Rosales, A., 225 n.152
- Rosen, Stanley, 57 n.31
- Russell, B., 111 n.12
- Sage, 32 n.40, 32 n.41, 210, 214 n.2
- Sagen, 148 n.14, 210
- Sallis, John, 41 n.158, 54 n.16, 57 n.34, 73 n.39, 91 n.17, 216 n.18, 226 n.157, 226 n.159, 227 n.189, 229 n.217, 266 n.36
- Sameness, 14, 248 n.32
- Sartre, J.-P., 92 n.27, 218–19 n.57
- Saving, 123, 198, 239–44, 253
- Schrag, Calvin, 231 n.233
- Schulz, Walter, 216 n.11
- Seeing, 46–50, 55 n.24, 66, 67, 85
- Seiendes als solches, 209, 210
- Seiendheit, 9, 31 n.34, 54 n.7, 90 n.3, 125 n.7, 210, 215 n.4, 215 n.6, 215 n.7, 236 n.300. *See also* Beingness
- Seinlassen, 187, 199, 201. *See also* Letting-be
- Sinn, Dieter, 230 n.231
- Sophocles, 3, 16
- Sprache, 214 n.2. *See also* Language
- Stassen, M., 219 n.60
- Steigerung, 39 n.133, 80, 83, 90 n.7, 91 n.22, 92 n.33, 93 n.39, 93 n.45, 96 n.72, 111 n.12, 113 n.33, 137, 177. *See also* Increase
- Step backward, 121, 258
- Subject, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 72 n.31, 77, 103
- Subjectivity, 5, 9, 21, 30 n.14, 57 n.32, 81, 82, 89, 91 n.13, 92 n.29, 106, 107, 113, 256
- Taminiaux, J., 215 n.8
- Taux, Henri, 36 n.100
- Tέχνη, IX, 3–4, 6, 16–27, 28 n.2, 35 n.85, 36 n.87, 37 n.102, 38 n.119, 38 n.130, 39 n.134, 39 n.136, 39 n.137, 39 n.140, 40 n.145, 48, 50, 61, 73 n.41, 85, 94 n.49, 127 n.41, 131, 136, 148 n.14, 149 n.29, 158, 159, 202, 216 n.12, 246 n.12
- Technology, IX, X, 47, 59, 63, 67, 71 n.10, 89, 93 n.45, 99, 101–10, 115–24, 129–46, 157, 192, 203, 228 n.199, 228 n.207, 239–46, 249, 253
origin of, 3, 27
essence of, 27, 28 n.2, 53 n.1, 120, 122, 129, 130, 203, 212, 261
- Time, 159; of being 213–14
- Truth, 105, 144, 159–214. *See also* Being as self-sending
- Tugendhat, Ernst, 35 n.77, 158, 216 n.11, 216 n.16, 217 n.31, 228 n.208
- Turn, 115, 120–24, 129; turn, *this*, 115, 122, 123, 198, 229 n.228, 248 n.28, 255. *See also* Kehre, *diese*
- Unconcealment, 64, 117, 138, 139, 140, 141, 191, 201, 228 n.196, 231 n.234, 236 n.229, 240, 263, 264 n.16
of being, 90, 141–45, 146, 152 n.54, 198, 207, 217 n.24, 230 n.232, 231 n.239, 267 n.49
of beings, 7, 23, 39 n.139, 93 n.45, 127 n.35, 141–45, 146, 153 n.63, 192, 199, 200, 207, 228 n.207, 230 n.232, 231 n.239, 241, 242
- Understanding, 163–65, 166, 201, 219 n.60. *See also* Verstehen
- Universality, 133–34, 149 n.18, 149 n.20
- Ver- as prefix, 19, 35 n.80, 135
- Verbergung, 30 n.20. *See also* Being as self-concealing
- Vernehmen, 14, 73 n.42, 74 n.48. *See also* Apprehending
- Versetzen, 16, 35 n.80, 188, 227 n.181, 231 n.236
- Verstehen, 163. *See also* Understanding
- Verwindung, 113 n.28, 212, 224 n.130, 263 n.8. *See also* Recovery
- Von Herrmann, F., 70 n.3, 215 n.11, 222 n.99
- Vorstellen, 5, 9, 39 n.137, 43, 46, 48, 55 n.18, 65, 66, 67, 68, 73 n.40, 73 n.42, 74

- n.46, 74 n.50, 75 n.52, 81, 92 n.25, 109,
115, 118, 119, 126 n.16, 137, 196, 206,
226 n.157, 241, 250. *See also*
Representing
Vycinas, V., 230 n.231
- Will, 116, 117, 120, 121, 125 n.7
- Will to power, 39 n.133, 40 n.140, 57 n.32,
78, 79–87, 99, 107, 109, 113 n.34, 126
n.20, 137, 150 n.35, 204
Wille zum Willen, 126 n.20
Wiplinger, F., 224 n.144
- Zimmerman, M., 56 n.28, 110 n.4, 147 n.5

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